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iPreface
In the usage of present-day statistics ‘statistical inference’ is a profoundly ambiguous ex-
pression. In some literature a statistical inference is a ‘decision made under risk’, in other 
literature it is ‘a conclusion drawn from given data’, and most of the literature displays no 
awareness that the two meanings might be different. This book concerns the problem of 
drawing conclusions from given data, in which respect we have to ask: Does there exist a 
need for the term ‘statistical inference’? If so, does there also exist a corresponding need 
for every other science? If so, how does, for example, agronomy then manage to reason 
in terms of botanical inference, soil scientific inference, meteorological inference, bio-
chemical inference, molecular biological inference, entomological inference, plant patho-
logical inference, etc. without incoherence or self-contradiction? Consider the possibility 
that agronomy does not reason in terms of such a motley of special kinds of inference. 
Consider the possibility that, apart from subject matter, botany, soil science, entomology, 
etc. all employ the same kind of reasoning. If so, must we then believe that statistics, alone 
among all the sciences, is the only one that requires its own special kind of inference? 
Starting with Thomas Bayes (1763) the statistical profession has by and large believed that 
statistics requires a kind of inference of its very own. However, the belief does not rest on 
clear agreement as to what precisely the term ‘inference’ is supposed to mean, and so it has 
brought about confusion of which it can only be said: There is none so great as a learned 
one. There are no fewer than four different schools of thought identifiable as advocates of 
frequentist inference, Bayesian inference, likelihood inference and fiducial inference, re-
spectively. Even amongst these there are further disagreements. All Bayesians for instance 
proceed from so-called prior probabilities, but are unable to agree as to whether such 
probabilities are ‘logically’ determined (Jeffreys 1961) or ‘subjectively arrived at’ (Savage 
1954, 1962; Lindley 1965). Again, Fraser (1968) advocates structural inference, but does 
not make it clear whether or how that might differ from fiducial inference. And yet again, 
some frequentists embrace randomised hypothesis tests, whilst such tests are anathema 
to other frequentists. Then there are statisticians who refuse to admit to the existence of 
any such confusion. Along these lines a silly campaign has even urged us to be proud that 
statistics, unlike other sciences, ‘is not so simple a subject as to admit only one correct 
answer to any given question’. Clearly then, some two and a half centuries of debate and 
development has failed to produce consensus. So it is entirely reasonable to ask of the dif-
ferent schools of thought that instead of dwelling on the disagreements that divide them, 
they seriously consider whether in fact they might not be united in mutual error.
The present book proceeds from the premise that despite the vast variety of its subject 
matter all science is based on the same fundamental principles of reasoning. Statistics dif-
fers from the rest only in its subject matter, and so must learn from other, much older sci-
ences, how to reason. We must go back to the very outset and carefully, step by step, learn 
from our customers in the substantive sciences how to proceed. In order to do that, we 
have to understand that it is the principles of scientific reasoning, rather than mathemati-
cal reasoning, that we must grasp. We must be extremely careful not to foist some pecu-
liarly statistical ideas upon the discourse of substantive science. In other words, whatever 
ideas we try to develop must manifestly originate from all the other sciences together. That 
is the only way in which we can hope to clear up the confusion into which we have fallen. 
Clearly, that will require a discourse that spans the interface between statistics and sub-
stantive science. We need to involve, not only statisticians, but also our customers in the 
substantive sciences, as statistics can serve no purpose other than to be of service to sub-
stantive science. Ultimately then, it is our customers who must judge our contribution. 
With that in mind, the present book tries to involve a wide audience, and so, unavoidably, 
might then to a statistician seem pedestrian in its attempts to explain statistical matters, 
and might then to a substantive scientist seem pedestrian in its attempts to explain sub-
stantive matters. In this we can but beg the reader’s indulgence.
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1Chapter 1
COMMENCEMENT TESTS
PoPulations being brought into the huMan Mind
1.1 Introduction
This chapter concerns the situation where we take first steps toward trying to make sta-
tistical sense, so to speak, of a given set of raw data. The data will ge nerally be one of two 
different types. One type takes the form of a sequence of results, where we would then 
want to establish whether or not the sequence could be represented as the outcome of a 
specific class of stochastic processes. Suppose for instance that the following sequence 
is a record of apparent success (S) or failure (F) in nine consecutive responses by a par-
ticular animal in a learning trial:
F, F, F, S, F, S, F, S, S. (1.1.1)
We might ask whether the sequence involves a trend or, alternatively, whether it could 
more simply be represented as a random sample from a specific class of populations. 
A second type of data has no sequential structure, where we might then more directly 
ask whether the data could be represented as a random sample from a specific class of 
populations. Consider for instance the data in Table 1.1.1, giving, for each of two groups 
of fruit trees, the measured half-life of their fruit. In this case we might ask whether 
or not each group of measurements could be repre sented as a random sample from a 
normal population.
Table 1.1.1:  Half-life, in days, of the fruit of ten trees in a completely randomised design, com-
prising five replications each of a carbaryl treatment and control
Trees treated with carbaryl Untreated controls
11.9   12.8   13.1   13.1   14.4 8.8   10.8   11.1   11.2   11.4
In trying to deal with these pro blems we almost always begin by plotting the data in 
such a way that a proposed representation can be visually judged for its tenability. For 
instance, when the data given at (1.1.1) are plotted as in Figure 1.1.1 overleaf, a slight 
trend toward an increased frequency of success is made visually apparent. Similarly, 
each group of half-life measurements might be ordered from smallest to largest and 
then plotted against the expected values of the corresponding standard normal order 
statistics (Figure 1.1.2). The human body is thereby enabled to visually grasp and to 
analytically judge the tenability of the proposed model. We may ask, for instance, as a 
matter of visual judgement of the data plots in Figure 1.1.2:
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Figure 1.1.1: Success (1) or failure (0) in 9 consecutive attempts in a learning trial
 
Figure 1.1.2: Order-statistical plot of the half-lives, in days minus 8, of the fruit of 10 trees
Can each plot be represented as a sample of points scattered around a straight line?
If so, can the plots be represented as scattered around two parallel lines?
This example shows how physical experience and mathematical reasoning interplay to 
produce a refinement of primitive method. Here primitive method might try to judge 
the ‘shapes’ of the two distributions of half-lives by way of two histograms; but on second 
thoughts we realise that for so small a data set we need to refine the primitive method.
Clearly then, statistical data analysis concerns the development of statistical mo dels 
for the representation of certain kinds of data, and very early on data analysts began to 
experience a need for refined methods to test the adequacy of such models (Arbuthnott, 
1710). However, the systematic development of such tests only began in the 20th century. 
Significance tests originated in the test for isotropic directions of Raleigh (1880), the χ² 
test of Pearson (1900) and the t test of Student (1908). During the next 20 years R. A. 
Fisher developed many significance tests. Subsequently Neyman and Pearson (1933) 
introduced hypothesis tests. Despite sharing much mathematical common ground, the 
1 2 3 54 6 7 8 9
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1
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Commencement tests
3
two kinds of tests seek to implement fundamentally different ideas, where the difference 
has not at all been widely understood. Lehmann (1986) has given an excellent account of 
the formal mathematics of hypothesis tests. Kempthorne and Folks (1971) have given a 
definitive account of significance tests and how they differ from hypothesis tests.
This chapter takes the first steps toward the development of a new kind of test. The reader 
will find the development drawing on ideas that originate in Fisher (1970), first pu blished in 
1925. The reader should, however, be wary of taking the development to be a re-invention of 
significance tests, because as subsequent chapters will show, the new tests differ profoundly 
from significance tests, so much so that the reader will ultimately be compelled to take a 
stance on a devastating outcome. It will nevertheless be found that significance tests and 
co-ordination tests, as we will name the new kind of tests, share so much common ground 
that an economy of presentation is achieved by drawing on existing literature. To that end 
we draw primarily on Kempthorne and Folks (1971) and Cox and Hinkley (1974).
We will present a variety of examples to motivate the introduction of certain definitions 
and theorems. We will in fact risk a redundancy of such examples, as the introduction of 
unfamiliar ideas might well require some repetitiveness for their clarification.
As stated above, in this chapter we will be dealing with the very first steps required for the 
statistical modelling of given data. The further development, and the uses and usefulness 
of such models, are discussed in subsequent chapters. However, before proceeding to the 
development of any ideas about statistical data analysis, we must first examine the nature 
of the scientific discourse that statistical data analysis is supposed to serve, otherwise we 
risk trying to foist inappropriate statistical inventions onto the discourse of substantive 
science. This must be firmly grasped, as the development of modern statistics largely took 
place in the 20th century, long after the substantive sciences that it wishes to serve were 
already well developed. The point here is that long before the advent of modern statistics, 
individuals such as Kepler, Galileo, Newton, Mendel and many others, had already de-
veloped a huge body of scientific knowledge. Moreover, a great deal of their work rested 
on analyses of just the kind of data that we now look upon as requiring the expertise of 
mathematical statistics. So rather than try to tell our customers from the substantive sci-
ences about the principles of scientific data analysis, we should accept that they developed 
those principles in the first place. That is not to say that we should not try to develop their 
methods for application to the statistical case, but only that we must try to understand 
those methods before trying to develop them further. In the next few sections we there-
fore begin by briefly examining the nature of science, and how the concept of establishing 
scientific facts must bear upon our development.
1.2 The discourse of science
Science, like any other cultural product, requires an understanding of language, and the 
present development will require an especially clear understanding of a distinction that 
separates two different kinds of words, as follows:
Suppose we wish to compile a dictionary of the English language. It might seem at first 
that we must collect all the words in English, list them in lexicographical order, and then 
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adjoin to each word a definition of its meaning. On second thoughts, however, that cannot 
be, as the definitions would be circular; this word would be defined in terms of that word, 
and that word would be defined in terms of this word. Lexicographers are familiar with 
this problem. They deal with it by in effect drawing up, not one, but two lists of words; one 
list comprises definable words and the other list comprises ultimate words.
Ultimate words are not definable since they deal with the first-order experiences of life; 
the meanings of such words are demonstrable only. ‘Red’, for instance, is such a word; its 
meaning can be demonstrated to a normally sighted person by pointing out this, that 
and the other red object. However, a person who has always been blind is physically 
(bodily) incapable of grasping such a demonstration, where such physical incapacity 
cannot be circumvented by definitions; a person who has always been blind simply can-
not grasp the physical (bodily) meaning of ‘red’.
Having drawn up the two lists of words, the lexicographer must next consider how to ex-
plicate the ultimate words. As the dictionary can hardly provide its user with appropriate 
first-order experiences for the explication of ultimate words, it has to rely on experiences 
the user has already had. In the case of ‘red’, for instance, the standard solution is to have 
the dictionary declare ‘red is the colour of blood’, where that is not a definition, it is an 
evocation of a first-order experience of life. The dictionary relies on a childhood memory, 
in which a finger points and a voice says: ‘This is blood. See, it is red’.
The word ‘red’ is an ultimate of physical science, as physical science is the discourse that 
concerns the world as experienced by the human body. When used in this sense, the term 
‘physical science’ embraces basic sciences, such as physics, chemistry and biology, as well 
as applied sciences, such as agriculture, engineering and medicine. Many people would 
hold that the qualification ‘physical’ as used here is redundant, since they maintain that 
what we call ‘physical science’ is simply science. Others might disagree because they might 
want to distinguish physical science from, for instance, what they call ‘normative science’. 
Such disagreements need not concern us here. We need not establish the valid usage of 
the word ‘science’. We need only make it clear that unless explicitly stated otherwise, we 
are concerned with science in the sense of the discourse of physical experience (bodily 
experience), much of which concerns the development of two complementary, but fun-
damentally different questions formulated in Definitions 1.2.1 and 1.2.2.
Definition 1.2.1:
‘How might these bodily experiences have come about?’ is the definitive question of scientific investiga-
tion. In science it proclaims the discourse of the pursuit of knowledge.
Definition 1.2.2:
‘How might such bodily experiences be brought about?’ is the definitive question of scientific technology. 
In science it proclaims the discourse of the use of knowledge.
This chapter concerns the pursuit of knowledge, rather than the use of knowledge. The 
bodily experiences then to be explained are usually referred to as ‘data’. Hence, the de-
finitive question of investigative science can be put into the form ‘How might these data 
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be explained?’ We note in passing that the discourse of scientific technology sometimes 
involves ‘data’ in the different sense of bodily experiences to be responded to.
1.3 Establishing scientific facts
Scientific facts are those that can compel agreement by appealing to the experiences of 
the human body. Oenology, for instance, uses a variety of special terms to identify cer-
tain tastes, odours and colours that might characterise a wine. Most people can learn to 
detect those characteristics. For example, wines made from Pinot Gris vines grown in the 
Western Cape of South Africa were found to occasionally have a paraffin-like taste that 
is undesirable and that a panel of tasters were trained to detect. These tasters were then 
used by way of ‘blind’ tasting to establish whether or not, and to what degree, certain ex-
perimental wines had the paraffin-like taste. This example shows how science establishes 
physical facts, that is to say, facts that the human body can be compelled to grasp, as when 
the oenologist, if challenged, can say ‘Taste these for yourself’.
Again, recall Galileo’s law on the acceleration of falling bodies. Consider dropping two iron 
balls – one large, one small. To the human mind it might seem ‘logical’ that the heavier 
ball would accelerate faster than the lighter one. So Galileo had to trick his opponents into 
watching him drop two such balls from the leaning tower of Pisa. He had to circumvent 
their ‘logic’ in order to compel their bodies to physically grasp the contrary.
Once again: consider the drafts required to draw ploughs at speeds commonly attained 
by tractors. To the human mind it might seem ‘logical’ that the regression of draft, Y, 
on speed, X, should include the origin, as there would seem to be no draft when the 
plough is stationary. However, a plot of recorded (X, Y) data pairs will compel the hu-
man body to grasp that ‘inertia must be overcome’ before the plough will move (Figure 
1.3.1 overleaf).
The issue is crucial: the ultimate facts of science are those that can compel agreement by 
appeal to the human body as the ultimate arbitrator of science. Anyone who would try 
to make ‘logic’ circumvent such an appeal is either being obstinate or silly.
The epistemology of statistical science
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Figure 1.3.1: Draft (pounds times 0.01) and speed (miles per hour) of plows drawn by tractors 
(Source: Snedecor 1956, p. 142) 
It should be obvious from the foregoing discussion that we find it convenient to use the 
expression ‘physical experience’ ambiguously; sometimes we refer to an actual experi-
ence, and sometimes we refer to a representation (a record) of that experience. This is 
not important as long as it is perceived and understood.
1.4 The ultimate words of statistics
A spoon sent spinning into the air can land with its bowl facing either up (u) or down (d). 
The following sequence of outcomes was obtained from just 35 spins of a spoon:
duddu uuudu uudud uduuu uuuud uuudd uuudu.
By plotting the relative frequencies of the two different outcomes against the number of 
spins as in Figure 1.4.1, we can compel the human body to grasp the concept called long-
run frequency (theoretical frequency). It is an ultimate concept of science – of genetics, 
of statistical mechanics and of mathe matical statistics. It is in fact one member of an 
inseparable pair of ultimate concepts, the other being the one called sampling, as physi-
cally demonstrable by spinning a spoon, rolling a die, flipping a coin, or shuffling cards.
We note in passing that it is not uncommon for ultimate concepts of science to occur 
in inseparable pairs. Euclid’s geometry, for instance, is a theory of physical space where 
perpendicular and parallel amount to such a pair. One of the members of such a pair is 
often operational and the other one is perceptual. The simplest forms of these are found 
in looking to see, licking to taste, and listening to hear.
Commencement tests
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Figure 1.4.1: Frequency of outcome ‘bowl down’ when spinning a spoon
We also note that probability cannot be defined as long-run frequency; the latter is not de-
finable, it is demonstrable only. Mathematical probability is used to describe the physical 
experiences we associate with long-run frequency, but can also be used to describe other 
experiences. Thus, for instance, of a cocktail made of equal proportions of vermouth, gin 
and lemon juice, it can be said, correctly, and in terms of standard notation:
Pr(gin) =     , and Pr(ginalcoholic beverage) =     .
Mathematical probability is really just the mathematics of proportional constituency. 
However, unless stated otherwise, we use the term ‘probability’ to mean ‘theoretical 
frequency’ only.
1.5 Mathematical forms and physical meanings
This book will ask statisticians to revise deeply entrenched ways of thinking. We urge 
the reader to constantly bear the following fact in mind:
The same mathematical forms can be used to convey different physical mean ings; 
physical meanings therefore cannot be derived from mathe matical forms as such.
This fact is exemplified in Table 1.5.1 by a finite geometry developed by Miss Evelyn 
Rosenthal in a book for the parents of school children (Rosenthal, 1965, p. 204). In order 
to prove that the axioms of such a geometry as such is a consistent set, we must find 
at least one model that provides a physical (bodily) proof that they work, because, as 
explained by Miss Rosenthal, it is impossible to provide a mathematical proof of such 
1
0.8
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0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Numbert of spins
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consistency. For the present geometry she develops, not one, but two, quite different 
physical proofs by way of the two different diagrams in Figures 1.5.1(a) and (b). She says, 
‘If you check the three axioms and the theorem in each diagram you will find that they 
work’. Hence, by pointing at just one of the two diagrams, she compels the human body 
to grasp that the formal mathematics of the present example can be made to convey a 
system of physical meanings. Next, by pointing at the other diagram, she compels the 
human body to grasp that the selfsame formal mathematics can be made to convey 
another, very different, system of physical meanings. She thus proves inter alia that the 
mathematical forms per se are devoid of those meanings.
Table 1.5.1: A logic to which different scientific meanings can be adjoined
Undefined terms: 
rudd; vory. ‘A rudd joins two vories’ means the same as ‘Two vories are on a rudd’.
Axioms: 
(1) There are exactly four rudds on each vory. 
(2) There are exactly two vories on each rudd. 
(3) Every vory is joined to every other vory by exactly two rudds.
Among the theorems that can be deduced is:
Theorem: 
There are exactly six rudds and three vories.
Figure 1.5.1(a): In this figure, rudds are 
 points and vories are lines
Figure 1.5.1(b): In this figure, vories are 
 points and rudds are lines
vory
rudd
rudd
vory
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The distinctions between significance tests, hypothesis tests and co-ordination tests 
are very much like the distinctions between Miss Rosenthal’s finite geometries, in that 
the selfsame mathematical forms will ultimately turn out to be conveying very different 
physical meanings. Unfortunately, much of the present book has to be read before the 
different meanings will have been fully developed. Nevertheless, it will here serve our 
immediate purposes to take a first step in that direction by way of considering the fol-
lowing version of the so-called mixed sampling problem:
Suppose that an unknown value, μ, can be measured precisely by Instrument A and can 
be measured imprecisely by Instrument B, as follows: a measurement made by A can be 
represented as a realisation of X whose distribution is given by
Pr(X = μ) = 1.
A measurement made by B can be represented as a realisation of Y whose distribution 
is given by
Pr(Y = μ+ ε) =     for ε = -2, -1, 0, +1, +2.
If we flip a balanced coin to pick an instrument to make a measurement, the result can 
be represented as a realisation of Z whose distribution is given by 
Pr(Z = μ+δ) =      for δ = 0, and Pr(Z = μ+δ) =      for δ = -2, -1, +1, +2.
The precision of the various measurements is described by 
Variance (X) = 0. Variance (Y) = 2. Variance (Z) = 1.
We now ask the following questions:
If a measurement from A was obtained by flipping the coin, must it be represented as 
a sample from the population whose variance equals 0, or must it be represented as a 
sample from the population whose variance equals 1? (1.5.1)
If a measurement from B was obtained by flipping the coin, must it be represented as 
a sample from the population whose variance equals 2, or must it be represented as a 
sample from the population whose variance equals 1? (1.5.2)
We will, by way of developments in subsequent chapters, prove beyond reasonable con-
test that these two questions, as put forward here, cannot be answered. We will achieve 
that by showing that in a certain substantive context, the correct answers are variance = 0 
and variance = 2, respectively, and in another substantive context the correct answers are 
variance = 1 and variance = 1, respectively. Hence, just as Miss Rosenthal’s mathemati-
cal forms are scientifically vacuous when considered without substantive context to show 
how they are intended to address those bodily experiences (geometrical experiences) re-
ferred to in terms of the concept ‘the space we live in’. So also, a formal presentation of the 
mixed sampling problem is scientifically vacuous when considered without substantive 
context to show how it is intended to address those bodily experiences (statistical experi-
ences) referred to in terms of the concepts ‘sampling’ and ‘long-run frequency’.
1 
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In view of the foregoing, the reader must be very careful to avoid reading into our mathe-
matical formalities physical meanings that are not explicitly indicated, and must firmly 
grasp the physical meanings that will be explicitly indicated. In order to help the reader in 
this matter, we will from time to time underscore what is meant and what is not meant.
1.6 A few basic statistical ideas
A sample space is a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive descriptions in terms of 
which we choose to describe the outcome of a conceptual trail. Consider the outcome of 
twice spinning a spoon. Using the notation of Section 1.4, and the ordering
(outcome of 1st spin, outcome of 2nd spin),
let us choose the sample space to be {(u, u), (u, d), (d, u), (d, d)}. Let the pair of outcomes 
be modelled as statistically independent, and let μ denote the probability of ‘bowl up’ 
(0 < μ < 1). Then we obtain a class of models whose members are indexed by different 
values of μ (Table 1.6.1).
Table 1.6.1: A class of models whose members are indexed by μ for 0 < μ < 1
(x1, x2) (u, u) (u, d) (d, u) (d, d)
Pr[(X1, X2) = (x1, x2)] μ² μ(1-μ) (1-μ)μ (1-μ)²
Consider any member of the class of models given in Table 1.6.1, for instance the mem-
ber indexed by μ = 0.3. Then we obtain a fully specified model (Table 1.6.2). We will refer 
to a fully specified model as a singleton.
Table 1.6.2: A fully specified model (i.e. a singleton)
(x1, x2) (u, u) (u, d) (d, u) (d, d)
Pr[(X1, X2) = (x1, x2)] 0.09 0.21 0.21 0.49
There are infinitely many ways in which any given singleton can be imbedded into a class 
of models. In Table 1.6.3, for instance, the usual singleton for the outcome of rolling an 
ordinary die has been imbedded into a class of models. For reasons to be explained in 
this chapter we often deliberately avoid such imbedding, in which case we will call the 
singleton involved an isolated singleton.
Table 1.6.3: A class of models for the outcome of one roll of a die (-1/5 < θ < +1/5)
x 1 2 3 4 5 6
Pr(X = x) (1-5θ)/6 (1-3θ)/6 (1-θ)/6 (1+θ)/6 (1+3θ)/6 (1+5θ)/6
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The number of times ‘bowl up’ arises when twice spinning a spoon, say X, is an observable 
random variable (X = 0, 1, 2). Here the term ‘observable’ distinguishes unobservable vari-
ables such as X-2μ for unobservable μ (0 < μ < 1), from observable variables such as X-2μ0 
for specified μ0. The terms ‘observable’ and ‘unobservable’ often refer to ‘calculable’ and ‘not 
calculable’, respectively. An observable random variable is called a statistic. A statistic arises 
from a partitioning of a sample space into mutually exclusive and exhaustive subsets that are 
differentially and observably labelled. In the present case, for instance, the subsets are
{(u, u)}, labelled ‘2’, {(u, d), (d, u)} labelled ‘1’, and {(d, d)} labelled ‘0’.
Often, as in the present case, the labels describe how the subsets are formed.
There is a primitive statistical idea that if a given event is rare under presumed circum-
stances, its occurrence can be held to be indicative of circumstances other than those pre-
sumed. However, the development of the idea needs careful consideration. For instance, 
with just 2n flips of a balanced coin, the probability of equal numbers of outcomes being 
‘heads’ and ‘tails’, equals 0.5 when n = 1, equals 0.375 when n = 2, equals 0.3125 when n = 3, 
and so on, eventually becoming exceedingly small. So the idea as it stands would have us 
consider, nonsensically, that 500 outcomes ‘heads’ and 500 outcomes ‘tails’ in just 1 000 
flips of a seemingly balanced coin, is indicative of the coin being unbalanced. In fact, it is 
not the absolute frequency of a given event, but its comparative frequency under alterna-
tive circumstances that can lend force to the idea, as will appear in the sequel.
1.7 Measuring the quality of fit of an isolated singleton
We are now ready to provide a heuristic introduction to co-ordination tests. We do so by 
way of two very simple examples, and we note from the outset that although the exam-
ples are simple, they represent problems that are of actual investigative interest.
Example 1.7.1
If each of seven beetles can be expected to settle into one of eight compartments, the 
animals can occupy the compartments in 87 different ways. For instance, the eight com-
partments might be occupied by 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, and 0 beetles, in some order. Such a 
pattern is denoted by 2[2]1[3]0[3] when b[c] denotes that there are just b beetles in each of 
just c different compartments. The 87 ways can be sorted into just 15 different occupancy 
patterns, as shown in Table 1.7.1 overleaf. From this table we learn for instance that the 
pattern 2[2]1[3]0[3] accounts for 705 600 of the 87 cases.
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Table 1.7.1: Possible occupancy patterns and the corresponding numbers of cases 
Pattern #(cases) Pattern #(cases) Pattern #(cases)
7[1]0[7] 8 4[1]2[1]1[1]0[5] 35 280 3[1]1[4]0[3] 235 200
6[1]1[1]0[6] 392 4[1]1[3]0[6] 58 800 2[3]1[1]0[4] 176 400
5[1]2[1]0[6] 1 176 3[1]2[2]0[5] 35 280 2[2]1[3]0[3] 705 600
5[1]1[2]0[5] 7 056 3[2]1[1]0[5] 23 520 2[1]1[5]0[2] 423 360
4[1]3[1]0[6] 1 960 3[1]2[1]1[2]0[4] 352 800 1[7]0[1] 40 320
In order to obtain such counts in general, we note that there are AB different ways in 
which B beetles can occupy A compartments, and if a{r} then denotes the number of 
compartments occupied by just r animals, the number of cases accounted for by the oc-
cupancy pattern
0[a{0}]1[a{1}]2[a{2}] …
can be expressed as 
                                   
A!B!
a{0}!a{1}!a{2}!••• × 0!a{0}1!a{1}2!a{2}…
 (1.7.1)
wherein of course 0!a{0}1!a{1} = 1 (Feller, 1970, Section II 5).
Now suppose that the 3[1]1[4]0[3] data pattern arises in an actual trial, and that the inves-
tigator wishes to test whether a model of random occupancy could account for how the 
given data came about. Then we need a scale of ‘resemblance’ to random occupancy, 
such that the resemblance for data whose pattern frequently occurs with random occu-
pancy will be greater than it is for data whose pattern rarely occurs with random occu-
pancy. Table 1.7.1 shows for instance that 2[2]1[3]0[3] describes 100 times more model cases 
than does 5[1]1[2]0[5]. So, the resemblance to random occupancy for data with the former 
pattern would seem to be greater than it is for data with the latter pattern. This principle 
produces an ordering of model cases ranging from ‘most like random occupancy’, O1, 
to ‘least like random occupancy’, O14, as in Table 1.7.2. Note that O8 is a union of two 
equally frequent patterns. Note also that all of the patterns that have constituents of 
the form b[c] for b ≥ 5 are gathered into O
T
-like categories such that T ≥ 10, that is to say, 
into categories which, according to the present ordering, are relatively unlike random 
occupancy. So, inasmuch as b[c] for b ≥ 5 denotes cases where unusually many animals 
are found in the same compartment, the adopted ordering tests our model of ‘random 
occupancy’ against alternatives that can be described as ‘aggregative occupancy’.
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Table 1.7.2: A partial ordering of possible sample patterns and the respective mo delled frequen-
cies of the resulting ordinal classes
Order Modelled frequency Order Modelled frequency
O1 = 2[2]1[3]0[3]  705 600/8-7 O8 = 4[1]2[1]1[1]0[5] ∪ 3[1]2[2]0[5]  2(35 280)/8-7
O2 = 2[1]1[5]0[2]  423 360/8-7 O9 = 3[2]1[1]0[5]  23 520/8-7
O3 = 3[1]2[1]1[2]0[4]  352 800/8-7 O10 = 5[1]1[2]0[5]  7 056/8-7
O4 = 3[1]1[4]0[3]  235 200/8-7 O11 = 4[1]3[1]0[6]  1 960/8-7
O5 = 2[3]1[1]0[4]  176 400/8-7 O12 = 5[1]2[1]0[6]  1 176/8-7
O6 = 4[1]1[3]0[4]  58 800/8-7 O13 = 6[1]1[1]0[6]  392/8-7
O7 = 1[7]0[1]  40 320/8-7 O14 = 7[1]0[7]  8/8-7
The resulting test is displayed by the bar diagram in Figure 1.7.1, where the areas of the 
bars differ in proportion to the different frequencies of the patterns they represent. The 
given datum is described by 3[1]1[4]0[3]. In terms of the given ordering, the shaded bar re-
presents model cases whose resemblance to random occupancy equals that of the given 
datum. The bars to the left of the shaded bar represent model cases whose resemblance 
to random occupancy is greater than that of the given datum. The bars to the right of 
the shaded bar represent model cases whose resemblance to random occupancy is lesser 
than that of the given datum.
Figure 1.7.1: Testing the quality-of-fit of a model of random occupancy
We digress briefly in order to introduce a general terminology. We will use the notation O
T
 
for T = 1, 2, 3, …, to denote an ordered array obtained by partitioning the possible sample 
patterns arising from a given singleton into mutually exclusive and exhaustive subsets and 
then arranging those subsets in a specific order. We call the resulting array an ordering 
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(or a partial ordering) of sample patterns, where the term ‘partial’ (when used) serves to 
remind us that some of the subsets may comprise more than just one pattern, as exempli-
fied by O8 in Table 1.7.2. We call the resulting statistic a test statistic, and we call its dis-
tribution the test distribution. Consider Figure 1.7.1. The bars to the left of the shaded bar 
account for 0.7 of the model cases; we call those cases the left statistical co-ordinate of the 
modelled datum. The bars to the right of the shaded bar account for 0.2 of the model cases; 
we call those cases the right statistical co-ordinate of the modelled datum. The shaded bar 
accounts for 0.1 of the model cases; we call those cases the statistical rounding. The given 
datum is model led as a member of the rounding. Thus the modelled datum is the mental 
correlate of the given datum. We will often draw no distinction between a statistical co-
ordinate and its measure. Thus, in the present case, we might refer to 0.7 and 0.2 as the left 
and right statistical co-ordinates of the modelled datum, respectively. Similarly we might 
refer to 0.1 as the rounding within which the datum is being modelled. When we report 
the co-ordinates of a modelled datum as a number pair, for instance (0.7, 0.2) as in the 
present case, the member on the left will be the left co-ordinate.
Now consider what can be learned from Figure 1.7.1 noting that, if needs be, the theo-
retical frequencies displayed in Figure 1.7.1 could be replaced by simulated frequencies. 
So the display clearly belongs to the discourse of physical evidence, in which we point 
at Figure 1.7.1, or at a simulated equivalent, and say ‘See for yourself how the members 
of the rounding, including the modelled datum, are situated snugly within the crowd’. 
The human body is thus compelled to grasp, as a physically demonstrable fact, that the 
statistical model under test, by the test performed, fits the given data well. Once this is 
understood, we can of course dispense with Figure 1.7.1 and instead report simply that 
for the model under test, and for the test performed, the co-ordinates of the modelled 
datum are given by (0.7, 0.2).
The reader should carefully note that we have reasoned in terms of a single instance of 
given occupancies in the real world and an infinite population of random occupancies 
in the human mind. Our reasoning did not envisage or depend upon the existence, or 
the future existence, of any population of occupancies in the real world. True, our rea-
soning was intended to inform opinion about occupancy behaviour in a certain sort of 
beetle, such as for instance the male beetle of species X. That, however, did not require 
the existence or the future existence of a population of occupancies in the real world. 
At the risk of belabouring this point we note that had the seven males in the beetle trial 
been the last survivors of their species, that would have had no effect on the validity of 
our reasoning, or upon its ability to inform entomological opinion.
The reader should also take care to note that the result of our co-ordination test is not a 
result of which the veracity is qualified by probability. The result of our test is a physic-
ally perceived fact, which, as such, is forced upon the human body and is thus beyond 
reasonable contest. We have used the method once used at Pisa by Galileo.
Example 1.7.2
We often require a given string of consecutive non-negative integers to be partitioned 
into two or more groups using a pseudo-random device. For example, let 1, 2, 4, 5 and 
3, 6, 7, 8 be modelled as a random partition of the string 1, 2, 3, …, 8. How could we test 
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the quality of fit of the model? The model involves 8-choose-4 different sample patterns, 
that is to say, involves in terms of standard notation
8              8!
       = _______ = 70 patterns
4         
4!(8-4)!
These patterns are modelled as all having precisely the same frequency of occurrence. 
So a test of the quality of fit of the model cannot be based directly on the principle of 
ordering by size of modelled frequency. We are therefore compelled to replace the 70 
patterns by a smaller number of patterns, such that the latter patterns vary in modelled 
frequency. One way of doing this is based on runs, as follows: replace every number in 
the original string by A if it is in the first group and by B if it is in the second group. The 
original string is thus replaced by the string AABAABBB, consisting of the four runs AA, 
B, AA and BBB. The runs are then replaced by the run lengths 2, 1, 2, 3, where the origi-
nal two groups are no longer distinguished as they complement each other. Depending 
on the nature of the device used to partition the original string, we might then choose 
to further reduce the number of patterns by ignoring the order in which the runs occur. 
We thus obtain a datum described by 1[1]2[2]3[1]. Now, ordering by size of modelled fre-
quency, we obtain the test distribution given in Table 1.7.3. Note that patterns involving 
very long runs or many short runs are taken up by O5 and O6 where that indicates the 
nature of the alternatives we have in mind when we choose to order sample patterns by 
the present method.
Table 1.7.3: A test distribution based on runs
Partial ordering Modelled frequency
O1: 1[4]2[1]  18/70 = 0.26
O2: 1[3]2[1]3[1]  12/70 = 0.17
O3: 1[2]3[2] ∪ 1[1]2[2]3[1]  2(8)/70 = 0.23
O4: 1[2]2[3] ∪ 1[6]2[1]  2(6)/70 = 0.17
O5: 1[1]3[1]4[1]  4/70 = 0.06
O6: 2[2]4[1] ∪ 1[8] ∪ 2[4] ∪ 4[2]  4(2)/70 = 0.11
Using Table 1.7.3 the co-ordinates of the samples in O6 are found to be given by (0.89, Ø) 
where Ø denotes zero arising from the absence of a right co-ordinate. Note that (0.89, Ø) 
involves a rounding of measure 0.11, where that is large enough to discourage (0.89, Ø) 
from being considered descriptive of a poor fit, as the mental correlate of a given datum 
can be situated anywhere in the rounding it belongs to. This is underscored when the 
present co-ordinates are reported in the explicit form (0.89, 0.11, Ø) rather than in the 
implicit form (0.89, Ø). These co-ordinates reflect a paucity of data, indicating that any 
test based on Table 1.7.3 would be nearly vacuous.
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The reader should note that our usage of the expression the given datum in the foregoing did 
not refer to the original data set. It referred to a summary datum of which it may be said that 
it is being given to be tested. If preferred, one might call it the test datum.
1.8 Measuring the quality of fit of a class characteristic
In this section we consider the case of testing the quality of fit of an isolated singleton 
that has arisen as characteristic of each and every member of a class of models. As in the 
previous section we again employ concrete examples to develop the general idea.
Example 1.8.1
Suppose that an investigator counts the numbers of a certain plant species in each of six 
quadrates and finds 0, 1 and 2 of the plants in 3, 1 and 2 of the quadrates, respectively. 
The investigator’s experience might suggest that the given data might be modelled suc-
cessfully as six independent counts from a Poisson population with unspecified mean 
denoted by μ (0 < μ < ∞). This introduces a class of models whose composition was 
analysed by Fisher (1950). Let B denote the total number of plants, A denote the total 
number of quadrates, and a{r} denote the number of quadrates with just r plants. Fisher 
points out that for the proposed class of Poisson models, the probability that a random 
sample of A counts will have the pattern
0[a{0}]1[a{1}]2[a{2}] …
can be expressed as a product of two factors, as follows in square brackets:
e-Am(Am)B   ×                            A!B! × A-B       
                  B!             a{0} !a{1} !a{2} ! ...×(2!)a{2} (3!)a{3} (4!) a{4).... (1.8.1)
The first factor at (1.8.1) gives the probability that the sample total equals B, given that the 
sample comprises A independent counts from a Poisson population with mean equal to μ; 
for each value of μ it provides a singleton whose quality of fit depends on the total count 
only. Then, given that the total count equals B, the second factor at (1.8.1) gives the condi-
tional probability of the particular pattern occurring in A individual Poisson counts; as it 
is independent of μ, it is characteristic only of the Poisson-ness, so to speak, of the class of 
models. The second factor will be recognised as the singleton that originated at (1.7.1) in 
the previous section. We must commence by testing the quality of fit of the second factor, 
as the first factor relies on the sample of counts being Poisson without providing any means 
whatsoever for judging whether or not that is appropriate. So, using the second factor, we 
compute the conditional probability of each sample pattern obtainable with A = 6 and 
B = 5. Table 1.8.1 gives all these possible sample patterns, their respective conditional pro-
babilities, and the ordering that arises from the principle ‘a pattern less frequent with ran-
dom occupancy is a pattern less like those of random occupancy’. Just as in Section 1.7, 
the O
T
-like notations again indicate that ‘likeness’ to random occupancy decreases as 
T increases. By inspection of the patterns in O
T
 for T = 7, 6, 5, …, it can be seen that the 
ordering points at aggregative occupancy as an alternative against which our model of 
random occupancy is being tested.
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Table 1.8.1: A test distribution for a Poisson class characteristic
Pattern Probability Order Pattern Probability Order
5[1]0[5] 1/64 O7 2[2]1[1]0[3] 300/64 O2
4[1]1[1]0[4] 25/64 O6 2[1]1[3]0[2] 600/64 O1
3[1]2[1]0[4] 50/64 O5 1[5]0[1] 120/64 O4
3[1]1[2]0[3] 200/64 O3
As the test datum in the present case is described by 2[2]1[1]0[3], the test statistic devel-
oped in Table 1.8.1 produces the test displayed in Figure 1.8.1. The shaded bar repre-
sents the statistical rounding whose co-ordinates are given by (0.46, 0.31). So, by the 
test performed, the class characteristic matches the given data well. Should there be any 
doubt as to what this means, we can point at Figure 1.8.1, or a simulated equivalent, and 
say, ‘See for yourself that the members of the rounding, including the mental correlate 
of the test datum, are situated well within the bulk of the distribution’. We would thus 
compel the human body to grasp, as a physically demonstrated fact, that by the test 
performed, the class characteristic fits the given data well.
Ordinal class with frequency label
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Figure 1.8.1: Testing the quality of fit of a Poisson class characteristic
As in the previous section, so also in the present section, our reasoning neither made 
reference to, nor relied in any way on the existence, or on the possible future existence, 
of a population of occupancies in the real world. Our reasoning concerned only a single 
instance of given occupancies in the real world, corresponding to which it brought into 
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the human mind an infinite population of random occupancies as a model of how the 
given occupancies might have come about.
It would be foolish to pretend that our model has provided the only possible explanation 
of how the given occupancies might have come about, but it would also be foolish to 
pretend that our model arose from a blind guess. The point here is simply this: informed 
by facts about the mode of propagation in the particular species of plants involved, and 
informed by facts about the nature of the particular terrain involved, botanical opinion 
has chosen the hypothesised class of models, either to be refuted, or to be supported. 
We, in turn, must then produce appropriate statistical facts of fit (good or bad) that can 
serve to better inform that botanical opinion.
As in the previous section, our co-ordination test produces a finding of which the verac-
ity is not qualified by probability. The finding is a physically perceived fact of which the 
veracity is absolute, having been placed beyond reasonable contest. This point must be 
firmly grasped. So let us state precisely what our finding is, as follows:
A model of random occupancy, by the test performed, fits these data well.
Should we be forced to attach a ‘probability of truth’ to this finding, we would perforce 
have to declare that it be unity, as the finding is plainly a fact. We must, however, be 
extremely reluctant to introduce such a ‘probability’, as it can serve no positive purpose 
for an irrelevant concept to be dragged into our development.
Example 1.8.2
Suppose that on a visit to a town named T we spot municipal buses numbered T.xi for 
i = 1, 2, 3, …, n. A tenable model for these data might be that they are a subset of T.x for 
x = 1, 2, 3, …, θ. In order to estimate θ, the number of municipal buses in T, we require 
a probability model for our data. So let x
(i)
 for i = 1, 2, 3, …, n, denote the observed 
numbers ordered from smallest to largest, and let X
(i)
 for i = 1, 2, 3, …, n, denote corre-
sponding random variables in the human mind. Let the data be modelled as a random 
sample drawn without replacement. Then the probability of each of the possible sample 
patterns is taken to be
 q -1. 
 n  
This probability can be expressed as
   x(n)-1   q  -1      x(n)-1 -1 . (1.8.2) 
   n-1      n      ×   n-1
Here the first factor in square brackets is the probability of obtaining X
(n)
 = x
(n)
 where 
x
(n)
 = n, n+1, n+2, …, θ; the second factor is the conditional probability of the sample 
given that X
(n)
 = x
(n)
. The first factor tells us nothing at all about how the sample arose; 
it represents a class of models indexed by θ, which class is based on the premise that 
our data can be modelled as having been drawn at random without replacement. The 
second factor is the class characteristic. Given that X
(n)
 = x
(n)
 it tells us that the pattern 
of the remaining n-1 sampled numbers is one amongst (x
(n)
-1)-choose-(n-1) different 
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patterns that are equally frequent when sampling is random without replacement. Let 
the data be 1, 2, 3, 4, 9 and 10. The largest of these numbers, x
(n)
, equals 10, and the class 
characteristic models the five smaller numbers, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 9, as arising from a random 
partition of the first nine positive integers into two sets comprising five integers drawn, 
and four integers not drawn, respectively. So the class characteristic is a singleton of the 
type considered in Example 1.7.2. Just as in Example 1.7.2, we must replace a variety of 
equally frequent sample patterns with a smaller variety of sample patterns that vary in 
modelled frequency. Consider the use of runs as described in the previous section: when 
labelling the observed numbers ‘A’ and the unobserved numbers ‘B’, the given data set, 
apart from x
(n)
 = 10, yields the following:
1,  2,  3,  4,  5,  6,  7,  8,  9
A  A  A   A  B   B  B   B  A
The runs are AAAA, BBBB and A. If only the lengths of the runs are recorded, the test 
datum is 1[1]4[2]. The corresponding test distribution is given in Table 1.8.2.
Table 1.8.2: A test distribution for the number-of-buses problem
Partial ordering Modelled frequency
O1: 1[3]2[3] ∪ 1[4]2[1]3[1]  2(18)/126 = 0.29
O2: 1[5]2[2] ∪ 1[2]2[2]3[1]  2(15)/126 = 0.24
O3: 1[7]2[1] ∪ 1[1]2[1]3[2] ∪ 1[2]3[1]4[1]  3(8)/126 = 0.19
O4: 1[3]2[1]4[1] ∪1[3]3[2]  2(6)/126 = 0.09
O5: 1[1]2[2]4[1] ∪ 2[3]3[1]  2(4)/126 = 0.06
O6: 1[1]2[4] ∪ 1[6]3[1]  2(3)/126 = 0.05
O7: 1[1]3[1]5[1] ∪ 1[1]4[2] ∪ 2[1]3[1]4[1] ∪ 4[1]5[1]  4(2)/126 = 0.06
O8: 1[9] ∪ 2[2]5[1]  2(1)/126 = 0.02
As depicted in Figure 1.8.2, the modelled counterpart of the given datum is situated at 
(0.92, 0.02) in the test distribution. The characteristic, as tested, does not fit the given 
data well. Just as we could previously point at the scatter diagram in Figure 1.3.1 and say, 
‘See for yourself how poorly a straight line through the origin would fit these data’, so we 
can now point at Figure 1.8.2 and say, ‘See for yourself how awkwardly the counterpart 
is placed within the distribution. See how far down it is situated amongst the patterns 
least typical of runs arising from a random partition.’ Note, however, that this test would 
be utterly vacuous if we cannot produce a more tenable alternative to our hypothesised 
model, because we cannot doubt the possible occurrence of a data pattern that we our-
selves have modelled as being possible with non-zero probability. But perhaps we might 
recall that buses numbers 9 and 10 were spotted on the outskirts of the town as we were 
advancing toward the middle of town, where we then spotted the three smaller num-
bers. It might then occur to us that it could be the routes of the buses, rather than the 
buses themselves, that are numbered. Any new route would then tend to arise on the 
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outskirts of town and would have a larger number than previously established routes. 
We thus have a tenable alternative to the hypothesised model.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
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Ordinal class with frequency label
Figure 1.8.2: Testing the quality of fit of the number of buses class characteristic
Example 1.7.2 showed that large rounding discourages extreme co-ordination. The 
rounding in the present case is much smaller than the rounding in Example 1.7.2, but is 
never theless too large to be fobbed off. In such cases the rounding should be made ex-
plicit. So, in the present case, the co-ordination should be reported in the explicit form 
(0.92, 0.06, 0.02) rather than in the implicit form (0.92, 0.02), as good scientific practice 
always draws attention to any shortcoming of reported evidence. Henceforth, whenever 
we use the implicit form it must be tacitly understood that the rounding is much too 
small, or that both co-ordinates are much too large for the magnitude of the rounding 
to have forceful bearing on the physical evidence being reported. Sometimes, however, 
in spite of small rounding or large co-ordinates, we use the explicit form as a reminder 
that a rounding cannot be zero, as that would in self-contradictory terms try to model a 
given datum as one that could not have occurred.
1.9 A word of caution
The heuristic method of ‘ordering by modelled frequency’ cannot be relied upon to pro-
vide tests that are ‘good’ or ‘best’ in a defendable sense. We will in fact show that the 
method has an understandable tendency to produce inferior tests of co-ordination. How-
ever, for the time being that need not concern us, as we must first grasp in what sense our 
models are capable of being ‘tested’, before considering how certain tests might achieve 
that ‘better’ than others do. For our immediate purposes, it need only be grasped that dif-
ferent orderings produce different tests.
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1.10 The terms ‘sampling’ and ‘sample’
In the foregoing explanations we have been very careful to use language that draws a 
sharp distinction between the constituents of a particular data set in the real world and 
the constituents of a corresponding model in the human mind. The distinction we wish 
to draw is brought forward when we compare the traffic circles in the real world to the 
mathematical circle in the human mind. The traffic circles differ from the circle in the 
mind; yet everyday language understands in what sense they are ‘like’ the circle in the 
mind, and everyday language is satisfied to ignore their diversity. The very essence of 
statistics, however, is to not ignore such diversity, but instead to invent a sample space 
that models that diversity and, going further, to invent a distribution that models its 
proportional constituency. Nevertheless, the result is still a model only and, as we saw 
in Section 1.4, statistical modelling commences with a concept called sampling. So we 
will continue to draw a sharp distinction between the world of real physical experience 
and the world of conceptual physical experience by not referring to any object in the real 
world as ‘sampling’ or ‘a sample’. This results in slightly awkward language, but there are 
at least three good reasons for maintaining such language, these being as follows:
Firstly, given a model that puts forward an explanation of how a given data set might (or 
might not) have come about, we will find (for instance in Chapter 4) that the language 
helps us avoid circular reasoning when judging whether (or not) the model is tenable. The 
point here is that we must carefully distinguish between a data analyst who asks whether 
or not a particular representation is tenable (the pursuit of knowledge), and a decision-
maker who assumes that a particular representation is tenable (the use of knowledge).
Secondly, the language will help us come to grips (in Chapter 3) with certain slippery 
distinctions between hypothesis tests and tests of the kind currently being introduced. 
The reason for this is that in the current case the population is being brought into the 
human mind, whereas in the case of hypothesis tests the population is being brought 
into the real world.
Thirdly, long-run frequency is a conceptual consequence of sampling. So it is indeed a 
poor epistemology that would have us judge the quality of fit of a given long-run fre-
quency model without also having us judge the quality of fit of the corresponding sam-
pling model, in other words, without having us judge whether for instance a coin is 
being dropped instead of flipped.
1.11 Alternatives to a hypothesised model
Any test of a hypothesised model for its tenability, as explanation of how given data 
might have come about, must necessarily involve the idea that ‘there could be another 
explanation’. If no alternative explanation is to be considered, it is utterly impossible to 
make a non-vacuous ordering of sample patterns. Examples 1.11.1 and 1.11.2 will help 
to make this clear.
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Example 1.11.1
An ornithologist counts the number of non-breeding cape sugarbirds visiting each of 
24 different protea bushes and finds 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 birds at 10, 4, 5, 3, 1 and 1 of the 
24 sites, respectively. The ornithologist wants to test the quality of fit of a Poisson class. 
The present data set is too large to be dealt with readily by the method used in Section 
1.7, and in any case our immediate purposes will be better served by a partial ordering 
of sample patterns according to the magnitude of
(the sample variance)/(the sample mean). (1.11.1)
Under the model to be tested this quantity is approximately distributed as
(χ² on 24-1 degrees of freedom)/(24-1).
For the given data
(the data variance)/(the data mean) = 1.541
of which the modelled counterpart in the human mind is then found to be co-ordinated 
at approximately (0.96, 0.04) in the test distribution.
Example 1.11.2
The ornithologist also counts the number of breeding malachite sunbird males visiting 
each of 24 different protea bushes and finds 0, 1 and 2 birds at 8, 14 and 2 of the 24 sites, 
respectively. The ornithologist again wants to test the quality of fit of a Poisson class. In 
the present case
(the data variance)/(the data mean) = 0.493,
of which the modelled counterpart in the human mind is then found to be co-ordinated 
at approximately (0.02, 0.98) in the test distribution.
In each of the two cases we have obtained a poor fit that, in each case, prompts the ques-
tion, ‘Might that not be pointing at an explanation other than mere coincidence?’ The var-
iance of a Poisson sample is usually close to the mean; so for the sugarbirds the variance 
seems to be too large, and for the sunbirds the variance seems to be too small. More-
over, ornithology can, in each case, adjoin substantive facts pointing at a substantively 
conceivable alternative explanation, as follows: on the one hand, outside the breeding 
season sugarbirds do not display territorial behaviour; so the relatively large variance 
observed in their case is not unexpected, owing to aggregation at food sources. On the 
other hand, within the breeding season sunbird males are aggressive, and are often to be 
seen chasing conspecifics and other sunbirds; so the relatively small variance observed 
in their case is not unexpected, owing to territorial behaviour. 
The two examples involved the same hypothesised model and the same partial ordering 
of sample patterns. They differed only in the role of the alternatives, where evidence fa-
vouring the alternative in the first example would be vacuous as evidence favouring the 
alternative in the second example, and vice versa. Clearly then, in order for numerically 
extreme co-ordinates arising from the test of a hypothesised model to provide evidence 
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against the tenability of that model, a substantively conceivable alternative source of the 
observed data pattern must be brought forward.
The foregoing development shows that, given an ordering of sample patterns arising 
from a particular hypothesised model, a certain alternative might be indicated by small 
values of the left co-ordinate, and a different alternative might be indicated by small 
values of the right co-ordinate. This is not unusual. Let a data set of the form yx (x = 1, 
2, 3, •••, n) be modelled as a sample of n independent realisations of Yx = -1 or Yx = +1 
with equal frequency. Consider an ordering based on the magnitude of the covariance 
of yx and x. A negative covariance (a small left co-ordinate) might point at an increasing 
frequency of Yx = -1 as the alternative. A positive covariance (a small right co-ordinate) 
might point at an increasing frequency of Yx = +1 as the alternative. It might also be 
that only one of the two alternatives is substantively conceivable. Consider, for example, 
investigating the efficacy of sulphur applications for the control of stem rust in wheat. 
Consider ten pairs of pseudo-randomised plots dusted with different, and not exces-
sively high, levels of sulphur, as follows:
{(x units of sulphur), (x+1 units of sulphur)} where x = 0, 1, 2,…, 9.
Let yx = +1 when the plot receiving the higher level of sulphur is less affected by stem rust, 
and let yx = -1 otherwise. It is entirely realistic that the investigator might not be prepared 
to give credence to the possibility that any of the sulphur applications could increase the 
level of rust infection. So, on the one hand, if the mental correlate of the co-variance of yx 
and x is co-ordinated at (0.9, 0.1), we might consider that indicative, albeit slightly, of stem 
rust having been controlled by the sulphur applications. On the other hand, if the mental 
correlate of the co-variance of yx and x is co-ordinated at (0.1, 0.9), we would regard that 
as a good fit of the hypothesised model ‘no effect’, and giving no indication that stem rust 
was controlled by any of the sulphur applications. In order to avoid any misunderstanding 
in such cases, we now introduce a scaffolding symbol we refer to as the pointer. When we 
use the symbol to label one member of a co-ordinate pair, that member is identified as the 
co-ordinate that might be pointing (by way of smallness) or that might not be pointing 
(by way of largeness) at a specified alternative under consideration. For example:
In the case of the sugarbirds: (0.96, 0.04*).
In the case of the sunbirds: (*0.02, 0.98).
In the 1st case of the sulphur applications (0.9, 0.1*).
In the 2nd case of the sulphur applications (0.1, 0.9*).
Again, (0.08, 0.92*) would indicate an unusually good fit, whereas (*0.08, 0.92) would 
indicate a moderately poor one.
The pointer defines the pointing co-ordinate.
It might be thought that introduction of a pointer risks redundancy. We do not dispute 
that and note instead that R.A. Fisher left certain statisticians under the impression (or 
perhaps the faulty impression) that a significance test does not rely on any alternative 
to the hypothesised model (Jeffreys 1961, p. 377; Edwards 1972, pp. 177, 178, 180). So we 
wish to underscore the following. Let any co-ordination test of a hypothesised model 
produce a poor fit to a given data pattern. If we are unable to provide a substantively 
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credible alternative explanation of how that pattern might have come about, we can but 
ask for further data, perhaps to see if that kind of pattern will recur. The following three 
examples will help to make this clear.
Example 1.11.3
This writer was once asked to examine a thesis on inter alia results obtained in five dif-
ferent 2×2 factorial trials with sheep. The thesis reported five independent values of Sne-
decor’s F ratio when testing for treatment interactions, none of which, so it was claimed, 
provided any evidence of interaction. The five computed F ratios co-ordinated as follows 
in Snedecor’s test distribution:
(0.07, 0.93), (0.02, 0.98), (0.04, 0.96), (0.00, 1.00), (0.11, 0.89).
Having closely questioned the candidate about the conduct of the trials, this writer in 
effect held that the co-ordinations should be viewed as follows, pointing at improper 
randomisation:
(*0.07, 0.93), (*0.02, 0.98), (*0.04, 0.96), (*0,00, 1.00), (*0.11, 0.89).
Example 1.11.4
An investigator wishes to test, for each of three different species of fynbos, whether or 
not plants from seeds gathered at four different sites differ in growth potential under arid 
conditions. The investigator uses three separate and properly randomised designs and, 
testing for site mean differences (treatment differences), obtains values of Snedecor’s F 
that co-ordinate as follows in Snedecor’s test distribution:
(0.09, 0.91*), (0.07, 0.93*), and (0.11, 0.89*).
The investigator may conclude, reasonably, that these co-ordinations do not provide any 
evidence of site differences.
Example 1.11.5
A geologist wishes to test whether or not sandstone pebbles gathered at ten different sites 
differ in constituent grain size. Testing for site mean differences, the geologist obtains a 
value of Snedecor’s F that co-ordinates at (0.03, 0.97*) in Snedecor’s test distribution. The 
geologist might wonder whether something went wrong; might re-check the data record; 
might re-examine graphical representations; might repeat the various calculations testing 
for normality, homogeneity of variance, and so on. But, if nothing untoward is found, the 
geologist, if unwilling to give credence to the unusual data pattern as just such by mere 
co-incidence, can but resort to gathering further data, perhaps to see if a similarly unusual 
pattern will recur.
An inescapable fact of investigative science
It is inescapable that, depending on prior experience, one investigator might notice a data 
pattern of alternative significance, of which another investigator might be utterly oblivi-
ous. For a remarkable real-life example the reader is referred to an exchange of papers 
between Berkson (1942) and Fisher (1943).
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1.12 Data analysis, science and sufficiency
The development of a sound theory of data analysis must begin with Immanuel Kant’s 
recognition that we cannot know anything about a thing-in-itself (ding-an-sich). If, for 
instance, we say Thembi is ‘a woman’, ‘small’, ‘black’, we find that we are using universal 
terms, rather than terms limited to Thembi’s proprietary. If we try very hard to overcome 
this by, for instance, saying: ‘ … but Thembi has a tiny little mole on her left cheek’, we 
again use universal terms. How else could the reader possibly grasp what is being said? We 
touched upon this in a previous section when explaining our usage of the terms ‘sampling’ 
and ‘sample’ as referring to universal concepts that cannot be made part of the proprietary 
of particular data sets. In this section we wish to come to grips with certain fundamen-
tal principles of statistical data analysis, where a data set is then always a ‘thing’ whose 
proprietary cannot be conveyed in any language. So it will be found that, willy-nilly, any 
principle for statistical ‘data’ analysis always seems to turn into one for statistical ‘sample’ 
analysis so to speak. This is important only inasmuch as it needs to be clearly understood 
that a ‘thing’ can be invested with meaning, only by way of making universal concepts ad-
dress it. So we may anticipate that principles for scientific data analysis will turn out to be 
principles for analysis of the scientific concepts that might address those data. In our case 
(the statistical case), the first step in that direction is to analyse any class of models giving 
the probability of the sample into two main subsidiary models: on the one hand, we must 
obtain the subsidiary that represents the characteristics of the class as a whole and, on 
the other hand, we must obtain the subsidiary that represents all the different members of 
the class. We have in fact already met examples of such an analysis at (1.8.1) and (1.8.2), 
respectively. We now wish to develop the principles of such analysis. So let a data set given 
by n numbers, {x1, x2, x3, … xn}, be modelled as a random sample, of which the long-run 
frequency in terms of corresponding random variables, {X1, X2, X3, … Xn}, and a vector of 
parameters, Θ = (θ1, θ2, θ3, …, θm), is given by
Pr(x1, x2, x3, …, xn; Θ) in an obviously simplified notation.
We envisage Θ as taking different values. We thus envisage a class of models indexed by 
the different values of Θ. Now bear in mind that the very essence of any scientific model 
is the universe of all predictions that can be obtained from it. In our case every member 
of our class of models predicts the long-run frequency of each of the possible sample 
patterns envisaged for that class, and from that further predictions can then be derived. 
We might, for instance, derive the frequency with which the mean of X1, X2, X3, …, Xn is 
predicted to exceed a given value. Or we might wish to predict what the average value, 
over repetitions, of the variance of X1, X2, X3, …, Xn would be. This prompts a concern 
that replacement of the sample with a set of summary statistics can inadvertently result 
in diminished predictive capacity; in other words, the summary might be insufficient for 
all of the predictions of the class. Consider a set of statistics {T1, T2, T3, … Tn}, defined by 
a one-to-one transformation:
ti = ti(x1, x2, x3, …, xn) for i = 1, 2, 3, …, n.
As the transformation is one-to-one, the original numbers can be recovered by inverse 
transformation. So, any prediction that can be derived from {X1, X2, X3, …, Xn} can also be 
derived from {T1, T2, T3, …, Tn }. We will express this by saying that the set of statistics {T1, T2, 
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T3, …, Tn} is sufficient for the predictions of the class. A familiar example of this is the trans-
formation from a number of ‘yields’ to the same number of independent degrees of freedom 
in the analysis of variance, when the grand total of the ‘yields’ is viewed as one of the degrees 
of freedom (See for instance Fisher 1970, p. 120). This motivates Definition 1.12.1.
Definition 1.12.1:
Let a data set Sx = {x1, x2, x3, …, xn} be modelled as a random sample SX = {X1, X2, X3, …, Xn}, which arises 
from a class of models indexed by Θ = (θ1, θ2, θ3, …, θm). Let k transformations
 ti = ti(x1, x2, x3, …, xn) for i = 1, 2, 3, …, k
define a set of statistics S
T
 = {T1, T2, T3, …, Tk}. If and only if all the predictions that can be derived from SX 
can also be derived from S
T
, we say that S
T
 is sufficient for the predictions of the class.
Let {T1, T2, T3, …, Tk} be sufficient for the predictions of a class, and let Tk+1 be any func-
tion of {T1, T2, T3, …, Tk}. Then {T1, T2, T3, …, Tk, Tk+1} will also be sufficient for the predic-
tions of the class, but redundantly so. This brings us to the concept of a necessary and 
sufficient set of statistics, or (in more customary language) a minimally sufficient set of 
statistics, where this motivates Definition 1.12.2. 
Definition 1.12.2:
Let a data set Sx = {x1, x2, x3, …, xn} be modelled as a random sample SX = {X1, X2, X3, …, Xn}, which arises 
from a class of models indexed by Θ = (θ1, θ2, θ3, …, θm). Let k transformations
 ti = ti(x1, x2, x3, …, xn) for i = 1, 2, 3, …, k
define a set of statistics S
T
 = {T1, T2, T3, …, Tk}. Then ST is minimally sufficient for the predictions of the 
class if and only if it is both sufficient for the predictions of the class and can be derived from any other 
set of statistics that is sufficient for the predictions of the class.
Trivially, S
X
 is itself minimally sufficient for the predictions of the class. We wish to analyse 
the predictions of the class into all those that are characteristic of the class as a whole, 
and all those that distinguish the different members of the class from one another. So, we 
introduce Definition 1.12.3.
Definition 1.12.3:
Let a data set Sx = {x1, x2, x3, …, xn} be modelled as a random sample SX = {X1, X2, X3, …, Xn}, which arises 
from a class of models indexed by Θ = (θ1, θ2, θ3, …, θm). Let k transformations
 ti = ti(x1, x2, x3, …, xn) for i = 1, 2, 3, …, k
define a set of statistics S
T
 = {T1, T2, T3, …, Tk}. Then we say:
S
T
 is sufficient for the class if and only if it can supply all the predictions that can be made with the given 
class of models.
S
T
 is sufficient for the index if and only if it can supply all the indexed predictions that can be made with the 
given class of models. (An indexed prediction is one whose physical meaning depends on the value of the 
index.)
S
T
 is sufficient for the characteristic if and only if it can supply all the predictions that are characteristic of 
the given class of models as a whole.
The members of the class are distinguished from each other by the index of the class. So 
the predictions that can differentiate between the members of the class are those that 
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depend on the index. As the sample itself, S
X
, is sufficient for the class, it is also sufficient 
for the index. And, as S
X
 comprises n statistics, we might ask whether it is possible to 
summarise ‘whatever S
X
 can “tell” us about the index’ in terms of fewer than n statistics. 
Here the phrase ‘whatever S
X
 can “tell” us about the index’ is short for ‘whatever S
X
 can 
provide by way of predictions that depend on the index’. In fact we have already met this 
idea at (1.8.1) and (1.8.2), where we saw how a given data set might be modelled as a 
sample from the one or the other, of various members of a class of models indexed by a 
parameter, and where we saw how the probability of the sample could then be factored 
such that a single scalar statistic sufficient for the index is given by one of the factors. So, 
let us re-label the T-like statistics as:
{T1, T2, T3, …, Tn} = {R, C1, C2, C3, …, Cn-1}
and let us consider how to define R as being sufficient for the index. (For the moment we 
are thinking of R as a scalar random variable.) In order to allow for certain trivial cases, 
a factorisation of the form
Pr(r; Θ)×Pr(c1, c2, c3, …, cn-1r)
might have to be interpreted as Pr(r; Θ)×(1), in which case c1, c2, c3, …, cn-1 are any arbi-
trary constants. This being understood, we introduce Definition 1.12.4.
Definition 1.12.4:
Let {R, C1, C2, C3, …, Cn-1} be a set of statistics derived from a random sample of size n arising from a class 
of models indexed by a vector Θ = (θ1, θ2, θ3, …, θm). Let the probability of the sample be given by
 Pr(r; Θ) × Pr(c1, c2, c3, ..., cn-1r)
where the first factor is the unconditional probability that R = r, and the second factor is the conditional 
probability that
 (C1, C2, C3, …, Cn-1) = (c1, c2, c3, …, cn-1) given that R = r.
R is sufficient for the index if and only if the second factor is independent of Θ.
It should be noted that the phrase ‘independent of’, as used in Definition 1.12.4, refers 
not only to frequency, but also to range. For instance, if θ ≠ 0 and C ranges over the va-
lues θ, 2θ, 3θ, …, 10θ with equal frequency, that frequency, 0.1, is independent of θ, but the 
distribution of C is not independent of θ. Definition 1.12.4 hardly requires any explica-
tion; Pr(c1, c2, c3, …, cn-1r) stands for a predicted long-run frequency from which further 
predictions can be derived, and as the initial prediction is independent of Θ, the further 
predictions would also be independent of Θ. So the predicted long-run frequency that 
Pr(r; Θ) stands for can provide whatever indexed predictions the class of models can provide.
Sometimes no scalar statistic sufficient for the index exists. However, as the sample itself 
is always sufficient for the index, there always exists a set of statistics jointly sufficient for 
the index. Consider for instance a sample of n integers drawn at random without replace-
ment from the set of all the integers straddled by two integers, θ and 2θ, where θ > 3 and 
2 ≤ n ≤ θ-1. The probability of the sample is given by:
 q-1 -1 
  n         
.
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Given the values of the smallest number drawn, x
(1), and of the largest number drawn, 
x
(n)
, the conditional probability of the other n-2 sample values is given by 
 x(n)-x(1)-1 
-1
       n-2             
.
So the probability of the sample factors as follows: 
  x(n)-x(1)-1  q-1 
-1 
 
×
   x(n)-x(1)-1 
-1
        n-2           n                   n-2             
.
 
(1.12.1)
Here the first factor in square brackets gives the joint distribution of X
(1) and X(n), and its 
range depends on θ, as θ+1 ≤ X
(1) < X(n) ≤ 2θ-1. The second factor in square brackets gives 
the joint distribution of the other n-2 sampled integers. Its range is independent of θ, being 
bounded by x
(1) and x(n). So we have that X(1) and X(n) are jointly sufficient for θ. Moreover, as
θ < X
(1) < X(n) < 2θ,
each one of the two X-like statistics tells us something about θ that the other one cannot 
tell us. For instance, X
(1) = 20 would tell us that θ must be < 20, but not by how much, and 
X
(n)
 = 30 would tell us that θ must be > 15, but not by how much. So we need both statistics 
for the sample to tell us all that it can tell us about θ. We express this by saying:
X
(1) and X(n) jointly, are minimally sufficient for θ.
It can also be that a single scalar statistic is sufficient for a vector of two independent sca-
lar parameters. For instance, let X be the sum of two independent random numbers; the 
first a random one of the integers 1, 2, 3, …, ι (ι < ∞) and the second a random one of the 
fractions 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, …, φ (φ < 1). If X = 7.3, say, its integral part tells us ι ≥ 7, but tells us 
nothing at all about φ, whereas its fractional part tells us φ ≥ 0.3, but tells us nothing at 
all about ι. Therefore X is minimally sufficient for (ι, φ). This leads to Definition 1.12.5. 
Definition 1.12.5:
Let {R1, R2, R3, … Rk, C1, C2, C3, …, Cn-k} be a set of statistics derived from a random sample of size n arising from 
a class of models indexed by a vector Θ = (θ1, θ2, θ3, …, θm). Let the probability of the sample be given by
 Pr(r1, r2, r3, ..., rk; Θ) × Pr(c1, c2, c3, ..., cn-kr1, r2, r3, ..., rk)
where the first factor is the unconditional probability that
 (R1, R2, R3, …, Rk) = (r1, r2, r3, …, rk)
and the second factor is the conditional probability that
 (C1, C2, C3, …, Cn-k) = (c1, c2, c3, …, cn-k)
 given that (R1, R2, R3, …, Rk) = (r1, r2, r3, …, rk).
Then the set of statistics {R1, R2, R3, …, Rk} is sufficient for the index if and only if the second factor is 
independent of Θ.
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Definition 1.12.6 then tells us that no set of statistics could tell us anything about the 
index that a set minimally sufficient for the index cannot tell us.
Definition 1.12.6:
A set of statistics is minimally sufficient for the index if and only if it is both sufficient for the index and 
can be derived from any set of statistics that is sufficient for the index.
The concept of a set of statistics minimally sufficient for the index now enables us to 
define a counterpart concept of a set of statistics minimally sufficient for the characte-
ristic. This is accomplished by Definitions 1.12.7, 1.12.8 and 1.12.9.
Definition 1.12.7:
Let R1, R2, R3, …, Rk, C1, C2, C3, …, Cn-k be n statistics derived from a random sample of size n arising from 
a class of models indexed by a vector Θ = (θ1, θ2, θ3, …, θm). If (R1, R2, R3, …, Rk, C1, C2, C3, …, Cn-k) is suf-
ficient for the class, then (C1, C2, C3, …, Cn-k) is sufficient for the characteristic if and only if (R1, R2, R3, …, 
Rk) is minimally sufficient for the index.
Definition 1.12.8:
A set of statistics is minimally sufficient for the characteristic of a class of statistical models if and only 
if it is both sufficient for the characteristic, and can be derived from any other set of statistics that is 
sufficient for the characteristic. Such a set of statistics may meaningfully be referred to as the class 
characteristic.
Definition 1.12.9:
Consider a set of statistics derived from a set of statistics that is minimally sufficient for the characteristic 
of a class of statistical models, without being itself minimally sufficient for the characteristic of the class. 
Such a set of statistics may be meaningfully referred to as a class characteristic.
We note that in Example 1.8.1, the class characteristic, which is displayed in Table 1.8.1, 
leads directly to a suitable test of fit. In the case of Example 1.8.2, however, we obtained 
a test of fit by replacing the class characteristic by a class characteristic. 
We note in passing that a derivation of the normal class characteristic is given by Kemp-
thorne and Folks (1971, pp. 260-261). We also note that in the examples we have given, it is 
easy to see how the probability of the sample must be factored so as to provide an analysis 
in terms of the two main subsidiary models, but that is not always the case. So certain spe-
cial methods for achieving such factoring have been developed by, for instance, Lehmann 
and Scheffé (1950, 1955). However, that is a technical matter and so, for the purposes of 
the present book, need not concern us.
In Section 1.15 we return to the foregoing. First, however, there are two matters that must 
briefly be remarked upon.
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1.13 Remark on ancillary frames of reference
In order to avoid a possible misunderstanding of the concept ‘sufficiency’, we revisit 
the mixed sampling problem, as exemplified in Section 1.5. Recall that μ, an unknown 
quantity, would, in terms of our model, be measured precisely by Instrument A, and be 
measured with equally frequent errors, -2, -1, 0, +1, +2 by Instrument B. We then flip a 
coin of balanced sort to pick an instrument to make a measurement. This introduced a 
class of models indexed by μ (-∞ < μ < +∞), and to express this mathematically, we now 
define a random variable, Y, as follows:
Y = 1 when Instrument A is used to make the measurement. Pr(Y = 1) = 0.5.
Y = 2 when Instrument B is used to make the measurement. Pr(Y = 2) = 0.5.
If a random variable X then denotes the modelled value of the measurement, X and Y 
are jointly distributed as in Table 1.13.1. As {X, Y} is the sample, and as the sample is
Table 1.13.1: A class of models involving an ancillary partition
X = μ-2 X = μ-1 X = μ X = μ+1 X = μ+2 Total
Y = 1  0  0  0.5  0  0  0.5
Y = 2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.5
Total  0.1  0.1  0.6  0.1  0.1  1
always sufficient for the index, {X, Y} is sufficient for the index. As any prediction that 
can be derived from Y alone is independent of the index, it may be thought that X alone 
is sufficient for the index. However, that is not the case because, for instance, the follow-
ing pair of indexed predictions cannot be made without involving Y:
Pr(X > μY = 1) = 0 and Pr(X > μY = 2) = 0.4. (1.13.1)
So {X, Y} is minimally sufficient for the index. Now if the whole of our model is to be 
considered as the frame of reference within which we wish to predict the frequency of 
the event ‘X > μ’, we obtain the prediction
Pr(X > μ) = 0.2. (1.13.2)
Comparison of predictions (1.13.1) and (1.13.2) shows that the statistic Y is an indicator of 
two different subsidiary frames of reference, corresponding to which substantive science 
has in this case provided Instruments A and B, respectively. Such statistical indicators of 
possible subsidiary frames of reference are known as ancillary statistics. In Section 1.5 we 
saw that they lead to statistical questions, exemplified at (1.5.1) and (1.5.2), which mathe-
matical statistics cannot possibly hope to answer, as they are questions exemplifying 
Gödel’s incompleteness principle. The principle asserts that in any rigidly logical mathe-
matical system there arise questions that cannot be answered on the basis of the axioms 
within that system. They also cannot be resolved by imbedding the given logical system 
in a more extended logical system, as Gödel’s incompleteness principle would also apply 
to the more extended logical system. They might, however, be resolved by extra-logical 
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means. For instance, in the case of Miss Evelyn Rosenthal’s finite geometry, two different 
physical meanings are displayed in Figures 1.5.1(a) and 1.5.1(b), where physical science 
might select just one of the two as the intended physical meaning. So we must take the posi-
tion that as mathematical statistics is just a servant of substantive physical science, it is in 
substantive physical science that we will find correct answers to the seemingly unanswer-
able questions raised by ancillary statistics. Stated otherwise, if there were several possible 
frames of reference, a minimal sufficient statistic would cater for all the predictions arising 
in those several possible frames of reference, and substantive science must then select the 
appropriate frame of reference. At this point it would be premature to try to develop this 
matter any further. We raised the matter here only to prove that if a statistic is minimally 
sufficient for the indexed predictions of a class, it does not follow that all the predictions 
that can be made with that statistic will depend on the index of the class.
1.14 Remark on continuous sample spaces
One cannot measure a continuous variable exactly. Any data set therefore involves the re-
presentation of physical experiences on a discrete and essentially finite grid of class marks. 
This means that, in principle, the fundamental theory of statistical data analysis can be 
exhaustively formulated in terms of discrete sample spaces only. That does not imply that 
we have to avoid any ‘continuous’ sample spaces, whether for convenient approximation 
when appropriate, or for taking into account an underlying theoretical source of variation. 
It implies, however, that our development is not open to criticism on the grounds of for-
mulating the fundamentals of statistical data analysis in terms of discrete sample spaces 
only. Given the purposes of the present book, there would be no point in becoming in-
volved in unnecessary technicalities. So we take the position that the problem of extend-
ing fundamental theory in order to accommodate continuous sample spaces is a purely 
technical matter, and does not involve any intrinsically different principles of reasoning. 
We involve continuous sample spaces only for the sake of exhibiting the consequences of 
our development in familiar contexts, or when that achieves simplification without loss of 
principle. This approach also makes for a deve lopment that is accessible to a wider audi-
ence than would otherwise be the case.
1.15 Definition of a commencement test
The development in Section 1.12 has far-reaching consequences, just one of which is 
embodied in Definition 1.15.1.
Definition 1.15.1:
Let a class of statistical models for the representation of given data be analysed into the two main sub-
sidiary models, these being the subsidiary model giving the set of statistics minimally sufficient for the 
characteristic, and the subsidiary model giving the set of statistics minimally sufficient for the index. A 
test of fit that involves the former subsidiary only is a commencement test. A test of fit that involves the 
latter subsidiary only is an elimination test. (For reasons to be explained in subsequent development, we 
take the position that a test of fit that tries to involve both subsidiaries is an ill-conceived one.)
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This chapter concerns commencement tests, of which simple examples were given in Sec-
tion 1.8. However, the relation between sections 1.7 and 1.8 prompts Definition 1.15.2 as 
being more inclusive than Definition 1.15.1.
Definition 1.15.2:
A commencement test is a test of the quality of fit of an isolated singleton.
In terms of Definition 1.15.2, the tests presented both in Section 1.7 and in Section 1.8 
are commencement tests. In each of the two examples in Section 1.8 the test statistic 
was explicitly derived from the class characteristic. Another approach is to derive a com-
mencement test by developing a test statistic that is invariant with respect to the class 
index, as is done in the following three examples.
Example 1.15.1
In a study of induced repression, Lowenfeld (1955) had fifteen subjects learn ten non-
sense syllables. He then attempted to associate a negative response to a random five of 
those syllables by giving the subjects an electrical shock whenever one of those five syl-
lables was shown tachistoscopically. (Presumably the syllables for the shock treatment 
were chosen randomly per subject.) After a lapse of 48 hours each subject tried to recall 
as many of the syllables as possible. The subjects and their responses are listed in Table 
1.15.1 in non-decreasing order of the total numbers of syllables recalled. This listing
Table 1.15.1: Numbers of shock and non-shock syllables recalled by 15 subjects
Subject number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Control syllables recalled 1 1 2 3 4 2 2 4 4 5 3 3 4 5 5
Shock syllables recalled 0 2 1 0 1 3 3 2 2 2 4 4 3 2 3
Total number recalled 1 3 3 3 5 5 5 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 8
displays the advantage of each subject providing an own control; subjects 1 through 4, for 
instance, recalled only half as many or fewer syllables as did subjects 8 through 15. An ap-
propriate model must therefore account for different subject effects. So, let the probability 
of any shock-syllable being recalled by the jth subject be modelled as:
           exp(aj+b) 
qj =   __________ 
        1+exp(aj+b)  
, where aj is the subject effect, and b is the shock effect,
thus giving the linear logistic model           
qj   
                                                                      
___
   = aj + b for j = 1, 2, 3, …, 15. 
                                                                      
1-qj
The usual analysis would model the data as 15 pairs of binomial samples (Cox 1970). 
But here the defence of such a model on theoretical grounds is awkward, unless we 
can appeal to a historical record. By way of contrast, a binomial model for the number 
ln
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of outcomes ‘bowl up’ from 35 spins of a spoon is easily defended on the theoretical 
grounds that the spinning of spoons is akin to the flipping of coins, the rolling of dice, 
and the shuffling of cards. But, as we cannot reasonably hold that subjects somehow 
‘flip’, ‘roll’ or ‘shuffle’ memories in the mind, we would need an empirical defence for our 
model by way of a satisfactory result from a commencement test for binomial sampling. 
Such a test is obtained by using the standard analysis of variance for paired comparisons 
to compute the error sum of squares on the arc sine scale (Snedecor and Cochran 1989, 
p. 289). In the case of binomial sampling, this is modelled by chi-square times the theo-
retical variance on arc sine scale. With the angles expressed in degrees, the computed 
sum of squares for the present data equals 3 014.4 on 15-1 df, and the theoretical vari-
ance is equal to 820.7÷5. So the value of the chi-square test datum is
3014.4÷(820.7÷5) = 18.365 on 14 df,
whose mental correlate is situated at (0.80, 0.20) in the test distribution. And in order to 
test for an additional source of error variation, the pointing co-ordinate in this case is on 
the right. The class characteristic, as tested, fits the given data well.
Example 1.15.2
The volcanic eruption of Vesuvius in ad 79 preceded ten eruptions over the next 1 552 
years (Table 1.15.2). This brings to mind a Poisson process, in which case the waiting
Table 1.15.2: Waiting times for the first ten eruptions of Vesuvius after that of ad 79, given in years 
and in order of occurrence
124  269  40  275  81  23  8  8  29  595
times are modelled as a random sample from an exponential population, as described by 
the cumulative distribution function 1-exp{-x ÷ θ} for 0 < θ < ∞. A commencement test 
for this class of models, using the Cramer-Von Mises statistic, is obtained as follows: if X 
is a random value from a population with continuous cumulative distribution function 
F(x), then A = F(X) is a random value from a population that is uniformly distributed on 
the unit interval [a U(0, 1) population]. So if X
(1), X(2), X(3), … , is a random sample from 
a population of exponential waiting times, ordered in non-decreasing order of magni-
tude, then A
(1), A(2), A(3), … , for
A
(1) = 1-exp{−X(1)÷θ}, A(2) = 1-exp{-X(2)÷θ}, A(3) = 1-exp{−X(3)÷θ}, …, 
is a random sample from a U(0, 1) population, ordered in non-decreasing order of mag-
nitude. For the given data, the mean waiting time is 155.2 years, which is an estimate of 
θ. So the A-like quantities can be estimated from the given data as 
Â
(1) = 1-exp{-8÷155.2}, Â(2) = 1-exp{-8÷155.2}, Â(3) = 1-exp{-23÷155.2}, …,
provided that an exponential population of waiting times is appropriate, where that is 
the basis of the test, as the A-like quantities can for any population be estimated as
Ã
(1) = (1-0.5)÷n, Ã(2) = (2-0.5)÷n, Ã(3) = (3-0.5)÷n, … , for a sample of size n.
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The Cramer-Von Mises test compares the Â-like estimates to the Ã-like estimates by means 
of the following test statistic, whose distribution is invariant with respect to θ:
 
CvM =   
n
 
              
∑    Â(i)-Ã(i) 
2
+(12n)
-1
. 
            i = 1
The term (12n)-1 merely serves to improve an approximation for the test distribution, 
which is more or less independent of sample size (Bain and Engelhardt 1989, p. 423) As a 
large value of the test statistic points at a poor fit, the pointing co-ordinate is on the right. 
In the present case CvM = 0.131, whose mental correlate co-ordinates at (0.85, 0.15*) in the 
test distribution. So, by the test performed, a model of exponentially distributed waiting 
times fits the given data well.
It is a substantive fact that the character of the volcano changed after ad 1631. Activity be-
came continuous, alternating between so-called quiescent and eruptive stages. And it is a 
statistical fact that the waiting times for the next 20 eruptions tended to be much shorter 
than they were for the ten earlier eruptions (Table 1.15.3). The mean waiting time for these 
later eruptions is a mere 15.65 years, compared to 155.2 years for the earlier eruptions. 
Table 1.15.3: Waiting times for the first 20 eruptions of Vesuvius after that of ad 1631, given in 
years and in order of occurrence
29  22  12  4  9  30  23  7  12  15  28  12  5  11  5  6  7  4  34  38
As judged by the Cramer-Von-Mises test, the later waiting times can also be satisfactorily 
modelled as a sample of exponential waiting times: CvM = 0.150, whose mental correlate 
co-ordinates at (0.87, 0.13*) in the test distribution. Furthermore, for all the eruptions 
taken together, a model of exponential waiting times, as judged by the Cramer-Von-
Mises test, fits the data very poorly: CvM = 2.13, whose mental correlate co-ordinates at 
(1.00, 0.00*) in the test distribution. Thus substantive and statistical evidence taken to-
gether encourages geological opinion to hold that the volcanic action of Vesuvius from 
ad 79 up to ad 1944 falls into two distinctly and understandably different eras.
Example 1.15.3
A commencement test for the fixed-model analysis of variance was introduced in a bril-
liant paper by Tukey (1949a), as follows: consider a data set of responses arising from an 
experiment in randomised blocks, and make the notations:
Yij = the response arising from the i
th treatment in the jth block.
Y
•j = the mean response arising from the j
th block.
Yi• = the mean response arising from the i
th treatment.
Y
••
 = the mean response arising from the trial as a whole.
The standard class of models for such data is based on the identity
Yij = Y••+(Y•j-Y••)+(Yi•-Y••)+dij, (1.15.1)
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where dij denotes the following measure of observed non-additivity:
Yij-[Y••+(Y•j-Y••)+(Yi•-Y••)]. (1.15.2)
In the absence of any systematic non-additivity, dij measures the unsystematic ‘error’ 
subject to which the first three terms on the right at (1.15.1) model the systematic part 
of response on the left. This suggests a class of additive models of the form
Yij = E(Y••)+E(Y•j-Y••)+E(Yi•-Y••)+eij, (1.15.3)
where different members of the class are indexed by different values of
E(Y
••
) = the general mean,
E(Y
•j-Y••) = a deviation attributable to the additive effect of the j
th block, and 
E(Yi•-Y••) = a deviation attributable to the additive effect of the i
th treatment,
where the response differs from the sum of these constants by way of the random variable:
eij = the error of the response arising from the i
th treatment in the jth block.
Let the errors be modelled as uncorrelated, homoscedastic, normal random variables, 
with expectations that are equal to zero. In order to test the quality of fit of additively 
systematic effects, as modelled at (1.15.3), we imbed the additive model into a wider class 
of models, which is broadly envisaged by taking the expected values at (1.15.3) to be the 
constant term and the first-degree terms of a Taylor expansion. The second-degree terms 
of the expansion would then be given by terms
in [E(Y
•j-Y••)]
2, in [E(Yi•-Y••)]
2 and in [E(Y
•j-Y••)] [E(Yi•-Y••)]. (1.15.4)
The first two terms at (1.15.4) are absorbed by the additive effects, as they vary with j 
only and with i only, respectively. So the third term at (1.15.4) is the lowest-order term 
that could account for systematic non-additivity. Its estimated value,
(Y
•j-Y••) (Yi-Y••), (1.15.5)
provides a predictor variable whereupon we can regress the observed measure of non-
additivity given at (1.15.2). Following Snedecor and Cochran (1989, p. 284), let B denote 
the resulting linear regression coefficient. B = N/D when D denotes the sum of squares 
of the quantities arising at (1.15.5) and N denotes the sum of products of these quanti-
ties with those arising at (1.15.2). For non-additivity of the type to be tested for, we ex-
pect a non-zero regression coefficient. So we have introduced a class of models having 
E(B) = 0 owing to additivity, and we wish to test for non-additive alternatives broadly 
specified as having E(B) ≠ 0, owing to some or other non-additivity. Consider the distri-
bution of B, conditional on the values of the predictor variable. As B is a contrast among 
the residuals, it is an error contrast in the additive case. The standardised form of the 
contrast is given by N/√D. By subtracting (N/√D)² from the usual sum of squares for er-
ror, we obtain a residual sum of squares for error, with one degree of freedom less than 
the usual sum of squares for error. For a numerical example consider Table 1.15.4, which 
gives a data set reproduced by Snedecor and Cochran (1989, p. 256) concerning speci-
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mens of three species of citrus, whose ratio of leaf area to dry weight was determined 
under three different conditions of shading.
Table 1.15.4: Ratio of leaf area to dry weight in three species of citrus under three conditions of 
shading
Shamouti orange Marsh grapefruit Clementine mandarin
Sun  112  90  123
Half shade  86  73  89
Shade  80  62  81
For these data we find
Sum of squares for error  = 87.11 on 4 degrees of freedom 
                           (N/√D)²  = 57.50 on 1 degree of freedom 
                                                
__________________________
 Residual sum of squares = 29.61 on 3 degrees of freedom
The standard error of B is estimated by
√s2 ÷ D, where s2 denotes the residual mean square 
= √(29.61÷3)÷(178175) 
= 0.007443
We find B = +0.017965. Our hypothesised model has E(B) = 0, and in order to test that 
against E(B) > 0, as indicated by the B value, and using Student’s t, we find
t = B÷√s2÷D = +2.414 on 3 degrees of freedom,
whose mental correlate is found at (0.952, 0.048) in the test distribution. (1.15.7)
In order to attach a pointer we note that for each one citrus species involved, different 
leaves would tend to be of similar shape. So, if l is any given linear dimension, for in-
stance √(length)(breadth), the surface areas of the different leaves will tend to be pro-
portional to l2. Different leaves will also tend to be of similar, specific weight. So dry 
weight would tend to be proportional to fresh volume, which would in turn tend to be 
proportional to l3. Thus, for different leaves the ratio of leaf area to dry weight would 
tend to be proportional to l-1. One would expect additivity on the l scale, rather than 
on the l-1 scale and therefore the inverse transformation is indicated. Testing for non-
additivity on the inverse scale we find
t = B÷√s2÷D = +0.997 on 3 degrees of freedom
whose mental correlate is found at (0.607, 0.393) in the test distribution. (1.15.8)
This provides an alternative to the hypothesised model, owing to which we can attach a 
pointer to the right statistical co-ordinate given at (1.15.7).
Note that the tests at (1.15.7) and (1.15.8) do not correspond to the conventional proce-
dure. A co-ordination test that corresponds to the conventional procedure would have 
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us use Snedecor’s F instead of Student’s t, and would for instance at (1.15.7) have us 
calculate
B÷√s2÷D    
2
= 5.827 on 1 and 3 degrees of freedom, whose mental correlate
co-ordinates at (0.904, 0.096*) in Snedecor’s test distribution. (1.15.9)
This co-ordination test procedure is wrong, as it tries to test E(B) = 0 against E(B) > 0 
and E(B) < 0 simultaneously. We return to this point in a subsequent section.
1.16 Remark on the generality of Definitions 1.15.1 and 1.15.2
In the event of small data sets, the precision that typifies co-ordination tests enables us 
to recognise apparently appreciable, but nevertheless not unusual, departures from the 
data patterns predicted by a hypothesised model. At the same time, that precision can 
often, despite meagre data, uncover patterns that depart strongly from those predicted 
by the model. Note, however, that neither of the two definitions in the previous sec-
tion specifies a commencement test as necessarily being a co-ordination test. That is so 
because we must recognise that, especially with larger data sets, commencement tests 
also take other valuable forms, such as plotting data values against the expected values 
of the corresponding order statistics for sampling from a hypothesised singleton, and 
then judging whether or not the data points seem to scatter round a straight line. So 
we must avoid being prescriptive as to how investigators may test the quality of fit of a 
hypothesised singleton. We must rather try to establish the relative merits of different 
methods of commencement testing, bearing in mind only that in the usage of scientific 
data analysis, ‘tests of fit’ are tests that lead to physical facts of fit. That is to say, they are 
tests that lead to facts of fit that the human body can be compelled to grasp.
1.17 The specification of alternatives for a commencement test
Consider a scientific investigator who, at some stage, is able to say: ‘In my opinion the 
possibilities can now be limited to those listed here.’ In the statistical case, that would 
take the form of an investigator being able to say: ‘In my opinion the possibilities can 
now be limited to the members of this class of models.’ In neither case, however, can we 
view that as the situation at commencement. Thus, for instance, Tukey’s test for non-
additivity is a commencement test, as it uses a ruled surface as an approximation for an 
essentially boundless variety of non-additive alternatives. It would be silly to think we 
could gather all that variety into a tightly specified class of models. 
Again, consider the problem of testing for whether or not the hypothesised model called 
‘random numbers’ fits the output of a particular pseudo-random number generator. It 
appears at once that we cannot hope to imbed the hypothesised model into a class of 
models such that the alternatives embrace every possible form of non-random num-
bers. As we must then be leery of inadvertently precluding possibly important alterna-
tives, we must, by way of a variety of tests, specify broad varieties of alternatives, where 
such specifications rely on our insight into the substantive subject matter involved. If, 
for instance, the numbers are generated by rolling a special die we will not expect to 
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find a periodicity in the output, but we might well test for digits that occur with unequal 
frequency. For a different kind of generator, however, we would test for periodicity of 
various kinds. The point here is this: if we test a hypothesised member of a class of 
models against other members of that class, we can (and this is crucial) arrange for no 
member to be overlooked, but in commencement testing there can be no such assurance. 
To give an example, we note that an early non-mechanical pseudo-random number ge-
ne rator involved a non-random pattern that escaped the notice of those who devised it, 
R.A. Fisher and F. Yates. In order to grasp the slippery nature of choosing appropriate 
alternatives in the case of commencement testing, we need only to grasp that it could 
also happen to us. 
In order to help us grasp why the members of a class of statistical models cannot satis-
factorily serve as the alternatives for a commencement test, let us try to devise such a 
test. Let the points of the sample space on which the models are to be defined be denoted 
by x1, x2, x3, … . Let the probabilities of these points be denoted by P01, P02, P03, …, for the 
hypothesised model, and by P11, P12, P13, …, for a fully specified statistical alternative. 
Then we have introduced the class of models
Pr(X = xj) = (1-δ)P0j+δP1j for j = 1, 2, 3, … , where δ ∈ {0, 1}. (1.17.1)
The class arising at (1.17.1) consists of just two models indexed by the parameter δ. So 
we are asserting the appropriateness of a certain class of models without having estab-
lished whether or not the characteristics of the class as a whole fit the given data satis-
factorily. For instance, if the two members are characteristic of a Poisson class, and that 
of a negative binomial class, neither model might fit the data well. In commencement 
testing we must try to avoid such difficulties by specifying a broadly embracive variety 
of alternatives via partial orderings based on broadly descriptive concepts such as ‘ag-
gregated’, ‘over-dispersed’, ‘skewed’, and so on. We thus specify certain data patterns 
(rather than certain models) as being patterns that are ‘atypical of the hypothesised 
model’ in the broad sense of being ‘more frequent’ under various broadly envisaged 
circumstances. The alternatives thus broadly envisaged are appropriately described by 
Definition 1.17.1 as being ‘incipient’.
Definition 1.17.1:
An incipient statistical model is a statistical model that is only broadly envisaged, that is to say, without 
rigid mathematical specification.
A typical commencement test thus involves ‘an incipient class of models’ whose mem-
bers comprise one fully specified singleton, as the hypothesised model, and one or more 
incipient alternatives.
1.18 Remark on terminology
Cox and Hinkley (1974) use the term ‘pure significance test’ in a sense that is close to 
our term ‘commencement test’ and they then refer to some ‘pure significance tests’ as 
‘goodness of fit tests’. Kempthorne and Folks (1971) refer to all commencement tests as 
‘goodness of fit tests’. However, though Pearson’s goodness of fit statistic is often used 
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for a commencement test, such as when testing for normality, it is also used for other 
kinds of tests, such as when, presupposing a binomial class of models, Bi(n, μ), to be ap-
plicable, it is used to test μ = 0.5 against μ ≠ 0.05. So we will reserve the term ‘goodness of 
fit’ as the name of Pearson’s statistic and of tests based on his statistic since that is after 
all the original usage. We will develop the term ‘quality of fit’ in a much broader sense. 
In fact, we will agree with Anscombe (1963) inasmuch as he holds that in the discourse 
of data analysis, the only tests of interest are tests of ‘fit’.
1.19 Definition of co-ordination tests and significance tests
We must deliberately emphasise the distinction between hypothesis tests and the very 
different kind of tests required by a data analyst, as the statistical literature has largely 
failed to do so. We therefore follow Kempthorne and Folks (1971) by relinquishing the 
terms null hypothesis and alternative hypothesis and the corresponding notations H0 and 
H1, respectively, to the literature of hypothesis tests. We follow them also by using, for the 
purposes of the kind of tests being considered, the terms hypothesised model and alterna-
tive model, denoted by M0 and M1, respectively. These distinctions are not simply semantic 
or notational, as developments in subsequent chapters will show. We now introduce Defi-
nitions 1.19.1 and 1.19.2 in order to establish a formal relationship between significance 
tests and co-ordination tests.
Definition 1.19.1:
Let O
T
 for T = 1, 2, 3, …, denote a partial ordering of all the sample patterns that arise from a singleton M0 
being put forward as a probability model for how given data might have come about. Let the given data 
be modelled as if a sample in Ot, where t denotes a particular value of T. A significance test of this model 
attaches to the given data the calculable number:
 SL(t; 0) = Pr(a sample pattern ∈ O
T
 for T ≥ tM0),
which is called the significance level for the given data with regard to the model M0 and for the partial 
ordering chosen.
Definition 1.19.2:
Let O
T
 for T = 1, 2, 3, …, denote a partial ordering of all the sample patterns that arise from a singleton 
M0 being put forward as a probability model for how given data might have come about. Let the data be 
modelled as if a sample in Ot, where t denotes a particular value of T. A co-ordination test of this model 
attaches to the given data the calculable ordered number triplet:
 C(t; 0) = [U(t; 0), ε(t; 0), V(t; 0)]
given by:
 U(t; 0) = Pr(a sample pattern ∈ O
T
 for T < tM0),
 ε(t; 0) = Pr(a sample pattern ∈ O
T
 for T = tM0), and
 V(t; 0) = Pr(a sample pattern ∈ O
T
 for T > tM0),
whose members are called the statistical co-ordinates and the statistical rounding for the given data with 
regard to the model M0 and for the partial ordering chosen.
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Definition 1.19.1 is essentially that of Kempthorne and Folks (1971, p. 222). Both of the 
definitions envisage the sample space as discrete and effectively finite. This must be so, 
as the recording of any data can only be by using a finite set of descriptions to describe 
a finite set of items. This is underscored by Theorem 1.19.1.
Theorem 1.19.1:
Let C = (U, ε, V) denote the statistical co-ordinates arising from a co-ordination test of the quality of fit 
of a given singleton M0 being put forward as a probability model for how given data might have come 
about. Then U+V < 1, as ε cannot be equal to zero.
Hence, for any given data set and any partial ordering of the samples arising from any 
given singleton put forward as a model of how those data might have come about, the 
co-ordinates defined by Definition 1.19.2 cannot be recovered from the corresponding 
significance level defined by Definition 1.19.1. True, in practice a statistical rounding 
is usually very small, so that the co-ordinates can often be recovered almost precisely. 
However, that is beside the point here. The point is that the different definitions inten-
tionally convey two very different meanings. So it would be foolish to brush the formal 
distinction aside without having a very clear understanding of each of the two different 
meanings being conveyed, and without having a very clear understanding of the conse-
quences of reasoning in terms of one or the other of those two meanings. The reader is 
cautioned not to be impetuous on this point.
1.20 Derivation of co-ordination tests from given  
 significance tests
Many optimal co-ordination tests can be derived from existing significance tests. In fact, 
from every significance test, a corresponding co-ordination test can be derived, though 
not always an optimal one. In order to show how such derived co-ordination tests are 
obtained, we need Definition 1.20.1 and Theorem 1.20.1.
Definition 1.20.1:
Let O
T
 for T = 1, 2, 3, …, k denote any partial ordering of the samples arising from a given singleton. Then we 
refer to OS for S = 1+k-T for T = 1, 2, 3, …, k as the inverted ordering.
Theorem 1.20.1:
Let O
T
 for T = 1, 2, 3, …, k denote any partial ordering of the samples arising from a given singleton, and 
let (A, B, C) give the co-ordinates of t (a particular value of T) with respect to that partial ordering. Then 
(C, B, A) gives the co-ordinates of t with respect to the inverted ordering.
The term ‘significance test’ is widely misused in the statistical literature as a name for 
various kinds of ‘tests’ that are demonstrably not significance tests. Our usage of the term 
is restricted to Definition 1.19.1. That being understood, Theorem 1.20.2 follows directly 
from Definitions 1.19.1, 1.19.2 and 1.20.1, as well as from Theorem 1.20.1.  
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Theorem 1.20.2:
Any significance test yields a formal co-ordination test because:
 The complement of the left co-ordinate = the significance level for the chosen ordering
 The complement of the right co-ordinate = the significance level for the inverted ordering
 The statistical rounding = [(the sum of the two complements)-1]÷2.
Theorem 1.20.2 enables co-ordination tests to draw on the mathematics of significance 
tests. The theorem emphasises the term ‘formal’, because the distinction between the 
two kinds of tests cannot be mathematically (formally) understood; it can be understood 
only by grasping the distinction between the different scientific meanings conveyed. Once 
again, the reader is cautioned to be patient on this point.
1.21 A normative prescription with destructive consequences
The theory of hypothesis tests has exerted an exceedingly pervasive influence on the 
practices of statistical data analysis, particularly by way of a normative prescription that 
may for our immediate purposes be formulated in terms of the following rules:
(1) Let SL denote the significance level attached to given data by a significance test of a 
hypothesised model, M0, against an alternative, M1.
(2) Specify a test size α, which is a small fraction selected without reference to the data. 
A much favoured value is α = 0.05.
(3) If SL ≤ α, reject M0 and accept M1. If SL > α, accept M0 and reject M1.
In Chapter 4 we show how this prescription originates in a profoundly mistaken view. 
Here we merely prove that use of the prescription destroys scientific evidence, both of 
a statistical nature and of a substantive nature. We present three examples to prove the 
destruction of statistical evidence, and three further examples to prove the destruction 
of substantive evidence; in each of these two cases we present the three examples and 
then discuss them jointly. The reader will find that in each case the proof consists of 
presenting two of a kind and one that is different, and then showing that the use of the 
normative prescription results in a misclassification.
Example 1.21.1
The term ‘learning’ has a diversity of meanings, such as learning to judge distances, 
learning to ride a bicycle, and learning to find your way home. Some animals, sharks for 
instance, seem to have no learning ability. Other animals display various kinds of learn-
ing ability. It is even possible for different memory systems to occur in the same animal; 
in Octopus for instance visual and tactile memories are stored in anatomically distinct 
parts (Young, 1965). So, consider a sequence of just 13 trials in which an octopus either 
succeeds (S) or fails (F) to perform a task to be learned, as follows:
F, F, S, F, S, F, F, S, S, S, F, S, S. (1.21.1)
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Attempt number
Figure 1.21.1: Success (1) or failure (0) in 13 consecutive attempts in a learning trial
A trend toward an increased frequency of success is made obvious by plotting the data 
as in Figure 1.21.1. In order to assess this more incisively, we consider the possibility, to 
which we need not grant credence, that the animal is unable to learn the task. That leads 
us to a hypothesised class of models in which the sequence is represented as the outcome 
of just 13 independent Bernoulli trials, with the constant probability of success denoted 
by μ (0 < μ < 1). Let yx = 0 or 1, depending on whether the outcome in the ordinal position 
x is F or S, respectively (x = 1, 2, 3, … 13). Let y
•
 denote the total number of successes. The 
data are then modelled by a sample of which the probability is given by:
  13 
  ∏ myx (1-m)1-yx = my• (1-m)13-y•, 
x=1
where this probability can be expressed as:
 13                             13  -1 
      my• (1-m)13-y•  ×                    . (1.21.2) 
  y•                                                     y•       
The first factor in square brackets at (1.21.2) tells us that under the hypothesised class, 
the total number of successes, y
•
, is being represented as a realisation of a binomial 
random variable. It tells us nothing about the appropriateness of the class; the second 
factor is independent of μ and thus is the class characteristic; it tells us that, given the 
value of y
•
, there are 13-choose-y
•
 equally frequent sample patterns. We now wish to test 
the class cha racteristic against alternatives where Figure 1.21.1 reflects a trend towards 
an increased frequency of success, owing to learning ability. So we order all the possible 
sample patterns according to the size of the product moment correlation coefficient of 
yx and x. For the data at (1.21.1) we find r = +0.453, which is a class mark for the interval 
from +0.433 to +0.473. The hypothesised class characteristic models this as having an 
approximately normal distribution given in an obvious notation by
N(μ, σ²) = N[0, (n-1)–1],
where n = 13 in our case (Cox and Hinkley 1974, pp. 185-186). The mental correlate of the 
correlation is thus found to be co-ordinated at approximately (0.93, 0.02, 0.05*) in the test 
distribution.
Example 1.21.2
Suppose the sequence at (1.1.1) represents the results of another learning trial with an 
octopus, this time to see if the animal can be induced by rewards to learn a task that 
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is different to the one considered in the previous example. A trend toward an increased 
frequency of success, albeit slight, is clearly perceived when the data are plotted as in 
Figure 1.1.1. This trend is brought forward strongly by the kind of test performed in Ex-
ample 1.21.1, as follows: the product moment correlation coefficient of yx and x in this case 
proves to be r = +0.606, which is a class mark for the interval from +0.520 to +0.693. Using 
the approximation given in Example 1.21.1, the mental correlate of the present correlation 
is found to be co-ordinated at approximately (0.92, 0.05, 0.03*) in the test distribution.
Example 1.21.3
Suppose that for yet another different task to learn, an octopus performs as follows in just 
15 successive attempts:
F, F, S, S, F, F, F, S, S, F, S, S, S, F, F.
Performing the same kind of test used in Examples 1.21.1 and 1.21.2 we find that the 
pro duct moment correlation coefficient of yx and x is given by r = +0.124, which is a class 
mark for the interval from +0.093 to +0.155. Using the approximation given in Example 
1.21.1, the mental correlate of the present correlation coefficient is found to be co-ordinated 
at approximately (0.56, 0.08, 0.36*) in the test distribution.
Discussion of Examples 1.21.1, 1.21.2 and 1.21.3
Consider the following summary of tests performed in the three trials with Octopus:
 Task Observed correlation Number of attempts Level of co-ordination
 Task 1 +0.453 n1 = 13 (0.93, 0.02, 0.05*) 
 Task 2 +0.606 n2 = 9 (0.92, 0.05, 0.03*) 
 Task 3 +0.124 n3 = 15 (0.56, 0.08, 0.36*)
The investigator could hardly conclude otherwise than to consider that some evidence of 
learning ability, albeit slender, has been gathered in Tasks 1 and 2, whereas there is utterly 
no indication of learning ability in Task 3. Yet, if the test size, which must be selected with-
out reference to the data, is to be α = 0.075, the normative prescription destroys statistical 
evidence by mismatching Tasks 2 and 3, as follows:
 Task Significance level Compared to α Conclusion 
 Task 1 0.02 + 0.05 = 0.07 0.07 < 0.075 Octopus can learn Task 1 
 Task 2 0.05 + 0.03 = 0.08 0.08 > 0.075 Octopus cannot learn Task 2 
 Task 3 0.08 + 0.36 = 0.44 0.44 > 0.075 Octopus cannot learn Task 3
Apart from such destruction of statistical evidence, the normative rules also destroy sub-
stantive evidence. This is because the rules spring from the view that, concerning the 
matter being investigated, the investigator is ignorant to the extent of being utterly de-
pendent on the numerical data. The rules do not provide for such knowledge as, for in-
stance, knowing that Octopus can learn to respond to certain visual clues. Thus, if Task 2 
required learning to respond to a previously untested visual clue, the rules will disallow 
an investigator to consider, along with the trial results, prior experience with visual clues. 
Conversely, there is no provision for the investigator to be surprised by a result. Consider, 
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for instance, that although Octopus adjust correctly for the weight of objects they pick up, 
they cannot (and this is the surprise) learn to distinguish between objects differing only 
in weight (Wells 1961). So, had Task 3 required learning to distinguish certain objects by 
weight only, the investigator would wish to report a surprising result and so would surely 
consider SL > 0.075 to be an obscuring description of that result. In fact, one can hardly 
imagine an investigator who would not consider SL > 0.075 to be an obscuring descrip-
tion of the results for both Tasks 2 and 3. Even for Task 1, the normative prescription ob-
structs scientific debate, as substantive science might with good reason be sceptical of the 
conclusion that the rules would in that case foist upon it. This point is strongly brought 
forward by the following three examples.
Example 1.21.4
A test of fit introduced by R. J. Strutt (later Lord Raleigh) is known as Raleigh’s test. Let xj, 
for 0° ≤ xj < 360° and j = 1, 2, 3, …, n, denote a sample of independent angles from a popula-
tion of angles uniformly distributed on the interval [0°, 360°). We wish to test the quality 
of fit of this, as a hypothesised model, against alternatives with angles tending to cluster 
around a ‘preferred’ angle. So the variety of equally frequent sample patterns must be re-
placed by a lesser variety of patterns such that an ordering of patterns by the magnitude 
of their frequencies would tend to detect any tendency to cluster round a preferred angle. 
In Raleigh’s test we do so by vector addition of the unit vectors (sin xj, cos xj) for j = 1, 2, 3, 
…, n, and then ordering the possible samples according to the amplitude of the resultant 
vector, i.e. according to the magnitude of
             
n
           2       n
              2
q2 =     ∑ sin xj   +     ∑ cos xj    . (1.21.3) 
          j = l                  j = l
A large value of q² points at a preferred angle. Under the hypothesised model, the dis-
tribution of Q², the random variable corresponding to q², is approximately such that
Pr(Q² > q²) = exp(-q²/n) (1.21.4)
(Raleigh, 1880). When appropriate, a preferred angle is estimated by the vector mean, de-
fined by Krumbein (1939) as the angle corresponding to the resultant vector. Figure 1.21.2 
uses an equiareal rose diagram (a circular histogram) to display a data set given by Krumbein. 
It comprises 18 petals, so to speak, whose positions and relative areas make two oppo sing 
super-petals seem to appear. Glacial till pebbles were collected from a road cut through a 
late Wisconsin drumlin. The drumlin trends S 74°W, and is one among a field of drumlins 
whose average trend is S 82°W. The ice presumably travelled east to west from the Lake 
Michigan basin on the east. The directions of dip of the long axes of 100 pebbles were 
measured. Krumbein’s interpretation of the data is that the pebbles tend to present their 
minimum cross-sectional areas opposed to the direction of flow, so that statistically the 
maximum cross-sectional areas, and thus the long axes, tend to lie parallel to the direc-
tion of movement. The dip of a pebble’s long axis would then be independent of its direc-
tion of dip. So, a bimodal distribution would arise, as the dip of such a pebble contributes 
to one or the other of two opposite modes. So, adopting Krumbein’s model as alternative
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Figure 1.21.2: Equiareal rose diagram displaying the directions of the dip of the long axes of 100 
pebbles collected in a road cut through a drumlin that trended S 74°W. The num-
bers of pebbles counted in the different class intervals, clockwise starting from due 
north, are: 4  8  2  5  12  8  6  4  2  2  1  9  9  10   6  7  3  2 
to the hypothesised model, i.e. to Raleigh’s model envisaging random directions of dip, 
we double the observed angles and apply Raleigh’s test to the doubled angles. By doubling 
the angles, the 18 original class intervals are replaced by nine new intervals such that the 
data received in each new interval originates from two original intervals separated by 
180°. So the two opposite modes in the original data would thereby be replaced by a single 
mode in the derived data. It turns out that
q² = 877.09, for n = 100, where exp(-q²/n) = 0.0002. (1.21.5)
As the rounding is close to zero, the mental correlate of the q² value given at (1.21.5) is 
situated at approximately (0.9998, 0.0002*) in Raleigh’s test distribution. This favours 
Krumbein’s model over the hypothesised model. Moreover, the vector mean of the doubled 
angles, 177.3°, transforms to S 89°W on the original scale, compared to the drumlin trend, 
S 74°W, and the average drumlin trend, S 82°W.
Example 1.21.5
Table 1.21.1 gives the numbers of babies with harelip born month by month during 1951 
in Birmingham, England. Raleigh’s test can be applied by transforming dates to angles as 
shown in the table. The datum to be modelled as a value of Q² is q² = 782. As the round-
ing is close to zero, the co-ordinates of the modelled datum are given approximately by 
(0.999, 0.001*) where a tentative pointer indicates an increase in the number of babies 
born with harelip during February onward through May, owing to which the hypoth-
esised model fits the data very poorly. The vector mean, 67.1°, corresponds to about 68
North
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Table 1.21.1: Numbers of babies born with harelip in Birmingham, England, 1951
Month Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.
Number 8 19 11 12 16 8 7 5 8 3 8 8
Angle 0° 30° 60° 90° 120° 150° 180° 210° 240° 270° 300° 330°
days after mid-January, i.e. to round about the 23rd of March. The data used in this exam-
ple are given by Edwards (1961) who reports that the total numbers of babies born in the 
different months were more or less constant, showing no relation to the numbers with 
harelip. So the finding is not explained by an increase in the total numbers born during 
February onward through May.
Example 1.21.6
The early-morning orientation of 11 locusts with respect to the direction of the rising sun 
causes an entomologist to recall that under such circumstances certain species of poikilo-
therms sun themselves. Taking the direction of the sun to be 0°, the entomologist finds 
the facing directions of the animals to be
51°, 85°, 90°, 94°, 111°, 214°, 222°, 260°, 281°, 302° and 315°.
As some animals would be sunning their left sides and others would be sunning their 
right sides, a bimodal grouping would arise. So the entomologist applies Raleigh’s test to 
the doubled angles. The datum to be modelled as a value of Q² is q² = 33.2. This q² value 
is co-ordinated at approximately (0.951, 0.001, 0.048*) in Raleigh’s test distribution. The 
vector mean of the doubled angles, 179°, transforms to 89.5° on the original scale, where 
90° would be perpendicular to the direction of the sun’s rays.
Discussion of Examples 1.21.4, 1.21.5 and 1.21.6
Mathematical statistics can find very little difference between the first two examples. Sub-
stantive science, however, will judge them very differently. In Krumbein’s example the co-
ordination test has provided a fact of poor fit, which adds strongly to the force of an under-
standable train of explanatory reasoning, so much so that his interpretation of the data is 
essentially placed beyond reasonable contest. In Edwards’ example, a similar test provides 
a similar fact of poor fit, but where is the train of explanatory reasoning to which it might 
add, or from which it might subtract? The data pattern is not explained by fluctuations in 
the total numbers of babies born. It is known that the frequency of babies born with hare-
lip increases with the age of the mother, and also that it varies between families, but as 
neither of these two facts would seem to explain Edwards’ data, we can but ask for further 
investigation. For instance, did the pattern recur in subsequent years? As for the example 
with locusts, substantive science would judge it to be much closer to Krumbein’s example 
than to Edwards’ example. In order to grasp this we need only to note that substantive 
science has contributed drumlin trends for comparison to the vector mean of the pebble 
directions. It has also contributed the perpendicular to the direction of the sun’s rays for 
comparison to the vector mean of the locusts’ directions. But what has it contributed for 
comparison to the vector mean of the babies’ days of birth? Such understanding is utterly 
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destroyed by the normative rules. Consider, for instance, the specification a = 0.01, often 
favoured as a conventional means of avoiding reference to the given data. The norma-
tive rules would destroy substantive understanding by mismatching Examples 1.21.4 and 
1.21.5 as very similar cases, and viewing Example 1.21.6 as dissimilar to the other two.
1.22 Combining independent levels of co-ordination 
Definition 1.19.2 requires an ordering that will lead to co-ordinates that are observable 
under the hypothesised model. Thus C(t; 0) = [U(t; 0), ε(t; 0), V(t; 0)] denotes one of 
the values in the range of a statistic denoted by C(T; 0) = [U(T; 0), ε(T; 0), V(T; 0)]. 
Similarly, Kempthorne and Folks (1971, p. 223) want SL(t: 0) to be observable for any hy-
pothesised model. They therefore note that, for instance, the Behrens-Fisher test is not 
a significance test. Hence, our Theorem 1.20.2 cannot be used to derive a co-ordination 
test from the Behrens-Fisher test. We refer to the range of C(T: 0) as the attainable co-
ordinations for the test it represents. This being understood, Theorem 1.22.1 now states 
a fundamental property of co-ordination tests.
Theorem 1.22.1:
Consider the statistic C(T; 0) = [U(T; 0), ε(T; 0), V(T; 0)] arising from any test of co-ordination and let  
C(t; 0) = [U(t; 0), ε(t; 0), V(t; 0)] denote any one of the attainable co-ordinations that comprise the range of
C(T; 0), where t = 1, 2, 3, ... Then:
 Pr[U(T; 0) < U(t; 0)M0] = U(t; 0),
 Pr[ε(T; 0) = ε(t; 0)M0] = ε(t; 0), and
 Pr[V(T; 0) < V(t; 0)M0] = V(t; 0).
Proof of Theorem 1.22.1
It follows directly from Definition 1.19.2 that:
Pr[U(T; 0) < U(t; 0)M0] = Pr(a sample pattern ∈ OT for T < tM0) = U(t; 0).
Pr[ε(T; 0) = ε(t; 0)M0] = Pr(a sample pattern ∈ OT for T = tM0) = ε(t; 0).
Pr[V(T; 0) < V(t; 0)M0] = Pr(a sample pattern ∈ OT for T > tM0) = V(t; 0).
 Q.e.d.
The theorem yields a method for combining the results of independent co-ordination 
tests, perhaps performed on very different kinds of data, but in which the hypothe sised 
models are tested against alternatives that represent a common substantive source of 
possibly poor fit. The method, whose basic idea is due to R. A. Fisher, uses the fact that 
chi-square based on just two degrees of freedom, χ2, has the property                                                                                    2
-2ln[1-Pr(χ2 < chi2)] = chi2, or (equivalently) -2lnPr(χ2 > chi2) = chi2.
                              
2         2            2                                            2         2           2
So, given [U(t; 0), ε(t; 0), V(t; 0)] = (U, ε, V), we compute the pair of values given by
-2ln[1-U] and -2ln[1-(U+ε)], or (equivalently) -2ln[ε+V] and -2ln[V],
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and we model the pair as the boundaries of a class interval whose midpoint is a value of 
χ2, as measured approximately on a rounding grid. For example:
  2
 (U, ε, V) Lower boundary Upper boundary Midpoint
 (0.80, 0.06, 0.14) 3.22 3.93 chi2= 3.575
                                                                                                                        
2
 (0.92, 0.02, 0.06) 5.05 5.63 chi2= 5.340
                                                                                                                        
2
 (0.88, 0.03, 0.09) 4.41 4.82 chi2= 4.615
                                                                                                                        
2
                                                 Total: chi2= 13.530
                                                                                                                         
6
We interpret chi2 as the value of a chi-square random variable based on six degrees of
                            
6
freedom, χ2, as measured on a rounding grid, as follows: let the rounding errors of the
                   
6
three chi2 components be modelled as independent and uniformly distributed. Then               2the variance of the rounding error of their sum is modelled as being given by
[(3.93-3.22)²/12]+[(5.63-5.05)²/12]+[(4.82-4.41)²/12] = (2 × 0.50)²/12.
So, modelling the rounding error for the chi2 value as also uniformly distributed, the 
                                                                            
6
observed value, 13.530, is modelled as the midpoint of a class interval bounded by
13.53-0.50 = 13.03 from below, and 13.53+0.50 = 14.03 from above. Hence, under the hypoth-
esised model, the given chi2 value is co-ordinated at (0.96, 0.01, 0.03) in the χ2 distribution.
                                              
6
                                                                             
6
The foregoing theorem and application have not involved the pointer; we have formu-
lated a mathematical theorem and noted a mathematical consequence thereof. In order 
to apply the resulting recipe to a practical instance of substantive investigation, we must 
ensure that the pointers involved have all been aligned as pointing to the left, or as 
pointing to the right, possibly by inverting one or more of the orderings. This could only 
be done by understanding what alternatives would arise from the common underlying 
source of possibly poor fit being tested for. It is after all precisely this kind of considera-
tion that motivated us to introduce the pointer in the first place.
The problem solved by the foregoing method for combining several statistical co-ordinates 
when testing for a common underlying source of poor fit is of practical interest. However, 
the reason for presenting it here is to underscore the following: the co-ordinates produced 
by a co-ordination test direct us to where, in the particular test distribution involved, the 
mental correlate of a given test datum is to be found. They are directions in much the same 
sense as those given to us by a friend who telephones us to arrange a meeting ‘in the coffee 
bar on the corner of 3rd Avenue and 7th Street’. Of course, the coffee bar is in the real world, 
whereas the rounding is in the human mind. Nevertheless, directions to these places have 
this in common:
They are not interpretable as probabilities.
They are not subject to normative prescriptions.
They employ meanings that need to be grasped by the human body.
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1.23 The sensitivity of a given test to different alternatives
Consider the distributions displayed in Figures 1.7.1 and 1.8.1. The first is bimodal and 
the second is unimodal. However, that does not contribute to any co-ordination tests that 
might be based upon them. The entire contribution made by such distributions to such 
tests is taken up by statistics of the type denoted by C(T; 0) in the previous section, as any 
shape that the test distribution might otherwise have then falls away. For a given test of 
co-ordination, the distribution of C(T; 0), i.e. of the random co-ordinate arising under the 
hypothesised model, is in effect given by Theorem 1.22.1. In the case of the test distribu-
tion given in Table 1.7.3, for instance, the distribution of C(T; 0) is given in Table 1.23.1.
Table 1.23.1: A distribution of hypothesised co-ordinates
Attainable co-ordinates Modelled frequency
 (Ø, 0.26, 0.74)  18/70 = 0.26
 (0.26, 0.17, 0.57)  12/70 = 0.17
 (0.43, 0.23, 0.34)  2(8)/70 = 0.23
 (0.66, 0.17, 0.17)  2(6)/70 = 0.17
 (0.83, 0.06, 0.11)  4/70 = 0.06
 (0.89, 0.11, Ø)  4(2)/70 = 0.11
In such a table the right-hand column is redundant, as each frequency given in the right-
hand column is also the corresponding rounding given in the left-hand column. In this 
section we consider the distribution of the random co-ordinates arising under possible 
alternatives to the hypothesised model.
Let us recall that although commencement tests do not involve fully specified alternatives, 
they nevertheless do involve alternatives with certain broadly specifiable statistical prop-
erties. In the case of the sunbirds of Example 1.11.2, for instance, their territorial behaviour 
does not readily lend itself to statistical modelling. Nevertheless, their behaviour would 
generate an over-dispersed distribution. Again, in the case of Ronald Fisher’s analysis of 
Gregor Mendel’s data, it would be silly to try to model the enormously complicated alter-
natives that Fisher had in mind. Nevertheless, we can describe those alternatives as the 
consequences of prejudiced data collection, and we can understand how that leads to chi-
square values that are unduly small. Once again, when testing a pseudo-random number 
generator for excessively many runs, we need not be able to produce fully specified alterna-
tives in order to be able to specify the kind of data patterns that, if unduly frequent, would 
serve to specify such runs. So we take the position that statistical co-ordinates calculated 
under a hypothesised model also have a distribution under an alternative, albeit only 
broadly envisaged. However, in order to come to grips with the matter mathematically, we 
must devise an example with a fully specified alternative. Consider four animals occupying 
five compartments. Let the hypothesised model, M0, be that of random occupancy, and let 
an alternative model, M1, be that of an aggregative occupancy, whereby each animal would 
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twice avoid an unoccupied compartment, and then randomly occupy one of the other com-
partments. The distributions of the possible occupancy patterns are given in Table 1.23.2.
Table 1.23.2: Alternative distributions of occupancy patterns
Pattern Pr(patternM0) Pr(patternM1)
 2[1]1[2]0[2] 0.576 0.100
 1[4]0[1] 0.192 Ø
 3[1]1[1]0[3] 0.128 0.414
 2[2]0[3] 0.096 0.270
 4[1]0[4] 0.008 0.216
As we have already mentioned, a co-ordination test involves such distributions only via 
the statistical co-ordinates that arise from them. So, consider the co-ordinate distribu-
tions arising in the present case. They are given in Table 1.23.3, where C(T; 0) and C(T; 1) 
denote the random co-ordinates that arise under M0 and M1, respectively. 
Table 1.23.3: Distributions of alternative random co-ordinates
Data Ordering C(T: 0) C(T; 1)
 2[1]1[2]0[2]  O1  (Ø, 0.57, 0.43)  (Ø, 0.10, 0.90)
 1[4]0[1]  O2  (0.57, 0.19, 0.24)  (0.10, Ø, 0.90)
 3[1]1[1]0[3]  O3  (0.76, 0.13, 0.11)  (0.10, 0.41, 0.49)
 2[2]0[3]  O4  (0.89, 0.10, 0.01)  (0.51, 0.27, 0.22)
 4[1]0[4]  O5  (0.99, 0.01, Ø)  (0.78, 0.22, Ø)
In this table the ordering is based on the hypothesised model only, by using the principle 
that ‘the more frequent under the model, the more “like” the model’. Note again, that the 
frequency of a co-ordinate is given by its rounding; so, a list of all of the co-ordinates at-
tainable under any given model fully specifies the distribution of the random co-ordinate 
under that model.
Now consider how the information given in Tables 1.23.2 and 1.23.3 might be used to test 
the quality of fit of M0 vs. M1, as alternative explanations of how a given datum of occu-
pancy, say 2[2]0[3], might have come about. The distributions in Table 1.23.2 are displayed 
by bar diagrams in Figure 1.23.1, where the shaded bars represent the roundings within 
which the mental correlate of the given datum is placed by M0 and by M1, respectively. 
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Figure 1.23.1: Testing the quality-of-fit of two alternative models of occupancy behaviour in re-
spect of a given data set
As the meanings conveyed by the alternative displays in Figure 1.23.1 could by simulation 
be forced upon the human body, those meanings belong to the discourse of physical evi-
dence, in which we point and say:
‘See for yourself how the mental correlate of the given datum is
not so snugly placed within the crowd that M0 brings to mind.’
‘See for yourself how the mental correlate of the given datum is
more snugly placed within the crowd that M1 brings to mind.’ (1.23.1)
The human body is thus forced to grasp that by the test performed the explanation of-
fered by M1 fits the data better than does the explanation offered by M0.
For the test we have just performed, Figure 1.23.1 conveys irrelevant detail, which is stripped 
away when, using the information given in Table 1.23.3, we display the test as in Figure 
1.23.2, showing only the co-ordinates for 2[2]0[3], given by M0 and by M1, respectively. 
0.576
0.192
0.128
0.096
0.008
0.1
0
0.414
0.270
0.216
, , , , . , , , , .
Testing the quality-of-fit of Model 0 Testing the quality-of-fit of Model 1
O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O1 O2 O3 O4 O5
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Figure 1.23.2: Statistical co-ordinates displaying the quality-of-fit of two alternative models of 
occupancy behaviour in respect of a given data set
In Figure 1.23.2 the co-ordinates are now represented by rectangles whose areas differ in 
proportion to the frequencies they represent. This representation fully serves the purpose 
of the test, as we can point at Figure 1.23.2 and say with equal meaning precisely what we 
said before when we were pointing at Figure 1.23.1.
Three aspects of the foregoing must now be firmly grasped.
Firstly, we have reasoned in terms of a single instance of occupancies in the real world, 
and in terms of two alternative populations of occupancies in the human mind. Our 
reasoning did not envisage, or in any way depend upon, the actual existence, or future 
existence, of any population of occupancies in the real world.
Secondly, the result of our co-ordination test is not one whose veracity is qualified by 
probability. The result of our test is a physically perceived fact, as follows:
As an explanation of how the given data might have come about, the one offered by 
M0 does not, by the test performed, fit the data as well as the one offered by M1.
This fact has been forced upon the human body, and as such is beyond any reasonable contest.
Thirdly, by putting forward an explanation of how the given data might have come about, 
we have not in any way prevented other explanations from also being put forward.
Having firmly fixed these three ideas in mind, we now wish to consider how we might 
describe the extent to which a given co-ordination test might enable us to discriminate 
between alternative models for data in hand. We begin by noting that the ideas intro-
duced by way of Table 1.23.3 motivate Definition 1.23.1.
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Definition 1.23.1:
Let O
T
 for T = 1, 2, 3, …, k denote a partial ordering of all the sample patterns that arise from one, or 
the other, or both of a pair of singletons M0 and M1, being considered as alternative probability models 
of how given data might have come about. Let the given data be modelled as if a sample in Ot, where t 
denotes a particular value of T. A co-ordination test of M0 versus M1 attaches to the given data a pair of 
calculable ordered number triplets
 C(t, j) = [U(t, j), ε(t, j), V(t, j)], for j = 0, 1,
given by:
 U(t, j) = Pr(a sample pattern ∈ O
T
 for T < t  Mj),
 ε(t, j) = Pr(a sample pattern ∈ O
T
 for T = t  Mj), and
 V(t, j) = Pr(a sample pattern ∈ O
T
 for T > t  Mj),
whose members are called the statistical co-ordinates for the given data with regard to the models M0 and M1, 
respectively, and for the partial ordering chosen. We call C(t, 0) and C(t, 1) the hypothesised co-ordination and 
the alternative co-ordination, respectively, and we call C(T, 0) and C(T, 1) the hypothesised co-ordinator and 
the alternative co-ordinator, respectively.
The reader should note that nothing in this definition prevents one from re-labelling 
(M0, M1) as (M1, M0). So, the last sentence of the definition deliberately introduces a ter-
minological asymmetry. This provides for seamless extensions of our development to cases 
in which such asymmetry is required. In the case of the sunbirds of Example 1.10.2, for 
instance, the hypothesised co-ordination is hypothesised, not because it is the more credible, 
but because it is calculable, whereas the alternative, though capable of being broadly envi-
saged, is not calculable. We have already seen that such is the usual situation at commence ment. 
Theorem 1.23.1 is mathematically useful; it arises directly from Definition 1.23.1.
Theorem 1.23.1:
Let C(T, j) = [U(T, j), ε(T, j), V(T, j)] for j = 0 as opposed to j = 1, denote the co-ordinator pair arising from 
a co-ordination test of a hypothesised singleton M0, as opposed to an alternative singleton M1.
Let T = 1, 2, 3, …, k be the full range of T. Then the following recurrence relations are satisfied:
 ε(t, j) + V(t, j) = V(t − 1, j), for j = 0, 1, and for all of t = 2, 3, 4, …, k
 U(t, j) + ε(t, j) = U(t + 1, j), for j = 0, 1, and for all of t = 1, 2, 3, …, k − 1.
We digress briefly in order to develop a general terminology. The term test distribution names 
the distribution of a test statistic. Let the statistic be denoted by T, where O
T
 for T = 1, 2, 3, …, 
denotes an ordering of the sample patterns arising from a hypothesised singleton M0 being 
considered as a probability model of how given data might have come about. The terms test 
distribution and central test distribution are synonymous. The term non-central test distribu-
tion names the distribution of T under an alternative singleton M1. In place of the number 
labels T = 1, 2, 3, … , we often use equivalent value labels T = t1, t2, t3, … , indicating how the 
ordering of the sample patterns was achieved. In that case we also use terms such as central 
T and non-central T when it is clear what value T refers to. Examples such as central χ² and 
non-central χ² come to mind. We note that the use of the pointer can be extended to any al-
ternative co-ordination. For instance, referring back to Table 1.23.3, and again supposing the 
datum in hand to be 2[2]0[3], the facts stated at (1.23.1) are described by
C(T, 0) = (0.89, 0.10, 0.01*) vs. C(T, 1) = (0.51, 0.27, 0.22*) (1.23.2)
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When the pointer is attached to either a left or a right co-ordinate, we refer to that co-ordi-
nate as the pointing co-ordinate. At (1.23.2) for instance, the right statistical co-ordinates 
are the pointing co-ordinates. We note that in this particular example the hypothesised 
co-ordinates place the mental correlate of the given datum on the right-hand outskirts of 
the central test distribution, whereas the alternative co-ordinates place the correlate well 
within the bulk of the non-central test distribution. We express this by saying that the test 
is right sensitive to the alternative in question.
In trying to develop the foregoing ideas into a mathematically tractable theory, we en-
counter several fundamental difficulties, as follows.
A first fundamental difficulty is that there is a multiplicity of ways in which a co-ordina-
tion test might be made to discriminate between a hypothesised model and an alterna-
tive. Recall for instance how the following five co-ordinations arising from the use of 
Snedecor’s F, as circumstantially described in Example 1.11.3, were found to be pointing 
at inflated error estimates:
(*0.07, 0.93), (*0.02, 0.98), (*0.04, 0.96), (*0.00, 1.00), (*0.11, 0.89).
Each of the five F ratios can be expressed in terms of Student’s t as F = t², as each F arose 
from a test for 2 × 2 factorial interaction. So we might instead have considered the co-
ordinates of the corresponding t values in Student’s distribution, as follows, where the 
pointers are pointing at persistent mediocrity of calculated t values:
(0.54*, *0.46), (0.51*, *0.49), (0.48*, *0.52), (0.50*, *0.50), (0.56*, *0.44).
As there are many other ways for alternatively indicative patterns to be contrived, we are 
compelled to agree on Definition 1.23.2 as the definition of sensitivity in general.
Definition 1.23.2:
A co-ordination test of a hypothesised model is sensitive to a specific alternative if and only if we can 
point out data patterns that would be more frequent under the alternative circumstances than under the 
hypothesised circumstances.
Definition 1.23.2 merely serves to underscore the contrived nature of co-ordination tests. 
The most satisfactory tests usually turn out to be tests whose orderings place sample pat-
terns typical of an alternative of interest, into a specific tail of the test distribution. Unless 
stated otherwise, it must be tacitly understood that we will be considering tests that are 
thus contrived.
A second fundamental difficulty arises because for any mutually exclusive and exhaus-
tive ordering of sample patterns, O1, O2, O3, … , Ok, the initial member, O1, has no left 
co-ordinate, and the final member, Ok, has no right co-ordinate. Therefore, in the nota-
tion of Definition 1.23.1, we must necessarily have
U(1, j) = ∅ and V(k, j) = ∅ regardless of whether j = 0 or j = 1.
This is exemplified in Table 1.23.3, where k = 5. Now consider, for instance, just n in-
dependent attempts to discriminate by taste between two items. Let the hypothesised 
model be that the taster is simply guessing with equal chances of success or failure at each 
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attempt. An appropriate ordering for achieving sensitivity to the alternative that the taster 
has some ability to so discriminate, is Oj for j = 1, 2, 3, … , where j-1 = the number of suc-
cessful attempts. The co-ordinates under the hypothesised model for n successes in just n 
attempts are then given by (1-2-n, 2-n, ∅*) as, for instance,
(0.5, 0.5, ∅*) if n = 1, and (0.9375, 0.0625, ∅*) if n = 4. (1.23.3)
The magnitude of the right co-ordinate is evidentially vacuous in such cases, and they 
are not so rare in practice that they may be fobbed off. So we must devise a definition of 
sensitivity that accounts for them.
A third fundamental difficulty arises owing to the variable magnitude of statistical 
roundings, as exemplified by the following sets of possible co-ordination:
Set 1: (0.90, 0.04, 0.06*), (0.90, 0.05, 0.05*), (0.90, 0.06, 0.04*).
Set 2: (0.89, 0.06, 0.05*), (0.90, 0.05, 0.05*), (0.91, 0.04, 0.05*).
A co-ordination test places the mental correlate of the given datum anywhere within the 
rounding. Hence, by placing the mental correlate at the right-hand ‘edge’ of each round-
ing in Set 1, we bisect the test distribution at 0.94:0.06, 0.95:0.05, 0.96:0.04, respectively, 
which bisections are progressively more extreme from left to right. This progression is 
reflected by the right co-ordinate values 0.06, 0.05, 0.04, respectively, but not by the left 
co-ordinate values, 0.90 in each case. Next, by placing the mental correlate at the left-
hand ‘edge’ of each rounding in Set 2, we bisect the distribution at 0.89:0.11, 0.90:0.10, 
0.91:0.09, respectively, which bisections also are progressively more extreme from left to 
right. But this progression is not reflected by the right co-ordinate values, 0.05 in each 
case; it is reflected by the left co-ordinate values, 0.89, 0.90, 0.91, respectively. The source 
of this difficulty was noted at the very outset of our development by way of Theorem 
1.19.1, where it was underscored that any co-ordination test requires, for its precise 
expression, the values of two variables (not just one). However, that being understood, 
we note that the rounding produced by such a test is often small to the extent of having 
no forceful bearing on the outcome of the test. So, unless stated otherwise, it must be 
tacitly understood that the main thrust of our development concerns tests such that, in 
the notation of Definition 1.23.1,
U(t, j)+V(t, j) ≈ 1 both for j = 0 and for j = 1.
Either the values of U(t, j) for j = 0, 1, or (equivalently) those of V(t, j) for j = 0, 1, can 
then be used to describe the properties of such a test.
We now revisit our analysis of Krumbein’s angular data (Example 1.21.4). We applied 
Raleigh’s test after doubling the observed angles. The rose diagram displayed in Figure 
1.23.3 describes the doubled angles. The result of the test is given by:
C(t; 0) = (0.9998, ε, 0.0002*), (1.23.4)
where here and henceforth the symbol ε in an otherwise numerically expressed co-
ordination denotes a near-to-zero rounding. 
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Figure 1.23.3: Equiareal rose diagram of directions obtained by doubling those of the dip of the 
long axes of 100 pebbles collected in a road cut through a late Wisconsin drumlin. 
In this diagram the doubled angle that corresponds to the drumlin trend is 182°
For the interpretation of the co-ordinates at (1.23.4) we envisage the hypothesised model, 
M0, as an isotropic distribution, and we envisage the alternative, M1, incipiently as a uni-
modal distribution whose shape is broadly indicated by Figure 1.23.3. The amplitude of 
the resultant vector, q² as defined at (1.21.3), will in such a case tend to be larger for sam-
ples from M1 than for samples from M0. For near-to-zero rounding this is described by
U(t, 0) > U(t, 1), or (equivalently) by V(t, 0) < V(t, 1). (1.23.5)
We will say that such a test is right sensitive to M1. An ideal right-sensitive test would be 
such that the values of
[U(t, 0), ε(t, 0), V(t, 0)] and [U(t, 1), ε(t, 1), V(t, 1)]
would be given by 
(1-ε, ε, ∅) and (∅, ε′, 1-ε′),
respectively. Apart from shared sample patterns in near-to-zero roundings denoted by ε 
and ε′, respectively, the non-central test distribution would then be situated entirely to 
the right of the central test distribution.
Consider now that instead of applying Raleigh’s test to the doubled angles, we apply 
the test directly to the raw angles displayed in Figure 1.21.2. Contributions from class 
intervals separated by 180° would then tend to cancel, as:
sin x+sin (x+180°) = 0, and cos x+cos (x+180°) = 0
0°
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So, small rather than large values of q² in such a case point at Krumbein’s alternative. 
Raleigh’s test would then be left sensitive rather than right sensitive to Krumbein’s alter-
native. For near-to-zero rounding this is described by:
U(t, 0) < U(t, 1) or (equivalently) V(t, 0) > V(t, 1). (1.23.6)
An ideal left-sensitive test would be such that the values of
[U(t, 0), ε(t, 0), V(t, 0)] and [U(t, 1), ε(t, 1), V(t, 1)]
would be given by
(∅, ε, 1-ε) and (1-ε′, ε′, ∅),
respectively. Apart from shared sample patterns in near-to-zero roundings denoted by ε 
and ε′, respectively, the non-central test distribution would then be situated entirely to 
the left of the central test distribution.
We note in passing that in order to compare right sensitivity achieved by one test to 
left sensitivity achieved by another test, one of the orderings has to be inverted. For in-
stance, when applying Raleigh’s test directly to the raw angles shown in Figure 1.21.2, we 
obtain the co-ordinates (*0.1371, ε, 0.8629). If we invert the ordering used in this test for 
comparison to the co-ordinates obtained when applying Raleigh’s test to the doubled 
angles shown in Figure 1.23.3, the co-ordinations obtained are
(0.9998, ε, 0.0002*) for the doubled angles, and
(0.8629, ε, 0.1371*) for the raw angles. (1.23.7)
The test based on the raw angles is evidently exceedingly insensitive compared to the 
test based on the doubled angles. This was to be expected, as a realistic model for the 
original data would have to involve nine independent binomial partitions of pebbles 
received in each of the nine pairs of opposing class intervals, respectively. This source of 
irrelevant variation is removed when the angles are doubled.
Proceeding from ideas introduced at (1.23.5) and (1.23.6) we take account of cases such 
as those exhibited at (1.23.3) by introducing a definition of sensitivity such that when 
T = 1, 2, 3, …, k, gives the full range of T, sensitivity at T = k requires
ε(k, 1) > ε(k, 0) because V(k, 1) and V(k, 0) are both given by ∅,
and sensitivity at T = 1 requires
ε(1, 1) > ε(1, 0) because U(1, 1) and U(1, 0) are both given by ∅.
This is accomplished by way of Definition 1.23.3 overleaf.
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Definition 1.23.3:
Let C(T, j) = [U(T, j), ε(T, j), V(T, j)] for j = 0 as opposed to j = 1, denote the co-ordinator pair arising from 
a co-ordination test of a hypothesised singleton M0, as opposed to alternative singleton M1. Let
 T = 1, 2, 3, …, k give the full range of T.
If ε(t, 1) ≥ ε(t, 0) and V(t, 1) ≥ V(t, 0) with at least one inequality sharp, we say the test is right sensitive 
to M1 at the C(t, 0) level of co-ordination, and if this is the case for every one of t = 1, 2, 3, …, k, we say the 
test is invariably right sensitive to M1.
If ε(t, 1) ≥ ε(t, 0) and U(t, 1) ≥ U(t, 0) with at least one inequality sharp, we say the test is left sensitive to 
M1 at the C(t, 0) level of co-ordination, and if this is the case for every one of t = 1, 2, 3, …, k, we say the 
test is invariably left sensitive to M1.
In many cases of practical interest, the rounding is too small to have a forceful bearing 
on the interpretation of any realised co-ordinates. In such cases the simpler Definition 
1.23.4 may be used.
Definition 1.23.4:
Let C(T, j) = [U(T, j), ε(T, j), V(T, j)] for j = 0 as opposed to j = 1, denote the co-ordinator pair arising from 
a co-ordination test of a hypothesised singleton M0, as opposed to an alternative singleton M1. Let
 T = 1, 2, 3, …, k give the full range of T.
If V(t, 1) > V(t, 0), we say the test is right sensitive to M1 at the C(t, 0) level of co-ordination, and if this is 
the case for every one of t = 1, 2, 3, …, k − 1, we say the test is invariably right sensitive to M1.
If U(t, 1) > U(t, 0), we say the test is left sensitive to M1 at the C(t, 0) level of co-ordination, and if this is 
the case for every one of t = 2, 3, 4, …, k, we say the test is invariably left sensitive to M1.
Note that the explanations leading to Definitions 1.23.3 and 1.22.4 make it clear that the 
definitions are limited to the extent of trying to pick off various important cases rather 
than trying to take account of every mathematical possibility. Consider Definition 1.23.5.
Definition 1.23.5:
Let C(T, j) = [U(T, j), ε(T, j), V(T, j)] for j = 0 as opposed to j = 1, denote the co-ordinator pair arising from 
a co-ordination test of a hypothesised singleton M0, as opposed to an alternative singleton M1. Let
T = 1, 2, 3, …, k give the full range of T. We refer to the mapping:
 V(t, 0) → V(t, 1) for t = 1, 2, 3, …, k-1
as the right sensitivity function of the test, and we refer to the mapping:
 U(t, 0) → U(t, 1) for t = 2, 3, 4, …, k
as the left sensitivity function of the test.
The test displayed in Table 1.23. 3 is right sensitive. So, the appropriate function for describing 
its sensitivity is V(t, 0) → V(t, 1) for t = k-1, k-2, k-3, …, 1, which (as k = 5) is given by:
(0.01 → 0.22), (0.11 → 0.49), (0.24 → 0.90), (0.43 → 0.90).
This mapping is depicted in Figure 1.23.4. 
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Figure 1.23.4: The sensitivity function of a right-sensitive test. The arrows in the diagram depict the 
mapping of hypothesised right co-ordinates onto alternative right-co-ordinates
In the sense of Definition 1.23.4 the present test is invariably right sensitive to the alternative 
involved. If, for such a test, all the roundings throughout the entire ranges of C(T, 0) and C(T, 1) 
were to be near to zero, a mapping of the type depicted in Figure 1.23.5 would arise.
Figure 1.23.5: The sensitivity function of a right-sensitive test in a near-continuous case
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We now give two concrete examples that display the practical value of the concepts in-
troduced in this section.
Example 1.23.1
In horse racing around an eight-horse circular track, each horse is assigned to one of the 
eight possible post positions in the starting line-up. Position 1 is closest to the inside 
rail of the track, followed by Positions 2, 3, 4, and so on up to Position 8 on the outside 
rail, furthest from the inside rail. It is widely thought that of any two horses, the one 
whose post position is closer to the inside rail has an advantage. Table 1.23.4 gives a data 
set adapted for the purposes of this example from an actual data set. We wish to test the
Table 1.23.4: Numbers of winning horses in 50 races from each of the eight possible starting post 
positions at a particular eight-horse circular track
Post position 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Number of winners 9 7 6 8 7 4 5 4
hypothesised model, M0, that a winning horse’s post position is just a random number 
from 1, 2, 3, …, 8. We also wish the test to be sensitive to the alternative, M1,: a winning 
horse’s post position tends to be smaller than just a random number from 1, 2, 3, …, 8. 
Now if X denotes a randomly sampled one of the numbers 1, 2, 3, …, 8, its expected value 
and variance are given by
E(X) = 4.5 and V(X) = 5.25,
respectively. Consider a partial ordering of sample patterns based on the magnitude of 
the sample mean, X. Let n denote the sample size. Owing to the central limit theorem 
the distribution of the following quantity is approximately standard normal:
  X-E(X). 
√V(X)÷n
Our test datum is the mean of the n = 50 winning post positions given in Table 1.23.4, 
which is given by x = 3.98. We find that
  3.98-4.5  = -1.605, 
√5.25÷50
which is a class mark for the interval between -1.543 and -1.667. The mental correlate of 
the test datum is thus found to be situated at approximately (0.05, 0.01, 0.94) in the test 
distribution. In order to test
M0: ‘A post position closer to the inside rail entails no advantage’
vs.
M1: ‘A post position closer to the inside rail entails an advantage’,
we must attach the pointer to the left co-ordinate, thus obtaining (*0.05, 0.01, 0.94), 
which points quite strongly away from M0 at M1. In order to make the nature of our test 
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entirely clear, let us consider that under M1, a random post position might have expecta-
tion E(X) = 4.5-0.75, with variance more or less the same as under M0. We then find that
3.98-(4.5-0.75)
 = -0.710, 
     √5.25÷50
which is a class mark for the interval between -0.648 and -0.772. So, again using the 
normal approximation, we find that the mental correlate of our test datum is situated 
approximately at the (*0.22, 0.04, 0.74) level of co-ordination in the non-central test 
distribution. Should the meanings conveyed by the co-ordinates here given as
(*0.05, 0.01, 0.94) and (*0.22, 0.04, 0.74) (1.23.8)
respectively, be questioned, those meanings can be forced upon the human body by the 
use of diagrams of the type displayed in Figure 1.23.1, or (better) Figure 1.23.2. We note 
in passing that this example nicely exemplifies the purpose of data analysis, which is to 
enlarge the investigator’s supply of relevant facts. The example proceeds from the fact 
that the distance between the starting gate and finishing line is shorter for a post posi-
tion closer to the inside rail. So the investigator is of the prior opinion that a post position 
closer to the inside rail entails an advantage, i.e. that E(X) < 4.5. Our statistical analysis 
now produces, at for instance (1.23.8), further relevant facts, which (in the present case) 
strengthen the grounds for the investigator’s opinion.
Example 1.23.2
As a further example of the practical value of the concepts introduced in this section, 
Table 1.23.5 draws on certain results Shapiro and Wilk (1965) obtained by simulating 
the performance of several tests for normality against several alternatives. The symbol ε
Table 1.23.5: Alternative co-ordinations achieved by four commencement tests of normality in 
respect of four different alternatives to the hypothesised model for samples of size 
n = 20 when the given datum co-ordinates at (0.95, ε, 0.05) in the test distribution. 
Right-sensitive ordering has been employed throughout
Shapiro-Wilk W Pearson χ² Pearson √b1 Pearson b2
M0: Normal (0.95, ε10, 0.05) (0.95, ε20, 0.05) (0.95, ε30, 0.05) (0.95, ε40, 0.05)
M1: Logistic (0.92, ε11, 0.08) (0.94, ε21, 0.06) (0.88, ε31, 0.12) (0.94, ε41, 0.06)
M2: Uniform (0.78, ε12, 0.23) (0.89, ε22, 0.11) (1.00, ε32, 0.00) (0.71, ε42, 0.29)
M3: Cauchy (0.12, ε13, 0.88) (0.59, ε23, 0.41) (0.23, ε33, 0.77) (0.19, ε43, 0.81)
M4: Log-normal (0.07, ε14, 0.93) (0.05, ε24, 0.95) (0.11, ε34, 0.89) (0.42, ε44, 0.58)
serves as a reminder of non-zero rounding. In order to construct the table all the order-
ings were made to be right sensitive. For instance, the natural ordering of the W statistic 
was inverted, as small values of W point at the alternatives. The second row in Table 
1.23.5 shows that of the four tests considered, none achieves useful sensitivity to the lo-
gistic. That was to be expected, as the logistic is so close to normal that it is often used as 
a more convenient stand-in for the normal. Pearson’s √b1 is insensitive to M2, which was 
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to be expected, as √b1 tests for skewness. Somewhat unexpectedly, √b1 turns out to be 
sensitive to M3. In retrospect, however, the result is understandable because, as Shapiro 
and Wilk point out, the Cauchy distribution, although symmetric, has extremely high 
tails. So, with sample size as small as 20, it often happens that a small number of extreme 
values contribute unequally to the tails of the sample, and the √b1 test, as used by Shapiro 
and Wilk, does not discriminate between skewness to the right and skewness to the left. We 
note that these remarks have, in effect, introduced Definition 1.23.6, involving the same 
sort of simplification that leads from Definition 1.23.3 to Definition 1.23.4.
Definition 1.23.6:
Let C(T, j) = [U(T, j), ε(T, j), V(T, j)] for j = 0, 1, 2 denote the co-ordinator triplets arising from a particular 
ordering for a co-ordination test of a hypothesised singleton, denoted by Mj for j = 0, against one or the 
other of two alternative singletons, denoted by Mj for j = 1, 2, respectively. At the C(t, 0) level of co-
ordination, the test is more right sensitive to M1 than it is to M2 if:
 V(t, 1) > V(t, 2),
and is more left sensitive to M1, than it is to M2, if:
 U(t, 1) > U(t, 2).
Definition 1.23.6 can obviously be extended to embrace further possibilities, such as the 
test being invariably more sensitive to one alternative than to another.
In making use of Table 1.23.5 we may compare entries in the same column or in the same 
row. The two types of comparison are fundamentally different, as follows: When we com-
pare entries in the same column, we consider a particular data pattern whose mental cor-
relate recurs in every rounding in that column, as the same ordering of sample patterns is 
repeatedly involved. For entries in different columns, that is not the case. So, apart from 
the passing remark on the comparative sensitivity of the two Raleigh tests applied to 
Krumbein’s data, this section avoided comparisons involving different tests, that is to say, 
avoided comparisons involving different orderings of sample patterns.
1.24 The sensitivity of different tests to a given alternative
In the previous section certain difficulties had to be overcome in trying to develop a 
mathematically tractable way of describing the sensitivities of a given test to various 
alternatives. In the present section we wish to extend the previous development, so as to 
be able to describe the sensitivities of various tests to a given alternative. A further dif-
ficulty must then be overcome because, as pointed out by Kempthorne and Folks (1971, 
p. 317), it is fundamentally difficult to make meaningful comparisons between tests 
that do not have the same set of attainable levels. Consider, for instance, the derivation 
of Table 1.23.3 from Table 1.23.2. Instead of ordering the sample patterns according to 
their frequencies under M0, we can order the patterns according to their frequencies 
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under M0 relative to their frequencies under M1. This so-called likelihood ratio ordering 
is displayed in Table 1.24.1.
Table 1.24.1: A co-ordination test based on a likelihood ratio ordering
Data pattern O
T
C(T; 0) C(T: 1)
 1[4]0[1] O1  (Ø, 0.19, 0.81)  (Ø, Ø, 1.00)
 2[1]1[2]0[2] O2  (0.19, 0.57, 0.24)  (Ø, 0.10, 0.90)
 2[2]0[3] O3  (0.76, 0.10, 0.14)  (0.10, 0.27, 0.63)
 3[1]1[1]0[3] O4  (0.86, 0.13, 0.01)  (0.37, 0.41, 0.22)
 4[1]0[4] O5  (0.99, 0.01, Ø)  (0.78, 0.22, Ø)
Clearly, the orderings in Tables 1.23.3 and 1.24.1 are both right sensitive to M1. Equally 
clearly, we cannot readily decide which test is the more sensitive to M1. When comparing 
the two Raleigh tests at (1.23.7) we could ignore this difficulty, as the distribution of 100 
pebbles between nine or eighteen class intervals generates many attainable levels of hy-
pothesised co-ordination. In general, however, Definition 1.24.1 may not be ignored.
Definition 1.24.1:
The sensitivities of two different co-ordination tests are strictly comparable only at those levels of hy-
pothesised co-ordination that are attainable by both tests.
For example, when pooling two consecutive members of a given ordering, we obtain an or-
dering that is strictly comparable to the original only at levels not involved by the pooling. 
We note, however, that Definition 1.24.1 does not forbid us to consider certain tests to be ap-
proximately comparable, provided we can show that the approximation is not misleading.
Let (U, ε, V) denote a level of co-ordination numerically attainable under a hypothesised 
singleton, M0, by each of two different tests, T and T′, both contrived to test M0 against 
an alternative singleton, M1. Here we emphasise the term ‘numerical’, as two different 
orderings are involved. In other words, we now consider two different data patterns that 
in two different orderings, respectively, are co-ordinated at the same numerical level under 
M0, or at least approximately so, as is the case for any pair in the first row of Table 1.23.5. 
Let the two different data patterns under M1 then be co-ordinated at (U1, ε1, V1) and at 
(U′1, ε′1, V′1) by T and T′, respectively. If ε1 and ε′1 are both near to zero, we would consider 
test T to be the more right sensitive to M1 if V1 > V′1, and we would consider test T to be 
the more left sensitive to M1 if U1 > U′1. Consider, for instance, a comparison based on 
Table 1.23.5 of the sensitivity to M3, of the χ² test and the √b1 test. The table tells us that 
if any given data pattern is by the χ² ordering placed in ε20, the same data pattern is also 
by the χ² ordering placed in ε23. Similarly, if any given data pattern is by the √b1 ordering 
placed in ε30, the same data pattern is also by the √b1 ordering placed in ε33. However, the 
two patterns will almost surely differ. Therefore under M0, two different sample patterns 
have by two different orderings, respectively, both been placed at the (0.95, ε, 0.05) nu-
merical level of co-ordination. At the same time, under M3, the same two patterns have 
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by the same two orderings been placed at the (0.59, ε, 0.41) and (0.23, ε, 0.77) numerical 
levels of co-ordination, respectively. So, inasmuch as (0.23, ε, 0.77) is more toward the 
right than (0.59, ε, 0.41), we consider the √b1 ordering to be more right sensitive to M3 
than the χ² ordering, at the (0.95, ε, 0.05) level of hypothesised co-ordination. We note 
that these remarks have, in effect, introduced Definition 1.24.2, which once again involves 
the kind of simplification used to obtain Definitions 1.22.4 and 1.22.5. Definition 1.24.2 
can obviously be extended to embrace further possibilities, such as the one test being in-
variably more right sensitive or more left sensitive to M1 than the other.
Definition 1.24.2:
Let (U, ε, V) denote a level of co-ordination that is numerically attainable under a hypothesised singleton 
M0, by each of two different tests of M0 against an alternative singleton M1. Let the co-ordinator triplet for 
test k (k = 1, 2) under singleton Mj (j = 0, 1) be denoted by [Uk(Tk, j), εk(Tk, j), Vk(Tk, j)]. Let:
 [Uk(Tk, 0), εk(Tk, 0), Vk(Tk, 0)] = (U, ε, V) when Tk = tk (k = 1, 2).
Then, at the (U, ε, V) level of hypothesised co-ordination:
 Test 1 is the more right sensitive to M1 if V1(t1, 1) > V2(t2, 1), and
 Test 1 is the more left sensitive to M1 if U1(t1, 1) > U2(t2, 1).
1.25 The separating characteristics of a co-ordination test
We must distinguish between the separating characteristics of co-ordination tests and 
the operating characteristics of hypothesis tests. In the case of hypothesis testing, a de-
cision-maker employs the test as an operational rule whose purpose it is to place into the 
real world a population of decisions whose constituency in terms of correct and incorrect 
decisions satisfies certain specifications. Typically the decisions have to do with certain 
items that might correctly or incorrectly be classified as ‘good’, or might correctly or incor-
rectly be classified as ‘bad’. The two types of misclassification, i.e. of erroneous decision, 
are called the Type I and Type II errors, respectively, whose frequencies are specified in 
some or other way. The specifications cannot (and this is crucial) tell us whether a solitary 
decision is correct or incorrect; the specifications apply only to the host of decisions as a 
whole. It is therefore entirely appropriate to speak of those specifications as ‘the operating 
characteristics’ of the decision rule, because they are meaningful in an operational sense 
only. Co-ordination tests concern problems of an entirely different kind. To begin with, 
any co-ordination test is designed to deal with a particular data set, i.e. with one solitary 
item in the real world. The problem to be addressed is to try to provide tenable answers 
to the question: ‘How might (or might not) these data have come about?’ Here the word 
‘might’ and the plurality of possible answers underscore the investigative rather than the 
decision-making nature of the problem. An investigator (not a decision-maker) brings to 
mind this, that and the other possible explanation of how the given data might, or might 
not, have come about, and co-ordination tests then try to separate the more tenable expla-
nations from the less tenable ones. So it is entirely appropriate to say that the previous two 
sections concern the separating characteristics of co-ordination tests. Indeed we need 
only consider the statements made at (1.23.1) to understand this terminology.
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1.26 A symmetric representation
Many test distributions can precisely or with satisfactory approximation be expressed as 
originating from a partial ordering of the form:
… , O-3, O-2, O-1, O0, O1, O2, O3, …, 
such that U(-t, 0) = V(t, 0) for t = 1, 2, 3, …, 
and where O0 might be an empty set. (1.26.1)
We refer to this as a symmetric representation of the ordering. Consider, for example, 
the distribution of Raleigh’s test statistic, which is approximated by that of a random 
variable Q², whose distribution is defined by:
Pr(Q² > q²) = exp(-q²/n) for 0 < q² < ∞.
Suppose n = 100. By solving for q² from the equations
exp(-q²/100) = … 0.475, 0.485, 0.495, 0.505, 0.515, 0.525, … , (1.26.2)
and then labelling the solutions … -3, -2, -1, +1, +2, +3, … , respectively, we obtain an 
approximately symmetric representation of the ordering for Raleigh’s test, with (in this 
case) O0 as the empty set. The grid at (1.26.2) can be replaced by a finer grid, or by a 
coarser one. As the distribution of Raleigh’s test statistic is asymmetric, this example 
shows that an approximately symmetric representation does not require an initially 
symmetric distribution. Often, however, initial ordering needs to be near to continuous 
so as to be capable of a satisfactorily precise symmetric representation.
1.27 Simultaneous statistical inference
We are now ready to take the first steps toward coming to grips with a primitive idea that 
leads to one of the largest sub-literatures of the statistical literature – an idea known as 
simultaneous statistical inference. It may as well be said at once that this book will prove 
to be extremely critical of the primitive idea, let alone the procedures inspired by it. How-
ever, at this early stage of our development it would be premature to expect the reader to 
take a firm stance on the matter. Here we can only try to provide a modicum of advance 
insight into an argument whose complete development will be possible only after we have 
come to grips with a deeply hidden flaw in R. A. Fisher’s theory of significance testing.
Consider the problem of testing a hypothesised singleton, M0, against one or the other 
of two alternative singletons, denoted by M1 and M2, respectively. Let the ordering for a 
suitable test statistic have a symmetric representation given by 
… , O-3, O-2, O-1, O0, O1, O2, O3, … . (1.27.1)
Suppose the test is invariably left sensitive to M1, and invariably right sensitive to M2, 
and that both alternatives are of interest. Then simultaneous statistical inference would 
typically have us test for both the alternatives simultaneously, by using the so-called 
‘two-tailed test’ that arises from the ordering
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O0, O-1∪O1, O-2∪O2, O-3∪O3, … . (1.27.2)
Given the supposed properties of the original ordering at (1.27.1) the new ordering at 
(1.27.2) would tend to be right sensitive to both M1 and M2. However, in most, if not all, 
cases of practical interest the test based on the two-tailed ordering, as compared to the 
test based on the original ordering, has inferior separating characteristics. In order to 
make this clear, we will present two concrete examples, followed by a discussion. Before 
proceeding, a word of caution: In much of the statistical literature certain well-known 
probability arguments are used to motivate two-tailed tests and other, more general, 
recipes for simultaneous statistical inference. Those arguments have no place at all, in 
the theory of co-ordination tests. So, any intrusion of those arguments into the present 
development can only sow confusion. We will meet and analyse the arguments in sub-
sequent chapters; here they must be kept at bay. However, as the arguments have pro-
moted deeply entrenched habits of thought, they are very difficult to fend off. So we 
must meticulously recognise the presence of any statistical rounding, as that will serve 
to remind us that statistical co-ordinates are intended to provide directions to certain 
places brought into the human mind. Such co-ordinates are not at all intended to con-
vey any probabilities and certainly not any probabilities of the kind associated with si-
multaneous statistical inference.
Example 1.27.1 
Snedecor and Cochran (1989, p. 87) reproduce a data set giving the mean numbers of 
florets produced per plot by seven pairs of plots of gladiolus, one plot from each pair 
planted with high (first-year) corms, the other with low (second-year or older) corms – 
this presumably in pseudo-randomised pairs. (A corm is an underground propagating 
stem.) Calculating the differences ‘mean for high corm’ minus ‘mean for low corm’ for 
each of the seven pairs of plots, we obtain
-0.1, -0.5, +0.7, -1.0, -1.9, -2.2, -3.4. (1.27.3)
Do these data indicate a difference in the yielding capacity of the two kinds of corm? 
Consider, as hypothesised model, M0 such that the whole of the sampling variation is 
attributable to randomisation only. The expected value of the sample mean difference is 
then given by E(D) = 0. We wish to test M0 against two alternatives, M1 such that E(D) < 0, 
and M2 such that E(D) > 0. An appropriate ordering of sample patterns is then according 
to the value of the sample mean difference. Such an ordering is left sensitive to M1 and 
right sensitive to M2. The mean difference for the data is given by d = -1.2. Under M0 the 
absolute values of the sample differences are fixed, and their signs are attributable to ran-
domisation only and so altogether 27 equally frequent sample patterns arise. The samples 
that comprise the rounding have the pattern corresponding to the data, i.e. the pattern
0.1     0.5     0.7     1.0     1.9     2.2     3.4
 -         -        +         -         -         -         - (1.27.4)
Sample mean differences less than the data mean difference arise from just four of the 
27 different sample patterns, these four patterns being as follows:
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0.1     0.5     0.7     1.0     1.9     2.2     3.4
 +        +        -         -         -         -         -
 -        +         -         -        -          -         -
 +        -         -         -        -          -         -
 -        -         -          -        -         -          - (1.27.5)
Hence the level of co-ordination at which the mental correlate of the given datum of 
mean difference is situated in the test distribution, is given by
4  ,  1  , 1-4+1  ≈ (0.031, 0.008, 0.961). (1.27.6) 
27   27         27
Here the left co-ordinate and rounding are small enough to place the mental correlate well 
out in the left-hand outskirts of the distribution. We can offer a substantively cre dible alterna-
tive as causative explanation. We introduce that alternative by way of the pointer, stating that 
(*0.031, 0.008, 0.961) points strongly at the older corms being the more productive. This result 
is a physical fact, as it can be forced upon the human body. We note in passing that one might 
imagine the investigator commenting on this by saying: ‘The result does not surprise me, as 
a number of anatomical characteristics of the younger corms are known to be indicators of 
immaturity in certain gladiolus species’. We are thus again reminded that the sole purpose of 
statistical data analysis is to augment the investigator’s supply of relevant physical facts.
Now let us consider how the two-tailed test arises. The ideas of simultaneous statistical 
inference would typically have us proceed as follows:
If E(D) ≤ 0 is known for sure use a one-tailed test for E(D) = 0 vs. E(D) < 0.
If E(D) ≥ 0 is known for sure use a one-tailed test for E(D) = 0 vs. E(D) > 0.
If neither of the two certitudes use a two-tailed test for E(D) = 0 vs. E(D) ≠ 0.
As a substantive investigator is typically reluctant to embrace a certitude, a two-tailed 
test is often (even routinely) introduced. In the present case that implies that, instead 
of ordering the sample patterns according to the magnitude of D, we have to order them 
according to the magnitude of  D . The rounding doubles, as  D  = 1.2 arises not 
only with the pattern of signs listed at (1.27.4), but also with the converse pattern, i.e.:
0.1     0.5     0.7     1.0     1.9     2.2     3.4
 +        +         -        +        +        +         + (1.27.7)
The pointing co-ordinate also doubles, as it receives, not only the four sample patterns 
listed at (1.27.5) but also the four converse patterns, i.e.:
0.1     0.5     0.7     1.0     1.9     2.2     3.4
 -         -         +        +        +        +        +
 +        -         +        +        +        +        +
 -        +         +        +        +        +        +
 +        +        +        +        +        +        + (1.27.8)
For the two-tailed ordering, the pointing co-ordinate is on the right. Thus, the level of 
co-ordination at which the mental correlate of the datum of absolute mean difference is 
situated in the derived test distribution, is given by
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 1-2×(1+4), 2×1, 2×4  ≈ (0.922, 0.016, 0.062*). (1.27.9) 
         2
7         27     27
But look at what we have done! Out of altogether 27 = 128 different sample patterns, those 
listed in (1.27.4) and (1.27.5) are the five sample patterns most typical of M1 and least 
typical of M2. Conversely, the five sample patterns listed at (1.27.7) and (1.27.8) are those most 
typical of M2 and least typical of M1. Moreover, we cannot conceive of an alternative such that 
both E(D) < 0 and E(D) > 0 can simultaneously be the case. So, at (1.27.9) we are trying to test 
for one or the other of two mutually exclusive alternatives, and for each alternative we use 
an ordering that deliberately confounds the sample patterns most indicative of that alter-
native, with the sample patterns least indicative of that same alternative. We will take the 
position that common sense and science must surely hold that for an investigator to thus 
confound evidential patterns with counter-evidential patterns is wrong.
In subsequent discussion it is convenient to consider the use of Student’s t for examples of 
the present kind. So we note that the foregoing results can satisfactorily be approximated 
as follows: the usual formula for Student’s t under M0 is given in obvious notation by
t = (D-0)÷s
D 
.
The values of the sample total advance in steps of 0.2, from -8.6 for the first pattern at 
(1.27.5), to -8.4 for the pattern at (1.27.4), to -8.2 for the pattern that gives the next smallest 
total. The raw sum of squares of the differences equals 21.76 throughout. So, using Yates’s 
principle to adjust for continuity, the rounding is found as if the sample total advances 
from -8.5 to -8.3 in the rounding. This gives approximate co-ordinates for the datum t 
under M0 as (*0.031, 0.005, 0.964) in place of those at (1.27.6). For a two-tailed test the or-
dering of sample patterns must be according to the value of t. We note in passing that 
the term ‘two-tailed’ refers to the composition of the pointing co-ordinate and rounding, 
whose constituents are the samples that contribute the tails of the original distribution. In 
the present case, the samples contributing one tail are those whose patterns are listed at 
(1.27.4) and (1.27.5), and the samples contributing the other tail are those whose patterns 
are listed at (1.27.7) and (1.27.8). We also note that the term ‘two-tailed’ might well be 
confusing, as the original ordering is sensitive in each of its two tails, whereas the derived 
ordering is sensitive in the right tail only.
Example 1.27.2
We now revisit Example 1.15.3 in which we considered how to apply Tukey’s test for non-
additivity to a data set given in Table 1.15.4. We first considered a co-ordination test using 
Student’s t as indicated at (1.15.7). Next we considered a co-ordination test corresponding 
to the customary procedure using Snedecor’s F as indicated at (1.15.9). We stated that the 
latter test procedure is wrong. Our reason for that statement is that the values of Snede-
cor’s F as used at (1.15.9) label a partial ordering of sample patterns that are equivalently 
labelled by the corresponding values of Student’s t. Thus the ordering used at (1.15.9) 
replaces the one used at (1.15.7) with a two-tailed ordering, where that confounds any 
evidential patterns being tested for with counter-evidential patterns.
Commencement tests
69
Discussion of Examples 1.27.1 and 1.27.2
In order to compare the two different tests performed on the same data set in Example 
1.27.1 we must reverse the original ordering. Hence, in Example 1.27.1 the two-tailed 
ordering replaces
(0.961, 0.008, 0.031*) with (0.922, 0.016, 0.062*).
Similarly, from the results arising at (1.15.7) and (1.15.9) we find that in Example 1.27.2 
the two-tailed ordering replaces
(0.952, ε, 0.048*) with (0.904, ε, 0.096*).
In both examples, the original ordering leads to a symmetric central test statistic and, 
because of that, the values of the pointing co-ordinate and rounding for the two-tailed 
ordering are exactly twice the values of the pointing co-ordinate and rounding for the 
original ordering. Tests using Student’s t are ubiquitous in present-day statistical 
practice, especially so inasmuch as Snedecor’s F is often just a convenient way of using 
Student’s t via the relationship F = t². We have argued that it is wrong for a data 
analyst to use a two-tailed test; in subsequent chapters we show that such tests belong 
to decision-making under risk. The reader may wish to reserve judgement. It needs to be 
understood, however, that the argument has very serious implications in terms of costs 
to substantive science, as follows.
Consider planning the number of replicates required for contrasting the mean yields of 
two treatments in randomised pairs. Let us specify that should the future trial place the 
mental correlate of the mean difference at say (0.95, ε, 0.05) in Student’s central t distribu-
tion, the same correlate must be placed at say (0.20, ε, 0.80) in the non-central t distribu-
tion when the observed differences are modelled as independent N(δ, σ²) random vari-
ables for a specified positive value of δ÷σ. On second thoughts, however, suppose we are 
(wrongly) persuaded to use the derived two-tailed co-ordination test based on Student’s 
t. By how much must the requisite number of replicates then be increased to meet the 
selfsame specifications? A table of Snedecor and Cochran (1989, p. 104) shows that the 
requisite proportional increase is given approximately by 7.9÷6.2 = 1.27. So, should it in-
deed be wrong to use the two-tailed ordering, we would be wasting 0.27÷1.27 = 21% of the 
input of substantive science by way of its contribution in material, salaries, time, plant, 
etc. This matter cannot be shrugged off as small beer.
The reader might for the time being reserve judgement on the matter discussed in this 
section, but must bear in mind that when a friend telephones us to arrange a meeting 
‘in the coffee bar on the corner of 3rd Avenue and 7th Street’, the possibility that the coffee 
bar could have been situated on the corner of 7th Avenue and 3rd Street must not per-
suade us to proceed to the corner of 10th Avenue and 10th Street. In short:
Directions are not intended to convey probabilities.
Directions do not ‘add up’.
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1.28 Ordering by modelled frequency – a defective principle
We return to the caution in Section 1.9. The test distribution displayed in Table 1.8.2 is ob-
tained when the ordering of the sample patterns is by their frequencies under the hypothe-
sised model. In Table 1.28.1 a very different test distribution is obtained when the order-
ing of the sample patterns is by their number of runs under the hypothesised mo del. 
Table 1.28.1: Another test distribution for the number-of-buses problem 
Partial ordering Modelled frequency
O1: 4[1]5[1] 2/126 = 0.02
O2: 1[1]3[1]5[1] ∪ 1[1]4[2] ∪ 2[1]3[1]4[1] ∪ 2[2]5[1] 7/126 = 0.06
O3: 1[1]2[1]3[2] ∪ 1[1]2[2]4[1] ∪ 1[2]3[1]4[1] ∪ 2[3]3[1] 24/126 = 0.19
O4: 1[1]2[4] ∪ 1[2]2[2]3[1] ∪ 1[3]2[1]4[1] ∪ 1[3]3[2] 30/126 = 0.24
O5: 1[3]2[3] ∪ 1[4]2[1]3[1] 36/126 = 0.29
O6: 1[5]2[2] ∪ 1[6]3[1] 18/126 = 0.14
O7: 1[7]2[1] 8/126 = 0.06
O8: 1[9] 1/126 = 0.01
In this new table we find that patterns involving an unusually large number of runs are 
gathered together in one tail of the distribution, while patterns involving an unusually 
small number of runs are gathered together in the other tail of the distribution. That is 
as it should be when we can only conceive of the possible physical causes of the one kind 
of pattern as being very different to the possible physical causes of the other kind of pat-
tern. In that case we would avoid confounding the two different kinds of patterns with 
each other by way of a two-tailed test. In contrast, the method of ordering by modelled 
frequency simply gathers together in one of the tails of the test distribution all those 
patterns that are infrequent under the hypothesised model, regardless of what alterna-
tive circumstances might have caused them. Consider, for instance, the co-ordinates of 
the sample patterns 2[2]5[1] and 1[9] in the two different test distributions. In Table 1.8.2 
these patterns are gathered into the same ordinal class at (0.98, 0.02, ∅) in the test distri-
bution, whereas in Table 1.28.1 they are put into the opposite extremes of the ordering, 
respectively at (0.02, 0.06, 0.92) and (0.99, 0.01, ∅) in the test distribution. Clearly then, 
sound principles of ordering must take account of different possible alternatives. And 
so, for different alternatives that tend to produce different sample patterns, those pat-
terns must be gathered into different tails of the test distribution, or else into one tail 
each of different test distributions. Thus, if three different alternatives are distinguished 
by different sample patterns, sound principles of ordering would lead us to tail areas in 
at least two different test distributions.
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1.29 Some formal relations between co-ordination tests and 
 significance tests
Using Definitions 1.19.1 and 1.19.2, we obtain a pair of formal significance levels, as follows:
SLU(T, 0) = U(T, 0)+ε(T, 0).
SLV(T, 0) = ε(T, 0)+V(T, 0).
Kempthorne and Folks (1971, p. 224) note that any significance level has the property:
Pr[SL(T, 0) ≤ SL(t, 0)M0] = SL(t, 0). (1.29.1)
For instance, SLU(T, 0) arises by inverting the ordering used for SLV(T, 0). So, using Defi-
nition 1.19.1 for an inverted ordering, we find that
Pr[SLU(T, 0) ≤ SLU(t, 0)M0] = Pr(a sample ∈ OT for T ≤ t M0)
                                                 = SLU(t, 0).
We can, without loss of generality, restrict further development to the V-like forms, as any 
results obtained can also be applied to the U-like forms by inverting the ordering. As a re-
minder of this, we will use the notation SLV, instead of SL, throughout the rest of this section. 
The result at (1.29.1) prompts Definitions 1.29.1 and 1.29.2. Note that SLV(1, j) ≡ 1 identically 
in j, where that explains an aspect of Definition 1.29.2 and of the present development.
Definition 1.29.1:
Let O
T
 for T = 1, 2, 3, …, k denote a partial ordering of all the sample patterns that arise from one or the 
other or both of a pair of singletons M0 and M1, being considered as alternative probability models of 
how given data might have come about. Let the data be modelled as if a sample in Ot, where t denotes 
a particular value of T. A significance test of M0 versus M1 attaches to the given data a pair of calculable 
numbers, SLV(t, 0) and SLV(t, 1), given by:
 SLV(t, j) = Pr(a sample pattern ∈ OT for T ≥ tMj), for j = 0, 1.
We call SLV(t, 0) the significance level for the given data with regard to the model M0 and for the partial 
ordering chosen, and we call SLV(t, 1) the sensitivity level for the given data with regard to the model M1 
and for the partial ordering chosen.
Definition 1.29.2:
Let SLV(T, 0) and SLV(T, 1) denote the significance level and the sensitivity level arising from a significance 
test of a hypothesised singleton M0 against an alternative singleton M1. Let T = 1, 2, 3, …, k give the full 
range of T. If SLV(t, 1) > SLV(t, 0), we say the test is sensitive to M1 at the SLV(t, 0) level of significance, and 
if this is the case for all of t = 2, 3, 4, …, k, we say the test is invariably sensitive to M1.
The ideas brought forward by Definitions 1.29.1 and 1.29.2 are clearly implicit in the usage 
of the term ‘sensitivity’ by Kempthorne and Folks (1971, e.g. p. 236 and p. 317). The same 
is true of the usage of the term ‘sensitiveness’ by Fisher (1966, Sections 11 and 12). We 
draw on that by way of Theorem 1.29.1.
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Theorem 1.29.1:
Let O
T
 for T = 1, 2, 3, …, k denote a partial ordering of all the sample patterns that arise from one or the 
other or both of a pair of singletons, M0 and M1, being considered as alternative probability models of how 
given data might have come about. If the ordering produces a significance test of M0 that is invariably sensi-
tive to M1, then the same ordering also gives a co-ordination test of M0 that is invariably sensitive to M1.
Proof of Theorem 1.29.1
Let SLV(t, 0) for t = 1, 2, 3, …, k denote the attainable significance levels, and SLV(t, 1) for 
t = 1, 2, 3, …, k denote the corresponding sensitivity levels. According to Definition 
1.29.2, the premise of the theorem then implies that
SLV(t, 1) > SLV(t, 0) for all of t = 2, 3, 4, …, k. (1.29.3)
(The enumeration starts at t = 2, because SLV (1, j) ≡ 1 identically in j.) It then follows 
from Definitions 1.23.1 and 1.29.1 that the inequalities at (1.29.3) can be expressed as
ε(t, 1)+V(t, 1) > ε(t, 0)+V(t, 0) for all of t = 2, 3, 4, …, k.
So it follows from the recurrence relations given in Theorem 1.23.1 that
V(t-1, 1) > V(t-1, 0) for all t = 2, 3, 4, …, k,
that is to say, that
V(t, 1) > V(t, 0) for all t = 1, 2, 3, …, k − 1.
(This last enumeration stops at t = k-1, because V(k, j) ≡ ∅ identically in j.)        Q.e.d.
It is not the aim of the present chapter to develop significance tests for comparison to 
co-ordination tests. We will do so in a subsequent chapter. Presently we merely point out 
certain formal relationships for later use. The reader is yet again cautioned not to jump to 
premature conclusions about the two kinds of tests.
1.30 Predictions, predications and forecasts
We must come to grips with a precise usage of the terms prediction, predication and fore-
cast. For example, the usual rainfalls of the Western Cape of South Africa are brought on 
by cold fronts that originate in the South Atlantic Ocean. So, a weather forecast often 
takes the following form: a photograph taken from a weather satellite is displayed and, 
pointing at the photograph, the forecaster says: ‘As can be seen here, a cold front is ap-
proaching. We expect it to bring rain in Cape Town tomorrow.’ This relies on a predic-
tion: ‘cold fronts bring rain’, proceeds to a predication: ‘this is a cold front’, and so arrives 
at a forecast: ‘this cold front will bring rain in Cape Town tomorrow’. Here it is useful 
to distinguish between universal concepts and particular individuals. For instance, ‘a 
woman’ is a universal concept seated in the human mind, whereas ‘Ethel, Jane and Sally’ 
are corresponding particular individuals seated in the real world. By drawing these dis-
tinctions, the following appears:
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‘Cold fronts bring rain’ makes one concept (cold front) address another concept 
(rain), it does not refer to any particular individual. This conveys a proposition in 
theoretical knowledge.
‘This is a cold front’ makes a concept (cold front) address a particular individual 
(this one here). This conveys a proposition in empirical knowledge (experienced 
knowledge).
‘This cold front will bring rain in Cape Town tomorrow’ makes a present particular 
individual (this one here) address a future particular individual (the one that will 
be in Cape Town tomorrow). This conveys a proposition in applied knowledge.
The concepts are not individuals; they are the sorts of corresponding individuals. Also, 
‘cold front’ and ‘rain’ are scientific concepts, as they refer to bodily experience. Any con-
cepts are always seated in the human mind. It is only the corresponding particular indi-
viduals that are seated in the real world, or that are represented in the data record (the 
historical record) as having been seated in the real world. As noted at the end of Section 
1.3, there is for our purposes usually no need to distinguish between any real-world in-
dividual, as directly present, or as represented in the data record. Any future individuals 
are, of course, seated in the mind only, but are there being conceived of as part of the 
real world of the future; we may refer to them as prospective individuals, as opposed 
to particular individuals. A particular individual has its own proprietary; a prospective 
individual does not. The proprietary nature of particular individuals either as directly 
present, or as represented in the historical record, is acknowledged when we identify 
them by their proprietary names (proper names). Three examples of this are ‘Kiliman-
jaro’, ‘Nelson Mandela’, and ‘Krumbein’s 1939 data (collected in a road cut through a late 
Wisconsin drumlin)’. Proper names as such are conventional only, as they then convey 
identity only. Among Zimbabweans, for instance, Learnmore, Trymore and Wiseman 
are popular names for a boy child. Again, according to a news report in the Cape Times 
of 25 August 2005, a man named Always Innocent, believed to be of Tanzanian national-
ity, was to have appeared in the Cape Town Magistrate’s Court to face a charge of pos-
session of suspected stolen goods. But he failed to turn up and magistrate Aziz Hamied 
issued a warrant for his arrest.
The main thrust of this chapter concerns the development of propositions in empiri-
cal knowledge, that is to say, propositions in which we point at a data set (at a solitary 
individual in the real world) and then try to bring the matching sort into the human 
mind. Note, however, that the development might well concern the testing of a proposi-
tion in theoretical knowledge. For instance, in order to test the proposition ‘cold fronts 
bring rain’ we might consider testing for a positive association between cold fronts and 
rain, via a 2 × 2 contingency table. However, such tests (and this is crucial) involve no 
forecasting whatsoever. The following example makes this clear.
Example 1.30.1
Meulepas (1998) considers an example of a 2 × 2 contingency table with n = 20 items 
classified according to each of two characteristics, as follows:
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                                                           Has the item Characteristic 2?
                                                                     Yes         No
Has the item Characteristic 1?      Yes     a = 2       b = 0
                                                         No     c = 0       d = 18 (1.30.1)
Fisher (1970) introduced a classic analysis according to which such data are modelled as 
a sample of n = 20 independent items, with probabilities respectively as follows:
                                                                     Yes               No
                                                           Yes     θ1θ2             θ1(1-θ2)
                                                           No     (1-θ1)θ2       (1-θ1)(1-θ2) (1.30.2)
(0 < θ1 < 1; 0 < θ2 < 1). This conceives of no association between row classifications and 
column classifications, as Fisher’s purpose is to test the tenability of this particular aspect 
of the model. The probability of the sample is then given by the multinomial expression
     n!      (q1q2)
a[q1(1-q2)]
b[(1-q1)q2]
c[(1-q1)(1-q2)]
d. 
a!b!c!d!
Fisher analyses this into a product of three factors, as follows:
         n!          q1
a+b(1-q1)
c+d  ×   
(a+b)!(c+d)!
         n!          q2
a+c(1-q2)
b+d  ×   
(a+b)!(c+d)!
(a+b)!(c+d)!(a+c)!(b+d) 
             n!a!b!c!d!             . (1.30.3)
The first factor displays a subsidiary class of binomial models for the row totals; the 
second factor displays a subsidiary class of binomial models for the column totals. The 
third factor characterises lack of association, giving the probability of the sample con-
figuration, given the row and column totals, when there is no association between the 
row and column classifications. For Meulepas’ numerical example just three such con-
figurations are possible, with hypothesised probabilities given in Table 1.30.1.
Table 1.30.1: Example for Fisher’s exact test for association in a 2×2 table
                        Configuration 1                      Configuration 2                      Configuration 3
                                0       2                                    1       1                                       2       0
                                2      16                                   1      17                                      0      18
         Probability = 153/190            Probability = 36/190                   Probability = 1/190 
By advancing from patterns ‘less like positive association’ to patterns ‘more like positive 
association’ we obtain the partial ordering Ot ∼ Configuration t (t = 1, 2, 3). Statistical 
co-ordinates directing us to just where within the test distribution the mental correlate 
of the given datum of conditional configuration is being placed, are then found to be 
(189/190, 1/190, ∅). For the pointer, a substantively conceivable alternative must be on 
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offer. Meulepas envisages the data given at (1.30.1) as arising from n = 20 patients one 
week after having been admitted to an intensive care unit, as follows:
                 Survived     Died
Treated           2              0
Control           0            18 (1.30.4)
That the treatment might increase the frequency of survival, must be considered to be a 
substantively conceivable alternative, as the medical advisors of the two survivors must 
have had prior facts pointing in that direction. So we attach the pointer to the right co-
ordinate, thus obtaining the co-ordination (189/190, 1/190, ∅*) as a further fact, and one 
that turns out to strengthen the case in favour of the treatment, as it points in the same 
direction as the prior facts.
The reader should note that the test involves a pair of alternative predictions being tested 
against a given data set, i.e. against a solitary individual in the past, the pair of predic-
tions being:
M0: ‘Such treatment does not increase the survival rate’
vs.
M1: ‘Such treatment increases the survival rate’.
The test, as such, does not involve any forecast whatsoever with regard to prospective in-
dividuals (‘those’ that may or may not be treated ‘in the future’). All that the test produces 
is a proposition in empirical knowledge (experienced knowledge) stating, as a physically 
demonstrable fact, that ‘The hypothesised model, as tested, matches the given data rather 
poorly’. This proposition is neither a prediction, nor a forecast; it is a predication. It does 
not differ in epistemological principle from other predications such as ‘this is red’, ‘that is 
an apple’, and ‘Nelson Mandela is a man’. In each case we point at a solitary object in the 
real world and we bring a matching physical sort into the human mind.
We note in passing that the ordering used in the foregoing is incapable of a satis factory 
symmetric representation. Such examples present severe difficulties for the ideas of si-
multaneous statistical inference. Meulepas discusses altogether eight different recipes for 
complementing Fisher’s exact one-tailed significance test for the 2×2 table, with a two-
tailed version. One is due to Finney (1948) and defended by Yates (1984). One is due to 
Irwin (1935). Three are due to Gibbons and Pratt (1975) and discussed by Gibbons (1986). 
One is due to Cox and Hinkley (1974) and discussed by Cox (1984). One is due to Pike, 
given in Hill and Pike (1965) and discussed by Hill (1984). Lastly, one is given in Meulepas’ 
paper itself, and intended to be a significance test to counter a randomised two-tailed 
hypothesis test due to Lehmann (1959, 1986). A randomised one-tailed hypothesis test for 2×2 
tables was first proposed by Tocher (1950). We take up this matter in Section 1.34.
Returning to the ideas introduced in this section, we remark that for statistical data 
analysis to draw the distinction between predicting and forecasting is especially impor-
tant, for at least the following three reasons:
A first reason is that the distinction is not drawn in every-day language.
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A second reason is that popular notions of a scientist declaring ‘Did I not tell you so?’ 
promote habits of thought in which we wrongly tend to think of the evidence favouring 
a scientific model as a belief in our ability to use that model for forecasting. Yet any data 
against which a scientific view might be tested, can be seated in the past only (in the 
data record); it is never seated in the future.
A third reason for distinguishing between prediction and forecasting is that much of the 
statistical literature would have us (wrongly) present a forecast as if that could be evi-
dence. We will develop this point in Chapter 4. In the meantime the reader may wish to 
reserve judgement.
1.31 Scientific data analysis
The term ‘data analysis’ refers to a fundamental principle of scientific investigation, and 
can be defined on very general grounds, as in Definition 1.31.1.
Definition 1.31.1:
Any question of the kind: ‘Does this model fit these data?’ must, as far as possible, be analysed into sub-
sidiary questions of that same kind, i.e. into questions of the kind: ‘Does this subsidiary model fit these 
subsidiary data?’ If a given model can be analysed into several self-contained subsidiary models, then any 
test of the given model must preferably be by way of analytic tests in the sense of testing each subsidiary 
model in its own right. That is meant whenever we speak of data analysis. (Later we will find that the 
notion of a subsidiary model must, for the purposes of this definition, be qualified as that of a relevant 
subsidiary model. But, for the time being, that need not concern us.)
It appears at once that for any model, or subsidiary model, we must be able to identify the 
appropriate data, or subsidiary data, against which it can be tested. That involves a second 
fundamental principle, namely that a model is a scientific model if, and only if, it predicts con-
ceptual physical experiences corresponding to which actual experiences can then serve as the 
data against which the model might be tested. We state this principle as Definition 1.31.2.
Definition 1.31.2:
Any model is a scientific model if and only if it predicts, in the conceptual world of the human mind, 
conceptual ‘physical experiences’ for comparison to corresponding real-world physical (bodily) experiences, 
where such comparisons ultimately constitute the only possible way in which such a model might be tested.
We note in passing that any prospective counterparts of the bodily experiences referred to 
in this definition, then provide for whatever physical rewards a tenable model might be 
used by way of forecasting; but that does not concern us in this chapter.
In previous sections we have already met, in statistical context, the principles defined by 
the foregoing pair of definitions. At (1.8.1), (1.8.2) and (1.30.3) we saw how certain sam-
pling models can be analysed into subsidiary sampling models. We saw that sampling 
models are predictive models in the scientific sense of predicting certain conceptual 
bodily experiences, which experiences we referred to as ‘patterns’ and ‘frequencies’. We 
also saw how, by comparing a single instance of real-world bodily experience to an or-
dered ensemble of conceptual bodily experiences, the tenability of a sampling model is 
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tested. Such tests must be analytic, as required by Definition 1.31.1, where this involves 
a subtlety, as follows: the analyses at (1.8.1), (1.8.3) and (1.30.3) are examples of how cer-
tain models and classes of models can be analysed in well-defined mathematical terms. 
But we have repeatedly found that the alternatives in commencement testing are only 
broadly envisaged. That does not mean that such alternatives are not capable of being 
described in meaningful scientific language. It means only that the language of their de-
scription is not capable of being expressed in tightly specified mathematical terms. So 
it has to be understood that the principle of analysis applies not only to our hypothesised 
models, but also to any of the alternatives that are brought to mind. We will now present 
a number of examples to illustrate this, followed by further discussion. The reader will 
find that in each of the examples the notions of ‘two-tailed tests’ and, more generally, of 
‘simultaneous statistical inference’, are inter alia rebuffed as being non-analytic notions. 
That should not come as a surprise, as the notion of ‘simultaneous statistical inference’ 
must quite obviously lead to synthesis, rather than to analysis.
Example 1.31.1
Consider Pearson’s measure of skewness, √b1, and his measure of kurtosis, b2, for large 
samples of size n. Let
Z1 = (√b1)/√(6/n) and Z2 = (b2-3)/√(24/n).
When sampling from a hypothesised normal population, Z1 and Z2 are distributed ap-
proximately as two independent N(0, 1) variables.
Z1 is left sensitive to left skewness and right sensitive to right skewness.
Z2 is left sensitive to leptokurtosis and right sensitive to mesokurtosis.
Using different notation, Cox and Hinkley (1974, pp. 71-72) recommend as follows:
‘If, say, only the symmetry of the distribution is of concern and only departures in 
one direction are of importance one can use Z1 directly as a test statistic; if depart-
ures in either direction are of approximately equal importance, |Z1| or equivalently 
(Z1)² can be used.’
A similar recommendation must then of course apply to Z2, and they make the further 
recommendation
‘If both statistics Z1 and Z2 are of interest, then some composite function is needed. 
… We may for example take (Z1)²+(Z2)², which has for large n approximately a chi-
squared distribution with two degrees of freedom.’
Now consider an investigator who has found the following for given data:
Z1 = +1.000, which co-ordinates at (0.84, ε, 0.16) in the test distribution.
Z2 = +1.645, which co-ordinates at (0.95, ε, 0.05) in the test distribution. (1.31.1)
Either way the Z1 test hardly points at skewness. However, the Z2 test points strongly at 
mesokurtosis. Suppose, however, that the investigator accepts the recommendations of 
Cox and Hinkley, not realising that these arise from the doctrine of simultaneous statis-
tical inference. The investigator would then be persuaded that since interest is in either 
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form of skewness and either form of kurtosis, the tests at (1.31.1) must be disregarded 
and be replaced by:
|Z1| = 1.000, which co-ordinates at (0.68, ε, 0.32) in the test distribution.
|Z2| = 1.645, which co-ordinates at (0.90, ε, 0.10) in the test distribution.
Moreover, following the further recommendation of Cox and Hinkley, the investigator 
would be persuaded that these two tests must also be disregarded and replaced by:
(Z1)²+(Z2)² = 3.706, co-ordinating at (0.83, ε, 0.17) in the test distribution. (1.31.2)
The two tests at (1.31.1) are analytic. The three tests that follow are not analytic. First 
the sample patterns that are typical of skewness to the left are confounded with those 
that are typical of skewness to the right. Then the sample patterns that are typical of 
mesokurtosis are confounded with those that are typical of leptokurtoses. Finally, at 
(1.31.2), all four types of patterns are confounded with one another, and the result has 
hidden the evidence displayed at (1.31.1).
Example 1.31.2
Consider the ten waiting times for the early-era eruptions of Vesuvius (Table 1.15.2). We 
previously found that, as tested by the Cramer-Von Mises ordering, our model of expo-
nential waiting times fits the data well. That test would obviously be sensitive to various 
non-exponential sample patterns, but it cannot possibly be sensitive to a non-random 
order of waiting times, as it deals with waiting times in order of magnitude, ignoring 
order of occurrence. In order to test for non-random order of occurrence, we label the 
five highest values ‘A’, and the five lowest values ‘B’, to obtain the string
AABAABBBBA.
Define yx = 1 or 0, depending on whether the outcome in ordinal position x is A or B, res-
pectively. Let the 10-choose-5 possible sample patterns be ordered by magnitude r, the 
product moment correlation of x and yx. Let the hypothesised model be that of a random 
order of waiting times. For the given data the product moment correlation is r = -0.383, 
which is a class mark for the interval from r = -0.453 to r = -0.313. Under the hypothesised 
model, the test statistic is distributed approximately as an N(0, σ²) random variable, where 
σ² = (n-1)–1 and n denotes the number of waiting times (Cf. Example 1.21.1). Using this 
approximation, the mental correlate of the test datum is to be found at (0.087, 0.092, 0.821) 
in the test distribution. This kind of test is at its most sensitive if the numbers of A’s and 
B’s are as nearly equal as possible. For the 20 waiting times for the later-era eruptions this 
is achieved by labelling values > 11 as A, and values < 12 as B, to obtain the string
AAABBAABAAAABBBBBBAA,
comprising 11 A’s and 9 B’s. Using the same type of ordering as before, we find that 
r = -0.270, which is a class mark for the interval from r = -0.253 to r = -0.288. The mental 
correlate of the test datum in this case is situated at (0.105, 0.030, 0.865) in the test distri-
bution. Now consider how we might attach the pointers. We see at once that each of the 
two separate tests is left sensitive to a negative trend in waiting times and right sensitive 
to a positive trend in waiting times. A data analyst would not wish to confound sample 
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patterns that point at the one kind of trend with those that point at the opposite trend 
and therefore two-tailed tests are ruled out. For each era our tests have thus analysed 
the alternatives into two different possibilities. For the possibility of negative trends, our 
evidence is very weak:
Early era: (*0.087, 0.092, 0.821). Later era: (*0.105, 0.030, 0.865). (1.31.3)
For the possibility of positive trends, we have no evidence:
Early era: (0.087, 0.092, 0.821*). Later era: (0.105, 0.030, 0.865*).
Finally, now having very little reason to represent the data in terms of a sequence of re-
sults, we ignore the sequential order of the waiting times, and use the Cramer-Von Mises 
statistic to test the quality of fit with which the data could be represented by two Poisson 
processes. We obtain good fit, as follows (cf. Example 1.15.2):
Early era: (0.85, ε, 0.15*). Later era: (0.87, ε, 0.13*). (1.31.4)
Here the pointer is strictly on the right, as the test is right sensitive to the possibility of a 
non-exponential pattern of waiting times. We note that for each era, the quality of fit of 
two distinctly different subsidiary class characteristics have been tested at (1.31.3) and 
at (1.31.4), respectively.
Example 1.31.3
If the unit vectors (sin xj, cos xj) for j = 1, 2, 3, …, n represent a data set of directions, it 
has been proposed that to test
M0: ‘The directions are a random sample from an isotropic distribution’
vs.
M1: ‘The directions cluster around a preferred direction, α0’,
we might take our test statistic to be the distribution under M0 of the quantity given by
j = n 
(1.31.5)   ∑ cos(xj-a0). 
j = 1
We should, however, use this test hesitantly, for the following reasons: vector addition 
of the given unit vectors yields the resultant vector
 
j = n  
  ∑ (sin xj, cos xj) = q(sin x, cos x), 
j = 1
whose length and direction are denoted by q and x, respectively. The identity
cos(α − β) ≡ sin α sin β + cos α cos β,
~ ~
~
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then leads to the following expression for the test statistic introduced at (1.31.5):
j = n  
  ∑ cos (xj - a0) = q × cos(x - a0) 
j = 1                                                
. (1.31.6)
Hence,
j = n  
  ∑ cos(xj - x) = q. 
j = 1  
(1.31.7)
A test for isotropic directions using the resultant vector length, q, would simply be an 
equivalent of Raleigh’s test (Raleigh’s test as presented at (1.21.3) uses q².) Krumbein 
(1939) introduced the vector mean, x , as an estimator of the population mean, say α. 
Clearly then, a test based on q×cos(x-α0) is not an analytic test; in fact it is even more 
defective in that the factor q is sensitive to unimodal alternatives by way of unusually 
large values, whereas the factor cos(x-α0) is sensitive to α ≠ α0 by way of unusually small 
values. An analytic approach must rather separate the two factors, making them the 
basis of two different tests. A q test is right sensitive to unimodal alternatives, and a 
cos(x-α0) test would be left sensitive to α ≠ α0. Note, however, that a co-ordination test 
for α ≠ α0 should rather be based on
sign(x-α0)×[1-cos(x-α0)],
as that would be left sensitive to α < α0, and right sensitive to α > α0, and would not con-
found the two different data patterns that underlie these sensitivities. A test based on 
cos(x-α0) would be the two-tailed version of the latter test, where a co-ordination tester 
will avoid the use of such a two-tailed test as it confounds indicative sample patterns 
with counter-indicative sample patterns.
Returning now to the test proposed at (1.31.5), let us apply the proposal to Krumbein’s 
data taking α0 to be the drumlin trend. Using the formula on the right at (1.31.6) to-
gether with the information given in Example 1.21.4, we find for the doubled angles
q×cos(x-α0) = 29.61×cos(177°-148°), which equals 25.90.
Cox and Hinkley (1974, p. 67) give the test distribution as approximately N(0, 0.5n) with 
n = 100 in our case. The test datum, 25.90, co-ordinates at (0.9999, ε, 0.0001*) in the 
test distribution, pointing at (yes) non-isotropic alternatives, but (no) not at just those 
whose preferred direction does not deviate substantially from the drumlin trend.
Again, consider a record of the vanishing directions of a number of homing pigeons, when 
released one by one away from home. Yes! Of course they have flown home! But the home 
direction might systematically deviate from the vanishing directions, other wise why have 
those directions been recorded?
Comparison of the expressions on the left at (1.31.6) and (1.31.7) shows that when α0 = α, 
Raleigh’s tests arises by substituting an estimated value in place of the value estimated. In 
~
~
~
~
~ ~
~
~
~
~
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that case it can be anticipated that, compared to Raleigh’s test, a q×cos(x-α) test would 
have greater sensitivity for almost any, if not any, unimodal alternative, but that is not a 
tenable criticism of Raleigh’s test. Instead, we should recognise that separating characte-
ristics arising within different frames of reference are not comparable. In other words, the 
choice of a test statistic does not begin with a comparison of separating characteristics; it 
begins with a substantive question.
Example 1.31.4
Snedecor and Cochran (1989, p. 197) reproduce a data set giving the numbers of four distinct 
types of second-generation plants from a cross between two pure lines in corn. Table 1.31.1 
presents these data, along with corresponding expected values that arise, as follows. Using
Table 1.31.1: The numbers of four distinct types of maize plants found in the second generation 
from a cross between two pure lines. The expected numbers for a 9:3:3:1 hypothe-
sised ratio are given in brackets
Plain Striped Row Totals
Green a = 773
(731.8)
b = 238
(243.9) 1 011
Gold c = 231
(243.9)
d = 59
(81.3) 290
Column totals 1 004 1 301 297
the notations introduced at (1.30.1) and (1.30.2) a commonly used Mendelian model aris-
es at (1.30.2) when θ1 and θ2 are both = 3/(3+1). In customary genetic terms the model 
then states that the green:gold segregation ratio θ1:(1-θ1) equals 3:1, that the plain:striped 
segregation ratio θ2:(1-θ2) equals 3:1, and that the two pairs of genes segregate independ-
ently. Together these three statements imply the overall segregation ratio,
θ1θ2:θ1(1-θ2):(1-θ1)θ2:(1-θ1)(1-θ2),
equals 9:3:3:1. The expected values given in Table 1.31.1 are those for this 9:3:3:1 ratio. Us-
ing the well-known formula:
Σ[(observed-expected)²÷expected], (1.31.8)
Snedecor and Cochran obtain chi-square = 9.25 on 3 df. (1.31.9)
However, we take the position that this cannot provide an analytical test, as the analysis 
given at (1.30.3) shows that the 9:3:3:1 ratio arises from three different, self-contained 
subsidiary models. We begin by fitting the third factor in square brackets at (1.30.3), so 
as to test for independent segregation. By using a large-sample approximation, the fol-
lowing test statistic can be modelled as an N(0, 1) random variable:
Z1 = (ad-bc)÷√[(a+b)(c+d)(a+c)(b+d)÷(a+b+c+d)].
~
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We obtain
Z1 = -1.14, which co-ordinates at (0.374, ε, 0.626) in the test distribution.
In order to attach a pointer we would have to know whether the first generation was in 
linkage phase or in repulsion phase, corresponding to which the pointing co-ordinate 
would be on the left or the right, respectively. In the present case, however, that does not 
matter, since either way our hypothesised model of independent segregation, as tested 
here, fits the data well. Next, to fit the first two factors in square brackets in (1.30.3), 
and again relying on large-sample approximations, the following two test statistics are 
modelled as two independent N(0, 1) random variables:
Z2 = [(1)(a+b)-(3)(c+d)]÷√[(1)(3)(a+b+c+d)].
Z3 = [(1)(a+c)-(3)(b+d)]÷√[(1)(3)(a+b+c+d)].
Z2 tests for a 3:1 green:gold segregation ratio, and Z3 tests for a 3:1 plain:striped segrega-
tion ratio. We obtain:
Z2 = +2.26, which co-ordinates at (0.988, ε, 0.012*) in the test distribution.
Z3 = +1.81, which co-ordinates at (0.965, ε, 0.035*) in the test distribution.
The pointers arise from the observation that ‘striped’ and ‘gold’ represent chlorophyll 
abnormalities. So, the shortfall in the numbers of such plants is not unexpected, and 
our analysis produces further facts pointing at a lower viability of such plants. Here we 
have used Z1, Z2 and Z3 to fit three distinctly different, self-contained subsidiary models, 
each in its own right, as Definition 1.31.1 would have us do. As opposed to that, the chi-
square test based on the result at (1.31.9) would have us fit a complex model arising from 
the three subsidiaries jointly. We note in passing that the sum of squares of the three 
Z-values, 9.68, differs slightly from the value given at (1.31.9). But that is owing to ap-
proximation errors only; i.e. we have for all practical purposes analysed the chi-square 
statistic arising at (1.31.8) into terms corresponding to three statistically independent 
degrees of freedom. Clearly, the chi-square test is in this case not analytic. Using the 
chi-square value at (1.31.9) for a significance test, Snedecor and Cochran find the value 
too large for the 9:3:3:1 ratio to be tenable (SL = 0.030). They then go on to say that with 
more than two Mendelian classes, such a test
‘… is usually only a first step in the examination of the data. From the test we 
have learned that the deviations between observed and expected numbers are 
too large to be reasonably attributed to sampling fluctuations. But the χ² test 
does not tell us in what way the observed and expected numbers differ. For this, 
we look first at the individual deviations and their contributions to χ².’
So, examining the deviations of observed from expected numbers, they note that these
‘… could be largely explained by a physiological cause, namely the weakened con-
dition of the last three classes due to the chlorophyll abnormality.’
To illustrate this by further analysis, they consider whether the large chi-square value is 
attributable to poor survivorship of the class with doubly deficient chlorophyll. So they 
perform two further chi-square tests: (i) a test of whether or not the numbers of plants 
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in the first three classes reflect a 9:3:3 ratio, and (ii), a test of whether or not the number 
of plants in the first three classes together and those in the last class reflect a (9+3+3):1 
ratio. Again using the recipe given at (1.31.8), they obtain the following:
(i) To test for the 9:3:3 ratio, chi-square = 2.70 on 2 df. SL ≈ 0.25. (1.31.10)
(ii) To test for the (9+3+3):1 ratio, chi-square = 6.53 on 1 df. SL ≈ 0.01. (1.31.11)
They then gather their findings as follows:
‘To summarize, the high value of χ² obtained initially, 9.25 with 3 df, can be ascribed 
to a deficiency in the number of (doubly deficient) plants, with the other three class-
es not deviating abnormally from the Mendelian probabilities.’
With regard to the two singly deficient classes, they do, however, remark that:
‘… some deficiencies may also exist in the second and third classes relative to the 
first class, which would show up more definitely in a larger sample’.
The remark overlooks the following analysis: the 9:3:3 ratio can be viewed as arising in-
dependently from a 9:(3+3) ratio and a 3:3 ratio, where only the 9:(3+3) ratio and not the 
3:3 ratio is of the type (number normal):(number deficient). Thus the test at (1.31.10) is 
not analytic. An analytic test for the question it asks is given by the first of the following 
two test statistics, where the second test statistic gives an analytic test for a distinctly 
different question:
Y1 = [(3 + 3)(a) − (9)(b + c)] ÷ √[(3 + 3)(9)(a + b + c)].
Y2 = [(3)(b) − (3)(c)] ÷ √[(3)(3)(b + c)].
Y1 tests for a 9:(3 + 3) ratio of normal to singly deficient plants. Y2 tests for a 3:3 ratio 
between the two classes of singly deficient plants. We note that these two tests will be 
conditional with sample totals equal to (a+b+c) and (b+c), respectively; thus each test 
involves only those plants whose characteristics have a bearing on the question being 
addressed by that particular test; i.e. each test is appropriately analytic. Under the hy-
pothesised ratios each Y-like statistic is approximately distributed as an N(0, 1) random 
variable. We find:
Y1 = +1.61, which co-ordinates at (0.946, ε, 0.054*) in the test distribution.
Y2 = +0.32, which co-ordinates at (0.627, ε, 0.373) in the test distribution.
The 1 df chi-square at (1.31.11) is the squared value of
[(1)(a+b+c)-(9+3+3)(d)]÷√[(3)(3)(a+b+c+d)] = +2.56, 
which co-ordinates at (0.995, ε, 005*) in the N(0, 1) distribution.
However, in view of what we have already learned from the tests based on the two Y-like 
statistics, this last test is of little interest. A more informative test is given by
Y3 = [(1)(b+c)-(3+3)(d)]÷√[(1)(3+3)(b+c+d)].
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The rationale for this test is that if the expected shortfall in the observed numbers of de-
ficient plants would be proportionately the same in all three deficient classes, the ratio 
of singly deficient to doubly deficient plants would remain (3+3):(1). Using the N(0, 1) 
approximation, we find:
Y3 = +2.04, which co-ordinates at (0.979, ε, 0.021*) in the test distribution.
The Y1 test shows that the number of singly deficient plants falls short of expectation. 
The Y2 test shows no difference in numbers of the two types of singly deficient plants. 
The Y3 test shows that the shortfall in the number of doubly deficient plants is greater 
than the shortfall in the number of singly deficient plants.
Discussion of Examples 1.31.1, 1.31.2, 1.31.3 and 1.31.4
Technology is synthetic. Investigation is analytic. For instance, medical professionals co-
operating in the surgical removal of a tumour do so in a technological capacity. The ques-
tion addressed by their reasoning is: ‘How might the desired physical outcome be brought 
about?’ So, they synthesise preparatory procedures, anaesthetic procedures, surgical pro-
cedures, and so forth, as an exercise in the use of knowledge. But medical professionals co-
operating in the diagnosis of an ailment do so in an investigative capacity. The question 
addressed by their reasoning is: ‘How might this physical ailment have come about?’ So, 
they analyse blood samples, urine samples, X-rays, and so on, as an exercise in the pursuit 
of knowledge. Thus the definitive characteristic of investigative science is that it invariably 
tries to analyse its questions into as many self-contained subsidiary questions as possible. 
And so it must also be for statistical investigation. In order to achieve this we must recog-
nise the following three binding principles:
We must try to establish precisely what questions substantive investigation wishes 
to ask of the data in hand.
We must, as far as possible, try to analyse those questions (and further questions 
that may thus be raised) into self-contained subsidiary questions.
We must try to deal with the subsidiary questions separately and, for each of the 
subsidiary questions, try to do so by commencing from a statistic that is minimally 
sufficient for that particular subsidiary question. 
Although these desiderata cannot always be met, we must nevertheless try to do so. Our 
examples indicate how this may be achieved. Examples 1.31.1 and 1.31.2 show that by 
asking suitably different questions, the class characteristic is analysed into different sub-
sidiary class characteristics. Example 1.31.3 shows that sample patterns telling us about 
the class characteristic must not be confounded with sample patterns telling us about the 
class index. Example 1.31.4 displays a revealing fact: Z1, Y1, Y2 and Y3 provide four quite dif-
ferently informative one degree of freedom contrasts, where mathematical statistics can 
find only three algebraically independent one degree of freedom contrasts. This is because 
the investigation raised four quite different extra-mathematical questions. In Chapter 6 
we will find that there are many such examples whose existence proves that meaning-
ful scientific questions formulated in terms of a given number of mathematical variables 
may, without redundancy, outnumber those variables.
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1.32 Relevant subsidiary models
In order to clarify the parenthetical remark in Definition 1.31.1, we now present four 
examples, followed by a discussion, further definitions, and a further example.
Example 1.32.1
Consider how an investigator might use the data given in Table 1.1.1 on the half-life of 
certain fruits, to arrive at an opinion about what values of m might represent the mean 
natural ripening time of such fruits. The 0.1 and the 0.9 quartiles of Student’s central t 
distribution for 8 df are –1.397 and +1.397, respectively. So let the equation
t = (x-m)÷√s
2
, where x denotes the mean time for the n = 5 control trees, 
                       n
and s2 denotes the pooled error variance estimate based on (5-1)+(5-1) = 8 df, 
be solved for m with t = +1.397, and with t = -1.397, respectively. The solutions are
m = 12.4 days and m = 13.7 days, respectively.
A co-ordination test of any value of m between these limits, using Student’s t, would re-
sult in a test datum whose mental correlate would be situated between (0.1, ε, 0.9) and 
(0.9, ε, 0.1) in Student’s test distribution. Such a value could thereby be judged tenable, 
provided of course that the two sets of half-life values can be modelled satisfactorily as 
samples from normal populations that are possibly different in mean only. In Figure 
1.1.2 the two sets of responses are plotted against the expected values of the correspond-
ing standard normal-order statistics. For normal sampling each set of points would scat-
ter round a straight-line regression with slope equal to the population standard deviation. 
Using a table of constants of Shapiro and Wilk (1965), the slope of the regression in the 
case of the five responses to carbaryl is estimated to be 1.824. For sampling from a normal 
population, this would also estimate the population standard deviation, where that pro-
vides the basis for the Shapiro-Wilk test for normality, as the standard deviation of the 
same responses, 1.062, calculated in the usual way, applies to sampling from any popu-
lation. Here the value of the Shapiro-Wilk statistic, W, is equal to (1.824÷1.062)²÷(n-1), 
where n denotes the sample size, five in the present case. The test values for carbaryl and 
control are W = 0.738 and W = 0.936, respectively, and their mental correlates are to be 
found within the Shapiro-Wilk test distribution at
(*0.065, ε, 0.935) and (*0.569, ε, 0.431), respectively. (1.32.1)
A lack of ‘straightness of scatter’ tends to deflate the numerator of W and so the pointing co-
ordinates are on the left. However, we must take the position that instead of these two separate 
tests, our use of Student’s t requires a single test, as it relies on a model involving a compound 
class characteristic, whereby the responses to carbaryl and to control were jointly modelled in 
terms of normal sampling. We must therefore employ a single test to judge the quality of fit 
of that compound. So, using the method of Section 1.22, we combine the results at (1.32.1) to 
obtain a chi-square value of 6.59 on 4 df. The mental correlate of this value is to be found at
(*0.175, ε, 0.825) in the test distribution. (1.32.2)
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Our hypothesised compound class characteristic, here that of joint normal sampling as 
tested at (1.32.2), fits the given data well.
Example 1.32.2
Consider the eruptions of Vesuvius (Example 1.15.2). The mean waiting times for the two 
eras were hugely different, namely 155.2 years during the ancient era and 15.65 years dur-
ing the modern era. Suppose that we must express this difference in terms of a co-ordi-
nation test. Let θ1 and θ2, n1 and n2, and X1 and X2 denote the expected waiting times, the 
sample sizes, and the sample means for the ancient and the modern eras, respectively. For 
the model developed in Example 1.15.2, a minimal sufficient statistic for (θ1÷θ2) is given by:
(θ1÷θ2)(n2 X2÷n1 X1), which is distributed as Snedecor’s F on 2n2 and 2n1 df.
So, in order to test M0: (θ1÷θ2) = 1, we calculate the test datum as
(1)[(10×155.2)÷(20×15.65)] = 4.9 on 40 and 20 df,
whose mental correlate is situated at (1.00, ε, 0.00 ) in the test distribution. Here a small left 
co-ordinate would point at θ1 < θ2, and a small right co-ordinate would point at θ1 > θ2. In the 
present example the right co-ordinate points overwhelmingly at θ1 > θ2. A commencement 
test for this development requires that the data for the two eras be jointly modelled as the 
outcome of two independent Poisson processes. So, the two class cha racteristics that were 
previously considered separately, and correctly so for the purpose of Example 1.15.2, must 
for the present purpose be considered to be the components of a single compound characte-
ristic. The results previously obtained when testing separately for exponential waiting times 
in Example 1.15.2 were:
For the ancient era: (0.85, ε, 0.15*). For the modern era: (0.87, ε, 0.13*)
Combining these results by the method of Section 1.22, we obtain chi-square = 7.87 on 
4 df, whose mental correlate is found at (0.90, ε, 0.10) in the test distribution.
So, for both eras jointly: (0.90, ε, 0.10*). (1.32.3)
As tested at (1.32.3), our hypothesised compound class characteristic, here that of joint 
exponential sampling, fits the data, though slightly awkwardly.
Example 1.32.3
Recall that in Example 1.31.2 we tested whether or not the two sets of waiting times for 
the eruptions of Vesuvius can be modelled satisfactorily by two random samples of some 
or other kind, rather than by two stochastic sequences of some or other kind. In Example 
1.31.2 the quality of fit of the two characteristics were tested separately for the two eras, 
and correctly so for the purpose of that example. There we obtained the following:
Ancient era: (*0.087, 0.092, 0.821). Modern era: (*0.105, 0.030, 0.865) (1.32.4)
However, for the purpose of the F test performed in the previous example we must rec-
ognise that the two class characteristics jointly are the components of a compound class 
characteristic, in which case we must employ a single test to judge the quality of fit of that 
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compound. So, using the method of Section 1.22 to combine the results given at (1.32.4) 
we obtain chi-square = 8.42 on 4 df, which is a class mark for the interval from chi-square 
= 7.25 to chi-square = 9.59.
So, for both eras jointly: (*0.049, 0.057, 0.872). (1.32.5)
Here the magnitude of the rounding is such as to discourage extreme co-ordination. So 
our hypothesised compound characteristic, here jointly that of a random order as tested 
at (1.32.5), fits the data, though slightly awkwardly.
Example 1.32.4
In Examples 1.32.2 and 1.32.3 we tested the quality of fit of a class of models for the wait-
ing times for the eruptions of Vesuvius, by way of testing the quality of fit of two entirely 
different and statistically independent compound class characteristics. That the two 
are statistical independent follows from the fact that the tests we discussed in Example 
1.32.2 are invariant under re-ordering of waiting times within eras, whereas the tests we 
discussed in Example 1.32.3 rely on, and only on, the consequences of such reordering. It 
follows that the results at (1.32.3) and (1.32.5) are mathematically capable of being com-
bined by the method of Section 1.22. However, to do so would be wrong, as that would 
run counter to the principle of scientific data analysis expressed by Definition 1.31.1. In 
fact, the pointing co-ordinates in the two cases point at quite different alternatives. So, 
the method of Section 1.22 is not available, as it requires the pointing co-ordinates to 
be identified as those pointing at the same underlying source of possibly poor fit, so that 
they can both be made to be pointing to the right, or both to be pointing to the left.
The foregoing examples show that Definition 1.31.1 requires clarification in that an ana-
lytic test can sometimes involve a class characteristic that is ‘a compound’ in the sense of 
being capable of analysis into two or more self-contained subsidiaries, but irrelevantly 
so for the purposes of the test in question. At the same time the examples also show that 
certain compounds must be ruled out as being synthetic hybrids. Thus for instance, in 
Example 1.31.1 the test shown at (1.31.2) was ruled out on the grounds that it tries, by way 
of alternatives, to involve a synthetic hybrid compounded of four entirely different class 
characteristics. Similarly, in Example 1.32.4, we ruled out the use of the method of Section 
1.22 to combine the results at (1.32.3) and (1.32.5), as that would have us involve a synthetic 
hybrid compounded of two entirely different class characteristics. So, any self-contained 
components of an admissible compound class characteristic must, in some or other sense, 
be ‘of the same sort’. For instance, Example 1.32.1 involves a compound comprising a pair 
of mathematically identical components, but Example 1.32.2 shows that our concept ‘of 
the same sort’ must also allow for different sample sizes. So the components of an admis-
sible compound will have to be conspecific in some or other sense broader than identi-
cal. Again, consider how the termination of a field trial using a completely randomised 
design might result in inequitably censored treatment groups. A special version of the 
Shapiro-Wilk test would then be applicable, and we could justifiably use the method of 
Section 1.22 to combine the results of such tests over different treatment groups. Hence 
a satisfactory concept of conspecific components must allow for differences in sample 
size, and for differences arising from censorship or truncation. Perhaps these are the only 
ways in which the components of a well-conceived compound characteristic might differ. 
But we avoid making that a strict limitation in Definition 1.32.1. Instead, the phrase ‘for 
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instance’ as used in this definition, leaves it up to us to make sensible interpretations 
of what is meant by ‘conspecific components’, because that seems to be the best way of 
avoiding unintended interpretations. Thus, for instance, if a compound consists of nine 
mathematically identical components, we would not intend that it could be viewed as 
inadmissible on the grounds that five of the components jointly form a class charac-
teristic ‘not of the same sort’ as that formed jointly by the other four components. So 
Definition 1.32.2 arises.
Definition 1.32.1:
A compound class characteristic is an admissible compound if and only if it comprises conspecific 
components, possibly differing only with respect to for instance different sample sizes, or censorship, or 
truncation.
Definition 1.32.2:
Let a class characteristic serve as a premise or a partial premise for a further sampling model. Let the 
characteristic be a compound, thus capable of analysis into several self-contained components. A test of 
fit of the characteristic can be an analytic test if and only if the compound is an admissible compound, 
is not a component of a further admissible compound, and serves in its entirety as a premise or a partial 
premise for the further sampling model. We refer to such a compound as a relevant subsidiary of the 
further sampling model.
Definitions 1.32.1 and 1.32.2 concern the purely conceptual problem of ensuring that 
a proposed subsidiary model is neither ill conceived, nor irrelevant. The definitions do 
not concern the empirical problem of testing whether or not subsidiary parts of given 
data are tenably predicated by such a subsidiary model. The following example will help 
make this clear.
Example 1.32.5
The data set considered in Example 1.32.1 brought into the human mind a compound 
class characteristic comprising a pair of normal class characteristics, where the mental 
correlates of the corresponding pair of Shapiro-Wilk test values were situated at
(0.065, ε, 0.935) and (0.569, ε, 0.431) in the test distribution. (1.32.6)
The seemingly extreme situation on the left might prompt a heterogeneous incipient 
alternative to come to mind. A test for such heterogeneity can be based on Theorem 
1.22.1, according to which a hypothesised statistical co-ordinate is approximately dis-
tributed as a U(0, 1) random variable. An improved approximation replaces U by U+0.5ε, 
or replaces V by 0.5ε+V (Stone 1969). Let us choose U+0.5ε = Q, so as to transform the 
information given at (1.32.6) into the following order-statistical values:
q[1] = 0.065+0.5ε and q[2] = 0.569+0.5ε, where ε ≈ 0 in this example.
For samples of size n from a U(0, 1) population, the jth smallest value, Q[j] in present 
notation, is transformed as follows to Snedecor’s F (Wilkinson 1933; Ling 1992):
{(1-Q[j])÷Q[j]}÷{2(n+1-j)÷2(j)} = F on 2(n+1-j) and 2j df, for j = 1, 2, 3, …, n.
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We find that 
{(1-0.065)÷0.065}÷{2(2+1-1)÷2(1)} = 7.19 on 4 and 2 df, whose mental correlate is 
found at (0.85, e, 0.15*) in Snedecor’s central F distribution.
Here the pointer is on the right, as an unduly large F value would point at the left co-
ordinate on the left at (1.32.6) as being unduly small, which is presently not the case. 
(Ordering on 0.5ε+V inverts the ordering on U+0.5ε, and so produces the same test.)
1.33 The notion of ‘critical regions’ as a source of ill-conceived 
 orderings
Let a partial ordering for any co-ordination test or any significance test be denoted by 
O1, O2, O3, …, Ok-2, Ok-1, Ok. The nested regions forming the following array have been 
termed the critical regions for the test (Cox and Hinkley 1974, Section 4.2):
Wk = Ok, Wk-1 = Ok-1∪Ok, Wk-2 = Ok-2∪Ok-1∪Ok, … .
The ensuing development will, however, show that the concept of ‘the critical region’ is more 
natural to hypothesis testing than it is to significance testing or co-ordination testing.
Consider a given data set being modelled as the outcome of just n independent Bernoul-
li trials, where the probability of success μ is constant from trial to trial, and 0.5 ≤ μ < 1. 
Suppose we wish in some sense to ‘test’ M0: μ = 0.5 vs. M1: μ > 0.5. If n = 4 an appropriate 
partial ordering for a significance test or a co-ordination test is as follows, where S or F 
denotes success or failure, respectively, and each string of four such letters denotes one 
of the 24 sample patterns that comprise the sample space:
O1 = {FFFF}
O2 = {SFFF, FSFF, FFSF, FFFS}
O3 = {SSFF, SFSF, SFFS, FSSF, FSFS, FFSS}
O4 = {SSSF, SSFS, SFSS, FSSS}
O5 = {SSSS}. (1.33.1)
The attainable significance levels for this ordering are given by:
SLk = Pr(a sample ∈ WkM0) for k = 1, 2, 3, …, 5
where each of these can be calculated as a number of favourable cases divided by the 
total number of cases. For example, W3 = O3∪O4∪O5. So
SL3 = Pr(a sample ∈ W3M0) = [(6 cases)+(4 cases)+(1 case)]÷(16 cases).
However, for a hypothesis test the sample space must be divided into at least two, and at 
most three, disjoint regions. In the case of just two regions, these will be the critical region, 
Wr, and its complement, Wa, where any region in the sample space may serve as a critical 
region, and where the corresponding hypothesis test is just a decision rule of the form: 
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If the sample that models the data is ∈ Wr, reject M0 and (equivalently) accept M1.
If the sample that models the data is ∈ Wa, accept M0 and (equivalently) reject M1.
The operating characteristics of the decision rule are two error rates, these being the 
frequencies of the two possible kinds of errors (erroneous decisions), as follows:
‘Reject M0M0’ is a Type I error. Pr(reject M0M0) = α is the Type I error rate.
‘Reject M1M1’ is a Type II error. Pr(reject M1M1) = β is the Type II error rate.
Usually the Type I error rate is specified. Consider the specification α = (0.5)4. The criti-
cal region may then be chosen to be any one of the 24 sample patterns comprising the 
sample space. The 24 different regions involve different Type II error rates, these being, 
for each region, the frequency of sample patterns that belong to the complement of that 
region when given M1. So we can readily calculate that, for instance:
If we choose Wr = {SSSS}, then α = (0.5)4 and β = 1-μ4.
If we choose Wr = {FSSS}, then α = (0.5)4 and β = 1-(1-μ)μ3.
If we choose Wr = {FSSF}, then α = (0.5)4 and β = 1-(1-μ)μ2(1-μ). Etc.
As μ > 0.5 implies that 1-μ < 0.5, it appears at once that for the choice Wr = {SSSS} the Type 
II error rate (the value of β) is less than for any one of the other 24-1 possible choices, and 
uniformly so over all the possible values of μ > 0.5. Such a test is called a uniformly most 
powerful hypothesis test (UMP hypothesis test). Suppose that we now alter the specified 
value of the Type I error rate for our test to be α = 2(0.5)4. Then, depending on our choice 
of Wr, there are four different UMP hypothesis tests, each with β = 1-μ3, as follows:
If Wr = {SSSS, FSSS}, then α = 2(0.5)4 and β = 1-[μ4 + (1-μ)μ3].
If Wr = {SSSS, SFSS}, then α = 2(0.5)4 and β = 1-[μ4 + μ(1-μ)μ2].
If Wr = {SSSS, SSFS}, then α = 2(0.5)4 and β = 1-[μ4 + μ2(1-μ)μ].
If Wr = {SSSS, SSSF}, then α = 2(0.5)4 and β = 1-[μ4+μ3(1-μ)]. (1.33.2)
Can any of these UMP hypothesis tests serve our purpose? The answer to the question 
depends crucially on Definitions 1.2.1 and 1.2.2. On the one hand: should Definition 1.2.1 
define our purpose, we are compelled to answer in the negative, because we are then be-
ing asked to pick any arbitrary one of the four patterns FSSS, SFSS, SSFS, SSSF, and to 
pretend that it is more indicative of μ > 0.5 than any of the other three would be. Clearly, 
that amounts to a nonsensical physical ‘explanation’ in response to the investigative ques-
tion How might the value of m explain how these experiences (data) have come about? On 
the other hand: should Definition 1.2.2 define our purpose, we are compelled to answer 
in the affirmative because then the question to be addressed is: Depending on the value of 
m, how might such experiences be brought about?, where the experiences in question are 
a forecasted Type I error rate of 2(0.5)4 should μ equal 0.5, and a forecasted Type II error 
rate of 1-μ3 should μ exceed 0.5, and where any one of the four tests described at (1.33.2) 
achieve just that. Hence, the language of critical regions and error rates is foreign to inves-
tigative statistics; it belongs to a statistical technology of decision-making under predict-
able risks. Instead of the concept ‘critical region’, a concept more suitable for significance 
tests would be that of ‘ordinal regions’ as provided by Definition 1.33.1. Such regions are 
always nested in the sense that Wj ∈ Wj-1 for j = k, k-1, k-2, …, 2, and the last member of 
such an array, W1, is always the entire sample space. Owing to the formal relationship 
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between significance tests and co-ordination tests, as given in Theorem 1.20.2, the con-
cept of ordinal regions might well arise in a discussion of co-ordination tests, though for 
co-ordination tests, per se, the concept is redundant.
Definition 1.33.1:
Let O1, O2, O3, … Ok-2, Ok-1, Ok denote the partial ordering for a significance test. Then the ordinal regions 
for the test are the terms of the array:
Wk = Ok, Wk-1 = Ok-1∪Ok, Wk-2 = Ok-2∪Ok-1∪Ok, …
Returning to the four UMP hypothesis tests exhibited at (1.33.2) we note that should any 
ordering for a co-ordination test of M0: μ = 0.5 vs. M1: μ > 0.5, assign any of the four pat-
terns FSSS, SFSS, SSFS, SSSF to different ordinal classes, such an ordering would be ill 
conceived. That is so because in the scientific sense of the term ‘test’, alternative models 
can be tested for their tenability by, and only by, testing alternative predictions derived 
from those models against corresponding data. In order to make this entirely clear we 
note that at (1.33.2) we are asked a priori to choose one of four different tests. Yet in effect 
we can make the choice a posteriori, as follows: let the sample space be partitioned into 
just three disjoint regions as follows, where X denotes the number of successes:
Wr ~ {X = 4}. Wb ~ {X = 3}. Wa ~ {X = 2, 1, 0}.
Let the four sides of a balanced tetrahedral die be marked FSSS, SFSS, SSFS and SSSF, 
respectively. Then arbitrarily nominate any one of these four patterns, and use the fol-
lowing randomised decision rule:
If the sample that models the data is ∈ Wr, reject M0.
If the sample that models the data is ∈ Wb, roll the die.
     If the die comes to rest on the nominated pattern, reject M0.
     If the die comes to rest on one of the other three patterns, accept M0.
If the sample that models the data is ∈ Wa, accept M0. (1.33.3)
This is an example of a randomised hypothesis test. It has exactly the same operating 
characteristics as those of the four UMP hypothesis tests exhibited at (1.33.2) and so 
is a randomised UMP hypothesis test. The regions Wr, Wb and Wa are often called the 
rejection region, the boundary region and the acceptance region, respectively. We note in 
passing that the existence of randomised hypothesis tests should contribute fundamen-
tally to our understanding of the statistical discourse, where, as we will see in Chapters 
3 and 4, that has not at all been widely understood. The point here is that hypothesis 
tests are widely (and mistakenly) seen as part and parcel of data analysis, but then there 
is almost always extreme reluctance to maximise power, for Type I error rates, as speci-
fied by means of randomised tests. On the one hand, such reluctance tacitly admits to 
knowing that there is a defect in the reasoning. On the other hand, to persist with such 
reasoning, tacitly admits to not knowing where the reasoning has gone wrong.
The foregoing has shown that a type of ill-conceived ordering arises when we try to 
place sample patterns that have the same frequency under both the hypothesised model 
and the alternative into different ordinal classes. Another type of ill-conceived ordering 
arises when we consider orderings of the type:
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O1 = W
a, O2 = W
b, O3 = W
r. (1.33.4)
For instance, let us enlarge our binomial example by taking n = 10 (instead of 4) and 
specify α = 0.01, as is often recommended. Then a randomised UMP hypothesis test re-
quires the following, where X denotes the number of successes, and where a data value 
of x = 9 would require the use of the auxiliary random device:
Wa = {X < 9}, Wb = {X = 9}, Wr = {X = 10}. (1.33.5)
Considered as an ordering, the defect in this is that the ordering O1+X for X = 0, 1, 2, …, 
10 will often be much more informative, giving for instance the co-ordinates of X = 8 as 
(0.95, 0.04, 0.01) for μ = 0.5, which is clearly extreme. Opposed to that, the ordering that 
arises at (1.33.4) from the partitioning at (1.33.5) conceals this extreme by giving the 
co-ordinates of X = 8 as (∅, 0.95, 0.05) for μ = 0.5. So, an ill-conceived ordering arises if 
we try to place sample patterns that have different frequencies under either the hypoth-
esised model or the alternative, into the same ordinal class. 
1.34 Inconceivable orderings
It cannot be overemphasised that science is the discourse of bodily experience, where 
various forms of mathematical reasoning about science are demonstrably inclined to 
lose sight of the fact. As a first step toward coming to grips with this very serious defect 
in some of the literature on our subject, we now re-visit the learned confusion around 
the idea of a two-tailed significance test for a 2×2 contingency table, as referenced in 
Section 1.30. We here consider Tocher’s one-tailed hypothesis test, and just two of the 
eight different recipes proposed for a two-tailed significance test. To begin with, we take 
note of an epistemological usage of the term ‘conception’.
Consider the notion of ‘a unicorn’. It might be thought that the human mind is able to con-
ceive of a unicorn as being ‘a horse-like creature with the tail of a lion, and a long spirally 
twisted horn growing from its forehead’. However, we take the position that this involves 
an incorrect usage of the term ‘conceive’ instead of ‘imagine’. We must use conceive as a 
technical term for describing the process by which a number of bodily experiences make 
the human mind conceive of their sort. For instance, imagine being asked to join a panel 
of tasters who must identify individual instances of ‘Pinot Gris wine with a “paraffin-like” 
taste’. We might protest no experience of Pinot Gris wines, let alone instances of a paraffin-
like taste. But if so, the oenologist would explain that we first have to be trained by way of 
being exposed to samples of Pinot Gris wines with and without the paraffin-like taste. Our 
minds would be made to conceive the requisite sorts of bodily experience by our bodies hav-
ing been exposed to individual experiences of those sorts. When we speak of an inconceiv-
able sort, we mean that no such sort of bodily experience can be brought to mind.
Now consider Tocher’s test. Being a hypothesis test, it relies on the normative pre scriptions 
we met in Section 1.21. As viewed through the spectacles of significance testing, the fol-
lowing rules are prescribed:
(1) Let SL denote the significance level that a one-tailed significance test attaches to the 
data conveyed by a given 2×2 table, when testing
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M0: ‘No association’ vs. M1: ‘Positive association’.
(2) Specify a test size, α, without reference to the data.
(3) If SL ≤ α, reject M0 and accept M1. If SL > α, accept M0 and reject M1.
For such a test, Tocher proposed, by way of a hypothesis test, to improve on Fisher’s 
significance test by in effect replacing the natural ordering advocated by Fisher with an 
artificial ordering, as follows: consider the probability given by the characteristic factor 
at (1.30.3). It has the form ‘a number of favourable cases divided by a number of possible 
cases’. For Meulepas’ numerical example it is convenient to reason as if the number of 
possible cases equalled 380. (The actual number, given by n!a!b!c!d!, is of course much 
larger, but that does not affect the reasoning that follows.) The 380 possible cases in-
volve just three configurations whose hypothesised probabilities are then as follows:
 Configuration 1 Configuration 2 Configuration 3
 0       2 1       1 2       0
 2      16 1     17 0     18
 Probability = 306/380 Probability = 72/380 Probability = 2/380
For Fisher’s significance test the partial ordering is Ot ∼ Configuration t for t = 1, 2, 3. Let 
our specification be α = 0.05. This can be expressed as α = 19/380. So, using the norma-
tive prescriptions given above for a hypothesis test, we find that for Meulepas’ data:
The observed significance level is given by SL = (2/380)+∅ = 2/380
The specified test size is given by α = 19/380
SL < α
So M0: ‘No association’ is rejected, and M1: ‘Positive association’ is accepted.
The accept-reject rule would have us reject M0 if and only if SL ≤ 19/380. So Tocher in-
troduces a device that would in effect have us consider 19/380 to be ‘a significance level’ 
attainable by adjoining to ‘the two cases favourable for Configuration 3’, a further 17 
cases poached from ‘the 72 cases favourable for Configuration 2’. We are thus to obtain 
altogether 17+2 = 19 cases that are, so to speak, ‘favourable for rejecting M0’. As seen 
through the spectacles of a co-ordination tester, this would have us replacing Fisher’s 
partial ordering, i.e.
O1, O2, O3, corresponding to Configurations 1, 2 and 3, respectively,
with O1, O21, O22, O3, in that order, where O21 and O22 are obtained by partitioning O2 
into two disjointed sets of 55 and 17 cases, respectively (55+17 = 72). This is to be done 
by introducing an extraneous pseudo-random number, x, whose distribution is capable 
of being modelled as that of a random variable X, such that
Pr(X = 0) = 55/72 and Pr(X = 1) = 17/72.
Consider a bowl containing 72 homogenous chips, 55 marked 0, and 17 marked 1. Then 
if, for instance, the data in hand had Configuration 2, Tocher’s test would have the in-
vestigator haphazardly draw one chip to decide whether the given data belong to O21 
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(should the chip be marked 0) or belong to O22 (should the chip be marked 1). In such a 
case M0 is accepted or rejected depending on whether the chip is marked 0 or 1, respec-
tively. However, pseudo-random numbers that are subsequently adjoined to given data, 
cannot possibly contribute any insight whatsoever toward answering the question How 
might the given data have come about? Thus Definition 1.2.1 makes it clear that in the 
discourse of the pursuit of knowledge such numbers must be removed from the given 
data set. But if those numbers are removed, the partitioning of O2 into the two disjoint 
sets denoted by O21 and O22, respectively, would be asking us to conceive of two incon-
ceivable sorts, because how could the human body then distinguish between
‘a Configuration 2 of the O21-like sort’ and ‘a Configuration 2 of the O22-like sort’?
An investigator’s colleagues in substantive science will demand, indeed must demand 
the answer to this question. They must demand to know if the distinction can be tasted, 
if it can be heard, and if it can be seen. The point here is this: a significance level is by 
definition a hypothetical long-run frequency; in other words, its meaning must be ca-
pable of being conveyed by simulation. However, that is possible only if different ordinal 
sets, such as O21 and O22, comprise discernibly different sample patterns.
We note in passing that Chapter 4 will show that Tocher’s test originates from reasoning 
that in the terms of Definitions 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 has mistaken the pursuit of knowledge 
for the use of knowledge.
We now consider Finney’s recipe for a two-tailed test to complement Fisher’s one-tailed 
test for a 2×2 table. In fairness to Finney, we note that his recipe is based on a large-sample 
approximation given by Fisher (1970, p. 95). Nevertheless, any such approximation re-
quires explication of what is being approximated, and on this point Finney’s reasoning 
leads to difficulties. He proposes to calculate the significance level for a two-tailed test 
as being simply twice that for a one-tailed test. For the present problem, however, the 
ordering for a one-tailed test is not intrinsically symmetric. So, no matter how large a 
sample we have in mind, the following difficulties arise. Consider the example given in 
Table 1.30.1. If we observe Configuration 1, the proposal, when applied either to the or-
dering used in Example 1.30.1, or to the inverse ordering, will produce a significance level 
SL, such that SL > 1, where that describes an experience of an inconceivable sort. The dif-
ficulty may seem to be avoided by stipulating that the lesser of the two possible one-tailed 
significance levels must be doubled. However, an insurmountable difficulty then arises, 
as follows: let the probabilities in Table 1.30.1 be interpreted in terms of the number of 
‘favourable cases’ out of a total of 190 ‘possible cases’. Suppose that Configuration 3 is ob-
served. Then Finney’s recipe would have us calculate SL = 2(1/190). Clearly, that amounts 
to replacing Fisher’s ordering with O11, O12, O2, O3, in that order, where O11 and O12 arise 
by partitioning O1 into two disjoint sets comprising one case and 152 cases, respectively 
(1+152 = 153). It then appears at once that this entails the difficulty of explaining how the 
human body must establish whether a given Configuration 1 is
‘a Configuration 1 of the O11-like sort’ or ‘a Configuration 1 of the O12-like sort’.
Moreover, whatever device might be introduced in an attempt at a posterior labelling 
of the given data as being either O11-like or O12-like, will fall foul of Definition 1.2.1 
because that definition would compel us to admit that the labelling had nothing to 
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do with how the given data came about. In other words, Definition 1.2.1 would either 
compel us to explain how O11-like configurations are conceivable as being more ‘like’ our 
hypothesised model than O12-like configurations are, or would otherwise compel us to 
remove the labels as evidentially vacuous for the given investigative problem.
Next we consider the procedure proposed by Meulepas (1998) for a two-tailed significance 
test in place of a corresponding hypothesis test for 2×2 tables. Meulepas motivates the 
procedure as one that ‘exploits the properties of a two-sided hypothesis test’, however, in 
such a way that there is ‘no extraneous quasi-observation such as is needed in the exact 
randomised uniformly most powerful unbiased (UMPU) test of the hypothesis of inde-
pendence’. Applying the proposed procedure to the numerical example reproduced at 
(1.30.4) Meulepas (p. 5) calculates that
SL = (9/190)+(1/190)
as the proposed value of the significance level for that example, where the method of 
calculation makes it entirely clear that the procedure must be interpreted as follows 
in the given instance: there are altogether 190 ‘possible cases’, of which 153, 36, 1, are 
‘favourable’ for Configurations 1, 2, 3, respectively. The significance level is then to be 
obtained by taking the cases that are, so to speak, ‘favourable for the rejection of M0’, as 
nine of the 153 cases that are ‘favourable for Configuration 1’, plus the case that is ‘fa-
vourable for Configuration 3’. So, in effect, we are again dealing with a proposed ordering 
of the form O11, O12, O2, O3, in that order, with O11 and O12 in this proposal obtained by 
partitioning O1 into two disjoint sets comprising nine cases and 144 cases, respectively 
(9+144 = 153). So we are again faced with the difficulty that, in trying to demonstrate by 
simulation the bodily meaning of what is being said, we are unable by bodily experience 
to establish whether a given Configuration 1 is
‘a Configuration 1 of the O11-like sort’ or ‘a Configuration 1 of the O12-like sort’.
We also cannot escape this by resorting to what Meulepas so appropriately refers to as 
‘extraneous quasi-observations’ in an attempt at labelling given results as being either 
O11-like or O12-like, as that is precisely what Meulepas (quite rightly) would have us avoid. 
Such ‘extraneous quasi-observations’ fall foul of Definition 1.2.1 because our fellow inves-
tigators will demand, indeed must demand, to know how O11-like patterns are more in-
dicative than O12-like patterns of any agency that might have caused an association in the 
given 2×2 table. ‘Surely,’ they would be compelled to say, ‘these “extraneous quasi-observa-
tions” cannot be explained by any such cause, as they have been obtained by for instance 
drawing from a bowl of chips – after the given 2×2 table had already come about!’
The direct implication of the foregoing development is that, even if we were to allow for 
the possibility that ‘two-tailed tests’ might play some role in statistical data analysis, the 
recipes of Finney and Meulepas cannot survive scientific scrutiny. That is so because they 
fail to provide meanings that are capable of being forced upon the human body.
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1.35 Developing scientific concepts
The development in the previous section draws attention to the danger of introducing notions 
not anchored in the discourse of physical (bodily) experience. Three forms of such anchorage 
were put forth in Section 1.30. One form concerns predication. For instance, when we point 
and say ‘This is a cold front’, an experiential concept (cold front) predicates a given bodily expe-
rience (this thing here). A second form concerns forecasting. For instance, when we then say 
‘This cold front will bring rain tomorrow’, an experiential concept (cold front) forecasts a pro-
spective bodily experience (rain tomorrow). A third form concerns prediction. In the present 
case, for instance, our forecast relies on the prediction ‘cold fronts bring rain’, in which one 
experiential concept (cold front) addresses another experiential concept (rain). The concepts 
‘cold front’ and ‘rain’ are both directly experiential, as each one can be employed for the predi-
cation of bodily experiences. Scientific discourse also involves concepts that are only indirectly 
experiential, in that they cannot be employed for the predication of bodily experiences. Such a 
concept arose in the early development of genetics. In snapdragons for instance, the numbers 
of white-, pink-, and red-flowered offspring from the five possible parental combinations of 
those colours, conform statistically to the multinomial ratios given in Table 1.35.1.
Table 1.35.1: Parental combinations and resulting offspring ratios involving white, pink and red 
flowering snapdragons
Parental cross Offspring segregation ratio
White × White
Red × Red
White × Red
Pink × Pink
White × Pink
Pink × Red
White:Pink:Red::1:0:0
White:Pink:Red::0:0:1
White:Pink:Red::0:1:0
White:Pink:Red::1:2:1
White:Pink:Red::1:1:0
White:Pink:Red::0:1:1
By positing the genetic make-up of each individual as comprising two factors – AA if 
white, Aa if pink, and aa if red – and positing that reproductive cells receive one factor 
each, these ratios are explained as follows in Mendelian terms:
pink×pink = Aa×Aa and so reproduces as (A+a)×(A+a) = 1AA+2Aa+1aa
white×pink = AA×Aa and so reproduces as (A+A)×(A+a) = 2AA+2Aa
white×red = AA×aa and so reproduces as (A+A)×(a+a) = 4Aa
And so on. (1.35.1)
All the examples in garden peas investigated by Gregor Mendel involved a commonly 
occurring phenomenon in which one factor is dominant and the other one recessive. 
In humans for instance, the factor pair for brown eyes (B) and blue eyes (b) results in 
BB and Bb individuals, both brown eyed, and bb individuals that are blue eyed. Thus B 
is dominant and b is recessive, so that the Bb×Bb parental combination produces a 3:1 
segregation ratio by reproducing as:
(B+b)×(B+b) = 1BB+2Bb+1bb = (1+2)(brown-eyed)+1(blue-eyed).
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Mendel’s work (published in 1866) went largely unnoticed till its rediscovery in 1900 by, 
among others, William Bateson, who had then already made similar discoveries in domestic 
fowl. Bateson made a great contribution to the further development of genetics, as he named 
the new science. This brings us to a revealing disagreement on the nature of Mendel’s ‘fac-
tors’, or ‘genes’ as they now came to be called. Thomas Hunt Morgan, round about 1910, 
came to view genes as linearly arranged constituents of cell chromosomes. Bateson rejected 
this view as overly materialistic, advancing instead his own ‘vibratory’ notion, founded on 
ideas of force and motion. Morgan’s view prevailed, but that does not concern us here. What 
does concern us is that the disagreement proves beyond reasonable contest that in the early 
development of genetics, the concept ‘gene’ was clearly experiential, but clearly also only in-
directly so, otherwise there could not have been such a disagreement. For another example, 
consider the concept named ‘energy’ by basic physics. Energy can neither be created, nor 
destroyed; it can only be converted into various different forms. ‘Potential energy’ is ‘stored 
work’. If we are pumping water up into a storage tank, the potential energy that is chemically 
stored in our bodies is converted into kinetic energy. Up in the tank, our work is again stored 
as potential energy. It can then by the mechanical energy of falling water be converted into 
electrical energy. That energy can again be stored in a battery as potential energy, or it can be 
converted into heat energy, and so on. These examples show that ‘energy’ is an experiential 
concept. They also show that the concept is indirectly experiential, as we cannot ‘predicate 
energy’ by pointing and saying ‘See for yourself that “energy” there’. The need for indirectly 
experiential concepts is obvious when we consider that all our ultimate data are sensory data 
(seeing, smelling, tasting, etc.) by means of which we try to come to grips with the nature 
of an ‘external world’ that ‘lies beyond’. So, science can but try to understand the ‘external 
world’ as it is experienced through the human body. We must be careful not to introduce 
concepts that are not anchored in bodily experience. This point is especially important, as 
all of us also conduct extra-scientific discourses involving, for instance, ethical concepts, 
aesthetic concepts and legal concepts. It follows that a scientist, as such, must demand to 
know how any proposed concepts are anchored in physical (bodily) experience, and why 
they are needed above and beyond any concepts already put into scientific place, as required 
by Definition 1.35.1. This definition holds that science is ‘physics’ in the broad sense of 
being the discourse of bodily experience (physical experience). In terms of this definition 
the concepts of the extra-scientific discourses (ethical concepts, aesthetic concepts, legal 
concepts, and so on) are extra-physical concepts. Some literature, indeed much of the 
statistical literature, holds that the discourse of science can be advanced by the introduc-
tion of concepts that are not extra-physical in the foregoing sense, but that also do not 
satisfy Definition 1.35.1. Such concepts may thus reasonably be referred to as metaphysi-
cal concepts. This book holds, as a binding principle, that concepts and rules proposed for 
statistical discourse must be capable of having their proposed meaning either directly, or 
indirectly, forced upon the human body, otherwise they must be rebuffed as being incapa-
ble of scientific meaning (as being metaphysical). It is a principle that arises from science 
in general, as underscored by Definition 1.35.2.
Definition 1.35.1:
The discourse of science is concerned with, and only with, the development of predictions, predications 
and forecasts, all concerning the world as experienced through the human body (experienced physically). 
So the concepts and rules of science are those that are minimally sufficient for that discourse. We refer to 
those concepts, and to the rules for discourse in terms of those concepts, as physical concepts and rules.
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Definition 1.35.2:
A scientific concept is directly experiential if and only if it can be used to predicate a bodily experience, 
that is to say, if and only if its meaning is capable of being directly forced upon the human body by 
pointing and predicating. All other scientific concepts are indirectly experiential, being requisite for the 
discourse of bodily experience.
In retrospect it can now be seen that Definition 1.2.1 leads to the discourse of pointing and 
predicating, that Definition 1.2.2 leads to the discourse of forecasting, and that we can now 
complement those definitions by Definition 1.35.3 that leads to the discourse of predicting.
Definition 1.35.3:
‘How might such and such bodily experiences be related to each other?’ is the definitive question of theo-
retical science. In science it proclaims the discourse of the explication of knowledge.
1.36 The role of simulation
The term ‘simulation’, as used in this book, refers to the use of an analogue to explain 
or study a physical system. Simulation is sometimes resorted to because the system of 
interest is too complex to be capable of being studied analytically. An example of this 
is the use of small-scale models of alternative plans for a harbour development in order 
to simulate complex consequences in respect of oceanic wave action. Similarly, in our 
own subject we may resort to simulation, in order to obtain the distribution of a statis-
tic whose distribution defies mathematical derivation. Scientific investigation, however, 
would employ an analytical approach whenever possible. So it must be firmly grasped that 
simulation also provides such investigation with an important analytical tool. In agricul-
tural research, for instance, experimental design often provides an analogue of some or 
other subsidiary aspect of a farming system. In fact, in many fields of scientific investiga-
tion, analogy is all that is possible. Consider, for instance, investigation of the evolution 
of ring species, such as the herring gull/lesser black-backed gull ring. In Britain these 
gulls are clearly distinct species. Not only do they differ in appearance, but they also do 
not interbreed. Yet, if we trace the population of herring gulls westward around the North 
Pole, from Britain to Canada, to Alaska, to Siberia, to Europe, and back to Britain, we find 
interbreeding populations of herring gulls along the way, slowly but surely transforming 
to lesser black-backed gulls. So why do the two kinds not interbreed in Britain? Biology 
answers that as we travel from one end of the ring to the other, there is a gradual change 
in ecological niches occupied by the different populations we come across. So, back again 
in Britain, the two ends of the ring occupy ecological niches that are different to the extent 
that any bird that may arise from a herring gull × lesser black-backed gull cross will not be 
adapted to either one of the two niches. So, natural selection has, in Britain and Europe, 
resulted in a behavioural barrier that eliminates any tendency to interbreed. Obviously the 
theory of how such barriers evolved can only be tested by analogy. Consider for instance 
the snapdragons in Table 1.36.1. Should we maintain through successive generations an 
open pollinating population of such plants, removing the pink flowering plants in each 
generation, such a barrier may arise, perhaps by way of pollen incompatibility. Such tests 
have in fact been conducted. In a well-known test using vinegar flies, two gene tically differ-
ent types of flies stopped interbreeding after 50 generations. The reader should note (and 
this is the point of the present discussion) that simulation not only provides explanatory 
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reasoning, but it also provides tests of meaning, as the acts of simulation are physical acts 
that have physical consequences. So, if a purportedly ‘scientific’ assertion has no scientific 
meaning, we will be unable to simulate that which it asserts. In Section 1.34 such tests 
of meaning were conducted in order to expose certain metaphysical ideas. For a further 
example, let us bring into the human mind two continuous U(0, 1) random variables, U’ 
and V’ = 1-U’. Then
Pr(U’ < u’) = u’ and Pr(V’ < v’) = v’.
These equations resemble the first and third of the three equations of Theorem 1.22.1, 
in which sense the hypothesised statistical co-ordinates of any given test statistic are 
approximately those of a U(0, 1) random variable, but never exactly so, as an actual 
real-world rounding cannot be of measure zero. When, for instance, we are given the 
statistical co-ordinates of U’ = u’ as
 u’      u’      1 
 ∫dU’, ∫dU’, ∫dU’  = (u’-0, 0, 1-u’) = (u’, 0, v’), 
 0       u’     u’
it is a conceptual rounding, a ‘rounding in the human mind’, that is being made to be of 
measure zero. Now let the notation of Theorem 1.22.1 be abbreviated as follows:
[U(T, 0), ε(T, 0), V(T, 0)] = (U, ε, V),
and consider the approximation
(U, ε, V) ≈ (U’, 0, V’).
Stone (1969) proposes to improve on this approximation by using instead
(U+0.5ε, 0, 0.5ε+V) ≈ (U’, 0, V’). (1.36.1)
The reader may recall that in Example 1.32.5 we used this approximation to provide an 
indirectly experiential random variable. But, as will now be explained, Stone tries to make 
the approximation provide a directly experiential random variable by way of ‘a significance 
level’, which is a very different kettle of fish. In the present notation, the true significance 
level, considered as a statistic, is defined by Definition 1.19.1 as
SL = U+ε when the pointing co-ordinate is on the left, and
SL = ε+V when the pointing co-ordinate is on the right.
Hence, by virtue of Theorem 1.22.1, SL has the property
Pr[SL ≤ sl M0 ] = sl.
A significance tester interprets this property as follows:
Suppose we were to regard the observed significance level as just decisive against 
M0. Then we would be bound to regard any smaller value of the significance level 
as even more decisive against M0. Hence the observed significance level, sl, is the 
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theoretical frequency with which we would mistakenly regard such a significance 
level as being decisive against M0.
That this interpretation has direct experiential meaning is beyond reasonable contest, 
because, if needs be, we could by simulation force that meaning onto the human body. 
However, Stone considers the improved approximation obtained via the recipe given at 
(1.36.1) as a sound motivation for proposing to re-define the significance level as
U+0.5ε when the pointing co-ordinate is on the left, and
0.5ε+V when the pointing co-ordinate is on the right.
This fails to grasp that such a ‘significance level’ cannot be interpreted as ‘a datum of phy-
sical evidence’, as the value calculated for it in any given instance cannot have direct expe-
riential meaning. This must be firmly grasped. So, consider just five replicate attempts to 
discriminate by taste between two   wines, with four apparently successful (S) attempts, and 
one apparent failure (F). Let the hypothesised model be the binomial with equal chances 
of S or F at each attempt, thereby positing M0: ‘No discriminative ability’, the alternative 
being M1: ‘Some discriminative ability’. Taking the number of successes, X, as test statis-
tic, the mental correlate of the test datum, X = 4, is situated within the test distribution at 
(U, ε, V) =  32-5-1,  5  ,  1   . (1.36.2)                       32      32   32
The pointing co-ordinate is on the right. In order to simulate the meaning conveyed by 
this test, we could repeatedly flip five coins of a balanced sort, interpreting heads as S and 
tails as F. Suppose we then obtain the following:
Replicate 1   Replicate 2   Replicate 3   Replicate 4   Replicate 5   Replicate 6   … 
 F F F S S      F S S F S        S S S S S        S F F S F       S F S S S       F F S F F      …
Simulation of the co-ordination test at (1.36.2) assigns
Replicates 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, …, to U, U, V, U, ε, U, …, respectively.
As the pointing co-ordinate is on the right, simulation of a corresponding significance 
test, as defined by Definition 1.19.1, assigns
Replicates 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, … to U, U, ε+V, U, ε+V, U, …, respectively.
But attempted simulation of Stone’s ‘significance test’ here founders at Replicate 5, as 
the placing of the mental correlate of the test datum ‘in the centre of the rounding’ is 
incapable of simulation. The problem is this:
Does S F S S S belong to U+0.5ε, or does S F S S S belong to 0.5ε+V?
In other words:
Is S F S S S a ‘left-of-the-mental-correlate’ sort of sample pattern, or
is S F S S S a ‘right-of-the-mental correlate’ sort of sample pattern?
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If we try to resolve this by flipping an auxiliary coin, we will be asked ‘What does the aux-
iliary simulate? Does it simulate an “after-taste” of some or other sort? If so, why in the 
first place is there no mention of such an “after-taste” in the data record?’ Here again, as in 
Section 1.34, mathematical reasoning has lost track of reality, and so ends up asking the 
human mind to conceive of an experience of inconceivable sort. However, in the present 
instance that is so for a reason that differs somewhat from that in Section 1.34. The present 
reason is that mathematical thought has failed to grasp the importance of Theorem 1.36.1. 
Theorem 1.36.1:
The real continuum can be of service to science as an indirectly experiential concept only.
Section 1.14 issued an advance caution on this point. That our use of the continuum is 
limited by Theorem 1.36.1 is often overlooked because, as a matter of convenience, de-
velopment of statistical theory and method is usually accomplished by loosely reasoning 
as if real-world sample spaces can be continuous, and then treating certain small sample 
problems involving discrete sample spaces as if they are special cases rather than cases 
that actually reflect a universal reality. So it must be firmly grasped that any set of descrip-
tions used for recording data, will always necessarily be a discrete and essentially finite set. 
Overlooking this fact makes Stone’s 1969 paper fall into metaphysical reasoning. In ad-
dition, we have obtained proof of that simply by asking of the outcome of that reasoning 
‘How can it be simulated?’ and showing that the answer is ‘It cannot!’
We note in passing that the foregoing example, together with Example 1.32.5, shows 
how simulation might enable us to distinguish a directly experiential concept (a predi-
cative concept) from an indirectly experiential concept (a concept not predicative but 
necessitated by predictive reasoning).
We must distinguish simulation from formal analogy. Consider, for instance, the influence 
of two different sources of light on the orientation of a copepod with just one cyclopean 
eye. Fraenkel (1927) posited that the animal’s path might be predicted by formal analogy 
in which the animal is drawn toward the two light sources like iron toward two magnets. 
By then formally treating light intensities as physical forces, the animal’s path would be 
predicted by the resultant force. However, as pointed out by Maynard Smith (1972, p. 45), 
‘Analogies’ and he means formal analogies, ‘may be helpful in suggesting theories, but 
are irrelevant when it is a question of confirming or disproving them.’ Thus for instance, 
Fraenkel’s predictive model came to be viewed as tenable, not because of how he arrived 
at the model, but because the model seemed to match the corresponding data.
In statistical debate we are fortunate in that appropriately formulated proof by statisti-
cal simulation is so straightforward that it can hardly be challenged as yielding no more 
than formal analogy. Certainly, the proofs by statistical simulation we have developed 
in the present section and in Section 1.34 cannot be challenged thus, as they can be 
executed as laboratory experiments. That is to say, they can be executed such that one 
can call upon the human body, as the ultimate arbiter of science, and demand of it to 
‘Experience this for yourself ’.
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1.37 Spanning the interface
In the case of data arising from a randomised design, the design is part and parcel of how 
the given data came about and so cannot be ignored by investigative reasoning. On the 
contrary, such reasoning almost always, if not always, relies on the properties of the de-
sign. In the case of our analysis of the gladiolus data in Example 1.20.1, for instance, that 
is largely so. We must, however, be leery of the idea that randomisation obviates the need 
for commencement tests. The reason for that is that a sound theory of data analysis must 
necessarily span the interface between mathematical statistics and substantive science. In 
this section, and in the next three sections, we take steps toward clarifying this point.
Consider the data given in Table 1.1.1. Inspection of those data suggests that carbaryl 
treatment shortened the half-life of the fruit involved. In order to judge that more inci-
sively, consider, as hypothesised model,
M0: The whole of the sampling variation is attributable to randomisation only.
Let the ostensible effect of carbaryl on the half-life of the fruit, say d, be measured as the 
mean half-life for carbaryl-treated trees minus the mean half-life for control trees. Ran-
domisation then brings to mind a corresponding random variable, D, such that under 
M0 the expected value of D is zero. In order to test the quality of fit of 
M0 such that E(DM0) = 0 vs. M1 such that E(DM1) ≠ 0,
we order the possible sample patterns according to the magnitude of D. The resulting test 
is left sensitive to reduced half-life owing to carbaryl. As the five smallest of the observed 
half-life values are also those five that arose with the carbaryl treatment, the observed 
value of d is the smallest possible under M0. As there are just 10-choose-5, i.e. 252 differ-
ent field plans, of which just one accounts for the observed value of d, and as the different 
plans arise with equal frequency, the mental correlate of the test datum is situated at
(*∅, 1÷252, 251÷252) = (*∅, 0.004, 0.996) (1.37.1)
in the test distribution. This strongly suggests that carbaryl shortened the half-life of 
the fruit involved. Such reasoning extends to other hypothesised values for the effect of 
carbaryl. For instance, to test whether carbaryl treatment might have shortened by one 
day the half-life of the fruit involved, we modify the given data by adding one day to each 
of the five observed half-life values arising from the carbaryl-treated trees. This replaces 
the test datum and the test statistic by d+1 and D+1, respectively. Then, in order to test 
whether the modification cancels the ostensible effect of carbaryl, we order the modi-
fied sample patterns according to the magnitude of D+1 and test:
M0 such that E(D+1M0) = 0 vs. M1 such that E(D+1M1) ≠ 0.
Let T and C denote carbaryl treatment and control, respectively. Then the given value of 
D+1 arises as at (1.37.2) in the following, where the first row gives the original half-life 
values for carbaryl-treated trees, the second row gives in order of magnitude the half-life 
values as modified to test the new hypothesised model, and the third row corresponds 
to the field plan:
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8.8   10.8             11.1   11.2   11.4
9.8   11.8   11.9   12.1   12.2   12.4   12.8   13.1   13.1   14.4
 T       T       C        T       T       T        C       C       C        C (1.37.2)
Smaller values of the test statistic arise from just three other field plans, as follows:
8.8   10.8             11.1   11.2   11.4
9.8   11.8   11.9   12.1   12.2   12.4   12.8   13.1   13.1   14.4
 T       T        T      C        T        T        C      C       C        C
 T       T        T      T        C        T        C      C       C        C
 T       T        T      T        T        C        C      C       C        C (1.37.3)
The sample pattern at (1.37.2) accounts for the statistical rounding. The three sample 
patterns at (1.37.3) account for the left co-ordinate. Owing to randomisation, there are 
just 252 different sample patterns, and they arise with equal frequency. So, under the 
hypothesised model, the mental correlate of the test datum is in this case situated at:
(*3÷252, 1÷252, 248÷252) = (*0.012, 0.004, 0.984) (1.37.4)
in the test distribution.
It now appears that many different hypothesised models can be tested in this manner. 
Let Δ denote the hypothesised effect of carbaryl, where Δ = 0 vs. Δ < 0 is tested at (1.37.1), 
and Δ = -1 vs. Δ < -1 is tested at (1.37.4). Let -∞ < Δ < +∞. Then we obtain a class of models 
indexed by Δ. The design is a random variable that ranges over 252 different field plans, 
where each plan occurs with frequency 1÷252, regardless of the value of Δ. So (and this 
is the point of the foregoing development), the design is a class characteristic. Typically 
the design will have been generated by the use of an extensively tested source of pseudo-
random numbers, such as the 10 000 pseudo-randomly assorted digits given in Table A1 
of Snedecor and Cochran (1989). So it might be thought that the foregoing development 
does not need commencement testing. However, that is not the case. Suppose, for instance, 
that the ten experimental trees were evenly spaced in a straight row, and we then assigned 
carbaryl treatment to the trees whose row positions were given by the first five different 
digits in Snedecor and Cochran’s table. In that case our field plan would have been:
Tree in position number     0     1      2     3      4      5     6      7      8     9
Treatment                            C     C     T     T     T     T     T      C     C     C
Would we have used this plan? Or would we have discarded it, drawing another plan 
instead? Had we decided to draw another plan by using the next five different digits in 
Snedecor and Cochran’s table, our field plan would have been:
Tree in position number     0     1      2     3      4      5     6      7      8     9
Treatment                            T     C     T     C     C     T     T     C      C     T
Surely this would have seemed a better plan than the previous one? The issue is this: no 
sensible person would be prepared to base an investigation on the following plan:
Tree in position number     0     1      2     3      4      5     6      7      8     9
Treatment                            T     T     T     T      T     C     C     C     C     C (1.37.5)
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So, it is a fact of every-day statistical life that an investigator will occasionally discard a 
field plan drawn by valid randomisation and draw another plan instead. The issue can-
not be evaded by arguing that it arises only with an inappropriate design. It arises with 
any design involving adequate slack to provide for statistical analysis. In case of the 
gladiolus trial of Example 1.27.1 for instance, the field plan giving the positions of older 
corms (O) and younger corms (Y) might physically, on the ground, in a straight row of 
seven pairs of plots, turn out to be:
(O, Y) (O, Y) (O, Y) (O, Y) (O, Y) (O, Y) (O, Y). (1.37.6)
This plan would surely be discarded in favour of drawing another plan.
In order to come to grips with the foregoing it must be firmly grasped that the problem 
belongs to investigative statistics. That is so, as it arises when we ask ‘How may these 
particular data have come about?’ and where we then wish to be able to discourage the 
unsavoury answer ‘Possibly by way of a field plan that has confounded treatment effects 
with systematic variation owing to the substantive subject matter’. So, inspection of the 
field plan for its suitability is an inescapable commencement test. Clearly, it is a test that 
spans the interface between statistics and substantive science, as it amounts to judging 
the quality of fit of a class characteristic (a statistical design) with respect to a given data 
set (the field plan in relation to the substantive nature of the experimental material). Just 
as clearly, such judgement is of an axiomatic nature, as it cannot involve mathematical 
definition and deduction only. It must also involve, as exemplified at (1.37.5) and (1.37.6), 
judgement on possible systematic variation in the experimental material.
It might be thought that the foregoing involves self-contradictory reasoning, as it might 
be contended that rejection of the plans at (1.37.5) and (1.37.6) presupposes knowledge 
of the experimental material that, by the choice of the design, was tacitly denied. But 
that is easily disproved. If, for instance, forethought indicated a completely randomised 
design for allotting eight replicates of each of two treatments, A an B, to 16 trees evenly 
spaced in a 4×4 array, then the following field plans would be discarded:
A A A A           A A A B         A A B B
A A A A           A A B B         A A B B
B B B B            A A B B         A A B B
B B B B            A B B B         A A B B
The point here is that we would not be discarding such a plan because of knowledge of the par-
ticular fertility trends in the proposed experimental material. We would be discarding such a 
plan because of knowledge of the sort of fertility trends that often occurs in such material. We 
return to this point at the end of the next section, and again at the end of the section after that.
We note in passing that we would reluctantly discard a field plan, as we must be sure that, 
having thereby modified our design, the original design is an adequate approximation 
of the modified design. In practice, that is made possible by knowing that the number 
of plans that would be discarded is very small compared to the total number of possible 
plans. Stated otherwise, the practising statistician will make sure that field plans obtained 
by valid randomisation are very seldom discarded in favour of replacement. This is aided 
by avoiding, when possible, designs with little slack.
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We also note that, instead of the randomisation tests presented at (1.37.1) and (1.37.4), 
corresponding tests using Student’s t instead are, for the particular data set, justified. This 
is so partly by insight that anticipates Gaussian-like errors, and partly also by the com-
mencement test at (1.32.2), which shows that a model of Gaussian-like errors, as tested, 
fits the half-life data well. In such cases we tend to favour Student’s test over the ran-
domisation test, as the former then has superior separating characteristics. Such use of 
Student’s t amounts to modelling the error structure as having, above and beyond certain 
properties, owing to randomisation, also certain properties of a pseudo-Gaussian nature, 
owing to the substantive subject matter. All the various properties are then brought into 
account by treating the error structure as if Gaussian.
Clearly then, randomisation cannot obviate the need for commencement tests.
1.38 Beyond the interface
As statistical data analysis concerns the development of scientific evidence by way of physi-
cal facts, and as the development of such facts originates in substantive science, that is where 
our understanding of such matters must begin. Consider, for instance, a substantive scien-
tist who wants to conduct an experiment with sheep. Examination of any two sheep will 
show that they differ in countless ways; they are individuals of the sort named ‘sheep’. Such 
individuality is unavoidable. Consider, for instance, a group of sheep. Comparison to other 
groups of sheep will show that such groups are further individuals of the sort named ‘group 
of sheep’. So the question arises: ‘How can an investigator obtain “a group of sheep” that is 
suitable for a proposed experiment?’ An inferior statistical literature tries to deal with such 
questions by prescribing random sampling of a target population, where the prescription is 
a circular one, as random sampling cannot turn sheep of ‘an unsuitable sort’ into sheep of ‘a 
suitable sort’. The point here is that a substantive investigator may require for instance a re-
presentative variety of two-tooth merino ewes, veld-reared on typical Karoo range, normal, 
healthy and in good condition. Then the selection of suitable sheep will require appropri-
ately experienced bodily perception. The meanings conveyed by ‘a representative variety’, 
‘in good condition’, ‘normal’, ‘typical Karoo range’, etc. are familiar to the farmers and the 
substantive scientists involved. A novice joining that community initially has to learn those 
meanings by having this, that and the other matter to be grasped by bodily experience, be-
ing pointed out. The outcome is, so to speak, a language of the body, where there is no place 
for demands of the kind, define ‘a representative’ variety of sheep, define ‘a normal’ sheep, 
or define the line that separates a sheep ‘in good condition’ from a sheep ‘in poor condition’. 
Such demands are out of place in the discourse of bodily experience, as they demand defin-
able realities where only demonstrable realities are available.
We note in passing that use of Student’s t as described in the last paragraph of the 
previous section does not at all imply that the experimental trees would thereby be 
modelled as ‘a random sample from a more extensive population of trees’. The ten trees 
were, in the manner explained in this section, selected as ten suitable trees and not as a 
pseudo-random sample of ten trees. This point is often overlooked despite the excellent 
explanations by for instance Hinkelmann and Kempthorne (2007).
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The matters discussed in this and the previous section are essentially the same in that 
we must judge whether a particular individual represents the sort of individual we have 
in mind, and where particular individuals of that sort demonstrably exist, but that sort 
is not capable of being defined.
1.39 The receding Ideal
Recall how we pointed at the standard representations in Figure 1.23.2 so as to force the 
human body to agree. When pointing thus, we are often trying to force the human body 
to grasp that a given co-ordination is extreme. Consider, for the sake of simplicity, a near-
to-zero rounding. We might then be trying to force agreement by pointing at a standard 
representation where the ratio is:
(one of the two co-ordinates):(the other co-ordinate)::95:5 (1.39.1)
This particular ratio is a widely accepted norm of disproportion. Similarly, the ratio
(one of the two co-ordinates):(the other co-ordinate)::99:1 (1.39.2)
is a widely accepted norm of extreme disproportion. These particular norms are often con-
sidered an embarrassment, or are ridiculed on grounds that, for instance, a 16-fingered 
species would have chosen different norms. Yet, the norms survive, and not only in the 
context of the silly prescriptions considered in Section 1.21. They survive also as approxi-
mate benchmarks for practical data analysis where that is not at all a laughing matter.
The issue here is simply this: in the same way that the sheep farmers and their associ-
ated scientific community need to have examples pointed out so that a language of bod-
ily understanding can be established, we too need to establish such a language. So when 
we point at physical representations of the type appearing in Figures 1.23.1 and 1.23.2, 
asking for co-ordinations ‘like’ (0.90, 0.10), (0.95, 0.05) and (0.99, 0.01), to be recognised 
as ‘slightly extreme’, ‘extreme’, and ‘very extreme’, respectively, we are not laying down 
prescriptions or strict rules. We are offering examples of a kind of bodily experience so as 
to communicate in a language of such bodily understanding. And we must grasp that it 
is essentially the same kind of bodily understanding without which our customers in the 
substantive sciences would not in the first place have been able to conduct their investiga-
tions. So, instead of having nods and winks poke fun at what are after all just illustrative 
examples, we should instead take careful note of the following incontestable fact: when 
examples are physically displayed as in Figures 1.23.1 and 1.23.2, they do in fact communi-
cate in ‘a language of the body’. Similarly, when such figures are used to physically convey 
the norms numerically conveyed at (1.39.1) and (1.39.2), they do in fact communicate in 
that ‘language’ by exemplifying ‘extreme’ and ‘very extreme’ co-ordinates. We only have to 
bear in mind that, in that language of the body, ‘extreme’ and ‘very extreme’ are not defin-
able. So the norms at (1.39.1) and (1.39.2) must not be thought of as defining extreme and 
very extreme co-ordinates, they must be understood as exemplifying those extremes. After 
all, we know full well that for various reasons, calculated statistical co-ordinates are more 
often than not approximate only. One good reason for that is that any sensible investigator 
must occasionally discard a field plan arising from valid randomisation, owing to which 
the mathematics of randomisation theory is, in respect of reality, approximate only.
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This section and the previous two sections dealt with essentially just different versions of the 
same epistemological problem, namely that of the receding ideal. It is a very old problem 
and can be traced back to the works of Plato. In answer to a question raised by Socrates, 
Plato held that a horse, for instance, is recognised as such because of its resemblance to ‘the 
Ideal horse’. That, however, leads to difficulty: what determines ‘the Ideal horse’? If, on the 
one hand, ‘the Ideal horse’ is a horse, its recognition as such would have to be by virtue of 
its resemblance to ‘the Ideal Ideal horse’, whose recognition in turn would require ‘an Ideal 
Ideal Ideal horse’, and so on, into infinitely circular reasoning. And if, on the other hand, ‘the 
Ideal horse’ is not a horse, how is it to be distinguished from for instance ‘the Ideal goat’? 
Again: when using a randomised design, do we accept a field plan because it resembles ‘the 
Ideal field plan’? Is ‘the Ideal field plan’ itself a field plan? It would seem that Aristotle sub-
sequently developed the correct solution to the problem of the receding ideal: individual, 
real-world horses are to be predicated of the indefinable concept (ultimate concept) ‘horse’, 
which concept can demonstrably be conceived by the human mind in response to the hu-
man body having experienced various real-world horses (Metaphysics, Z: 13-14; 1038b8 — 
1039b19). Aristotle emphatically denies that the universal sorts of particular individuals can 
have any substantiality; so he holds that universals have no existence beyond cognition (i.e. 
beyond the human mind); the universals do not partake of the individuals, and the indi-
viduals do not partake of the universals. Thus, for example, the universal called ‘random 
sample’ is a concept brought into the human mind in response to the human body having 
experienced particular real-world individuals such as this flip of coin, that roll of die, or yon-
der shuffle of a pack of cards. Here clearly the universal does not partake of the real-world 
individuals, and the real-world individuals do not partake of the universal.
The receding Ideal exemplifies the slippery nature of axiomatic problems. That slipperi-
ness arises from an inclination to cast around for definitions, whereas axioms do not 
concern what can be defined, but what can be demonstrated only. This point must be 
grasped very firmly, otherwise we either become confused and fall into circular reason-
ing of the type that would have us turn ‘sheep’ into ‘suitable sheep’ by means of ‘random 
sampling’, or we succumb to normative ideas of the type that would try to define the 
meanings of ‘tenable’, ‘hardly tenable’, and ‘untenable’ in terms of the cut-and-dried 
prescriptions of the silly kind discussed in Section 1.21.
1.40 The scientific status of randomised designs
Section 1.37 contained a very simple demonstration of an important fact we formulate 
as Theorem 1.40.1. Note (as proof) that the theorem would apply no matter what class 
of models one may try to defend for the given data set in question, otherwise one will 
fall into self-contradiction.
Theorem 1.40.1:
The use of a randomised statistical design for the purpose of obtaining any given data set implies that 
that design is a class characteristic of any class of models that one might wish to defend as a possible 
explanation of how those particular data might have come about.
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Chapter 2 
ELIMINATION TESTS
PoPulations being deleted froM the huMan Mind
2.1 Introduction
The main thrust of the previous chapter was the development of tests for the quality of fit 
of isolated singletons when used for the representation of given data. Isolated singletons 
are the most elemental statistical models, and at the very outset Examples 1.7.1 and 1.8.1, 
and Examples 1.7.2 and 1.8.2 were introduced to demonstrate that class characteristics are 
instances of such singletons. In this chapter we wish to take first steps toward developing 
tests for the quality of fit of the alternative members of any given class, where it must then 
be clearly understood that a comprehensive theory of data analysis must, for its viability, 
present a cumulative development of consistent ideas. It simply will not do to commence 
by introducing certain ideas for the initial analysis of given data, and then to in effect jet-
tison those initial ideas by proceeding with further ideas in conflict with the initial ones. 
This must be firmly grasped, as it is a source of much slippage in the statistical literature. 
So here, at the very outset of this chapter, we challenge the reader to note carefully that the 
following development is a seamless continuation of the reasoning that was developed in 
the previous chapter.
2.2 Null hypotheses as opposed to hypothesised models
Hypothesis tests address certain problems in decision-making under risk; they do not ad-
dress problems in data analysis properly at all, although they are often mistakenly thought 
to do so. Owing to that mistake, certain concepts of hypothesis testing invade much of 
the literature on data analysis, and as those concepts are not motivated by the needs of 
investigative science, the invasion sows confusion. Amongst those sources of confusion are 
the concepts simple hypothesis and composite hypothesis. In order to come to grips with 
this, consider 25 measurements that can satisfactorily be modelled as a random sample of 
N(m, 5²) values for m ∈ {-2, -1, 0, +1, +2}. A hypothesis test is a decision rule for accepting 
the null hypothesis H0, or else the alternative hypothesis H1, where a hypothesis is a set of 
models. It is a simple hypothesis if it comprises just one member of a class, and a composite 
hypothesis if it comprises several members of a class. For example, in the present case:
H0: m ∈ {0} versus H1: m ∈ {-2, -1, +1, +2} (2.2.1)
proposes to test a simple null hypothesis against a composite alternative, whereas
H0: m ∈ {-2, -1, 0} versus H1: m ∈ {+1, +2} (2.2.2)
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proposes to test a composite null hypothesis against a composite alternative. Despite 
the simplicity of our example, a large variety of such pairs of hypotheses can clearly be 
proposed for it. Moreover, for any particular pair there are many hypothesis tests from 
which to choose. In the case of the pair at (2.2.1) for instance, and even after the value 
of the Type I error rate has been specified as α = 0.05 say, there remain infinitely many 
tests from which to choose, as we can then specify infinitely many different rules for ac-
cepting H1. In the present case for instance that rule might be any one of the following, 
where X denotes the sample mean:
X ≤ -1.645.   X ≥ +1.645.   | X | ≥ 1.960.   X either ≤ -2.575 or ≥ +1.696, … .
Our example is not exceptional in this respect. The literature on hypothesis testing and 
related developments for decision-making under risk constitutes a vast pharmacopoeia of 
technological recipes. In terms of Definition 1.2.2, they are recipes for how this, that and 
the other experience can be brought about. By comparison, the literature on data analysis 
must be anticipated to be much smaller, as we must then, in terms of Definition 1.2.1, be 
concerned with the question of how given data might have come about, where that is a 
matter of investigation, rather than one of specification. Thus, for instance, instead of be-
ing able to specify infinitely many hypothesis tests for the present example, we are able to 
defend for it just five co-ordination tests. These tests arise as follows: any question about 
the tenability of different values for m can in the present case best be addressed by way of 
the sample mean, as that is here the minimal sufficient statistic for m. So there are then 
only five singletons:
N(m, 1) for m = -2, -1, 0, +1, +2,
wherein the mental correlate of the datum mean might then alternatively be placed. If 
for instance the datum mean equals x = 0.30 with negligible rounding, its mental cor-
relate is to be found within these five singletons, at:
(0.99, 0.01), (0.90, 0.10), (0.62, 0.38), (0.24, 0.76), (0.04, 0.96) (2.2.3)
respectively; and for the given problem, these are the only tests one can defend suc-
cessfully. Note that the two extremes fit the given datum poorly. There is no need for a 
pointer, as we have arrived at a closed system of alternatives. Now consider (and this is 
crucial) how to reason in order to grasp what the foregoing array of co-ordinates tells us. 
It then appears that we do not need to reason in terms of more than just two singletons 
at a time. To give examples:
In order to test M0: m = -2 versus M1: m = 0, the co-ordinates to be compared are
(0.99, 0.01) versus (0.62, 0.38), strongly favouring M1 over M0.
In order to test M0: m = 0 versus M1: m = +2, the co-ordinates to be compared are
(0.62, 0.38) versus (0.04, 0.96), strongly favouring M0 over M1.
In order to test M0: m = -1 versus M1: m = +1, the co-ordinates to be compared are
(0.90, 0.10) versus (0.24, 0.76), only slightly favouring M1 over M0. (2.2.4)
and so on. Also, as previously noted in connection with Definition 1.23.1, when M0 and 
M1 are both fully specified singletons, they are on an equal footing, and can therefore be 
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relabelled M1 and M0 without other consequence if done consistently throughout. This 
has brought us to a fundamentally important fact:
Any tests of co-ordination can be analysed into pair-wise comparison of single-
tons for their tenability as alternative explanations of how a given datum might 
possibly have come about (and where, of course, in the case of commencement 
testing, one member of the pair is only a broadly envisaged incipient model).
The reason for this is simply that the outcome of a co-ordination test is never qualified 
by probability. So the outcome of a suite of such tests, for instance as exemplified at 
(2.2.3), is also never qualified by probability. Any notions about decisions subject to ‘er-
ror rates’, or about interval estimates subject to ‘coverage probabilities’, are simply out of 
place in the theory of co-ordination tests. That does not imply that co-ordination testing 
cannot involve a variable alternative. For instance, instead of the formulation at (2.2.1) 
a co-ordination tester might well be interested in testing:
M0: N(0, 5²) versus Mm: N(m, 5²), pair-wise for m = -2, -1, +1, +2, one by one.
And as we have explained at (2.2.4), that has already been provided for at (2.2.3). In other 
words, a model can be a member of an array of models, but there can be no such creature 
as a ‘composite model’ for a given data set, because a model cannot be a set of contradict-
orily different models for the given data set. In order to grasp this, one need only grasp 
that, given the datum x = 0.30, a co-ordination tester who has mistaken H0 as specified at 
(2.2.2) for a hypothesised model, would be trying to calculate three ‘numbers’ given by:
U = Pr(X < 0.30 | m ∈ {-2. -1, 0})
ε = Pr(X = 0.30 | m ∈ {-2. -1, 0})
V = Pr(X > 0.30 | m ∈ {-2. -1, 0})
where no such ‘numbers’ exist (cf. Kempthorne and Folks 1971, pp. 336-337).
There is more to come.
Let the test proposed at (2.2.1) be for N(m, s²) with 0 < s² < ∞. Then a very different case 
arises because the null hypothesis corresponding to the one at (2.2.1), i.e.
H0: {m, s²} ∈ {0, s²} (2.2.5)
is now, in the language of hypothesis testing, ‘a composite hypothesis’ rather than ‘a simple 
hypothesis’, as it is a set of different singletons corresponding to the different values of s². 
However, a co-ordination tester cannot conceive of ‘a composite model’, as that refers to a 
set of contradictorily different models for a given data set. A co-ordination tester conceives 
of the set specified at (2.2.5) as an array of alternative models for the selfsame data; we call 
such an array a suite of models, which (in this case) is indexed by a nuisance parameter. 
In other cases such a suite of models might be indexed by a parameter of interest only, or 
by parameters of both kinds. We have preferred to speak of a suite of models rather than a 
class of models because, as indicated by Definition 1.15.1, elimination tests do not involve 
class characteristics. So, a suite of models proposed for any particular data set will have 
been derived from a minimally sufficient statistic for the index of a class of models.
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The foregoing development shows that from a data analyst’s point of view, the term 
composite hypothesis fails to separate two very different cases, as exemplified at (2.2.2) 
and (2.2.5). That is so because hypothesis tests do not pursue the problem of modelling 
an individual data set; instead they pursue the problem of producing a host of individu-
als that satisfies certain specifications.
2.3 Measuring the quality-of-fit of alternative members of 
 a class of models
When a data set, its substantively circumstantial details and suitable commencement 
tests have brought a class of models into the human mind, it is often (even usually) the 
case that not all the members of the class are tenable models of ‘how the given data 
might have come about’. In such cases the untenable index values must then be weeded 
out. We refer to that as elimination testing. Now recall that, for any class of models, the 
only predictions that can differentiate amongst the different members of the class are 
those that depend on the index. So it would be silly to use an elimination test whose out-
come depends on any prediction of the class characteristic. Such silly tests were ruled 
out by Definition 1.15.1. (See also Section 1.33.)
In this section and sections that follow, we develop a number of examples for the eluci-
dation of elimination tests. Although we will consider tests that make sense, we are not 
at this stage seriously concerned about whether or not these tests are ‘best’ in any sense. 
At this stage of development our main purpose is to provide sufficient insight into the 
ideas of such tests for the reader to be able to grasp the extent to which the ideas differ, 
and even conflict, with ideas to be considered in subsequent chapters. We introduce 
certain terminology as we go along.
Example 2.3.1
Consider the suite of elimination tests leading to the five sets of co-ordinates given at 
(2.2.3). Given the test datum x = 0.30, we wished to test each member of a suite of hy-
pothesised models N(m, 1) indexed by m = -2, -1, 0, +1, +2. This was done for each hypoth-
esised model by calculating a set of co-ordinates of the form:
C(x, m) = [U(x, m), ε(x, m), V(x, m)]
giving directions to just where within that particular hypothesised model, the mental 
correlate of the test datum is being situated. We refer to the function that maps the 
index onto the co-ordinates as the co-ordinate trace (of the mental correlate). Using the 
results at (2.2.3), the co-ordinate trace for the present example is found to be:
[m, C(x, m)] = [-2, (0.99, 0.01)], [-1, (0.90, 0.10)], [0, (0.62, 0.38)], … .
We note that, for the given data set, the function traces the different situations of the 
mental correlate from model to model in the human mind. The test datum, x = 0.30 in 
the present case, usually arises from a larger data set in the real world. We refer to the 
corresponding random variable brought into the human mind as the elimination quan-
tity, previously denoted as X in the present example. An elimination quantity provides 
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indexed predictions to be tested against the test datum. These predictions might be 
indexed in one or both of two different ways. One way is for the predicted distribution 
to be indexed. For instance, as x = 0.30 in the present case, the values of V(x, m) can, with 
X as the elimination quantity, be calculated as:
                                      
1
      ∞                 
1Pr(X > 0.30) =            ∫     exp[-     (z-m)2]dz for m ∈ {-2, -1, 0, +1, +2}. 
                         √2π  0.30           2
The other way is for the elimination quantity itself to be indexed. For instance, in the present 
case, the values of V(x, m) can, with X - m as the elimination quantity, also be calculated as:
                                                
1
      ∞                      
1Pr(X - m > 0.30 -m) =           ∫         exp[-     (z)2]dz for m ∈ {-2, -1, 0, +1, +2}. 
                                  √2π  0.30-m            2
So, in this particular example, there are two different elimination quantities for the self-
same suite of tests:
X whose distribution is N(m, 1), and
X - m whose distribution is N(0, 1).
The distribution of X-m is independent of the index; we call such an elimination quan-
tity an elimination pivot.
Example 2.3.2
Let us take up the problem raised in Example 1.8.2, where n = 6 municipal buses num-
bered 1, 2, 3, 4, 9 and 10, and spotted in a town T, prompted the development of a model 
giving the minimal sufficient statistic for θ, the total number of municipal buses in T, as 
follows: letting x
(n)
 denote the largest number observed, and X
(n)
 denote a corresponding 
random variable in the human mind, we found that if the n = 6 numbers are modelled 
as a random sample obtained without replacement, X
(n)
 is a sufficient statistic for θ. In 
fact, X
(n)
 is minimally sufficient for θ. The probability of X
(n)
 = x
(n)
 was given by the first 
factor in square brackets at (1.8.2) as:
  x
(n)-1       q  
-1
 for x
(n)
 = n, n+1, n+2, …, θ. 
    n-1       n
For the number of observed buses in our example, n = 6, this probability is given by:
6[(x
(n)
-1)(x
(n)
-2)(x
(n)
-3) … (x
(n)
-5)] ÷ [θ(θ-1)(θ-2) … (θ-5)]
for x
(n)
 = 6, 7, 8, … , θ. (2.3.2)
As our datum is x
(n)
 = 10, we cannot have θ < 10. Consider M0: θ = 11. By using the recipe at 
(2.3.2) we obtain the model given in Table 2.3.1, where small x
(n)
 values point at a ‘poor 
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Table 2.3.1: Hypothesised distribution of X
(n)
 for n = 6 and θ = 11
x
(n)
6 7 8 9 10 11
Pr[X
(n)
 = x
(n)
 |θ = 11] 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.12 0.27 0.55
fit’. So, in order to test this model, let the x
(n)
 values be ordered from largest to smallest. 
The modelled counterpart of the datum x
(n)
 = 10, is by means of Table 2.3.1 found to be 
co-ordinated well within the crowd at (0.18, 0.27, 0.55) in the test distribution. The sin-
gletons M0: θ = J for J = 10, 11, 12, … can now be tested one by one in this way. Some of the 
resulting co-ordinates for the mental correlate of the datum are displayed in Table 2.3.2, 
showing that, by the tests here performed, θ = 10, 11, 12 fit the data well, θ = 13 fits slightly 
awkwardly, and θ = 14, 15, 16, … fit the data poorly.
Table 2.3.2: Co-ordinating trace arising from a suite of elimination tests
Hypothesised model Co-ordinates of the mental correlate
θ = 10  (0.40, 0.60, Ø)
θ = 11  (0.18, 0.27, 0.55)
θ = 12  (0.09, 0.14, 0.77)
θ = 13  (0.05, 0.07, 0.88)
θ = 14  (0.03, 0.04, 0.93)
θ = 15  (0.02, 0.02, 0.96)
θ = 16  (0.01, 0.02, 0.97)
…  …
We note again that the pointer was introduced as a scaffolding symbol. It served only to 
remind us that any unusual co-ordination has to be interpreted as nothing more than 
just that, unless a substantively conceivable alternative explanation of how the given da-
tum might have come about is thereby being pointed out. So the pointer, having served 
its purpose, may now be dropped, as an elimination test deals with a closed system of 
explicit alternatives.
Now consider how the co-ordinates for testing M0: θ = 11 arose. A data set in the real 
world indicated that the value of θ might be 11. Further thought on how the given data 
might have come about then brought into the human mind a population of many sam-
ples. The question of how to then test whether or not the value of θ might be 11, brought 
into the human mind an ordering of the many x
(n)
 values arising from the many samples. 
We then considered the real-world value x
(n)
 = 10, and calculated that the co-ordinates 
(0.18, 0.27, 0.55) would give directions to just where amongst the many x
(n)
 values in the 
human mind, the mental correlate of that real-world value was being situated. This situ-
ation is depicted in Figure 2.3.1.
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Figure 2.3.1: Testing the quality of fit of a member of a class of models for a number of munici-
pal buses
The shaded bar depicts a statistical rounding of size 0.27, where the mental correlate is to 
be found. Clearly then, we can point at Figure 2.3.1 or, if needs be, at a simulated counter-
part, and declare: ‘See for yourself how the hypothesised model, as here being tested, fits 
the given data well. See how snugly the mental correlate of the datum is being placed 
within the crowd.’ We would thus use the method once used by Galileo at Pisa. It is the 
method that is invariably used by substantive science for the marshalling of its ultimate 
evidential facts, which facts are of course physical facts, that is to say, facts capable of be-
ing forced upon the human body.
It might be objected that we are neglecting the outcome of the test that we displayed in 
Figure 1.8.2 where, using the method of runs, we found that our model, as tested there, 
does not fit the data well. However, we reply that this is no cause for embarrassment: the 
two tests are tests of the quality of fit of two different subsidiary models with respect to 
two different subsidiary data sets. In principle, that does not differ at all from how, for 
instance, we might point and say: ‘The shape of this spoor is unlike that of an aardwolf. 
But if it were to be the spoor of an aardwolf, the size of the spoor is like that of a juvenile.’ 
In other words, we must firmly rebuff any arguments to the effect that the test here per-
formed rests on the assumption that the six numbers were drawn as if by random sam-
pling without replacement. When we say ‘… if it were to be the spoor of an aardwolf’, we 
are not in any way assuming it to be the spoor of an aardwolf. The point being made here 
must be firmly grasped: the term assumption does not belong to data analysis, as data 
analysis is the discourse of the pursuit of knowledge. The term belongs to technology, 
as technology is the discourse of the use of knowledge, which discourse often needs to be 
assisted by assumptions. In other words, scientific investigation is the pursuit of physical 
facts, whereas scientific technology is the pursuit of physical rewards. So, the former does 
not want presumed ‘facts’ to be based on assumed ‘facts’, whereas the latter will often set-
tle for the expected rewards of augmenting facts with reasonable assumptions. In short, a 
technology may act upon assumptions, but an investigation must point at facts.
 , , , , ,
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The foregoing dealt with the very simple case in which a scalar statistic is minimally suffi-
cient for a scalar parameter. The next example displays a more complex situation in that the 
minimal sufficient statistic is a vector, rather than a scalar, although the index is a scalar.
Example 2.3.3
Consider a sample of n integers drawn as if at random without replacement from the set 
of all the integers straddled by two integers, θ and 2θ, such that θ > 3 and 2 ≤ n ≤ θ-1. 
Let x
(1) denote the smallest number drawn, and let x(n) denote the largest number drawn. 
Then the corresponding random variables X
(1) and X(n) are (jointly) minimally sufficient 
for θ. Their joint distribution was previously given by the first of the two factors in the 
square brackets at (1.12.1). For n = 3 the distribution is given by:
Pr{[X
(1), X(3)] = [x(1), x(3)]} = 3(3-1)      
[x
(3)-x(1)]-1    , where 
                                                         (q-1)(q-2) (q-3)
x
(1) = q+1, q+2, q+3, …, 2q-3
x
(3) = q+3, q+4, q+5, …, 2q-1
and x
(1)+2 ≤ x(3), because n = 3. (2.3.3)
Let the given data be (x
(1), x(3)) = (16, 19).
As q+1 ≤ x
(1) and x(1) = 16, we cannot have q > 15.
As 2q-1 ≥ x
(3) and x(3) = 19, we cannot have q < 10.
So, our class of models comprises just six different members indexed by q = 10, 11, 12, 
…, 15. Consider M0: q = 11. Using the formulae given at (2.3.3), the joint distribution and 
the marginal distributions of X
(1) and of X(3) are easily found (Table 2.3.3). It appears from
Table 2.3.3: Joint and marginal distributions of X
(3) and X(1) when θ = 11 and n = 3. 
X
(1) ranges from θ+n-2 to 2θ-n inclusive, i.e. from 12 to 19 when θ = 11 and n = 3. 
X
(3) ranges from θ+n to 2θ-1 inclusive, i.e. from 14 to 21 when θ = 11 and n = 3.
X
(1) 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Total
X
(3)
14  1/120  1/120
15  2/120  1/120  3/120
16  3/120  2/120  1/120  6/120
17  4/120  3/120  2/120  1/120  10/120
18  5/120  4/120  3/120  2/120  1/120  15/120
19  6/120  5/120  4/120  3/120  2/120  1/120  21/120
20  7/120  6/120  5/120  4/120  3/120  2/120  1/120  28/120
21  8/120  7/120  6/120  5/120  4/120  3/120  2/120  1/120  36/120
Total  36/120  28/120  21/120  15/120  10/120  6/120  3/120  1/120  1
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these distributions that either large values of x
(1), or small values of x(3) point at a ‘poor 
fit’. As θ bounds x
(1) from below, that implies that a large value of x(1) is sensitive to a 
value of θ that is too small to supply a good fit (i.e. try a larger θ value – one closer 
to x
(1)). Similarly, as 2θ bounds x(3) from above, that implies that a small value of x(3) 
is sensitive to a value of θ that is too large to supply a good fit (i.e. try a smaller 2θ 
value – one closer to x
(3)). Let us then consider the X(1) test statistic for M0: θ = 11, as 
given by the X
(1) margin of Table 2.3.3, and let us calculate that the mental correlate 
of the given datum, i.e. of x
(1) = 16, is being situated within the X(1) test distribution, at 
 36+28+21+15,  10  ,  6+3 + 1  = (0.833, 0.083, 0.083). 
         120          120      120
Here the pointing co-ordinate is on the right, corresponding to a large x
(1) value. For the X(3) 
test statistic, the pointing co-ordinate is on the left, corresponding to a small x
(3) value. Using 
the X
(1) and X(3) test statistics separately, in each case to test, one by one, the quality of fit of 
the six models M0: θ = J for J = 10, 11, 12, … 15 for the given data, Table 2.3.4 arises. On the
Table 2.3.4: The co-ordinating traces of the X
(1) and X(3) tests of θ = J for J = 10, 11, 12, …, 15. The data 
for the two suites of tests are X
(1) = 16 for the X(1) suite and X(3) = 19 for the X(3) suite with 
sample size being n = 3.
Hypothesised model Co-ordinates of x
(1) Co-ordinates of x(3)
θ = 10  (0.95, 0.04, 0.01)  (0.67, 0.33, Ø)
θ = 11  (0.83, 0.08, 0.08)  (0.29, 0.18, 0.53)
θ = 12  (0.66, 0.13, 0.21)  (0.12, 0.09, 0.79)
θ = 13  (0.45, 0.16, 0.38)  (0.05, 0.05, 0.91)
θ = 14  (0.23, 0.19, 0.58)  (0.01, 0.02, 0.97)
θ = 15  (Ø, 0.26, 0.74)  (0.00, 0.01, 0.99)
one hand, M0: θ = 10, as tested by the X(1) test, fits the data poorly, pointing at larger 
values of θ. On the other hand, M0: θ = 15 and M0: θ = 14, as tested by the X(3) test, fit the 
data poorly, pointing at smaller values of θ.
The present example nicely exemplifies why co-ordination tests never require us to rea-
son in terms of more than a pair of hypothesised singletons at a time. In order to see 
this, note that in Table 2.3.4 we can pick out co-ordinates arising from:
2×  6  = 30 pairs of X
(j)
 tests (j = 1, 2). 
      2
Consider the pair of X
(1) tests for M0: θ = 10 versus M1: θ = 14. Table 2.3.4 tells us 
that for this particular pair, the mental correlate of the x
(1) datum is to be found at 
(0.95, 0.04, 0.01) and (0.23, 0.19, 0.58) in the respective test distributions. The two situa-
tions are displayed in Figure 2.3.2.
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, , . , , .
Testing the quality-of-fit of the model 
indexed by q = 10
Testing the quality-of-fit of the model 
indexed by q = 14
ε
Figure 2.3.2: Comparing the quality of fit of two alternative members of a class of models for the 
value of an unknown integer θ
The meanings displayed in Figure 2.3.2 can, if needs be, be forced upon the human body 
by simulation. They are meanings that belong to the discourse of physical evidence, as we 
can point and say:
‘Look at Figure 2.3.2, and see for yourself how awkwardly the mental correlate of 
the x
(1) datum is situated on the outskirts of the crowd that θ = 10 brings to mind.’
‘Look at Figure 2.3.2, and see for yourself how snugly the mental correlate of the 
x
(1) datum is situated within the crowd that θ = 14 brings to mind.’
The human body is thus forced to grasp that, by the two tests performed here, the θ = 14 
explanation of ‘how this x
(1) datum might have come about’ fits the datum better than does 
the θ = 10 explanation.
We challenge the reader to note that, just as in the previous chapter, so also in the present 
chapter, co-ordination tests produce findings whereof the veracity cannot be qualified by 
probability. The findings are facts whose veracity is absolute, having by physical percep-
tion (bodily perception) been placed beyond reasonable contest. As this point must be 
firmly grasped, let us state and consider precisely what the findings of the previous para-
graph are, as follows:
By the tests performed, the explanation offered by θ = 10 fits the data poorly, whereas 
the explanation offered by θ = 14 fits the data well.
Should we be compelled to attach a ‘probability of truth’ to this statement, we would 
perforce have to declare that it be 1 (unity), as the statement is plainly a fact. We must, 
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however, be exceedingly reluctant to introduce such a ‘probability’, as it can serve no posi-
tive purpose for an irrelevant concept to be dragged into our development.
Example 2.3.4
The index of a class of models often represents some or other quantity of interest such 
as a number of municipal busses, or a percentage of viable seed, or a variance of human 
statures, or the effect of a vitamin supplement on the egg production of laying hens. In 
each of these examples the quantity of interest ranges over an ordered scale of values. 
It is important to understand that such is not always the case. So, consider a yield trial 
with tomato cultivars named Money Maker, Beauty, Bonny Best and Juicy Lucy, with 
equal numbers of replication in a completely randomised design, where interest is in 
potential fruit production, the higher the better. (If interest were to be in the percentage 
of defective fruits, the defining phrase would be the lower the better.) For any of the en-
tries, say Beauty, an unknown q names the best of the other entries. We consider a case 
for which the standard analysis of variance can be defended. So, the following random 
variables are brought into the human mind:
X
q
, representing the mean yield of q, where E(X
q
) = m
q
XBeauty, representing the mean yield of Beauty, where E(XBeauty) = mBeauty
Xmax • Beauty, representing the highest mean yield excluding that of Beauty
s2, representing the error variance of the trial.
The extent to which Beauty’s yield potential falls short of that of its unknown best com-
petitor named θ, is represented by the shortfall parameter:
m
q
-mBeauty = dBeauty, (2.3.4)
which shortfall may of course be negative, as Beauty might be better than q. It is im-
possible to estimate this shortfall untrammelled by nuisance parameters involving the 
expected yields of entries other than Beauty and q. But with all other parameters fixed, 
the larger the shortfall of Beauty would be, the larger the expected value of
Xmax • Beauty-XBeauty
.
would be. So to test whether Beauty must be indexed by positive shortfall, we employ 
the t-like statistic of Dunnett (1955) given by:
t’ = 
Xmax • Beauty-XBeauty, where n is the number of replications. (2.3.5)
               √2s2                       n
In this expression it is wrong to interpret the denominator as the standard error of the nu-
merator, because the first term of the numerator is of an order-statistical nature. In order 
to underscore this, the denominator is in some of the literature taken to be the standard 
error of a single treatment mean. In fact, as it merely serves to eliminate the error variance 
as a nuisance parameter, it may be taken to be Cs, for C any positive constant. Let us, for 
the moment, imagine that in order to test whether or not a tenable model for the data in 
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hand needs a positive shortfall value for Beauty, we can supply the values of the remaining 
nuisance parameters. Then we would be able to supply the test distribution within which 
the mental correlate of the calculated t’ value is to be seated, and small values of the right 
co-ordinate would then point at Beauty as being lower than best. In order to overcome the 
problem of not knowing what values are to be supplied for the remaining nuisance param-
eters, we replace the probability of t’ exceeding any given value, with the supremum of that 
probability over the nuisance parameter space. So when referring a given t’ value to Dun-
nett’s test distribution, the statistical co-ordinates obtained are the leftmost co-ordinates 
for the given t’ under all the various possible nuisance parameter values. Consider the 
hypothetical data given in Table 2.3.5. 
Table 2.3.5: A suite of tests for the elimination of entries that are lower than best
Entry name Mean yield
(kg/plot)
Shortfall t’ value Left-most co-ordinate when modelling the entry as best
Money Maker 44 -7 -0.99 (0.040, ε, 0.960)
Juicy Lucy 37 +7 +0.99 (0,662, ε, 0.338)
Bonny Best 29 +15 +2.13 (0.934, ε, 0.066)
Beauty 26 +18 +2.55 (0.968, ε, 0.032)
The estimated standard error of an entry mean equals 4.99 kg on 12 df.
We wish to test:
M0: mq-mBeauty ≤ 0 versus M1: mq-mBeauty > 0.
Note that M0 involves two different possibilities:
m
q
-mBeauty < 0 means Beauty is the sole best entry, whereas
m
q
-mBeauty = 0 means Beauty is one of several best entries.
So we may express the alternatives more explicitly, as follows:
M0: ‘Beauty is a best entry’ versus M1: ‘Beauty is lower than best’.
The observed mean for Beauty falls short of the highest mean observed amongst the 
other entries by +18 kg. Using the formula given at (2.3.5), the corresponding value of 
Dunnett’s -like statistic is found to be:
t’=18÷(4.99×√2), i.e., t’ = 2.55 on 12 df. with three competitors. (2.3.6)
From a table in Dunnett (1955) we find that in this case the right co-ordinate of t’=2.29 
equals 0.05 and that of t’=3.19 equals 0.01. Linear interpolation gives the co-ordinates of 
the mental correlate of the value obtained at (2.3.6) as (0.962, ε, 0.038). More exact co-ordi-
nate values, given in Table 2.3.5 as (0.968, ε, 0.032), are obtained by adapting the PROBMC 
function of SAS (1992). The pointing co-ordinate in such a test is always on the right. As 
the computed co-ordinates are the leftmost co-ordinates that arise when taking account 
of all possible nuisance parameter values that might arise from entries other than Beauty 
and one or more unknown best competitors, we should strictly speaking say:
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The mental correlate of the test datum is to be found at least as far down as at 
(0.968, ε, 0.032) in the right-hand tail of the hypothesised distribution.
In other words, Dunnett’s t’ has enabled us to pick out from amongst the models in the 
human mind, that model which is most tenable under the proposition ‘Beauty is a “best” 
entry.’ As this ‘most tenable’ model, by the test performed, fits the given data poorly, 
every one of the models in which Beauty is modelled as a ‘best’ entry, must then, by the 
test performed, fit the given data poorly. Table 2.3.5 displays the results of a suite of such 
elimination tests. In this suite of tests the parameter of interest is: 
θ ∈ {Beauty, Bonny Best, Juicy Lucy, Money Maker} (2.3.7)
The parameter ranges over a set of identities, and not over an ordered scale of values. Our 
findings are that by the suite of elimination tests performed in Table 2.3.5, all the models 
in which Beauty is modelled as a best entry fit the given data poorly, and all the models 
in which Bonny Best is modelled as a best entry fit the given data poorly, although not 
quite as poorly as Beauty, and not all the models in which Money Maker and/or Juicy 
Lucy are modelled as best entries fit the given data poorly. We note that Table 2.3.5 ef-
fectively displays only three tests, not four tests, as the highest yielding entry can never, 
by the method used, be judged ‘lower than best’. So the co-ordinates given in the table 
for Money Maker are redundant and may be omitted.
Example 2.3.6 
Shortfall testing sometimes involves a number of entries and a control. An example 
involving six entries and a control is provided by a yield trial concerning the recovery 
of Pythium when bits of infested lucerne tissue are plated on growth media made up 
of various kinds of agar. Recovery rates (from 50 bits per replicate) were transformed to 
angles leading to the analysis given in Table 2.3.6.
Table 2.3.6: Shortfall tests involving a control
Growth medium
Mean Test 1 (7 entries in all) Test 2 (6 entries in all)
(3 reps) Shortfall Co-ordinate Shortfall Co-ordinate
Corn meal agar 28.5° -0.9° (0.11, ε, 0.89)
Lima bean agar 27.6° +0.9° (0.25, ε, 0.75)
Water agar (control) 27.6° +0.9° (0.22, ε, 0.78)
Potato-carrot agar 26.1° +2.4° (0.41, ε, 0.59)
V-8 agar 25.0° +3.5° (0.54, ε, 0.46)
Oat agar 22.4° +6.1° (0.81, ε, 0.19)
Potato-dextrose agar 16.7° +11.8° (0.99, ε, 0.01)
The estimated standard error of an entry mean equals 2.709° on 96 df.
(The error source was a wider analysis involving factorial interaction.)
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Because water agar, a standard medium, has a low nutrient content, interest was directed 
at the possibility of increasing yields by using any of six alternative nutrient-enriched me-
dia. As the alternatives require extra effort to prepare and are somewhat difficult to work 
with, we must begin by asking Question 1:
Does the recovery rate for water agar evidently fall short of that for the unidentifi-
able best one amongst the six nutrient-enriched media?
An affirmative answer would then prompt us to ask Question 2:
Can any members of the group of six nutrient-enriched media be ruled out as 
evidently lower than best within that group?
Question 1 leads to Test 1 in Table 2.3.6, and it so happens that in this case the evidence 
would not persuade us to replace the standard medium (control) with any of the other 
media. In other words, there is no indication that the standard falls short of its unknown 
best competitor amongst the nutrient-enriched media. It may nevertheless be noted 
that amongst the nutrient-enriched media only, Test 2 provides forceful evidence that 
potato-dextrose agar is lower than best within that group. We note that Test 1 has been 
singled out as the only test of interest from amongst a suite of seven possible shortfall 
tests. However, for Test 2 the full suite of the six possible shortfall tests involving the six 
nutrient-enriched media is of interest. We note again that a full suite of shortfall tests 
always involves at least one redundant test.
In Table 2.3.6 the mean for water agar is straddled by the other entry means. A shortfall test 
does not presuppose that the population mean for an entry under test may not similarly 
be straddled by the other population means. For instance, a test based on the contrast:
Xaver•j-Xj,
where Xaver•j denotes the average over all of the entries other than Entry j,
would be entirely unsuitable for tests of the kind appearing in Tables 2.3.5 and 2.3.6, as 
an entry can be lower than best without being lower than average.
We remark in passing that Dunnett’s t-like statistic appears in the literature on decision-
making under risk in connection with a variety of different problems, and is also widely 
– and wrongly – viewed as necessarily being subject to certain ideas arising from the doc-
trine of simultaneous statistical inference. In the subsequent development we will meet 
and critically examine that view. For the time being, however, we need only note that 
shortfall testing is not a procedure for decision-making under risk and also does not in any 
way involve the doctrine of simultaneous statistical inference.
2.4 Some definitions
Various ideas exemplified in the previous section motivate a series of definitions that we 
now introduce along with further explanations as we proceed. To begin with, note that 
if a problem in elimination testing involves a vector parameter, interest is often (even 
usually) in some or other scalar function of that vector. For instance, let the two sets of 
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waiting times for the eruptions of Vesuvius during the ancient era and the modern era 
be modelled as two independent, random samples of exponential waiting times (Ex-
ample 1.32.2). If θ1 and θ2 denote the expected waiting times and R1• and R2• the sample 
totals for the two eras, respectively, (R1•, R2•) is minimally sufficient for (θ1, θ2). Here 
interest might be in θ1÷θ2 = θ, for which R1•÷R2• = T(θ) is an elimination quantity. This 
example serves to clarify Definition 2.4.1. 
Definition 2.4.1:
Let given data Sx = {x1, x2, x3, …, xn} be modelled by a random sample SX = {X1, X2, X3, …, Xn}, whose 
probabi lity is given by a class of models indexed by a vector, Θ = (θ1, θ2, θ3, …, θm). Let k transformations:
rj{x1, x2, x3, …, xn} for j = 1, 2, 3, …, k,
define a set of statistics S
R
 = {R1, R2, R3, …, Rk}, that is minimally sufficient for Θ. Let two further trans-
form ations:
θ = θ(θ1, θ2, θ3, ..., θm) and t(θ) = t(r1, r2, r3, ..., rk, θ),
define a scalar random variable T(θ), whose value and/or distribution depends on Θ through θ only. Then 
we call T(θ) a (well-conceived) elimination quantity for θ.
We remark on four aspects of this definition.
Remark 1: The expression ‘well conceived’ is used to underscore the principle that an 
elimination quantity may not depend on the class characteristic. The present defini-
tion thus provides for elimination tests in the sense of Definition 1.15.1. The point here 
is that when we judge the quality of fit of alternative members of a class of models in 
respect of predictions that depend on the index of the class, those predictions must be 
untrammelled by predictions that do not discriminate amongst different index values.
Remark 2: In order to show that the elimination quantity supplies predictions indexed 
by θ, the definition denotes the quantity as T(θ), which is not to say the quantity itself 
is indexed by θ. Possibly only its distribution is indexed by θ. For instance, let X be an 
exponentially distributed random variable with expected value θ-1 (0 < θ < ∞), in which 
case X is minimally sufficient for θ. So a well-conceived elimination quantity for θ is 
T(θ) = X, which is not indexed by θ, but whose distribution,
θ
-1e-xθ for 0 < x < ∞,
is indexed by θ. In this example an equivalent suite of tests is obtainable via an elimina-
tion pivot T(θ) = Xθ, which is itself indexed by θ, but whose distribution,
e-x for 0 < x < ∞,
is independent of θ. So the co-ordinates of X = x, for any given x, are calculable either 
via X or via Xθ, as (1-V, ε, V) where: 
                 ∞                                                      ∞ 
V = ∫θ
-1 
exp(-yθ)dy = exp(-tθ), or V = ∫exp(-y)dy = exp(-tθ), respectively 
      x                                                           xθ
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However, not every elimination quantity is capable of an equivalent elimination pivot. 
For the elimination quantity used in the number-of-busses problem in Example 2.3.2 for 
instance, an equivalent elimination pivot seems non-existent. We note in passing that X 
is a statistic, and Xθ is not a statistic. In general elimination pivots are not statistics.
Remark 3: The definition requires T(θ) to be scalar. The reason for this can be shown by 
means of Example 2.3.3. It is perfectly possible, in the case of that example, to calculate 
statistical co-ordinates that will direct us to precisely where within the hypothesised 
model, indexed by say θ = 11, the mental correlate of the vector datum
[x
(1), x(3)] = (16, 19)
is to be found. Consider for that purpose Table 2.3.3. It then appears that the required 
directions partition the probability content of the table into nine parts corresponding 
to the Cartesian product:
[U(x
(1); θ), ε(x(1); θ), V(x(1); θ)] × [U(x(3); θ), ε(x(3); θ), V(x(3); θ)] for θ = 11.
These nine parts, in a layout corresponding to that of Table 2.3.3, are as follows:
34/120     1/120     0/120
18/120     2/120     1/120
48/120     7/120     9/120 (2.4.1)
In this layout, the column totals:
(110/120, 10/120, 10/120) = (0.83, 0.08, 0.08) are the co-ordinates of x
(1)
and the row totals:
(35/120, 21/120, 64/120) = (0.29, 0.18, 0.53) are the co-ordinates of x
(3).
These co-ordinates have already been given in Table 2.3.4 as those arising for θ = 11, and 
the joint co-ordination at (2.4.1) dissipates the evidence conveyed by them. Such dissi-
pation is avoided by gathering evidence of any given sort together into ‘a single degree of 
freedom’ so to speak. So we must always try to employ univariate ordering of evidence, 
which in this case is supplied by ordering first the one, and then the other of the two 
marginal sample patterns.
Remark 4: An elimination quantity T(θ) is brought to mind by a real-world data set. 
Hence, by definition, we make T(θ) depend on a real-world datum t(θ). This is obviously 
the case in Examples 2.3.2 and 2.3.3. However, these examples are not exceptional on 
that account. It is fundamentally important to grasp that co-ordination tests always test 
models that have arisen in response to and that involve just one particular real-world 
data set, as that is a fundamental distinction between such tests and hypothesis tests. 
This is underscored by Definition 2.4.2.
A co-ordinate trace represents an array of self-contained predications. Consider, for in-
stance, the trace listed in Table 2.3.2 and depicted in Figure 2.4.1 by a bar diagram whose 
subsidiary parts have areas proportional to the frequencies they represent. The human
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Definition 2.4.2:
Let T(θ) denote a (well-conceived) elimination quantity for θ. Let t(θ) denote the corresponding real-world 
elimination datum. For every given value of θ, the distribution of T(θ) is a singleton whose range includes 
the value t(θ) = t. All the singletons thus formed together constitute a suite of hypothesised models indexed 
by θ. For each member of that suite, the calculable ordered number triplet:
C(t; θ) = [U(t; θ), ε(t; θ), V(t; θ)],
provides the requisite statistical co-ordinates to direct us to just where, within that particular member, the 
rounding that contains the mental correlate of t(θ), i.e. of the real-world elimination datum, is to be found. 
For the suite of tests performed, we call C(t; θ), when considered as a function of θ, the co-ordinate trace of 
the mental correlate.
q=16
q=15
q=14
q=13
q=12
q=11
q=10
Figure 2.4.1: Bar diagram displaying the values of U (left), ε (centre) and V (right) when tracing 
the situation of the mental correlate of a given datum X
(n)  
= 10, the correlate being 
transported from model to model indexed by θ = 10, 11, 12, …, respectively
body is thereby forced to physically grasp the nature of the evidence being put to it 
because, pointing at Figure 2.4.1, or at a simulated equivalent if needs be, we force the 
human body to make the corresponding array of predications when we say:
‘See for yourself how snugly the mental correlate of the test datum is placed within 
the crowds that θ = 10, θ = 11, and (yes) also θ = 12, bring into the human mind.’
‘See for yourself how the placing of the mental correlate within the crowd that 
θ = 13 brings into the human mind, is slightly maladroit.’
‘See for yourself how the placing of the mental correlate within the crowd that 
θ = 14 brings into the human mind, is distinctly maladroit.’
‘See for yourself …’
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The reader should note carefully that the predications are not qualified by probability. 
Note in particular that we make no qualification of the kind:
‘{10, 11, 12, 13} covers θ with coverage probability = …’ (2.4.2)
Herein we are taking the first steps toward ultimately showing that such qualifications 
rely on poor epistemology, regardless of whether the coverage probability in question is 
a confidence coefficient, a fiducial probability, or a personal probability.
We usually view a co-ordinate trace as an ordered succession of predications. Note, however, 
that in Table 2.3.5 the ordering is by co-ordinates, as listed in the last column on the extreme 
right, whereas in Table 2.3.2 the ordering is by index values, as listed in the left-hand column.
An investigator is usually not interested in an entire trace; instead interest will usually 
be directed at several specially selected terms, as in the following examples.
Example 2.4.1
A much simplified version of the problem leading to the trace shown in Figure 2.4.1, but 
nevertheless retaining certain essentials for the present discussion, is obtained by con-
sidering just n = 1 measurement t, made using a continuous scale with negligible round-
ing, and modelled by a continuous U(0, θ) random variable T. An observation cannot be 
modelled as one that could not have occurred. So the members of our class of models 
are exhaustively indexed by all θ in the interval t ≤ θ < ∞. With T(θ) = T as elimination 
quantity, the trace of the mental correlate of the datum t, is thus given by:
[U(t; θ), ε(t; θ), V(t; θ)] =  t  , ε, 1-  t  for t ≤ θ < ∞, where ε ≈ 0 (2.4.3) 
                                            θ             θ
This is depicted in Figure 2.4.2, showing how the co-ordinates of the mental correlate
Figure 2.4.2: Tracing the situation of the mental correlate of a given datum T = 2, when mo-
delled as a sample from a U(0, θ) population for various θ, where 2 ≤ θ < ∞
V
U
V = U
Value of θ
272 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
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range from (1, ε, 0) at θ = t toward (0, ε, 1) as θ increases. An abbreviated account of the 
trace is obtained by specifying certain co-ordinate values and solving for θ. Thus, for 
instance, with t = 1.8, we obtain the following abbreviated trace:
(0.98, ε, 0.02) and (0.02, ε, 0.98) are attained at θ = 1.84 and 90.0, respectively
(0.96, ε, 0.04) and (0.04, ε, 0.96) are attained at θ = 1.88 and 45.0, respectively
(0.92, ε, 0.08) and (0.08, ε, 0.92) are attained at θ = 1.96 and 22.5, respectively.
This abbreviation has been tailor-made by specifying co-ordinates of special interest and 
then solving for the corresponding index values. In other cases we might specify index 
values of special interest and then solve for the corresponding co-ordinates. The two pos-
sibilities might be expressed by saying that we can specify certain elimination levels of 
special interest and then solve for the corresponding elimination bounds, or vice versa. We 
note that, beginning at θ = t, the pointing co-ordinate of the trace given at (2.4.3) is on the 
right until the elimination level,
(0.50, ε, 0.50), is attained at θ = 3.6
Thereafter the pointing co-ordinate is on the left. The pointing co-ordinate in the trace 
given in Table  2.3.2 and depicted in Figure 2.4.1 is on the left for every index value. We 
might express this by saying that the trace depicted in Figure  2.4.1 arises from ‘a suite 
of inherently one-sided tests’, whereas the trace depicted in Figure  2.4.2 arises from ‘a 
suite of inherently two-sided tests’. But we will prefer to describe such tests as unilateral 
and bilateral, respectively. At (2.4.3) we see yet again that a suite of models and the re-
sulting trace are always, by definition, data dependent.
Example 2.4.2
Snedecor (1956, p.57) gives a data set concerning the efficacy of an insecticide spray for 
control of the European corn borer. Corn yields, from both sprayed and unsprayed strips 
in each of 14 fields of corn on different farms, were recorded (Table 2.4.1).
Table 2.4.1: Yields of corn (bushels/acre) from sprayed (S) and unsprayed (U) strips on each of 
14 different farms in Boone County, Iowa, 1950 (D = S-U).
S 64.3 78.1 93.0 80.7 89.0 79.9 90.6 102.4 70.7 106.1 107.4 74.0 72.6 69.5
U 70.0 74.4 86.6 79.2 84.7 75.1 87.3 98.8 70.2 101.1 83.4 65.2 68.1 68.4
D −5.7 3.7 6.4 1.5 4.3 4.8 3.3 3.6 0.5 5.0 24.0 8.8 4.5 1.1
The mean difference in yield (sprayed minus unsprayed) is 4.7 bu./acre with an estimat-
ed standard error of 1.73 bu./acre. Let δ denote the expected mean difference. Pesticides 
are routinely tested on non-infested material of the kind to be protected, thus to ensure 
against deleterious consequences. This was evidently also the case here as Snedecor, 
apart from using a notion different to our δ, states:
‘It had already been established that the spray, at the concentration used, could not 
decrease yield. … Consequently, if δ is not zero then it must be greater than zero.’
The epistemology of statistical science
128
Following Snedecor, we employ Student’s t as an elimination pivot for δ by referring 
(4.7-δ)÷1.73 to Student’s test distribution on 13 df. Snedecor calculates that in order 
to break even, the cost of spraying requires a yield increase of about 2 bu./acre. So, the 
question: ‘Does spraying seem to increase yield?’ asks whether or not a good fit needs 
a hypothesised value > 0 bu./acre, and the question: ‘Does spraying seem to pay?’ asks 
whether or not a good fit needs a hypothesised value > 2 bu./acre. We find that:
at δ = 0 bu./acre the trace attains (U, ε, V) = (0.992, ε, 0.018), (2.4.4)
which evidence strongly points at larger δ values, and
at δ = 2 bu./acre the trace attains (U, ε, V) = (0.913, ε, 0.087), (2.4.5)
which evidence points at yet larger δ values, but not strongly so. Note that, in contrast to 
the previous example, the abbreviated trace at (2.4.4) and (2.4.5) was tailor-made by spe-
cifying the elimination bounds of special interest, rather than by specifying co-ordinate 
levels of special interest.
Example 2.4.3
A visitor to the Kgalagadi Transfrontier National Park learns from Maclean (1985) of a ‘rare’ 
yellow-breasted variant of the crimson-breasted shrike. Subsequently, during a game view-
ing drive, the visitor spots n = 11 birds of that species, all crimson. Modelling the number of 
yellow individuals as a binomial count T = 0, with E(T) = nθ when the population proportion 
of yellow birds is denoted by θ, the trace of the mental correlate of the test datum is found 
to be given by:
[Ø, (1-θ)11, 1-(1-θ)11] for 0 < θ <1.
We note again that a trace depends on a real-world data set. Here interest would be in a 
few selected terms of the trace, perhaps specified by way of the elimination levels
(Ø, 0.04, 0.96), (Ø, 0.06, 0.94), (Ø, 0.08, 0.92)
corresponding to which the elimination bounds are:
θ = 0.25, 0.23, 0.21, respectively.
As the value of θ is thereby bounded from above by about 1 in 5, and as 1 in 5 could hardly 
be interpreted as rare, the statistical analysis does not add to what is already known ac-
cording to Maclean. We note in passing that if Maclean’s information is not based on 
records capable of statistical analysis, the visitor’s two sources of information are inca-
pable of being combined in a physically meaningful way. Such situations, as we shall see 
later, have prompted the introduction of ‘Bayesian’ recipes for combining two such sourc-
es of information in terms of certain metaphysical notions of probability, i.e. notions of 
probability whose meanings are incapable of being grasped by the human body. But, for 
the time being, that need not concern us.
Elimination tests
129
Example 2.4.4
We revisit Example 2.3.4 and note that reversing the sign of the parameter defined at 
(2.3.4) expresses the gain or loss when Beauty is substituted for its unknown best con-
tender named θ. So let us call that gain or loss ‘Beauty’s substitution value’, and let it be 
denoted by:
∆Beauty = mBeauty-mq, where ∆Beauty = -dBeauty .
Inspection of Table 2.3.5 indicates that Beauty’s substitution value may well be -11, as 
that equals the difference between Beauty’s mean performance (judged lower than best 
within the group) and Juicy Lucy’s mean performance (not judged lower than best with-
in the group). In general, a shortfall pivot for Beauty’s substitution value is obtained by 
expressing the many-one t statistic at (2.3.4) in a general form, as follows, where ∆Beauty 
denotes Beauty’s substitution value:
t’ = 
Xmax . Beauty-(XBeauty-DBeauty). 
                  √2s
2 
                         n 
The test at (2.3.6) is thus interpretable as a test of:
M0: DBeauty = 0 versus M1: DBeauty < 0.
Similarly, to test say:
M0: DBeauty = -10 versus M1: DBeauty < -10,
we calculate the test datum:
t’ = [+18+(-10)]÷(4.99×√2), i.e., t’+1.13 on 12 df. with three competitors
whose mental correlate is situated at (0.71, ε, 0.29) in the test distribution. Recall that 
the co-ordinate thus obtained is the leftmost of the possible right co-ordinates under 
the hypothesised model. So, for leftmost right co-ordinates here specified by:
(1-0.08, ε, 0.08), (1-0.04, ε, 0.04), (1-0.02, ε, 0.02), (2.4.6)
the corresponding upper bounds for Beauty’s substitution value are the solutions of:
t’ = [+18+DBeauty ]÷(4.99×√2) = 1.98, 2.41, 2.83, respectively.
These solutions turn out to be:
DBeauty = -4, -1, +2, respectively. (2.4.7)
For Juicy Lucy, the corresponding upper bounds are the solutions of:
t’ = [+7+DJuicy Lucy]÷(4.99×√2) = 1.98, 2.41, 2.83, respectively,
which turn out to be:
DJuicy Lucy = +7, +10, +13, respectively. (2.4.8)
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The abbreviated trace conveyed at (2.4.6) and (2.4.7) jointly, underscores the result of the 
test appearing in the last line of Table 2.3.5. The abbreviated trace conveyed at (2.4.6) and 
(2.4.8) jointly, discourages the view that on the evidence given in Table 2.3.5 Juicy Lucy 
may be discarded in favour of Money Maker. Terminology now introduced by Definition 
2.4.3 underscores the tailor-made nature of trace abbreviation.
Definition 2.4.3:
A tailor-made trace comprises several of, rather than all, the terms of a co-ordinate trace arising from 
testing a suite of models for a given real-world data set. The terms of such an abbreviation are tailor-
made in the sense of having been selected to serve the purposes of the particular investigation. A tailor-
made trace comprises particular index values that we call elimination bounds. We call their correspond-
ing co-ordinate values, elimination levels.
Note that the definition emphasises ‘several’, that is to say, ‘more than one’. A tailor-
made trace is the co-ordination tester’s answer to the idea indicated at (2.4.2). Thus, a 
data analyst does not bundle together a motley of models ranging from some that fit the 
given data well to others that fit the given data poorly, so as to describe the motley by a 
just one number called a confidence coefficient, or a credibility coefficient, or a fiducial 
probability, etc. It should be perfectly obvious from the outset that such bundling to-
gether is symptomatic of poor epistemology, of epistemology that at best is marching to 
the beat of a mistaken drum.
2.5 One-to-one transformations of the index
Theorem 2.5.1 states a useful fact about one to one transformations of the parameter space.
Theorem 2.5.1:
Let T(θ) denote a well-conceived elimination quantity for θ, the index of a suite of hypothesised models. 
Let Ω(θ) denote the range of θ. Let:
C(t; θ) = [U(t; θ), ε(t; θ), V(t; θ)] for θ ∈ Ω(θ)
denote the trace of the mental correlate of the given datum t(θ) = t. Let φ = φ(θ) be any one to one trans-
formation of θ. Then C(t; φ) = C(t; θ) identically in θ.
The theorem is obvious, as the one to one transformation simply re-labels every single-
ton in the suite of hypothesised models without altering the situation of the mental cor-
relate within that singleton. This enables useful transformation of elimination bounds, 
as in the following examples.
Example 2.5.1
In order to estimate population size, a game farmer catches, marks and releases 104 
springbok. A subsequent survey finds eight marked animals amongst 884 spotted while 
traversing the farm. Let N denote the total number of animals, of which M = 104 are 
marked, and let n = 884 denote the number subsequently spotted, of which m = 8 are 
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marked. Solving from m/n ≈ M/N, we find N ≈ 11500 animals, indicating a negligibly 
small sampling fraction, 884/11500 = 0.08. So, we may consider binomial sampling as 
an approximate model for the given data set. Using the normal approximation for the 
binomial, the U, V = 0.050, 0.075, 0.100 elimination bounds for M/N are given by:
(m/n)-Z √(m/n)[1-(m/n)]/n ≤ M/N ≤ (m/n)+Z √(m/n)[1-(m/n)]/n,
with Z = 1.645, 1.439, 1.282, respectively. These bounds are:
0.00381 ≤ M/N ≤ 0.0143
0.00447 ≤ M/N ≤ 0.0136
0.00497 ≤ M/N ≤ 0.0131, respectively. (2.5.1)
As (M/N)-1 × M is a one to one transformation from M/N to N, we apply this transfor-
mation to the bounds given at (2.5.1) to obtain the following elimination bounds for N:
7 300 animals ≤ N ≤ 27 000 animals, at U, V = 0.050
7 600 animals ≤ N ≤ 23 000 animals, at U, V = 0.075
7 900 animals ≤ N ≤ 21 000 animals, at U, V = 0.100
In order to quarter the length of the intervals spanned by such bounds at the specified 
elimination levels, the farm must be traversed independently about 16 times.
Example 2.5.2
Saunders and Rayner (1951, p. 13) present data giving the number of suckers per plant 
for n = 600 maize plants from each of two different susceptible strains (Table 2.5.1).
Table 2.5.1: Numbers of suckers per plant for n = 600 maize plants from each of two different 
susceptible strains
Number of suckers per plant 0 1 2 3
Number of plants of strain 1 446 130 22 2
Number of plants of strain 2 507 85 7 1
They note that such data is often satisfactorily modelled in terms of Poisson sampling, 
stating that apparently ‘the various influences tending to produce a sucker in these strains 
of maize each operate with very small probability of producing a successful event, i.e. a 
single sucker.’ In order to try out this suggestion by way of a commencement test, let us 
model their data set as two independent Poisson samples of size n = 600 counts each, with 
the expected number of suckers per plant denoted by µ
J
 for Strain J (J = 1, 2). The joint 
probability of two such samples then factors similarly to the factoring displayed at (1.8.1), 
except that in this case there are four factors, say as follows in an abbreviated notation:
[Φ{µ1}×Γ1]×[Φ{µ2}×Γ2], (2.5.2)
The epistemology of statistical science
132
where the Φ-like factors correspond to the first of the two factors at (1.8.1) and the Γ-like 
factors correspond to the second of the two factors at (1.8.1). In order to test the quality 
of fit of the Γ-like factors, we might order each population of samples by the magnitude 
of the variance-to-mean ratio (Example 1.11.1). The calculated chi-square values for the 
two tests are 606.7 and 615.6, each on 599 df. The mental correlates of the datum ratios 
are then found to be situated in the test statistic at approximately: 
(0.59, ε, 0.41) and (0.55, ε, 0.45), for Strains 1 and 2, respectively. (2.5.3)
By these tests the Poisson characteristic fits each of the two data sets very well.
Turning now to the Φ-like factors at (2.5.2), the expression at (1.8.1) indicates how the 
total counts are modelled as the realisations of two Poisson random variables, denoted 
by X1 and X2 for Strains 1 and 2, respectively. (X1, X2) is then minimally sufficient for 
(µ1, µ2) and the data in hand indicate that a good fit requires values of µ1 in excess of 
those of µ2. In order to investigate this, we transform as follows:
ρ = µ1÷µ2 and µ• = µ1+µ2,
where ρ is the parameter of interest and µ• is a nuisance parameter. The probabil-
ity of (X1, X2) = (x1, x2), previously given as Φ{µ1}×Φ{µ2}, is then transformed, in terms of 
X1+X2 = X• and X1 = X, to the probability of (X•, X) = (x•, x), which is given by: 
  e
-m. m.x.  ×   
x.     r     x   1-   r      
x.-x  
, 
         x.!           x    1+r            1+r
where x. = 0, 1, 2, …, and x = 0, 1, 2, …, x.. (2.5.4)
The essence of the expression at (2.5.4) is that, conditional on X• = x•, we may treat X as 
a binomial random variable for a sample of size x. with probability of success equal to 
ρ÷(1+ρ). In our case the data are now:
X = 0(446)+1(130)+2(22)+3(2) = 180 successes out of just
x. = 0(446+507)+1(130+85)+2(22+7)+3(2+1) = 282 trials
and our suite of models comprises binomials indexed by ρ÷(1+ρ) over the range 
0 < ρ÷(1+ρ) < 1. In order to obtain the usual N(µ, σ²) approximation for the binomial total, 
we must take:
m = x.    r     and s2 = x.     r     1-     r     =    x.r    . 
            1+r                        1+r         1+r        (1+r)2
Using Yates’s correction for continuity, the approximation then gives the required right 
co-ordinate as the frequency with which a N(0, 1) variable exceeds:
z = [x-(x.-x) r+0.5]÷√x.r, in our case [180-102r+0.5]÷√282r.
For instance, to test whether a good fit is obtained with µ1 twice the size of µ2, we test 
M0: ρ = 2, finding z = -0.990 and V = 0.84. In order to evaluate the rounding we must 
repeat this procedure, after subtracting (rather than adding) 0.5 to the numerator of 
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the expression for z. We thus find z = -1.03 giving ε = 0.85-0.84 = 0.01. The requisite co-
ordinates are thus found to be approximately (0.15, 0.01, 0.84). By the test performed, 
the model indexed by ρ = 2 fits the given data well. Alternatively, we may specify certain 
interesting values of V and establish the corresponding values of ρ. For instance, to ob-
tain (U, ε, V) = (0.05, ε, 0.95) we must take z = -1.645. Squaring the expression for z, we 
must then find the roots of the quadratic equation:
(102)²ρ²-[2(180.5)(102)+(-1.645)²(282)]ρ+(180.5)² = 0.
The roots are ρ = 1.44 and ρ = 2.17, of which the larger root is the one asked for, and 
the smaller root is for (U, ε, V) = (0.95, ε, 0.05), i.e. these two roots are the elimination 
bounds at the U, V = 0.05 levels of elimination.
We note in passing that, in order to justify testing alternative values of ρ thus, the two 
tests leading to the co-ordinates at (2.5.3) should strictly speaking be replaced by test-
ing the compound consisting of both class characteristics (Section 1.32). Such a test is 
provided by the sum of the two chi-square values previously obtained, i.e.:
chi-square = 1222.3 on 599+599 df.,
whose mental correlate is situated close to the median of the test distribution.
2.6 Unilateral and bilateral tests of co-ordination
Hypothesis testing can often be specified to be either ‘one-sided repetitive testing’ or 
‘two-sided repetitive testing’. For instance, let X denote a N(µ, 1) random variable, where 
-∞ < µ < +∞, and where we require an accept-reject rule for testing H0: µ = 0 subject to 
a Type I error rate specified to be α = 0.05 in repetitive testing. Consider the following 
three different ways of specifying the alternative:
H1: µ < 0.     H1: µ = ±δ ≠ 0.     H1: µ > 0.
The matching three decision rules for minimising the Type II error rate in repetitive 
testing are reject H0 and accept H1 if and only if:
X ≤ -1.645.     |X| ≥ 1.96.     X ≥ +1.645.
The first and the last of these three rules exemplify one-sided hypothesis testing, and the 
second exemplifies two-sided hypothesis testing. Now note (and this is crucial) whether 
we then perform one-sided testing or two-sided testing is a matter of choice. One must 
specify whether the repetitive testing is to be one-sided or two-sided. As opposed to 
that, two different suites of co-ordination tests sometimes involve a superficially similar, 
but in fact fundamentally different distinction. In order to make this clear the following 
example is introduced for comparison to Example 2.4.3.
Example 2.6.1
A visitor to the Kruger National Park learns from Maclean (1985) of a ‘rare’ yellow-headed 
variant of the black-collared barbet, usually red headed. Subsequently, during a game 
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viewing drive, the visitor spots n = 11 birds of that species, all but one of them red-head-
ed. Modelling the number of yellow-headed individuals as a binomial count, T = 1, with 
E(T) = nθ when the population proportion of such birds is denoted by θ, the trace of the 
mental correlate of the datum count is given by:
[(1-θ)11, 10(1-θ)11-1θ1, 1-(1-θ)11-10(1-θ)11-1θ1] for 0 < θ < 1.
When θ increases from zero, we find the index being bounded from below at round about 
θ = 0.0037, 0.0056, 0.0076, the corresponding levels attained by the trace being:
(0.960, 0.036, 0.004), (0.940, 0.053, 0.007), (0.920, 0.070, 0.010), respectively.
For comparison to Example 2.4.3, note that here ε+V = 0.04, 0.06, 0.08, respectively. The 
quality of fit steadily improves as θ increases, until the best-fitting models are found at 
round about θ = 0.097, at which point the mental correlate is being placed at:
(0.326, 0.350, 0.324) in the test distribution.
Thereafter the quality of fit deteriorates as θ increases, until we find the index being bounded 
from above at about θ = 0.32, 0.34, 0.39, the corresponding levels attained by the trace being:
(0.01, 0.07, 0.92), (0.01, 0.05, 0.94), (0.01, 0.03, 0.96), respectively.
For comparison to Example 2.4.3, note that here U+ε = 0.08, 0.06, 0.04, respectively.
Comparison of Examples 2.4.3 and 2.6.1
In both examples the elimination quantity used is the total number of successes in just 
n = 11 Bernoulli trials, but the results are two very different traces. In Example 2.4.3 the 
tests are inherently one sided, as the co-ordinates of the mental correlate of the test 
datum T = 0 range from just right of (Ø, 1, 0) to just left of (Ø, 0, 1) when θ ranges from 
just more than θ = 0 to just less than θ = 1. So, as large rounding fails to provide informa-
tive directions to just where within the test distribution the mental correlate of the test 
datum is to be found, an informative co-ordination can here only take the form:
(Ø, 1-V, V) for small 1-V, thus pointing at smaller values of θ.
In Example 2.6.1, however, the tests are inherently two sided, as the co-ordinates of the 
mental correlate of the test datum T = 1 range from just right of (1, 0, 0) to just left of 
(0, 0, 1) when θ ranges from just more than θ = 0 to just less than θ = 1. So in that exam-
ple an extreme co-ordination can take one of the two different forms:
(U, ε, 1-ε-U) for small U and ε, thus pointing at smaller values of θ, or
(1-ε-V, ε, V) for small ε and V, thus pointing at larger values of θ.
Instead of describing a trace as an inherently one-sided trace, let us rather describe it 
as a unilateral trace, as that is more concise and (more importantly) helps to combat 
the importation of inappropriate ideas from the theory of hypothesis testing. So let us 
avoid the terms ‘one-sided’ and ‘two-sided’ and, instead using the terms unilateral and 
bilateral, respectively, defined as in Definition 2.6.1.
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Definition 2.6.1:
Let a real-world data set bring into the human mind a well-conceived elimination quantity for θ, the index of a 
suite of hypothesised models. Let θ range over an ordered space. Consider the trace of the mental correlate of 
the test datum.
If every term of the trace points at θ larger than the hypothesised value, we call the trace a lower-bounding 
unilateral trace. Such a trace comprises an array of lower-bounding unilateral tests of co-ordination.
If every term of the trace points at θ smaller than the hypothesised value, we call the trace an upper-bounding 
unilateral trace. Such a trace comprises an array of upper-bounding unilateral tests of co-ordination.
If there exists θ1, θ2, θ1 ≤ θ2, such that for any hypothesised value < θ2 the trace points at θ larger than that value, 
and for any hypothesised value > θ1 the trace points at θ smaller than that value, we call the trace a bilateral 
trace. Such a trace comprises an array of bilateral tests of co-ordination.
In Examples 2.4.3 and 2.6.1 the traces are unilateral and bilateral, respectively, owing 
to the particular data involved despite arising from the selfsame test statistic. In other 
cases such distinctions may be owing to the test statistic. In Table 2.3.4 for instance, we 
find a unilaterally lower-bounding trace arising from the X
(1) test statistic, and a unilat-
erally upper-bounding trace arising from the X
(3) test statistic, where that would be the 
case for any appropriate data. Again, at (2.4.3) we find a formula for a bilateral trace, no 
matter what appropriate data might be under consideration. In the case of the trace ap-
pearing in Table 2.3.5, the foregoing definition is not applicable, as the index in that case 
ranges over the unordered set of identities given at (2.3.7). Definition 2.6.2 now arises. 
Definition 2.6.2:
Let a real-world data set bring into the human mind a well-conceived elimination quantity T(θ) for θ, the index 
of a suite of hypothesised models. Let θ range over an ordered space. Consider the trace of the mental correlate 
of the test datum.
If the trace is a lower-bounding unilateral trace, regardless of the value of the test datum, we call T(θ) a strictly 
lower-bounding elimination quantity.
If the trace is an upper-bounding unilateral trace, regardless of the value of the test datum, we call T(θ) a strictly 
upper-bounding elimination quantity.
If the trace is a bilateral trace, regardless of the value of the test datum, we call T(θ) a bilateral elimination 
quantity.
In this definition, as in the previous definition, the phrase ‘elimination quantity’ may of 
course be replaced by the phrase ‘elimination pivot’.
2.7 Some principles of shortfall testing
In this section we develop a platform from which we can, in the next section, remove 
certain sources of possible confusion arising from the literature on Dunnett’s many–
one-t statistic. Here it will suffice to consider that statistic in the case of a known error 
variance, which can be formulated very simply, as follows: let a real-world data set, 
{x1, x2, x3, …, xk}
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comprising the yields of k different entries in a yield trial, bring into the human mind a 
corresponding set of independently and continuously distributed random variables:
{X1, X2, X3, …., Xk}
with corresponding density functions:
{f1(x1-µ1), f2(x2-µ2), f3(x3-µ3), …, fk(xk-µk)} (2.7.1)
fully specified apart from being indexed by corresponding location parameters:
{µ1, µ2, µ3, …, µk}, for -∞ < µ1, µ2, µ3, …, µk < +∞.
We wish to test whether or not any particular entry may be lower than best, where it will 
be convenient to label that particular entry as Entry 1. The apparent shortfall of Entry 
1 is calculated as:
xmax •1-x1 in the notation of Example 2.3.4.
Conceptual calculations bring into the human mind a corresponding random variable:
Xmax •1-X1.
Consider the statistical co-ordinates that direct us to just where within the Xmax •1-X1 dis-
tribution the mental correlate of the xmax •1-x1 datum is to be found. For the present pur-
poses we may consider a near-to-zero statistical rounding. The right co-ordinate then 
suffices to provide the required directions and is given by:
Pr(Xmax •1-X1 > xmax •1-x1) = 1-Pr(Xmax •1-X1 ≤ xmax •1-x1). (2.7.2)
The expression on the right is spelled out more explicitly as:
1-Pr(Xj-X1 ≤ xmax •1-x1 for all of j = 2, 3, 4, …, k). (2.7.3)
As X1, X2, X3, …, Xk are independently distributed, their joint density is given by: 
            
k
∏ fj(xj-mj). (2.7.4) 
j=1
Consider the transformation:
X1-µ1 = Y and Xj-X1 = Yj for j = 2, 3, 4, …, k
and the corresponding notations:
(x1-µ1) = y and (xj-x1) = yj for j = 2, 3, 4, …, k.
The Jacobian of the transformation equals unity. So, owing to the identity:
xj-µj = (xj-x1)+(x1-µ1)+µ1-µj = yj+y+µ1-µj,
it follows from the expression at (2.7.4) that the joint density function of Y and Yj for 
j = 2, 3, 4, …, k is given by:
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k
f1(y)×   ∏ fj(yj+y+m1-mj) . (2.7.5) 
            j=2
It also follows from the equation at (2.7.2) and the expression at (2.7.3) that:
Pr(Xmax •1-X1 > xmax •1-x1) = 1-Pr(Yj ≤ xmax •1-x1 for all of j = 2, 3, 4, …, k) (2.7.6)
Let the cumulative distribution functions corresponding to the density functions at 
(2.7.1) be denoted by:
{F1(x1-µ1), F2(x2-µ2), F3(x3-µ3), …, Fk(xk-µk)}. (2.7.7)
Then it follows from the expression at (2.7.5) and the equation at (2.7.6) that: 
                                                         
+∞  k
Pr(Xmax •1-X1 > xmax •1-x1) = 1-   ∫    ∏  Fj [(xmax •1-x1)+y+(m1-mj)]d F1(y). (2.7.8) 
                                              -∞  j=2
Example 2.4.4 introduced the notion of the substitution value of an entry under test 
as being the gain or loss in yield potential, should that entry be substituted for its un-
known ‘best’ competitor. Define:
µmax •1 as the largest value in the set of mean values {µ2, µ3, µ4, …, µk}. (2.7.9)
Then the substitution value of Entry 1 is given by ∆1 as defined by:
µ1 = µmax •1+∆1.
If ∆1 > 0, Entry 1 is a sole best entry.
If ∆1 = 0, Entry 1 is one of two or more best entries.
If ∆1 < 0, Entry 1 is lower than best.
The right-hand side of the equation at (2.7.8) can now be expressed as: 
               
+∞   k
1-  ∫     ∏ F
j
 [y+(xmax •1-x1)+∆1+(mmax •1-mj)]d F1(y), (2.7.10) 
    -∞  j=2
this being the right statistical co-ordinate directing us to just where in the Xmax •1 − X1 
distribution the mental correlate of the xmax •1-x1 datum is to be found.
Before proceeding further, it must be underscored that the derivation of the co-ordinate 
in (2.7.10) is mathematically correct beyond any reasonable contest. This is important, 
as we will have to concern ourselves with different interpretations of the result. So, note 
that the derivation is by a well-known method for obtaining the distributions of order-
statistical quantities. In fact, the mathematical result as such has in one form or another 
appeared in the statistical literature for close on a half a century. In the form given here, 
it goes back at least as far as Gupta (1965).
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Now, in order to grasp what the co-ordinate tells us, three facts must be borne in mind:
(1) xmax •1-x1 is a constant and y is a bound variable at (2.7.10), whereas the values 
the co-ordinate may take, depend on disposable variables only with the dispos-
able variables being the substitution value of the entry under test ∆1 and the 
nuisance parameters (mmax •1-mj) for j = 2, 3, 4, …, k.
(2) (mmax •1-mj) ≥ 0 for all of j = 2, 3, 4, …, k, owing to the definition in (2.7.9).
(By the way, mmax •1 does not denote the expected value of Xmax •1.)
(3) The functions defined at (2.7.7) are distribution functions, and any distribu-
tion function is non-decreasing. So, the term on the right at (2.7.10) will decrease, 
thus causing the value of the co-ordinate to increase whenever the value of any 
one or more of the disposable variables decreases, and vice versa.
It appears at once from the expression given at (2.7.10) that if, for any specified substitu-
tion value ∆10 we wish to test:
M0: ∆1 = ∆10 versus M1: ∆1 > ∆10,
the leftmost of the possible values of the hypothesised right co-ordinate arises when 
the values of all of the k-1 nuisance parameters are zero (as small as possible). So, the 
leftmost right co-ordinate is obtained from the result at (2.7.10) and given by:
               
+∞  k
1-  ∫    ∏   F
j
 [y+(xmax •1-x1)+∆10]d F1(y), (2.7.11) 
    -∞  j=2
If this leftmost right co-ordinate is small, the actual right co-ordinate is equally small or 
smaller. And if that is judged as untenably small, the term on the right at (2.7.11) is judged 
as untenably large, implying that ∆10 is judged as untenably large. In the case of ∆10 = 0, 
that would imply that Entry 1 is judged lower than best. There is nothing whatsoever to 
prevent us from then also testing whether Entry 2 may be lower than best, whether Entry 
3 may be lower than best, whether Entry 4 may be lower than best, …, whether Entry k may 
be lower than best. We will thus obtain a trace that, like any other trace, comprises the 
outcomes of an array of different tests of co-ordination. The point here is that results of 
the kind displayed in Table 2.3.5 do not involve the notion of simultaneous statistical in-
ference. On the contrary, they are the results of separate tests of co-ordination, each test 
possessing its own integrity. This is underscored by Example 2.4.4, showing that each test 
concerns the substitution value of one particular entry only. Note for instance that when 
writing:
Xmax •1 as in the foregoing, or Xmax •Beauty as in Example 2.4.4,
the notations ‘max•1’ and ‘max•Beauty’ do not identify any of the entries under test. In-
stead, they identify certain outcomes where different entries may be involved from outcome 
to outcome. In Example 2.4.4, for instance, the mean yield identified as the ‘max•Beauty 
mean’, may be the mean of Juicy Lucy in one sample, that of Bonny Best in the next 
sample, and so forth.
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We have shown how the substitution value of Entry 1 is bounded from above by finding, 
within the Xmax •1-X1 distribution, the leftmost of those positions that may be occupied 
by the mental correlate of the xmax •1-x1 datum. We now consider whether the substitu-
tion value of Entry 1 may be bounded from below by finding, within the Xmax •1-X1 distri-
bution, the rightmost of those positions that may be occupied by the mental correlate of 
the xmax •1-x1 datum. In the case of a negligible statistical rounding, as here being consi-
dered, the expression at (2.7.10) shows that the left statistical co-ordinate directing us 
to just where in the Xmax •1-X1 distribution the mental correlate of the xmax •1-x1 datum is 
to be found, is given by
             
+∞  k
  ∫     ∏   F
j
 [y+(xmax •1-x1)+∆1+(mmax •1-mj)]d F1(y). (2.7.12) 
-∞   j=2
So the value of the rightmost left co-ordinate for any fixed value of ∆1 is obtained by 
inserting into the expression at (2.7.12) the largest possible values of the k-1 nuisance 
parameters denoted by
(mmax •1-mj) for j = 2, 3, 4 …, k.
However, as these parameters are not bounded from above, the value of the rightmost 
left co-ordinate is then vacuously given by 1 (one). The point here is simply this: the 
elimination quantities used for shortfall tests are strictly upper-bounding elimination 
quantities. Traces of the type arising from a suite of shortfall tests for the substitution 
value of any one particular entry, for instance the abbreviated traces of Example 2.4.4, 
are upper-bounding unilateral traces.
In order to relate the foregoing development to Dunnett’s many-one-t, we note 
that the ‘∞ degrees of freedom’ form of the expression at (2.3.5) is given by: 
t’ = 
X max•Beauty - X Beauty. 
           √2s2 
                  
n
Taking n = 1, s2 = 0.5, and Entry 1 = Beauty, we find
t’ = X max•1-X1, as developed in the present section.
The requisite mathematics for extending the development to any fixed-model analysis 
of variance situation, as required for Examples 2.3.5, 2.3.6 and 2.4.4, is well established. 
The reader is referred to Gupta (1965), or Gupta and Panchapakesan (1979), or, for a treat-
ment closer to the present development, Van Aarde (1994).
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2.8 Shortfall tests vis-à-vis Dunnett’s ‘multiple comparison’ 
 procedures
Often the selfsame test statistic arises in otherwise unrelated contexts, a case in point 
being Snedecor’s F statistic arising in Example 1.32.2 – an example that otherwise has 
little, if anything, in common with analysis of variance. Moreover, unrelated contexts 
may involve formal similarities that sow confusion, a case in point being widespread 
failure to grasp the distinction between significance tests and hypothesis tests. So, in 
this section, we wish to make it clear that shortfall tests, despite involving Dunnett’s 
many–one-t statistic, are not to be confused with certain procedures for ‘simultaneous 
statistical inference’ proposed by Dunnett (1955) and involving the same test statistic. 
We do so by way of two contrasting examples, followed by a comparative discussion.
Example 2.8.1
Consider the following problem in decision-making under risk: an extensive array of 
sets, each comprising a standard item, and of k-1 other items to be tested against the 
standard, is brought into the real world. The performance of each item is measured, 
and within each set of items the performance of each non-standard item (test item) is 
compared to the performance of the standard item, so as to decide whether or not that 
test item is to be accepted or rejected. To provide a concrete example, consider a large 
number of crates of fruit being taken from cold storage. Let each crate contain a fruit 
(the standard) that is inedible owing to a prior treatment that prevents further ripening, 
and k-1 edible fruits whose measured ripeness, allowing for possible measurement er-
ror, must not be more than that of the standard. Let the set of random variables:
{X1, X2, X3 …, Xk}, as defined in the previous section,
reasonably describe the real-world array of sets of measurements being made, with X1 
representing that of the standard. Then there has been brought into the real world an 
extensive array of sets of measurements, say 1 000 or some such large number of sets, 
of the form:
{xj-x1 for j = 2, 3, 4 …, k}r for r = 1, 2, 3 …, 1 000,
where these sets can be viewed as 1 000 realisations of the set of random variables:
{Xj-X1 for j = 2, 3, 4 …, k}.
Consider the case:
Xj-X1 is an N(µj-µ1, 1) random variable for each of j = 2, 3, 4 …, k.
For each fruit to be tested, the decision-maker must decide whether that fruit is:
‘not too ripe’ (accepting H0: µj-µ1 = 0), or
‘too ripe’ (accepting H1: µj-µ1 > 0).
Consider a disposable number d(γ), and an accept-reject rule of the form:
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reject H0 and accept H1 if xj-x1 ≥ d(γ)
accept H0 and reject H1 if xj-x1 < d(γ)
j = 2, 3, 4 …, k, and r = 1, 2, 3 …, 1 000
where the value of d(γ) arises by specifying the Type I error rate as:
γ = Pr[Xj-X1 ≥ d(γ) | µj-µ1 = 0], the same for all of j = 2, 3, 4, …, k.
Then, for each crate of fruit, the decision-maker performs k different hypothesis tests, 
each of size γ. The expected value of the number of fruits erroneously rejected as too 
ripe, is thereby, for the entire array of crates, specified to be γ × k × 1 000. If γ = 0.05, 
the critical value of the Xj-X1 test statistic, here an N(0,1) random variable, is given by 
d(γ) = +1.645 for each of j = 2, 3, 4, …, k.
However, as opposed to the foregoing, Dunnett (1955) has the decision-maker specify γ 
per item, such that α = 0.05 per set equals the population proportion of sets where one 
or more items are erroneously rejected. For such a specification, α = 0.05 per crate in our 
case, the value of γ per fruit in our case is approximately such that:
1-(1-γ)k = 0.05. (2.8.1)
This formula arises as follows: let the probability of not erroneously classifying a fruit 
as too ripe be:
(1-γ) for a 1st fruit, (1-γ) for a 2nd fruit, (1-γ) for a 3rd fruit, … (2.8.2)
Then, supposing for the moment that these events are statistically independent, the 
probability of not erroneously classifying any of those fruits as too ripe equals:
(1-γ) × (1-γ) × (1-γ) …
It follows that the probability of erroneously classifying one or more of those fruits as 
too ripe then equals:
1-[(1-γ) × (1-γ) × (1-γ) … ]
Thus, for example, for k = 9 , α = 0.05 when γ = 0.0057, and the critical value of the N(0, 1) 
test statistic, i.e. (X
 
j-X1) under H0, then turns out to be approximately d(α) = +2.53. This 
value is approximate, as events such as those envisaged at (2.8.2) are not statistically 
independent for fruits from the same crate. The exact critical value is given in Table 1a 
of Dunnett (1955) as d(α) = +2.42. The derivation of the approximate d(α) value has been 
given here in order to make the nature of Dunnett’s reasoning entirely clear. The deriva-
tion of the exact value is explained below. 
Dunnett (1955, p. 1096) calls the decision-making procedure we are here discussing, ‘a 
multiple comparison procedure’ because he recognises (p. 1097) that it has much in com-
mon with the so-called ‘multiple comparison procedures’ of Scheffé and Tukey (as de-
scribed by Scheffé, 1959). In Chapter 13 we will come to grips with such procedures in gen-
eral. Here we merely want to relate Dunnett’s procedure to the mathematics of shortfall 
testing, so as to make it clear that shortfall testing is not a multiple comparison procedure. 
To that end, we note that Dunnett (1955, using his Equation (4) as simplified on p. 1105) 
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develops his procedure as directed at finding a (1-α)-confidence region for the values of 
µj-µ1 for all of j = 2, 3, 4, …, k, simultaneously, as follows. Make the notation:
Z = Xj-µj, so that E(Zj) = 0, for all of j = 1, 2, 3, …, k.
Corresponding to our equations at (2.7.2) and (2.7.8) we then have: 
                                               
+∞   k
Pr[Zmax •1-Z1 ≥ d] = 1-   ∫      ∏   Fj [d+y]dF1(y) 
                                   -∞    j=2
                                        = α when d = d(α).
This can be expressed as:
1-α = Pr[Zmax •1-Z1 < d(α)]
         = Pr[Zj-Z1 < d(α) for all of j = 2, 3, 4, …, k],
which corresponds to Dunnett’s simplified version of his Equation (4). Hence, for each 
one of the 1 000 crates, we obtain lower confidence bounds for each one of the k-1 fruits 
in that crate, by means of the inequalities:
zj-z1 < d(α) for j = 2, 3, 4, …, k, respectively.
Rearranging the terms of these inequalities in more explicit form, the requisite bounds 
are found to be the left-hand sides of the k-1 inequalities:
xj-x1-d(α) < µj-µ1 for j = 2, 3, 4, …, k, respectively. (2.8.3)
We thus obtain, for each crate, a simultaneous confidence region defined by:
Lj < µj-µ1 < +∞, where Lj = xj-x1-d(α), for j = 2, 3, 4, …, k. (2.8.4)
For instance, if k = 9 and we specify α = 0.05, Dunnett’s Table 1a gives d(α) = +2.42, as 
before, and the decision rule developed in the previous paragraph is equivalent to:
Reject any given crate if and only if 0 ≤ Lj for one or more of the fruits labelled 
j = 2, 3, 4, …, k in that crate.
Example 2.8.2
Brownlee (1949) considered the throughput obtained from units of plant before failure 
through corrosion at each of three foundries (Table 2.8.1). The data prompted him to 
consider whether there was sufficient justification for ‘regarding the Foundry A pots as 
giving smaller average throughputs than those from the other foundries’ (p. 55). It appears 
at once that a shortfall test of the extent to which the Foundry A throughputs fall short 
within the group, will provide – in the form of a set of statistical co-ordinates – exactly the 
kind of measurement required for such consideration. By adapting the PROBMC function 
of SAS (1992), the mental correlate of the appropriate test datum is found to be situated at 
(0.916, ε, 0.084), or further to the right, in the many-one-t distribution.
Elimination tests
143
Table 2.8.1: Throughput recorded at three different foundries
Foundry Mean throughput Number of replicates
C 79.7 3 pots
B 78.3 9 pots
A 53.0 5 pots
Mean square between pots within foundries = 528.5 on 14 df.
Comparative discussion of Examples 2.8.1 and 2.8.2
(1) The mathematics of a shortfall test of Entry 1 (Section 2.7), and that of Dunnett’s 
procedure with Entry 1 as standard (this section), both involve the parameters:
(σ², m2-m1, m3-m1, m4-m1, …, mk-m1).
In Dunnett’s procedure, σ² is the only nuisance parameter. But in the shortfall test, the 
only parameter that is not a nuisance parameter is ∆1, i.e. the substitution value of Entry 
1, which value is a special function of:
m2-m1, m3-m1, m4-m1, …, mk-m1,
and which value is not explicitly involved by Dunnett’s procedure. So, although the hy-
pothesised models in both cases lead to the use of Dunnett’s many-one-t statistic, the 
alternatives against which the hypothesised models are being tested are different.
(2) With Entry 1 as the standard, Dunnett’s procedure explicitly involves k-1 contrasts 
amongst the entry means, these being given by:
(-1)X1+λ2X2+λ3X3+λ4X4+…+λkXk when (λ2, λ3, λ4, …, λk) equals
(1, 0, 0, … 0), (0, 1, 0, … 0), (0, 0, 1, … 0), … (0, 0, 0, … 1). (2.8.5)
A shortfall test of Entry 1 explicitly involves just one contrast amongst the entry means, 
this being given by:
(-1)X1+δ2jX2+δ3jX3+δ4jX4+…+δkjXk when j labels Xmax•1, and δij is
Kronecker’s delta, i.e. δij = 1 when i = j, and δij = 0 when i ≠ j. (2.8.6)
At (2.8.5) the coefficients of X2, X3, X4, …, Xk are specified constants not depending on 
the sample values. In (2.8.6) the coefficients of X2, X3, X4, … Xk are the values of random 
variables arising from the sample values.
(3) In Dunnett’s procedure, the error rate α, or the corresponding confidence coefficient 
1-α, can only be meaningful in repetitive testing, as in say 1 000 repetitions. It would be 
meaningless to speak of a rate with reference to a single item, such as one crate. For just 
a single crate we could either have made the correct decision (‘α = 0’ so to speak) or we 
could have made the wrong decision (‘α = 1’ so to speak). But to speak of an error rate of 
α = 0.05 with reference to just one, isolated decision is nonsense. In contrast, shortfall 
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testing is not repetitive, it does not involve the notion of an error rate, and it does not 
lead to a decision. In Example 2.8.2 for instance, there is no repetitive testing, there is 
no error rate involved, and the test does not lead to a decision; it leads to a conclusion in 
the sense of a fact, which fact is the following:
The mental correlate of the many-one-t value for foundry A is situated rather far 
down at (0.916, ε, 0.084) or further down in the right-hand tail of the hypothesised 
distribution. So, by the test performed, the hypothesised model M0: ‘The foundry 
A population mean does not fall short within the group’, fits the data awkwardly. 
Whereas, by the same test, instances of the alternative model, M1: ‘The foundry A 
population mean falls short within the group’, would fit the data well. (2.8.7)
This is just a fact and is not in any way prescriptive; the investigator must consider it in 
conjunction with other facts. Was the layout of foundry A ergonomically inferior to the 
layouts of B and C? Were the pots at foundry A inferior to those at B and C? If so, the fact 
cited at (2.8.7) may strengthen the investigator’s opinion that foundry A is of inferior 
type. However, it may be that the investigator finds nothing to explain the awkward fit 
reported at (2.8.7), in which case the investigator might be of the opinion that the ob-
served co-ordination is extreme by mere coincidence. After all, the hypothesised model 
recognises the possibility of such coincidence.
(4) Dunnett’s procedure involves a control and other entries (Example 2.8.1), whereas a 
shortfall test need not involve a control (Example 2.8.2). Moreover, when shortfall test-
ing does involve a control, the natural question to be addressed for the purposes of data 
analysis is not the one that Dunnett would have us address (Example 2.3.6).
(5) Dunnett (1955) also developed two-sided confidence limits for the expected values of the 
k-1 differences arising at (2.8.5). In contrast, we found in Section 2.7 that the elimi nation 
quantities involved by shortfall testing are strictly upper-bounding elimination quantities.
Recall a passing remark at the end of Example 2.3.6. Clearly, shortfall testing provides 
the data analyst with a very useful tool. Yet most statisticians seem to be unaware of 
such tests. They are not found in Snedecor and Cochran (1989), despite many examples 
where their use would be appropriate. Other authors, such as Steel and Torrie (1980), 
present the many–one-t statistic as if it were of no more use than being part and parcel 
of Dunnett’s multiple comparison procedure. It is therefore important to grasp that 
shortfall testing is not a multiple comparison procedure.
2.9 A destructive prescription revisited
In Section 1.21 we saw, in the context of commencement testing, that inappropriate 
importation of certain ideas, from hypothesis testing into data analysis, results in a nor-
mative prescription with destructive consequences. In this section we display, in the 
context of elimination testing, further examples of such destruction. Recall that the 
essence of the normative prescription is embodied by the following rules:
(1) Let SL denote the significance level attached to given data by a significance 
test of a hypothesised model M0 against an alternative M1.
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(2) Specify a test size α, which is a small fraction selected without reference to the 
data. A much favoured value is α = 0.05.
(3) If SL ≤ α, reject M0 and accept M1. If SL > α, accept M0 and reject M1.
We begin with an example that displays destruction of statistical evidence, followed by 
two examples that display destruction of substantive evidence.
Example 2.9.1
A randomised block design was used to compare the tolerance of six different kinds of 
rootstock to waterlogged conditions. Each plot comprised a waterlogged plant and an 
own control. Response, per plot, was measured as total shoot length of the own control 
minus that of the waterlogged plant, relative to that from the own control. Three plots 
were lost owing to rootstocks that failed to take root. Table 2.9.1 displays a suite of short-
fall tests on the responses.
Table 2.9.1: Shortfall tests for elimination of root-stocks that are ‘lower than best’ in respect of 
toleration of waterlogged conditions
Root-stock No. of replicates Mean Many-one-t Co-ordinates
A: Red leaf prunus 1 5 -46.49
B: Peach-almond 5 -58.36 1.0929 (0.606; 0.394)
C: Red leaf prunus 2 5 -60.82 1.3194 (0.700; 0.300)
D: Red leaf prunus 3 4 -68.14 1.8794 (0.874; 0.126)
E: Red leaf prunus 4 5 -72.34 2.3801 (0.945; 0.055)
F: Peach 3 -85.20 3.0866 (0.988; 0.012)
Error mean square = 294.9 on 17 degrees of freedom
As ‘lowest is best’ in this example, the sign of each treatment mean is reversed and then 
tested as if ‘highest is best’. The evidence points strongly at F as lower than best, and points 
less strongly at E as also lower than best. In order to see that it is impossible to convey this 
by way of just one single cut-off, note that for each member of the suite of tests, the right 
statistical co-ordinate is interpretable as a significance level subject to negligible round-
ing. The cut-off for a corresponding hypothesis test of size α is then given by:
Accept as lower than best if and only if SL ≤ α, and not so if SL > α.
Two widely favoured test sizes are α = 0.01 and α = 0.05. But let us for good measure also 
consider α = 0.075.
If α = 0.01 is specified, the result is:
None of the six entries are lower than best. (2.9.1)
If α = 0.05 is specified, the result is:
F is lower than best. The other five entries are not lower than best. (2.9.2)
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If α = 0.075 is specified, the result is:
F and E are lower than best. The other four entries are not lower than best. (2.9.3)
At (2.9.1) the poor performances of both F an E have been concealed. At (2.9.2) the poor 
performance of E has been concealed. At (2.9.3) the difference in performance of F an E 
has been concealed. In all three cases, it was also concealed whether or not the signifi-
cance level for any entry classified as not lower than best, is much larger than α rather 
than just larger than α. This is bad. Yet there is worse to come. In order to come to grips 
with that, we must first note that on the evidence conveyed by Table 2.9.1, horticultural 
opinion could hardly be divided on the following facts:
As tested, all the models with F as a best entry fit the data poorly. The same is true 
of E, though the fit is not as poor as in the case of F. With D as a best entry, the fit 
is very slightly awkward, but hardly poor. As tested, many models with A as a best 
entry, and many models with B as a best entry, fit the data well. (2.9.4)
Bear in mind that the value of α is a single specification to be made without reference 
to the data. So some advocates of the accept–reject rules recommend that, rather than 
employ the rules directly, the ‘realised’ significance levels should be reported ‘so that,’ 
they explain, ‘a recipient of the report can specify his/her own value of α’ (Wackerly, 
Mendenhall and Scheaffer 1996, p. 432). If three different members of a horticultural 
society should then specify:
α = 0.01, α = 0.05, α = 0.075, respectively, (2.9.5)
we would, instead of promoting informed opinion by way of facts arising from given 
data as at (2.9.4), be instigating a ‘scientific’ controversy by way of values specified with-
out reference to those data.
We note in passing that owing to the missing plots, the sample means for this example 
are correlated in ways that do not conform to standard facilities for shortfall testing. The 
results given in Table 2.9.1 were obtained by simulation (Sadie 1996).
Example 2.9.2
Consider an experiment concerning the use of sulphur for controlling downy mildew in 
vineyards. Suppose two methods of application and an untreated control lead to the results 
in Table 2.9.2, all applications having involved the same amounts of sulphur per plot.
Table 2.9.2: Analysis of yields from a hypothetical experiment with grape vines to compare dif-
ferent methods of applying a fixed amount of sulphur per plot
Method Mean yield Estimated effect Student’s t Co-ordinates of t in test distribution
Dusting once a week 7.96 +3.04 +2.64 (0.993, ε, 0.007)
Drifting once a week 6.91 +1.99 +1.73 (0.905, ε, 0.095)
Untreated control 4.92 – – –
Standard error of a treatment difference = 1.15 on 28 df.
Elimination tests
147
‘Drifting’ means that the dust is allowed to settle down over the plants from above. ‘Dusting’ 
(the usual procedure) means that the sulphur is forced down among the vines by a blast of 
air, where the purpose of the experiment is to establish whether or not that does make the 
application more effective. Sulphur application is known to control downy mildew, and we 
must bear in mind that a positive but weak response to sulphur might to some extent be 
masked by experimental error. So, based on the evidence presented in Table 2.9.2, it is rea-
sonable to conclude that both the sulphur treatments increased yield as expected and that, 
perhaps also as expected, dusting does seem to be more effective that drifting. However, as 
it is known that sulphur applications in limited amounts do not harm the plants, a widely 
used normative prescription would have us consider for each method:
M0: E(effect) = 0 as hypothesised model, versus M1: E(effect) > 0 as alternative,
and would then have us apply the following accept-reject rule:
If ε+V ≤ 0.05, reject M0 and accept M1. If ε+V > 0.05, accept M0 and reject M1.
This rule would have us conclude that the sulphur has a beneficial effect if applied by 
dusting, but no effect if applied by drifting, where that asks us on statistical grounds to 
draw a conclusion that on substantive grounds we believe to be fallacious. (For a real-
world example, refer to Goulden 1939, Example 34, p. 149.)
Example 2.9.3
In the arid region of South Africa known as the Great Karoo, dust devils arise in the sum-
mer heat. Let us observe just eight of them, with just one whirling anti-clockwise, and 
let us model these data as a binomial sample from a population of clockwise and anti-
clockwise winds. Then a co-ordination test with
M0: P(clockwise) = 0.5 as hypothesised model
versus
M1: P(clockwise) ≠ 0.5 as alternative
places the mental correlate of the observed number of clockwise winds at 
(0.965, 0.031, 0.004) in the test distribution.
This would point to the right in favour of the popular belief that, owing to the rotation 
of the earth round its own axis, such winds more often than not whirl anti-clockwise in 
the northern hemisphere, and clockwise in the southern hemisphere. However, we may 
well be sceptical of such mechanics, and consider the following model instead. As the 
sun beats down, the temperature over certain terrain, say a patch of bare earth, rises to 
a higher level than that over surrounding parts shaded by plant cover. Hot air thus rises 
from the bare patch and cooler air is drawn in from surrounding parts, resulting in an 
unstable equilibrium. Subsequently, the equilibrium is destabilised by some or other co-
incidence – by the flight of a bird, or by the shape of a bush, or by the disturbance of some 
dry leaves – and so a dust devil whirls into being. Thus, owing to the coincidental nature of 
the destabilising cause, there is then no reason to expect that the two different directions 
of whirl occur in unequal proportions. So a normative prescription such as
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‘If and only if ε+V ≤ 0.05, reject M0 and accept the rotational mechanics’
would have us reject a model we believe to be correct, and have us accept a model we 
suspect of being ill-conceived. So again, as in the previous example, insistence on the 
normative prescription would have us on statistical ground draw a conclusion that on 
substantive ground we believe to be fallacious.
Discussion of Examples 2.9.1, 2.9.2 and 2.9.3
These examples show that the use of accept–reject rules based on fixed cut-offs selected 
without reference to the data, leads to two difficulties:
(1) It might happen that the data strongly point at a possibility to which, for good 
reasons based on other considerations, we are unwilling to grant credence.
(2) It might happen that the data weakly point at a possibility to which, for good 
reasons based on other considerations, we are willing to grant credence.
Difficulty (1) is uncommon, as it arises from coincidence. Difficulty (2) is common, as it 
arises from the limitations of finite data. In neither case, however, can there be any merit 
in arguments that would refuse us the right to try to recognise such cases by way of sci-
entific reasoning that takes into account facts not arising from the numerical data under 
analysis. In other words, statistical epistemology based on the notion that, in respect of 
the subject matter under investigation, a substantive investigator is entirely ignorant be-
yond the numerical data being subjected to scrutiny, is arrant nonsense. It is a sad state of 
affairs that this has not been understood in much, even most, of the statistical literature.
2.10 On a notion of objectivity
Sometimes prescriptions that are formally similar to those discussed in the previous 
section are advanced on the ground of promoting ‘objectivity’. And perhaps that is what 
motivated Fisher (1926, p. 504) to recommend as follows:
‘Personally, the writer prefers to set a low standard of significance at the 5 per cent 
point, and ignore entirely all results which fail to reach this level.’ (2.10.1)
This is puzzling, as Fisher liked to calculate the value of a significance level, and it is 
difficult to imagine him drawing such a vast distinction between a level of 0.049 and 
one of 0.051. The recommendation was, however, not intended to provide a forecasted 
Type I error rate of 0.05, as Fisher (1973, p. 47) makes entirely clear when he explains that 
significance tests:
‘… do not generally lead to any probability statements about the real world’.
He therefore wants to point at solitary data sets in the real world, and to employ signifi-
cance tests to test, for their tenability, explanatory populations brought into the human 
mind. So it is difficult to interpret the rule introduced at (2.10.1) as directed at anything 
else than promoting objectivity. Be that as it may, we consider, by way of the following 
example, whether or not such a rule would in fact promote objectivity.
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Example 2.10.1
In 1764 Arthur Young drew seven paired comparisons between the profit per acre (in pounds 
sterling) from wheat when broadcasting the seed (old husbandry) and drilling the seed 
in rows (new husbandry). His data are reproduced in Table 2.10.1. In modern terms, the 
Table 2.10.1: Difference (drilled vs. broadcasted), in profit per acre (Young 1771)
Field No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Difference -0.3 -0.3 -2.3 -0.7 +1.7 -2.2 -3.0
Total: -7.1; Standard deviation: 1.607
treatments were replicated in seven blocks, each block comprising a pair of plots with 
‘the soil exactly the same in both’. Let us model the treatment differences as a sample 
from an N(µ, σ²) population (-∞ < µ < +∞, 0< σ² < +∞). The datum mean difference 
(drilling minus broadcasting) is -1.01, whose estimated standard error is 0.6074 on 6 df. 
Using Student’s t to test:
M0: µ = 0 versus M1: µ ≠ 0
the test datum is t = -1.663 on 6 df., whose mental correlate is situated at:
(0.072, ε, 0.928) in Student’s test distribution.
Consider the normative prescriptions:
If U+ε ≤ 0.075, reject M0 and accept the old way as better.
If ε+V ≤ 0.075, reject M0 and accept the new way as better.
These prescriptions would have us conclude (decide) that the old way is better, but do 
we believe that? Are we being ‘subjective’ when we suspect that the given data set is 
misleading? Drilling clearly intends to provide for an even dispersion of seed and for 
planting at a given depth. So it is difficult to believe that drilling, correctly applied, can 
lead to a decrease in yield. And, inasmuch as the normative prescriptions would have us 
ignore that, the prescriptions would be better described as promoting obstinacy rather 
than promoting objectivity. It would surely be better for agronomic opinion to reserve 
judgement till better informed by further experimentation.
2.11 Normative prescriptions as comfortable recipes
It is worth noting that the problem of normative prescriptions is aggravated in part by 
the attraction of cut-and-dry decision rules, i.e. it being easier to decide than to think.
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2.12 Scientific data analysis in case of elimination testing
We have challenged the reader to note that in the development of elimination tests our 
reasoning is a seamless continuation of the reasoning that was previously employed in 
the development of commencement tests. So, inasmuch as Section 1.31 underlined the 
analytic nature of that reasoning in the context of commencement testing, the reader 
is challenged to note how the following example underlines the same analytic nature of 
the reasoning in wider context. The example also serves as a platform for a number of 
developments in subsequent sections.
Example 2.12.1
Snedecor (1956, p. 332) gives the gains in weight (grams) of 60 male rats in a feeding 
experiment for comparison of a 3×2 factorial array of rations. Each ration was fed to ten 
replicate rats in a completely randomised design. The rations comprised:
3 sources of protein (beef, cereal, pork)×2 levels of protein (high, low).
Tables 2.12.1 and 2.12.2 give the gains in weight and certain ‘summary statistics’.
We present an appropriate analysis of these data using analytic tests of co-ordination.
To begin with we analyse the six-fold compound class characteristic by performing three 
different commencement tests, one for skewness, one for non-normal kurtosis and one 
for heterogeneity of variance, as follows.
Using a transformation described by D’Agostino (1970), the six Pearson measures of com-
ponent skewness given in Table 2.12.2 are transformed to the six N(0, 1²) values denoted 
by Z1 in that table. In order to test the six-fold compound class characteristic for shared 
skewness, the latter values are gathered into a single degree of freedom in the form of the 
further N(0, 1²) value given by:
(-1.322-0.792+0.000-1.400-0.288+0.933)÷√6 = -1.172, (2.12.1)
whose mental correlate in the human mind is found to be situated at:
(0.12, ε, 0.88) in the test distribution. (2.12.2)
The hypothesised symmetry of the compound class characteristic, thus tested, fits the 
given data well.
Using a table obtained via statistical simulation by D’Agostino and Tietjen (1971) the six 
Pearson measures of component kurtosis given in Table 2.12.2 are transformed to statisti-
cal co-ordinates and via those co-ordinates to the six N(0, 1²) values denoted by Z2 in Table 
2.12.2. In order to test the six-fold compound class characteristic for shared non-normal 
kurtosis, the latter values are gathered into a single degree of freedom in the form of the 
further N(0, 1²) value given by:
(-0.432+0.860+0.860+0.269-0.813+0.169)÷√6 = +0.373,
whose mental correlate in the human mind is found to be situated at:
(0.65, ε, 0.35) in the test distribution. (2.12.3)
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Table 2.12.1: Weight gains of 60 rats on different rations comprising 3 × 2 factorial combinations, 
each ration was fed to ten replicate rats in a completely randomised design. The treat-
ment combinations comprised three protein sources at two different levels.
Source Level Gains in weight (grams) Mean
Beef High  73  102  118  104  81  107  100  87  117  111  100.0
Cereal High  98  74  56  111  95  88  82  77  86  92  85.9
Pork High  94  79  96  98  102  102  108  91  120  105  99.5
Beef Low  90  76  90  64  86  51  72  90  95  78  79.2
Cereal Low  107  95  97  80  98  74  74  67  89  58  83.9
Pork Low  49  82  73  86  81  97  106  70  61  82  78.7
Table 2.12.2: Moments round the mean and derived quantities for weight gains of replicate rats 
for 3 × 2 treatment combinations in a completely randomised design
Protein source Beef Cereal Pork Beef Cereal Pork
Protein level High High High Low Low Low
         
1
 
m2 =    ∑ (x-x)2 
         
n 206.20 203.09 107.25 173.56 222.09 246.41
         
1
 
m3 =    ∑ (x-x)3 
         
n -1 624.80 -1 060.57 -1.50 -1 830.74 -532.27 -563.90
         
1
 
m4 =    ∑ (x-x)4 
         
n 8 9613.4 125 242.3 36 572.4 79 385.3 92 057.5 155 373.2
√b1 =      
m3  
          m2√m2 -0.54874 -0.36644 -0.00135 -0.8006 -0.16082 -0.14579
Z1 -1.3225 -0.7923 0.0000 -1.4000 -0.2876 +0.9326
b2 =   
m4  
        (m2)2
2.108 3.037 3.179 2.635 1.866 2.559
U for b2 0.333 0.805 0.805 0.606 0.208 0.567
Z2 for U -0.432 +0.860 +0.860 +0.269 -0.813 +0.169
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The hypothesised normal kurtosis of the compound class characteristic, thus tested, fits 
the given data well.
The standard test for heterogeneity of variance, introduced by Bartlett (1937), is very sensitive 
to non-normality (Box 1953). An alternative test, by Levene, is insensitive to non-normality 
(Snedecor and Cochran 1989, p. 252). Levene replaces the given data with the absolute values 
of the corresponding residuals and performs the analysis of variance and omnibus F test for 
between-group differences. The F value obtained is the test datum. Its mental counterpart, 
under the hypothesised model of homogeneity of variance, is approximately distributed 
as Snedecor’s central F. In the present case the analysis in Table 2.12.3 is obtained, and the 
Table 2.12.3: Analysis of variance of absolute residuals (Levene’s test)
Source of variation df. Sum of squares Mean square F value
Between groups 6-1 171.229 34.246 0.4778
Within groups 6(10-1) 3870.440 71.675
Total 60-1 4041.669
mental correlate of the datum F in the human mind is found to be situated at: 
(0.21, ε, 0.79) in Snedecor’s central F distribution. (2.12.4)
The hypothesised homogeneity of variance of the compound class characteristic, thus 
tested, fits the given data well.
Note that if xij denotes the j
th gain from the ith treatment, x
i•
 denotes the mean gain from 
the i th treatment, and s the estimated error standard deviation, then a realisation of the 
compound class characteristic, untrammelled by the members of the class, is given by 
the standardised residuals:
(xij-xi•)÷s, i = 1, 2, 3, …, 6, j = 1, 2, 3, …, 10. (2.12.5)
Inasmuch as the realised value of each one of the three test statistics used at (2.12.2), 
(2.12.3) and (2.12.4) can be calculated from these residuals, each of the three tests thus 
performed is by Definition1.15.1 a commencement test.
We now wish to consider certain elimination tests. For that purpose, beef, cereal and 
pork are denoted by B, C and P, respectively, high and low by H and L, respectively, and 
the population means and error variance as:
m
BH
, mCH, mPH, mBL, mCL, mPL and σ², respectively. (2.12.6)
Interest then concerns the tenable values of seven different contrasts of the form:
l
BH
m
BH
+lCHmCH+lPHmPH+lBLmBL+lCLmCL+lPLmPL (2.12.7)
arising when the l’s are specified as in Table 2.12.4, where for instance the contrast 
numbered ‘1’ in that table arises as:
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[(+½) m
BH
+(0)mCH+(-½) mPH]-[(+½) mBL+(0)mCL+(-½) mPL].
Table 2.12.4: Contrasts of interest in comparison of mean weight gains of rats fed 6 different rations 
comprising a 3×2 factorial array of treatment combinations
Protein source Beef Cereal Pork Beef Cereal Pork
Protein level High High High Low Low Low
1 Beef vs pork × high vs low +½ 0 -½ -½ 0 +½
2 Beef vs pork +½ 0 -½ +½ 0 -½
3 Beef vs pork (both high) +1 0 -1 0 0 0
4 Beef vs pork (both low) 0 0 0 +1 0 -1
5 Meat vs cereal × high vs low +¼ -½ +¼ -¼ +½ -¼
6 Meat vs cereal (both high) +½ -1 +½ 0 0 0
7 Meat vs cereal (both low) 0 0 0 +½ -1 +½
Error variance estimate: 10.697 on 66 df.
Each of the seven quantities thus defined is a contrast amongst the treatment effects, as 
the sum of the  values = 0 in each case. Denote the sample means and error variance as:
X
BH
, XCH, XPH, XBL, XCL, XPL, and S², respectively,
where any population contrast defined at (2.12.7) is estimated by the corresponding 
sample contrast, i.e. by:
l
BH
 X
BH
+lCH XCH+lPH XPH+lBL XBL+lCL XCL+lPL XPL. (2.12.8)
In Table 2.12.4, each of seven contrasts is expressed on single-plot basis, that is to say, as:
a mean per plot – another mean per plot,
the sum of the positive l values and the sum of the negative l values being equal to +1 and 
-1, respectively. This enables comparison of the precision of different sample contrasts 
considered as estimates of the corresponding population contrasts because the estimated 
standard error of the expression at (2.12.8), considered as an estimate of the correspond-
ing expression at (2.12.7), is given by:
S × √D, where             n
S denotes the error standard deviation,
D denotes the sum of squares of the l’s,
n denotes the number of replications (n = 10 replications in our case), and
for the seven contrasts numbered 1, 2, 3, …, 7 in Table 2.12.4,
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√D = √1  , √1  , √2  , √2  , √3   , √3   , √3   , respectively. (2.12.9)       n           n          n          n          n         4n          2n         2n
The minimal sufficient statistic for:
G = l
BH
m
BH
+lCHmCH+lPHmPH+lBLmBL+lCLmCL+lPLmPL
is given by {C, S²}, where:
C = l
BH
X
BH
+lCHXCH+lPHXPH+lBLXBL+lCLXCL+lPLXPL.
So, an appropriate elimination quantity for G is given by:
Student’s t = (C-G)÷(S×√D). (2.12.10)                                              n
The resulting elimination tests can in fact not reasonably be improved upon, as they 
provide what statistical jargon describes as:
‘most separating similar regions tests of co-ordination, uniformly so over all pairs 
of G values, and invariably so over all levels of elimination’, where that holds for any 
solitary real-world data set of the form (C, S) = (c, s), given the class of models.
Substantive considerations together with inspection of the means given in Table  2.12.1, 
then suggest that gains from beef vs. pork might be the same for high and low, and (also) 
might sum to zero. That is to say, it is suggested that a tenable class of models might be 
obtained when:
[+½] m
BH
+(0)mCH+[-½]mPH+[-½]mBL+(0)mCL+[+½]mPL
and also
[+½]m
BH
+(0)mCH+[-½]mPH+[+½]mBL+(0)mCL+[-½]mPL
are both hypothesised as equal to zero. (2.12.11)
Here the first hypothesised class comprises all the initial models with zero interaction of 
beef vs. pork × high vs. low, and the second hypothesised class comprises all the initial 
models with zero main effect of beef vs. pork. The communality of these two classes is the 
hypothesised class comprising all initial models with expected gains the same from beef 
as from pork. By testing the pair of values hypothesised at in (2.12.11), the corresponding 
pair of datum values of Student’s t, as defined at (2.12.10), are found to be 0.000 and 0.108 
both on 54 df., whose mental correlates are situated in Student’s test distribution at: 
(0.500, ε, 0.500) and (0.543, ε, 0.457), respectively. (2.12.12)
Thus tested, the values hypothesised at (2.12.11) fit the given data well, where that im-
plies that to distinguish between beef and pork is superfluous here, that is to say, implies 
that the simple effects numbered 3 and 4 in Table 2.12.4 are satisfactorily modelled as 
zero. This raises a question:
Why reason in terms of the implication? Why not test directly whether the two 
simple effects are zero? (2.12.13)
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We reply:
Two such tests would be less separating than those reported at (2.12.12); this ap-
pears at once by inspection of the values listed at (2.12.9). (2.12.14)
In Section 2.14 we return to this point.
Further analysis is straightforward. Using Student’s t, as defined at (2.12.10), to test wheth-
er or not the contrast numbered 5 in Table 2.12.4 may be modelled as equal to zero, the 
datum value of t is found to be 2.343 on 54 df., whose mental correlate is situated at: 
(0.989, ε, 0.011) in Student’s test distribution. (2.12.15)
So, a tenable class of models would require non-zero interaction of meat vs. cereal × 
level of protein. More specifically, it would require the simple effect of meat vs. cereal 
at the high level of protein to be substantially larger than the corresponding simple ef-
fect at the low level of protein. In fact, using Student’s t as defined at (2.12.10), to test 
whether these two simple effects (numbered 6 and 7 in Table 2.12.4) might be modelled 
as each being equal to zero, the datum values of t are found to be 2.441 and -0.872 both 
on 54 df., whose mental correlates are situated in Student’s distribution at: 
(0.991, ε, 0.009) and (0.194, ε, 0.806), respectively. (2.12.16)
So, at first it might well seem that any tenable class of models would have a positive 
simple effect at the high level, and a zero simple effect at the low level. However, on sec-
ond thoughts a more tenable class of models would have positive simple effects at both 
levels, but would have the effect at the low level of being too small to have been detected 
(Cf. Examples 2.9.2 and 2.9.3).
The reader will note that in the case of elimination testing the data-analytic approach is facili-
tated by the possibility of expressing different questions in parametric terms. In the present 
example for instance the elimination tests deal with questions such as: ‘Is there non-zero in-
teraction of such-and such kind?’ ‘If so, is there such-and-such a non-zero simple effect?’ And 
so on. For each question in turn, the minimal sufficient statistic for the parameter involved is 
made to address the corresponding data. Thus, for instance, the minimal sufficient statistic 
for meat vs. cereal at the high protein level is given by the error variance estimate together with 
the contrast numbered 6 in Table 2.12.4, and is used at (2.12.16) to address the corresponding 
datum, without any reference whatsoever to the other six contrasts listed in Table 2.12.4, and 
without any reference whatsoever to the three class characteristics tested at (2.12.2), (2.12.3) 
and (2.12.4), respectively. In the case of a commencement test the selection of a minimally 
sufficient statistic for a question of interest is more subtle. Nevertheless, the principle of trying 
to achieve an analysis, here exemplified by the three commencement tests, is not to be aban-
doned. There can of course be no objection to consideration of various parametric alternatives 
to assist in the selection of commencement tests with desirable separating characteristics, and 
to assist toward analysing the class characteristics into different subsidiary characteristics – as 
long as we clearly understand that in actual practice we can never have a system of parameters 
that exhausts all possible variety of how the subject matter under investigation might have 
come about, i.e. as long as we clearly understand that a realistic approach will in practice nec-
essarily involve commencement tests for which the alternatives cannot be listed exhaustively.
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2.13 In the statistical laboratory
In the previous section we analysed a class of explanatory models for Snedecor’s beef-
cereal-pork data, on the one hand into the class characteristic, and on the other hand 
into the different members of the class, the latter being indexed by a vector comprising 
the seven parameters listed at (2.12.6). With regard to the class characteristic, a further 
analysis developed three subsidiary class characteristics as tested at (2.12.2), (2.12.3) 
and (2.12.4), respectively. With regard to the members of the class, factorial analysis 
then developed five subsidiary classes, each of whose members are tested either at 
(2.12.12), or at (2.12.15), or at (2.12.16), respectively. Each of the tests results in a factual 
statement, not a probability statement. In the statistical laboratory we can demonstrate 
those facts and other related facts as follows.
Consider the test at (2.12.4): let us calculate the datum F from the residuals indicated at 
(2.12.5). Then, using the hypothesised model, let us simulate 25 000 independent sets 
of corresponding residuals to obtain 25 000 corresponding F0 values, whence the co-
ordinates at (2.12.4) are for all practical purposes obtainable as:
U = the proportion of F0 values < the datum F
ε = the proportion of F0 values = the datum F
V = the proportion of F0 values > the datum F
This conveys a fact that can be forced upon the reader’s body by a graphic display of the 
datum F in relation to the 25 000 simulated F0 values, at which we can then point and 
say: ‘See for yourself how snugly the datum F is situated within the F0 crowd.’
Again, consider the simple effect of meat vs. cereal at the high level of protein, as tested 
on the left at (2.12.16). The co-ordinates given there (0.991, ε, 0.009), convey a fact – a 
fact that can be forced upon the human body by laboratory demonstration. We can, by 
means of simulation, generate a population of the hypothesised kind, and by generating 
a sufficiently large population (numbering 25 000? 50 000? 75 000?), we can calculate, to 
any specified degree of precision, the co-ordinates of the mental correlate of the given 
datum. Thus, by pointing at a suitable display of results, we could force the human body 
to recognise a fact of poor fit. ‘See for yourself’ we would say ‘that more than 99 % of the 
population values of Student’s t are situated left of the mental correlate of the datum value 
of Student’s t’. Moreover, by similar means we can force the human body to recognise that 
when hypothesising certain non-zero values for the parameter of interest, facts of good fit 
are obtained, thereby exhibiting, as observed physical facts, the separating characteristics 
of our test in the particular case, i.e. without reference to any host of other cases.
Three important points are made here.
Firstly, any facts developed by statistical data analysis are demonstrable by laboratory 
procedure. They are of precisely the same standing as any facts (concerning particular 
cases) as might be developed in a chemical laboratory, a microbiological laboratory, or a 
metallurgical laboratory. Contrary to various deeply entrenched ideas on statistical infer-
ence, investigative statistics appropriately employed is tantamount to laboratory proce-
dure. That is not to say that its findings do not apply outside the laboratory, as in the case 
of chemistry, or of metallurgy, or of microbiology, but we must deny emphatically that 
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results of sound data analysis can at all be subject to any error. In a practical investigation 
it will be found that, for instance, an appropriate co-ordination test will often (even usu-
ally) not involve laboratory procedure directly; indirectly, however, it always relies on such 
procedure, because simulation always provides its ultimate line of defence.
Secondly, the facts in question are facts concerning a single solitary datum in the real 
world. True, simulated outcomes are also particular cases in the real world, but serve only 
to represent explanatory populations that are being brought into the human mind.
Thirdly, we make no attempt whatsoever to express the ‘probability’ of our findings as 
being erroneous or not. The notion of such a ‘probability’ is ill conceived. How does one 
attach a probability of error to a physically perceived fact – a fact that we can point out 
and of which we can say: ‘See for yourself …’? If we point and say: ‘See for yourself that 
the sunset is red’, does that involve the probability that the sunset is red? If we ‘point’ by 
saying: ‘Feel for yourself that this water is cold’, does that mean that this water is prob-
ably cold? If we ‘point’ by saying: ‘Taste for yourself; this soy sauce is salty’, what is the 
probability that the soy sauce might not be salty? If we point and say: ‘See that horse’, 
we mean that that is a horse, because if we want to say that that is possibly a horse, we 
would say: ‘That is possibly a horse.’ This point is exceedingly important, as the litera-
ture on statistical inference has largely failed to understand that statistical evidence is 
factual and so does not require the probabilistic notions that pervade that literature. 
Statistical evidence does not involve anything in the nature of taking a chance, hazard-
ing a guess, or involving a risk. A statistical laboratory is not some sort of casino of sci-
ence. Statistics is not, as a certain silly slogan would have it, ‘the science of uncertainty’; 
the concept uncertainty belongs to psychology, not to statistics.
2.14 The principle of scientific implication
If meteorology has established that certain meteorological conditions are followed by 
snow and bitterly cold winds on the high grounds of the Eastern Cape, then animal hus-
bandry must conclude that following such meteorological conditions any newly shorn 
sheep might perish on those high grounds if not brought into shelter. Again, if physics 
establishes that certain sedimentary rocks are at least six million years old, then pal-
aeontology must conclude that a fossil imbedded in those rocks is at least six million 
years old. The point here is simply that scientific knowledge cannot be divorced from 
its implications, including those in other branches of science. This must also hold for 
statistical science and, as evidenced by current statistical practice, the following two 
examples represent cases in point in that, by tacit consent, there is universal agreement 
on the part of the statistical profession.
Example 2.14.1
The results of the elimination tests we performed in Section 2.13 for Snedecor’s beef-cereal-
pork data are summarised as follows, using the ‘±’-convention for initialling standard errors:
Meat vs. cereal (both high protein): 99.8-85.9 = +13.9±5.7
Meat vs. cereal (both low protein):  79.0-83.9 = -4.9±5.7 (2.14.1)
The epistemology of statistical science
158
Consider also a formally similar but substantively very different data set adapted from 
Steel and Torrie (1980), as in Table 2.14.1. In this case there are no indications of interac-
tion, and the elimination data are effectively summarised by the contrasts ‘larboard vs. 
starboard’ and ‘decks vs. sides’, as follows:
Larb. vs. Starb.: [(10.45+10.48)÷2]-[(7.76+7.85)÷2] = +2.7±1.3
Deck vs. Side: [(10.45+7.76)÷2]-[(10.48+7.85)÷2] = -0.1±1.3 (2.14.2)
Table 2.14.1: Density data measured as observed numbers of oysters per 400 cm², located on four 
different parts of a liberty ship artificial reef off the coast of North Carolina. Here 
given as mean numbers of 12 observations per location, expressed on a scale suit-
able for an analysis of variance (Steel and Torrie 1980)
Location
Larboard Larboard Starboard Starboard
Deck Side Deck Side
Mean number 10.45 10.48 7.76 7.85
We now ask a pair of rhetorical questions.
Question 1: Consider the facts at (2.14.1) and suppose that the 30 rats assigned 
to high protein and the 30 rats assigned to low protein had been assigned the 
other way round. Would it be at all credible that instead of the facts at (2.14.1), 
our findings might then also have been the other way round, as below?
Meat vs. cereal (both high protein): 79.0-83.9 = -4.9±5.7.
Meat vs. cereal (both low protein): 99.8-85.9 = +13.9±5.7.
Question 2: Consider the facts at (2.14.2) and suppose that the ship had been situ-
ated the other way around. Would it be at all credible that instead of the results at 
(2.14.2), our findings might then also have been the other way round, as below?
Larb. vs. Starb.: [(10.45+7.76)÷2]-[(10.48+7.85)÷2] = -0.1±1.3.
Deck vs. Side: [(10.45+10.48)÷2]-[(7.76+7.85)÷2] = +2.7±1.3.
We are compelled to answer Question 1 in the negative, and Question 2 in the affirmative.
In order to answer Question 1 in the affirmative we would have to give credence to an 
incredible possibility: according to our own statistical tests it is simply incredible that 
the random assignment of 60 rats to two groups numbering 30 rats each, could so utterly 
fail to separate the causative agents of systematic variation (the effects of treatment) 
from the causative agents of statistical ‘error’ (the variance of experimental material). 
Opposed to that, we are compelled to concede that an affirmative answer to Question 2 
cannot be ruled out, as we have no shred of evidence to indicate that the classification:
(larboard, starboard) × (deck, side)
identifies the causes of the observed systematic variation. What about tidal currents? 
What about prevailing winds? What about wave action? How was the ship situated in 
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relation to the passage of the sun? How was the ship situated in relation to the coast and 
the open sea? Did starboard, larboard, prow or stern face the open sea?
The foregoing concerns a well-known distinction between the possible interpretations 
of experimental data as opposed to those of survey data. We should, however, note care-
fully that this distinction exemplifies a broader consideration that was touched upon at 
(2.12.14). Consider the following question: 
Do the gains observed in Snedecor’s beef-cereal-pork data point at any of the ex-
pected gains from the six treatment combinations being less than the highest?
Poor understanding of scientific reasoning might have us address this question ineptly 
as in Table 2.14.2 because any reasoning that appeals to Table 2.14.2 in isolation of the 
implications of the experimental procedures that lead to the numerical data involved, 
amounts to turning a blind eye to the implications of that procedure.
Table 2.14.2: Example displaying inept usage of a suite of shortfall tests
Protein source Beef Cereal Pork Beef Cereal Pork
Protein level High High High Low Low Low
Mean response  100.0  85.9  99.5  79.2  83.9  78.7
Apparent shortfall  -0.5  +14.1  +0.5  +20.8  +16.1  +21.3
Left-most co-ordinate  (•, 0.86)  (•, 0.07)  (•, 0.81)  (•, 0.01)  (•, 0.03)  (•, 0.00)
It must be firmly grasped that we statisticians have ourselves overseen the application of the 
treatment combinations so as to ensure against systematic confounding of those treatments 
with any extraneous causative agents. So, it would be self-contradictory for us to turn a blind 
eye to our understanding of the causative agents involved. We, by appropriate analysis, have 
obtained (to quote our own findings from Section 2.12) overwhelming evidence that:
‘ … a tenable class of models would require non-zero interaction of meat vs. cereal × 
level of protein and, more specifically, would require the simple effect of meat vs. cereal 
at the high level of protein to be substantially larger than the corresponding simple effect 
at the low level of protein’. 
This finding implies that the highest gains (the ‘best’ gains) arise from the high levels 
of animal protein, and also implies that at the high level of vegetable protein the gains 
are lower than ‘best’. So, inasmuch as Table 2.14.2 might be interpreted as casting doubt 
on these implications, we are compelled to choose between the factorial tests and the 
shortfall tests of Table 2.14.2, and our choice must favour the factorial analysis, not only 
because by ignoring the factorial analysis the tests in Table 2.14.2 are less efficient, but 
because it is wrong for scientific reasoning to turn a blind eye to known facts. Moreover, 
and this is the point here, those facts arise from non-statistical considerations; the tests 
in Table 2.14.2 are purely statistical, whereas our understanding of the causative agents 
that lead to the data on which those tests rely, is substantive rather than statistical. That 
is after all the crux of the distinction that we are always compelled to draw between an 
experiment and a survey.
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Example 2.14.2
Consider the co-ordination tests at (2.12.12) which, on statistical grounds, compel us to 
agree that Snedecor’s beef-cereal-pork data are satisfactorily modelled in terms of:
zero interaction of beef vs. pork × high vs. low, and
zero main effect of beef vs. pork, respectively,
and so by implication compel us to agree that those data are satisfactorily modelled in 
terms of:
expected gains that are substantially the same from beef and pork.
Here the implication is on substantive grounds, as in fact we indicated at (2.12.13) and 
(2.12.14), where we advanced good reason for an implicational deduction rather than 
employing statistical tests of the simple effects numbered 3 and 4 in Table  2.12.4, i.e. 
good reason for reasoning on substantive grounds rather than statistical grounds.
Discussion of Examples 2.14.1 and 2.14.2
We have stated that these examples represent a universal agreement. Here there is no room 
for a contrary view, as our literature contains innumerable examples of factorial experiments 
(as opposed to surveys) where such reasoning is in evidence. Thus, any attempt to deviate 
from the rule given as Theorem 2.14.1 must necessarily involve self-contradiction. 
Theorem 2.14.1 (The rule of scientific implication):
It is impossible for any valid defence of a scientific conclusion not also to be a valid defence of any of its 
implications; and it is always wrong of an investigator to turn a blind eye to such implication. In short: 
scientific knowledge cannot be compartmentalised.
We have in fact already by implication committed ourselves to this rule by way of the 
development in Section 2.9. The reader might wonder whether it is really necessary to 
formulate this rule; after all, the most fundamental method of scientific research is to 
deduce the implications of a scientific model in order to then test the model by testing 
its implications against experience. However, it will be found that statistical inference 
often overlooks this. In Chapter 13, for instance, it will be found that Theorem 2.14.1 has 
devastating consequences for simultaneous statistical inference.
2.15 The notion of probability inference
Inasmuch as co-ordination testing deliberately avoids any notion of the probability of 
its findings being erroneous or not, such testing runs counter to the main thrust of the 
received theories of statistical inference. The reasons for this will be developed fully in 
subsequent chapters. In the meantime a brief explanation of the terrible difficulties that 
beset those theories will encourage the reader to reserve judgement. So, let us consider 
the commencement tests performed at (2.12.2), (2.12.3) and (2.12.4), where we found 
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that, in respect of symmetry, kurtosis and homogeneity of variance, respectively, our 
model of the error variation, as tested, fits the given data acceptably well. Thus, if that 
acceptability is tempting us into errors, those would have to be in the nature of Type 
II errors. And, supposing then that one could somehow account for the probabilities 
of such errors, i.e. ignoring (for the moment) the moot point of whether such prob-
abilities can at all be defined meaningfully, let us denote those probabilities of skew-
ness, non-normal kurtosis and heterogeneity of variance as β1, β2, and β3, respectively. 
Consider then any one of the elimination tests subsequently developed in Section 2.12, 
for instance the test on the left at (2.12.16), which shows that any tenable model for the 
given data requires a simple effect of meat vs. cereal at the high level of protein that is 
substantially larger than zero, and let us then ask what values of that effect are tenable 
in respect of the given data. In order to address this question, a standard recipe in the 
literature of statistical inference would have us compute one or more interval estimates 
of that effect by bounding the pivotal quantity on the right-hand side of the equation at 
(2.12.10) by a pair of specified values, −g and +g (g > 0), as follows: 
−g < (C-G)÷(S x √D) < +g, where √D = √3                                  n                                n          20
G denotes the effect of interest
C, the estimator of the effect of interest, equals +13.85
S, the estimator of the error standard deviation, equals 14.65
Solving for the possible values of G we find the requisite intervals to be of the form:
+13.85+5.67(-g) < G < +13.85+5.67(+g) for appropriately specified g,
where that brings us to the crux of the problem, namely how to specify g appropriately. Let:
(C-G)÷(S x √D) denote a random variable G.                          n
Then our problem is to specify the value g of G such that:
Pr(-g < G < +g) = 1-α(β1, β2, β3) for specified α(β1, β2, β3), where α(β1, β2, β3) de-
pends on the unknowns previously denoted by β1, β2, and β3.
The problem is insoluble. But statistical inference refuses to admit that and tries instead 
to defend this, that or the other silly ‘solution’, depending on the brand of inference. In 
the most commonly occurring brand of inference, the so-called solution is to employ 
the following exercise in circular reasoning:
{β1 = 0, β2 = 0, β3 = 0} is a ‘reasonable assumption’, owing to which
G is distributed as Student’s t, owing to which
α(β1, β2, β3) is specifiable as α(β1, β2, β3) = α for any α in 0 < α < 1.
It is at this stage of our development not necessary for the reader to take a stance on the 
matter. For the time being all that is required is an open mind.
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Chapter 3
DECISION-MAKING UNDER RISK
PoPulations being brought into the real world
3.1 Introduction
This book is not about decision-making under risk; it is about data analysis. However, 
in much of the statistical literature the distinction between these two different kinds of 
activity is not at all clearly drawn, with confusing consequences. So we need to come to 
grips with some of the ideas of decision-making under risk, at least to the extent of be-
ing able to recognise them when they try to invade the domain of data analysis. We will 
try to do so by presenting various examples, where the import of each example is then 
brought forward by way of a debate between two parties, a decision-maker and a data 
analyst, where the latter is a visitor in the domain of the former.
3.2 Decision-making under risk as opposed to data analysis
As the theory of hypothesis tests is the main source of the confusion we must try to 
clear up, the main thrust of the present chapter is to show that hypothesis tests are not 
properly directed at data analysis; they are directed at decision-making under risk. The 
following two examples of such decision-making will help explain this.
Example 3.2.1
Suppose that a decision-maker averages replicate measurements, made on specimens 
of amnion fluid from supposedly pregnant rabbits for sale, so as to provide assurance 
against phantom pregnancies. Let a historical record of such measurements show that 
they may be represented as realisations of independent N(µ , σ²) random variables for a 
known value of σ², with µ denoting unknown numbers of foetuses present; µ = 0 in the 
case of a phantom pregnancy. Let the inconvenience of an unplanned replacement be 
preferred over the embarrassment of having sold a barren animal. So, let the decision-
maker average as many replicate measurements as needed to achieve:
Type I errors (barren females erroneously sold as ‘pregnant’), and
Type II errors (pregnant females erroneously replaced as ‘barren’),
at rates controlled to be α = 0.02, and at most β = 0.20, respectively. (3.2.1)
By solving for X and sX from:
Pr(X-m ≥ +2.054 sX | µ = 0) = 0.02 and Pr(X-m ≤ -0.842 sX | µ ≥ 1) ≤ 0.20
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the decision-maker finds that the number of replicate measurements per animal needs 
to be such that sX = 0.3453, where the decision rule must be:
Classify any pregnancy as ‘phantom’ if and only if X < 0.71.
Let a visitor to the decision-maker’s workplace then witness how a population (a host of 
individuals) is being brought into the real world, as follows:
… {X = 0.31, ‘phantom’} {X = 0.92, ‘not phantom’} {X = 0.70, ‘phantom’}.
Visitor: ‘Just a moment. Surely your last classification is wrong, is it not?’
Decision-maker: ‘No. As 0.70 < 0.71, I must classify the pregnancy as “phantom”.’
Visitor: ‘But when the mean, being symmetrically distributed round µ, turns out to be 
0.70, much nearer to µ = 1 than to µ = 0, it would surely be odd, even eccentric, to be of 
an opinion that favours µ = 0 over µ = 1.’
Decision-maker: ‘I agree. But my decisions are not intended to service opinions about this, 
that, or the other solitary individual being classified, as I am not interested in the individu-
als as such. My interest is only in the host that is to be comprised of them. My decisions 
are directed at ensuring that the host will meet specifications. Hence there is nothing odd 
or eccentric about my decisions. To you they only seem to be odd, as you have mistaken 
decision-making under risk for data analysis. The question here is not “How might this 
individual, X = 0.70, have come about?” The question here is “How might a host of many 
individuals, such that α = 0.02 and β ≤ 0.20, be brought about?” A decision-maker proceeds 
from Definition 1.2.2 rather than from Definition 1.2.1.’
Example 3.2.2
Snedecor and Cochran (1989, p. 53) consider a decision-maker who wants assurance 
that the average content of the active ingredient in certain roots containing insecticide, 
will be at least eight parts per hundred, apart from a 1-per-100 chance of error. The roots 
are available in batches, and the decision-maker must accept, or reject, per batch, on the 
basis of the mean amount of the active ingredient in nine bundles of roots drawn from 
that batch. A historical record shows that the means can be represented satisfactorily as 
realisations of independent normal random variables whose expectations represent the 
amounts of insecticide for corresponding batches, and whose standard deviations equal 
3.30÷√9, i.e. 1.10, in parts per 100. So, solving from
Pr[(X-m)÷1.10 ≥ 2.33 | m ≥ 8] ≤ 0.01,
the decision-maker finds that any given batch is to be classified as ‘acceptable’ if and 
only if the mean of nine bundles drawn from that batch exceeds 8 + 2.33(1.10), i.e. 10.56, 
in parts per 100. Let a visitor to the decision-maker’s workplace observe how a popula-
tion (a host of individuals) is being brought into the real world, as follows: 
… {X = 8.13, reject} {X = 10.57, accept} {X = 10.56, reject}.
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Visitor: ‘Just a moment. The last two terms in this array puzzle me. Surely it would be 
statistically naïve to be of the opinion that two means, 10.57 and 10.56, each subject to a 
standard error of magnitude 1.10, arose from substantially different batches?’
Decision-maker: ‘I am not of such naïve opinion. You have mistaken two different deci-
sions for two different opinions concerning the two individuals in question. My decisions 
do not express opinions about the individuals involved. My decisions are directed at fab-
ricating a host of individuals, such that the host will be as specified.’
The reader is challenged to note carefully that mistaken reasoning need not be wrong. On 
the contrary, in each of the foregoing examples, the visitor’s reasoning is entirely correct 
for that at which it is directed, but that at which it is directed has mistaken the decision-
maker’s purpose.
3.3 Decision-making under risk in case of just one population
In certain games of chance, a participant (a decision-maker under risk) will reason in 
terms of repetitive sampling from a singleton. Two players might for instance wager on 
the outcome of rolling an ordinary six-sided die. The population is then envisaged as an 
infinite pool of the outcomes 1, 2, 3, …, 6 in equal proportions, with the players sampling 
the population over and over again and, prior to each sample, deciding how to wager. 
For our purposes, this kind of decision-making under risk is of little interest, as our in-
terest is in cases involving different populations.
3.4 Decision-making under risk in case of different populations
In Example 3.2.1 the model used envisages samples drawn from different populations 
corresponding to different pregnancies. These different populations fall into groups of 
different kinds: µ = 0, µ = 1, µ = 2, µ = 3, … . Define, for each sample, a count of ‘one error 
made’ when a classification error is made, and when not, a count of ‘zero errors made’. 
Let x
IJ
 denote the count for the Jth population of the Ith kind. Let the counts be arrayed in 
different columns corresponding to the different kinds, as follows:
x01   x11   x21   x31 …
x02   x12   x22   x32 …
x03   x13   x23   x33 …
…    …    …    …      
…    …    …    …     
…    …    …    … (3.4.1)
Let the long-run frequencies of ‘one error made’ in the different columns be denoted by:
α, β1, β2, β3, …,
respectively. For a mathematically tractable representation of such long-run physics, 
we envisage the successive columns as independent outcomes of Bernoulli variables de-
noted by:
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X0, X1, X2, X3, …, respectively, where
E(X0, X1, X2, X3, …) = (α, β1, β2, β3, …).
Let f1, f2, f3, …(f1+f2+f3+… = 1) denote the relative frequencies with which various populations 
of the kinds µ = 1, µ = 2, µ = 3, …, respectively, happen to contribute to the corresponding 
columns at (3.4.1). Here we make no assumptions as to how those frequencies come about; 
we accept them as constants. Then the expected value of the Type II error rate is:
f1β1 + f2β2 + f3β3 + … .
Henceforth we denote such an expected Type II error rate as β. Now it might seem that the 
notion of such a rate does not apply in the case of the insecticide roots, as the class index 
in that case ranges over a continuum of values, and not, as in the case of the pregnancies, 
over discrete values such as 0, 1, 2, … . We note, however, that for almost all, if not all, 
purposes of substantive science, the range of a class index can be taken as bounded be-
tween finite (though not necessarily explicit) limits. In the case of the insecticide roots, for 
instance, the class index is explicitly bounded from below by zero, and it is also bounded 
from above by some or other definite, though not explicit, upper bound. So, by round-
ing the possible values of such a class index onto a finite but sufficiently fine grid of class 
marks, we can satisfactorily approximate any class of statistical models that would inter-
est, for instance, the customers of Gupta and Panchapakesan (1979). For those customers, 
this establishes Theorem 3.4.1.
Theorem 3.4.1:
Consider an array of samples S1, S2, S3, … , drawn from an array of populations P1, P2, P3, … , respectively 
– just one sample per population. Let R denote a decision rule such that should R be applied in repeated 
sampling from any one of the populations, the Type I error rate is given by α (a specified fraction). Then, 
should R be applied to the array of samples, one each from the different populations, the Type I error rate is 
also given by α, and the expected value of the overall Type II error rate β is given by the mean of the Type II 
error rates that would arise should R be applied in repeated sampling from the individual populations.
We note that if assurance can be given that each of the constituents of β is bounded from 
above by a specified β, then β ≤ β. Thus we have the assurance in Example 3.2.1 that β ≤ 0.20.
3.5 Statistical thinkers versus statistical doers
We must distinguish between intellectual rewards and physical rewards. In the previous 
chapters we considered intellectual rewards being reaped in the conceptual world of the 
human mind, in the world that is ‘inside of us’, in the world of the thinker. In the present 
chapter we must consider physical rewards being reaped in the real world of the human 
body, in the world that is ‘outside of us’, in the world of the doer. A doer will of course do 
after forethought only, but any such forethought would be pointless without the intent to 
reap its rewards and, in the statistical case, that can be accomplished only through repetitive 
decision-making. A single, solitary decision in the real world can be at error or not at error, 
but it is utterly meaningless to speak of such a decision as being subject to error rates. In the 
previous chapters we began to lay a foundation that would enable us to grasp the foregoing 
Decision-making under risk
167
distinctions. And we did so by emphasising persistently that repetitive sampling takes place 
in the human mind only, whence it might then provide an explication of the possible ori-
gins of a single, solitary pseudo-sample in the real world. The present chapter develops that 
foundation further by emphasising persistently that, whilst repetitive sampling can provide 
representations of decision-making subject to error rates, it can do so usefully, only with 
reference to a host of pseudo-samples in the real world. The matter is crucial; so our choice 
of language must draw a sharp distinction between the statistical investigator whose think-
ing brings repetitive sampling into the conceptual world, and the statistical decision-maker 
whose repetitive doings bring pseudo-sampling into the real world.
3.6 The Neyman-Pearson lemma for decision-making under risk
Suppose that a certain rule for decision-making under risk would enable us to control the 
Type II error rate, for any specified Type I error rate, when repetitively sampling any one 
member of an array of singletons. Then, owing to Theorem 3.4.1, such a rule will also en-
able us to control the expected Type II error rate, for any specified Type I error rate, when 
sampling every member of the array just once. A method for finding such rules is pro-
vided by a mathematical lemma of Neyman and Pearson (1933). The lemma has several 
epistemologically different variants. Here we wish to develop the variant appropriate to 
decision-making under risk. The idea is then that we know, or we are willing to assume, 
that the one or the other of just two singletons – H0, called the null hypothesis, and H1, 
called the alternative hypothesis – satisfactorily models any member of a given array of 
populations. A prospective array of samples – just one sample per population – is to be 
drawn, and we must, with as little error as is possible, classify each population as either H0 
or H1, the possible errors being:
A Type I error when a H0 population is erroneously classified as ‘H1’.
A Type II error when a H1 population is erroneously classified as ‘H0’.
Consider dividing the sample space into two disjoint regions, Wa and Wr, and using a rule 
of the form:
Whenever a data pattern ∈ Wa, accept H0 and reject H1.
Whenever a data pattern ∈ Wr, reject H0 and accept H1.
Customarily, and with tacit reference to the null hypothesis, Wa and Wr are called the ac-
ceptance region and the rejection region, respectively. Often too, Wr is called the critical 
region. The Type I and Type II error rates are then given by
α = Pr(a sample pattern ∈ Wr|H0), and
β = Pr(a sample pattern ∈ Wa|H1),
respectively, where α is also called the size of the critical region, or of the test. We would 
wish to specify the size of the critical region. Often, however, one cannot form any region 
of the specified size. In order to overcome this, the sample space is divided into three 
disjoint regions: Wa and Wr as before, and a third region Wb, often called the boundary re-
gion. A test of any desired size can then be achieved by using an auxiliary random device, 
as follows: choose Wr to be of size α-γ ≤ α for γ as small as possible, and then choose Wb 
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such that Wr∪Wb is of size α+η ≥ α for η as small as possible. It is then always possible to 
let an auxiliary random device have ‘reject H0’ and ‘accept H0’ as exhaustive and mutually 
exclusive outcomes, with the probabilities of these outcomes in the ratio:
Pr(reject H0):Pr(accept H0)::γ:η.
A test of the desired size is then achieved by means of the rule:
Whenever a data pattern ∈ Wa, accept H0 and reject H1.
Whenever a data pattern ∈ Wr, reject H0 and accept H1.
Whenever a data pattern ∈ Wb, let the auxiliary device ‘decide’.
For example, consider drawing haphazardly, and with replacement, just three chips in 
succession from each one of an array of bowls, the content of each bowl comprising green 
chips and yellow chips, either in equal proportions (H0), or with twice as many green chips 
as yellow chips (H1). If G denotes green and Y denotes yellow, the sample space comprises 
eight possible outcomes, as follows:
{GGG, GGY, GYG, YGG, GYY, YGY, YYG, YYY} (3.6.1)
Let the binomial model Bn(θ, n), where θ = Pr(G) and n = 3, be deemed appropriate. Then 
H0 and H1 denote the singletons indexed by θ = (1/2) and θ = (2/3), respectively. If we 
choose any one of the eight descriptions at (3.6.1) as a critical region, the size of our test, 
α, equals (1/2)3, where this is the smallest size we could achieve without using an auxil-
iary random device. However, by using such a device, α = (1/2)(1/2)3, for instance, can be 
achieved by choosing
Wa = any seven of the eight descriptions at (3.6.1),
Wb = the remaining one of the eight descriptions at (3.6.1), and (3.6.2)
Wr = Φ (the empty set),
and then proceeding as follows:
Whenever a data pattern is ∈ Wa, classify the bowl involved as H0.
Whenever a data pattern is ∈ Wb, flip a coin of balanced sort and so, depending on 
the outcome, classify the bowl involved either as H0 or as H1, with equal chances.
At (3.6.1) there are eight different outcomes from which to choose a boundary at (3.6.2), 
and of these GGG is obviously the least like an H0 outcome. So one can anticipate that 
of these eight possible tests the one with the smallest Type II error rate is obtained by 
choosing Wb = {GGG} at (3.6.2). With just two singletons from which to choose, as is 
the case here, such minimisation of the Type II error rate for any specified Type I error 
rate α (0 < α < 1), is always achievable according to the variant of the Neyman-Pearson 
lemma that concerns us here. That variant will now be introduced using the concept of 
a critical function δ, defined below, where p denotes the disposable probability that the 
‘decision’ of the auxiliary device is ‘reject H0’, and is to be disposed of such that the test 
is of precisely specified size α:
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δ(S) = 0 if S is a sample with data pattern ∈ Wa.
δ(S) = p if S is a sample with data pattern ∈ Wb.
δ(S) = 1 if S is a sample with data pattern ∈ Wr.
As the auxiliary device and the sample are statistically independent, the probability of 
rejecting H0 is given by:
[Pr(S∈ Wb)×p]+P(S ∈ Wr).
This is called the power of the test. We will have chosen Wb and Wr such that
[Pr(S∈ Wb|H0)×1]+P(S ∈ Wr|H0) > α ≤ P(S ∈ Wr|H0).
This means that p for 0 ≤ p < 1 can always be disposed of such that
[Pr(S∈ Wb|H0)×p]+P(S ∈ W
r|H0) = α, as specified.
Having fixed the value of p, the power of the test in respect of H1 is then:
[Pr(S∈ Wb|H1)×p]+P(S ∈ W
r|H1) = 1-β. (3.6.3)
One wants this probability to be the largest possible for the specified value of α, that is 
to say, if given a choice between two or more tests of size α, one would choose the most 
powerful of those tests, i.e. the one with the smallest Type II error rate. Theorem 3.6.1 
tells us how that can be accomplished in the case of just two singletons. 
Theorem 3.6.1 (The Neyman-Pearson lemma for decision-making under risk):
Let an array of data sets s1, s2, s3, …, each of which can be modelled satisfactorily as a sample from one or 
the other of two singletons H0, and H1, respectively, be brought into the real world. Let the probabilities 
of these data sets, as modelled, be given by:
Pr(S = sj|H0) and Pr(S = sj|H1), for j = 1, 2, 3, …
Then an array of hypothesis tests of the form:
δ(S) = 0 if and only if Pr(S = sj|H1)÷Pr(S = sj|H0) < c
δ(S) = p if and only if Pr(S = sj|H1)÷Pr(S = sj|H0) = c
δ(S) = 1 if and only if Pr(S = sj|H1)÷Pr(S = sj|H0) > c
c and p being chosen such that all the tests are of exact size α, are most powerful in the long run for testing 
the singleton H0 against the alternative singleton H1.
A proof of this theorem is given by Kempthorne and Folks (1971, pp. 316-320). We note 
that Pr(S = sj|H1)÷Pr(S = sj|H0) is customarily called the likelihood ratio, and tests con-
forming to the theorem are called likelihood ratio tests. In brief, the theorem therefore 
states that for testing any singleton against any other singleton, and for any specified 
test size, the likelihood ratio tests are the most powerful. Consider, for instance, an array 
of real-world data sets that are satisfactorily modelled as binomial samples of size n = 5, 
with probability of failure given:
either by H0: q = 0.5, 
or by H1: q = q1, where
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q1 denotes any one particular value such that 0.5 < q1 < 1. (3.6.4)
Then the likelihood ratio for sj failures is given by:
5
  (q1)
sj (1-q1)
5-sj ÷ 5 (0.5)sj(1-0.5)5-sj 
sj                              sj
As q1 > 1-q1, this ratio is monotone increasing in sj = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. So the most powerful 
tests are of the form:
δ(S) = 0 if and only if sj < c,
δ(S) = p if and only if sj = c,
δ(S) = 1 if and only if sj > c,
for j = 0, 1, 2, …
If we choose c = 4, the critical region sj > 4, is sj = 5, with size (0.5)5 = 0.03125. Suppose 
however the specified size is α = 0.05. Then, taking sj = 4 as the boundary, the size of the 
boundary is 5(0.5)4(0.5). We note:
(0.5)5 = 5×0.00625.     0.05 = (5+3)×0.00625.     5(0.5)4(0.5) = 25×0.00625.
So, the required random device can take the form of drawing one number haphazardly 
from 1, 2, 3, …, 25, where we must then proceed as follows:
Whenever sj = 5 failures, reject H0.
Whenever sj = 4 failures, employ the device to draw a number.
If the number drawn is 1, 2 or 3, reject H0.
If the number drawn is larger than 3, accept H0.
Whenever sj < 4 failures, accept H0. (3.6.5)
From the expression at (3.6.3) the Type II error rate for this test is found to be:
β = 1-{[Pr(S∈ Wb|H1)×p]+P(S ∈ Wr|H1)}
                 
4
                       
5     = 1-{ 5q1 (1-q1)x  3   + q1} 
                              
25       
            3    4             5    = 1-      q1(1-q1)+q1  . (3.6.6) 
            
5
The value denoted by q1 at (3.6.4) was any value in the interval 0.5 < q1 < 1. So we have 
dealt with a more general case than that indicated at (3.6.4) because if we now consider 
an array of real-world data sets that are modelled satisfactorily as binomial samples of 
size n = 5, with probability of failure given
either by H0: q = 0.5 
or by one of H1: q = q1, q2, q3, …, where
q1, q2, q3, … denote particular values such that 0.5 < q1, q2, q3, … < 1, (3.6.7)
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then the recipe at (3.6.5) produces an array of hypothesis tests whose expected Type II 
error rate  is minimised for the specified Type I rate α, owing to Theorem 3.4.1. Such an 
array is called a uniformly most powerful array of hypothesis tests. From the expression 
at (3.6.6) the Type II error rate for this array of tests is now found to be
                   3    4              5 
b = 1-∑ fj    5  qj (1-qj)+qj   . (3.6.8)           j
This brings us to an important class of problems that is exemplified by the following.
Example 3.6.1
For each one of an array of consignments of a certain type of automobile component, a 
decision-maker subjects five components to a possibly destructive test so as to decide 
whether that consignment is to be accepted or rejected. On the basis of historical data, 
the tests have been so devised that a satisfactory component will survive the test, or be 
destroyed by it, with equal chances. Let the decision-maker model the situation as at 
(3.6.7) and so, fixing the Type I error rate at α = 0.05, use the recipe at (3.6.5) to minimise 
the expected Type II error rate, b. Let a visitor to the decision-maker’s workplace then 
observe a population being brought into the real world, as follows, where S denotes the 
number of failed components and X the number drawn from 1, 2, 3, … , 25:
… {(S, X) = (1, 7), accept} {(S, X) = (4, 3), reject} {(S, X) = (4, 8), accept}.
Visitor: ‘Just a moment. Is it not the case that any information concerning the possible 
θ values is conveyed by the S-like numbers only?’
Decision-maker: ‘That is so.’
Visitor: ‘So the X-like numbers convey no information whatsoever concerning those 
possible θ values.’
Decision-maker: ‘That is so.’
Visitor: ‘But then the last two terms in your array of responses do not make sense. As the 
only informative data with respect to θ is S = 4 in both cases, the X-like numbers being 
utterly uninformative in that respect, it would surely be odd, even eccentric, to draw dif-
ferent conclusions about the two consignments involved.’
Decision-maker: ‘That is so. But I have not drawn such conclusions about the two consign-
ments involved. You are mistaking two different decisions for two different conclusions. 
My decisions are not conclusions about corresponding consignments. My decisions are 
acts of fabrication that are guided by the principles of a scientific technology for bringing 
into the real world a host of classified consignments such that the host can be expected to 
meet certain specifications.’
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The import of the foregoing kind of example is diagnostic in the following instances:
In the use of knowledge (technology) it is intolerable that we should shy away from 
using an auxiliary random device when that would clearly help us achieve our goal, 
which is to bring about a prospective physical outcome (a host that would meet our 
specifications).
In the pursuit of knowledge (investigation) it is intolerable that we should wish to ad-
join to our data, after those data have already come about, the outcome of an auxiliary 
random device when that clearly cannot help us achieve our goal, which is to come to 
know how a given physical outcome (a data set) might have come about.
Let us recall that any data have always been recorded on a discrete and an essentially 
finite grid of class marks. So, in principle, randomised hypothesis tests are ubiquitous, 
and, given their forceful diagnostic value, examples of such tests should deliberately be 
brought forward and their epistemological implication underscored. But, sad to say, 
that is by and large not the current statistical way. Instead, randomised tests tend to 
be treated as something of an embarrassment, and are either not mentioned at all or 
exhibited briefly and then discounted quickly with words to the effect of:
‘This is the black sheep of the statistical family. We exhibit him in all honesty as, 
in contrast to certain colleagues, we hold that science should not shy away from 
unsavoury facts. And now, having made a clean breast of his disgraceful existence, 
let us bundle him away, so as to consort further with only the decent members of 
our family.’
The issue is this: if logical reasoning leads from certain premises to a conclusion that 
cannot be correct, there must be a flaw in the premises. The puzzlement of our visitor 
displays that flaw precisely, as the puzzlement arises from statistical decision-making 
under risk being mistaken for investigative statistics. Conversely, the embarrassment 
around the existence of randomised tests is symptomatic of a premise that mistakenly 
takes statistical investigation to be a form of decision-making under risk.
3.7 The first of two different resolutions of the mixed 
 sampling problem
We are now ready to take first steps toward resolving a problem introduced in Section 1.5. 
As pointed out in Sections 1.5 and 1.13, that problem arises when mathematical statistics 
formally offers substantive science a choice between different frames of reference, and it 
is then for substantive science to resolve the problem of which frame of reference is, for 
its purposes, the correct one. We now consider two examples, each of which displays the 
first one of two possible resolutions of the problem. The first of these examples is hardly 
of any practical interest, but it conveys the present resolution with great force. The second 
example shows how the present resolution might well be of practical interest.
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Example 3.7.1
Using Instrument A, a decision-maker can classify objects for sale as ‘good’ or ‘bad’, with 
misclassification rate zero. Using Instrument B, he can classify those objects as ‘good’ or 
‘bad’, with misclassification rate 0.10. Using Instrument A is more expensive than using 
B. A regulatory authority specifies rates in excess of 0.05 as unacceptable. So the decision-
maker must, as cheaply as possible, achieve a rate of 0.05. That is accomplished by spin-
ning a coin of balanced sort to determine, for each object separately, whether it is to be 
classified by A or by B and, without keeping records to show how particular individuals 
were classified, then to market only those individuals that were classified as ‘good’. Let a 
visitor to the decision-maker’s workplace witness how a population of such individuals is 
being brought into the real world.
Visitor: ‘Surely your work would be more informative in respect of every individual if records 
were kept that showed, for each individual, whether its classification was by A or by B?’
Decision-maker: ‘That is indeed correct.’
Visitor: ‘Then I cannot understand why you keep no such records.’
Decision-maker: ‘Because if I were to do so, I would obtain two identifiably different real-
world populations, only one of which would satisfy the regulating authority. All the indi-
viduals in the other population would then have to be reclassified. You mistake my deci-
sions for attempts to provide information in respect of this, that or the other individual. 
It is not my purpose to provide such information. It is my purpose to make a real-world 
population that would satisfy the regulating authority, and you can surely grasp that I am 
achieving that at minimum expected cost. You are mistaking the use of knowledge for the 
pursuit of knowledge.’
Example 3.7.2 
The expected Type II error rate at (3.6.8) can be re-expressed as:
                    
3    4      2     5
 
b = 1-∑ f j    5  qj  +   5   qj   .           j
So, let the decision-maker mix sets of n = 4 components and sets of n = 5 components 
in a 3-to-2 ratio, rejecting any consignment if and only if all tested components fail, and 
keeping no records of how many components were tested in any particular case.
Visitor: ‘Why do you prefer the present procedure to that of Example 3.6.1?’
Decision-maker: ‘Because in 3-in-5 cases the present procedure calls for only n = 4 in-
stead of n = 5 components, and yet has precisely the same operating characteristics as 
that of Example 3.6.1. Thus, for instance, the Type I error rate α remains fixed at
3   1  4 +  2   1  
5
  = 0.05, 
5   2         5   2
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and both procedures are uniformly most powerful in respect of any array of the kind of 
alternatives that must interest us here. If you cannot follow the mathematics of the mat-
ter, I can provide proof by simulation.’
We mentioned in Section 1.5 that the mixed sampling problem is resolved in different 
ways depending on different purposes of substantive science. Examples 3.7.1 and 3.7.2 
both involve a decision-maker who wishes to use knowledge for the purpose of gaining 
certain physical rewards. And in both examples it is the unconditional frame of refer-
ence that provides for that correctly. However, an investigator is someone who wishes 
to pursue knowledge for the purpose of gaining certain intellectual rewards. Clearly, as 
indicated by the visitor in Example 3.7.1, it is the conditional frame of reference that 
would provide for such a pursuit. Otherwise who would be so silly as to hold that a clas-
sification by means of Instrument A has a 1-in-20 chance of being a misclassification? 
We will return to this matter in a subsequent chapter.
3.8 The role of assumptions
It will be found that the literature proper on decision-making under risk has little, if 
anything, to say about commencement testing. Instead, a decision-maker is envisaged 
as proceeding from this, that or the other class of models, and it is taken more or less 
for granted that the class will be appropriate. There are two reasons for this: firstly, in 
practice, decision-making is often an ongoing procedure, as in the certification of plant 
material in nurseries, or in acceptance sampling of raw materials for manufactory. In 
such cases a historical record enables an appropriate class of models to be chosen. Sec-
ondly, in the absence of such a record, it is entirely justified to proceed from an informed 
guess, that is to say, from a reasonable assumption, as decision-making is a necessary 
activity. So we cannot criticise attempts at achieving a desired goal without suggesting a 
more appropriate procedure. And if such a suggestion is more appropriate, it will simply 
be adopted. In short, the decision-maker can always say: ‘I have to make these decisions, 
and if you can think of a better procedure than the one I currently use, convince me that 
your procedure is better, and I will adopt it.’
3.9 When separating characteristics are irrelevant
In each of the debates we envisaged in this chapter, the visitor reasons in terms of 
separating characteristics, whereas the decision-maker reasons in terms of operating 
characteristics. In Example 3.2.1, for instance, the visitor observes (correctly so) that a 
particular datum X = 0.70, where E(X) = µ, separates µ = 0 and µ = 1 as the less tenable 
model and the more tenable model, respectively. Whereupon the decision-maker re-
plies (also correctly so) that the visitor’s observation, though correct, is irrelevant for the 
purpose of realising the operating characteristics called for at (3.2.1). Again, in Example 
3.2.2 the visitor is puzzled to find data sets, given by
(X, sX) = (10.57, 1.10) and (X, sX) = (10.56, 1.10), respectively,
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seemingly being predicated by:
N(µ, sX) with µ ≥ 8 and µ < 8, respectively,
when the data in hand can hardly separate those models from each other. Whereupon 
the decision-maker can reply (correctly so) that the visitor has mistaken decisions for 
conclusions, where the decisions are those that best serve the purpose of achieving the 
requisite operating characteristics. The issue is most forcefully brought forward by Exam-
ple 3.6.1 where the values of random numbers that can convey no information whatso-
ever for the separation of the alternative models involved, nevertheless cause a decision-
maker to act as if they do convey such information, so as to realise specified operating 
characteristics. Once again: in Examples 3.7.1 and 3.7.2 a decision-maker deli berately 
suppresses data that would be of use in separating, for their tenability, the mo dels being 
held in the human mind. This is done in order for the rump of the data to ser vice deci-
sions that, owing to that suppression, meet specified operating characteristics.
3.10 Randomisation and an old enigma of card play
Fisher (1934) describes a game called Le Her, played by two players, each of whom is dealt 
just one card by player A, with the cards being valued in order from aces as lowest to kings 
as highest. Player B may then choose to exchange cards with A, except if A holds a king. 
Regardless of which card A then holds, A may choose to exchange that card for one drawn 
from the pack, except if a king is drawn, in which case no further exchange may take place. 
If the two cards then held are equal, A wins; otherwise the higher of the two cards wins. It 
can be shown that if, as a fixed rule, B chooses to exchange any card lower than 7, it is, as 
a fixed rule, to A’s advantage to exchange any card lower than 8, and vice versa. So it is to 
A’s advantage to follow a like rule with B, and it is to B’s advantage to follow an unlike rule 
with A. However, not knowing what rule an opponent follows makes it unclear what rule 
a player must follow. In the classical literature there is an unresolved disagreement on the 
matter. Fisher resolves it by proposing that either player, having to choose between two 
rules, must do so by a randomised decision, as follows: let A’s rule be to change an 8 with 
frequency P, and B’s rule to change a 7 with frequency Q. The game has 5 525 possible out-
comes all told, of which the expected number of outcomes where B wins, is then given by
2 828+6P+10Q-16PQ.
For Q greater than 3÷8, it is to A’s advantage to put P = 1, and for Q less than 3÷8, it is to 
A’s advantage to put P = 0. Hence B should choose Q = 3÷8, in which case A’s policy is a 
matter of indifference to B. Similarly, A should choose P = 5÷8, in which case B’s policy is 
a matter of indifference to A. To the uninformed, the players might then routinely seem 
to be making absurd use of random devices in order to make up their minds, but there is 
nothing absurd about such random decision-making. On the contrary, an informed indi-
vidual who regularly plays Le Her and refuses to use Fisher’s randomised decision rules, is 
being either obstinate or silly.
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3.11 The target problem
In this section we give an example of repetitive decision-making under risk involving cer-
tain formalities that resurface in subsequent chapters where the reasons for introducing 
the example will become clear. Consider a series of repetitions within each of which a 
given number, n, of bullets are fired at a target. The target is then removed and we are 
allowed to measure the points of impact only. In each of the repetitions, the measure-
ments must be used to estimate the position the target occupied in that repetition. The 
estimates must take the form of confidence regions for the unknown target centre, that is 
to say, sub-regions of the parameter space such that with a specified long-run frequency 
1-α (0 < α < 1), the centre of the target will have been within the sub-region. Let Cartesian 
co-ordinates (µ1j, µ2j) give the centre of the target in the j
th repetition, and let correspond-
ing co-ordinates (x1ji, x2ji) for i = 1, 2, 3, …, n give the various points of impact in the jth rep-
etition. We suppose that the (x1ji, x2ji) can be represented as realisations of 2n independent 
homoscedastic normal random variables, (X1ji, X2ji), with expectations
E(X1ji, X2ji) = (m1j, m2j), where i = 1, 2, 3, … , n and j = 1, 2, 3, … .
Consider a standard ‘between-within’ analysis of variance in repetition j, where
X1j and X2j denote the means of the X1ji and X2ji groups, respectively, and
S2 denotes the pooled variance estimate. 
  
j
Let a denote a specified error rate (0 < a < 1). 
Then it can be shown that:
Pr {[(X1j-m1j)
2
+(X2j -m2j)
2
]÷(2S2÷n) ≤ F(a)} 1 - a, (3.11.1) 
                                                
j
where F(a) denotes the percentage point exceeded with probability a by Snedecor’s F on 
2 and 2(n-1) degrees of freedom. By solving for (m1j, m2j) from the equation at (3.11.1), we 
obtain an array of confidence regions in the form of circular disks centred at
(x1j, x2j), and with radii √(2s2÷n)F(a) , when j=1, 2, 3, … .  
                                                
j
Consider a = 0.05 and n = 10. Then we have F(a) = F(0.05) on 2 and 2(10-1) df, which 
equals 3.55. Thus the 95% confidence regions for the unknown target centres take the 
form of a series of circular disks, as exemplified in Table 3.11.1.
Table 3.11.1: Circular 95 % confidence regions for an array of target centers
For Target 1: Centered at (3.1, 7.4) with radius √2[(0.389)2÷10]3.55 = 0.33
For Target 2: Centered at (2.7, 9.8) with radius √2[(0.952)2÷10]3.55 = 0.80
For Target 3: Centered at (9.4, 5.3) with radius √2[(0.310)2÷10]3.55 = 0.26
…
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This allows for a different error variance from one repetition to the next, which serves 
the further purposes of this example best. 
3.12 Decision-making under statistical risk. Is it of much 
 practical importance?
Much of the statistical literature concerns repetitive decision-making under risk, but pro-
vides scant appropriate real-world examples. For instance, in the first 23 chapters of a book 
on statistical decision theory, Gupta and Panchapakesan (1979) envisage many possible 
problems in repetitive decision-making under statistical risk, and develop recipes for their 
solution. In the 24th chapter, the authors then propose to exemplify the practical value of 
those recipes by applying them to 20 real-world examples. But the 20 examples concern 
problems in data analysis, not problems in repetitive decision-making under risk. As an 
introductory example, for instance, they consider the results of a yield trial with seven va-
rieties of barley as Repetition 1 in an array of such repetitions of application of a so-called 
subset selection procedure whose purpose it is to select, in each repetition, a subset of the 
seven varieties, such that ‘the best variety’ will be included in the subsets in a specified pro-
portion, or more, of repetitions. However, the barley data involved were first placed in the 
literature by Duncan (1955) and there has never been the slightest prospect that Repetitions 
2, 3, 4, …, would appear during the ensuing half century. Similarly, in most, if not all, of the 
other 19 examples, we find a single, solitary real-world data set whose possible origin is to be 
explained in the conceptual world of the human mind. So all 20 examples are inappropri-
ate, which compels us to ask why appropriate examples were not given. If we consult other 
sources, the same inappropriate exemplification is found. Gibbons, Olkin and Sobel (1977) 
for instance, try to complement ‘theory’ books like that of Gupta and Panchapakesan, with 
a ‘methods’ book. So they present many purported examples for decision-making under 
risk, but again we find that time and again we are presented with an example requiring data 
analysis, rather than decision-making under risk. Thus we are compelled to conclude that 
statistical decision-making under risk tends to be more of an ivory tower topic than one of 
real-life importance. This conclusion might of course be wrong, in which case we must plead 
with advocates of decision theory to develop the importance of the topic by using appropri-
ate examples; otherwise we can but conclude that they do not have such examples.
3.13 Concluding remark on a counter-argument
It might be countered that the argument in the previous section involves an oversight in 
that, if in each of many different cases we were to apply different rules of decision, but 
such that each rule would, if conceptually applied to an array of appropriate cases, lead 
to a specified proportion P of correct decisions, the overall proportion of correct deci-
sions would also equal P. We reply: That is correct, but as a counter-argument to that in 
Section 3.12, it fails because it leads to insurmountable difficulty. We will return to this 
point in section 4.29.
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Chapter 4
INVESTIGATION MISTAKEN FOR DECISION-MAKING  
UNDER RISK
the frequentist vicious circle
4.1 Introduction
We must now take first steps toward coming to grips with what can only be described as 
the idée fixe of mathematical statistics. The idea originated perhaps with Bayes (1763) 
and, if not, then with Laplace (1814). Its essence envisages the development of meth-
ods that would enable investigative statistics to qualify its findings by statements of 
the kind ‘ … and there is all of a 0.95 probability that this finding is correct’, or ‘ … and 
the probability that this finding is incorrect, is a trifling 0.01’. The idea has divided the 
statistical profession into different schools of thought, marred the statistical literature 
with controversy and, some 200 years on, has failed to produce consensus. So, to hold 
that the idea is a will-o’-the-wisp is not so eccentric a stance that it cannot merit serious 
consideration. In this chapter we show how the idea leads to ‘frequentist inference’, so 
named because such inference holds that the probabilities in question can be meaning-
ful in the sense of long-run frequency only. Also, and more importantly, it holds that this 
is achievable by adapting the reasoning of decision-making under risk to investigative 
needs. The reader may anticipate that problems in investigation are thereby mistaken 
for problems in decision-making under risk. The reader should also note that such mis-
takes are the converse of those displayed in Chapter 3, where it was shown how prob-
lems in decision-making under risk might be mistaken for problems in investigation. In 
order for this to be clearly understood we must grasp the distinction between reasoning 
that is mistaken and reasoning that is simply wrong. For instance, certain South African 
jokes poke fun at an imaginary simpleton named Koos van der Merwe. According to 
one such joke Koos brings a ladder to a party because he was told the drinks will be on 
the house. Koos mistook ‘on the house’ to mean ‘on the roof’, rather than ‘supplied by 
the hosts’. He mistook the figurative meaning for the literal one – which is not at all the 
same as simply being wrong. On the contrary, in Koos’s understanding it was not at all 
wrong to have brought a ladder in order to be able to get to the drinks. Similarly, this 
chapter shows how a mathematical ingenuity called ‘frequentist inference’ tries to make 
decision-making under risk serve the purposes of data analysis without realising that its 
efforts are based on a mistaken understanding of such analysis.
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4.2 The problem of attaining real-world repetitions
Let the reader ask: ‘Is there another person identical to me? Has there ever been such a 
person? Will there ever be such a person?’ These questions can be answered in the nega-
tive only since every individual is unique. This does not apply only to persons it applies 
to every single object in the real world and certainly to every data set. It must be grasped 
firmly that when we speak of ‘W. C. Krumbein’s data’ as opposed to ‘J.H. Edward’s data’, 
we draw a distinction that is vastly more complicated than a distinction between two 
different sets of numbers. So we introduce Definition 4.2.1.
Definition 4.2.1:
The term data set refers to a real-world individual and must be understood to embrace all the circum-
stantial details that constitute that individual’s uniqueness, and are thereby limited to that individual’s 
proprietary.
It might be objected that: ‘My brother and I share our mother, who is therefore not li-
mited to his proprietary’. Then we must reply: ‘You and your brother share the same sort 
of relationship to your mother, but your particular relationship to her is limited to your 
proprietary’.
Definition 4.2.1 raises a problem that must be solved if the ideas of frequentist inference 
are to have any hope at all of practical implementation. We refer to it as the problem of 
attaining real-world repetitions. In order to come to grips with it, let us re-visit the wait-
ing times for the eruptions of Vesuvius (Tables 1.15.2 and 1.15.3). Frequentists would 
have an investigator reason in terms of populations of repetitions being brought into 
the real world, as the idea is to exercise real-world control over the frequencies of Type I 
errors and Type II errors. So, for the Vesuvial data, consider a population of repetitions 
arising as follows:
Repetition 1: The 1st universe originates. The 1st earth cools, and Vesuvius the 1st 
appears. In a1std 79 Vesuvius the 1st erupts. A 1st series of waiting times follow. 
Repetition 2: The 2nd universe originates. The 2nd earth cools, and Vesuvius the 2nd 
appears. In a2ndd 79 Vesuvius the 2nd erupts. A 2nd series of waiting times follow. 
Repetition 3: The 3rd universe originates. The 3rd earth cools, and Vesuvius the 3rd 
appears. In a3rdd 79 Vesuvius the 3rd erupts. A 3rd series of waiting times follow. 
… . (4.2.1)
As a matter of real-world experience such nonsense will clearly not do. So frequentist 
inference is faced with the problem of how substantive investigators are supposed to at-
tain the proposed populations of real-world repetitions. Do not think that this problem 
is peculiar to certain types of data only. Consider trying to persuade an agronomist to 
repeat a replicated yield trial with oats. Repeat it? Yes, say about a thousand times. A 
thousand times! Well, how about a hundred times? Don’t be daft!
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4.3 Stereotypic arrays
Inasmuch as frequentists must achieve real-world error rates, Neyman (1952) clearly 
realised that imaginary nonsense repetitions such as those considered at (4.2.1) simply 
will not do. Instead he proposed essentially as follows: let each one of the D-like sym-
bols below denote a decision to accept or reject a null hypothesis, where each successive 
array in turn represents conceptual repetitions of a given hypothesis test.
Test 1: D11, D12, D13, …, of which a proportion, precisely α, are Type I errors.
Test 2: D21, D22, D23, …, of which a proportion, precisely α, are Type I errors.
Test 3: D31, D32, D33, …, of which a proportion, precisely α, are Type I errors.
…. . (4.3.1)
Now form an array of conceptual decisions by randomly selecting just one decision from 
each of the arrays at (4.3.1). Then we obtain
D1•, D2•, D3•, …, of which a proportion, precisely α, are Type I errors. (4.3.2)
Choosing α = 0.05, the decisions in this last array might then be represented as being 
brought into the real world, for instance as follows:
D1•: A χ² test for random dispersion leads to χ² = 15.50 on 8 df. The 0.05 critical 
region for this test is 15.51 ≤ χ² < ∞. Therefore H0 is accepted, i.e. our decision is 
that the dispersion is random.
D2•: A Raleigh test for isotropic directions leads to q² = 18.13 for n = 10 directions. 
The 0.05 critical region for this test is 29.95 ≤ q² < ∞. Therefore H0 is accepted, i.e. 
our decision is that the directions are isotropic.’
D3•: A Cramer-Von Mises test for exponential waiting times leads to CvM = 0.225. 
The 0.05 critical region for this test is 0.224 ≤ CvM < ∞. Therefore H0 is rejected, 
i.e. our decision is that the waiting times are not exponential.
… . (4.3.3)
It will be found appropriate to call such an array ‘a stereotypic array’. We challenge the 
reader to note that inasmuch as the idea of such arrays was introduced by Neyman 
himself, he established beyond reasonable contest that his dual theories of hypothesis 
tests and confidence regions are directed at trying to create real-world populations to 
specification. The introduction of such arrays would otherwise be pointless.
4.4 A dilemma
We have seen stereotypic arrays originating from certain mathematical thought trying 
to come to grips with the interface between statistics and substantive science. We will 
now prove by dilemma that, in so doing, such mathematical thought has tried to foist a 
creature of its own invention on the discourse of substantive science. To begin with, we 
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note that Neyman would have us envisage an incongruous real-world population arising 
from such diverse data sets as:
A data set on the frequencies of clockwise rather than anti-clockwise dust devils.
A data set on the ability of various rootstocks to tolerate waterlogged conditions.
A data set on the numbers of babies born with harelip in Birmingham, England.
A data set on occupancy behaviour in a certain sort of beetle.
A data set on the waiting times for the eruptions of Vesuvius.
A data set on the responses of Octopus in a learning trial.
…. .
The incongruous nature of such a population lands frequentist inference on the horns of 
a dilemma, as follows: consider (and this leads to the first horn of the dilemma) whether 
or not the foregoing population, as such, makes substantive sense:
‘What possible bearing,’ hortology will ask, ‘can the proportions of clockwise and 
anti-clockwise dust devils have on the survival of waterlogged root stocks?’
‘What conceivable bearing,’ entomology will ask, ‘can the occurrence of babies 
with harelip have on the occupancy behaviour of beetles?’
‘How on earth,’ ethology will ask, ‘can the eruptions of Vesuvius be related to the 
learning abilities of Octopus?’
… .
This forces us to recognise that the incongruous population has not arisen as a concept 
of substantive science; it is a creature of mathematical statistics. Now consider (and this 
leads to the second horn of the dilemma) how the incongruity might be removed. There 
is only one way. We will somehow have to so restrict the stereotypic arrays that they can-
not be held to be incongruous. Consider a yield trial with oats. If one tries to devise an 
appropriate stereotypic array for the given trial by limiting the further terms of the array 
to yield trials with oats, the substantive investigator will say:
‘But the two fertiliser trials I am conducting in the Swartland are not repetitions 
of the cultivar trial I am conducting in the Overberg. Moreover, the fertiliser trials 
are at Riebeeck Kasteel and Klawer, respectively, and are not repetitions of one 
another. Should these trials not be discernibly different in subject matter of inter-
est to me, I would have treated them as constituents of a single trial.’
Again, an eruption of Vesuvius is not a repetition of an eruption of Krakatoa, and nei-
ther of the two is a repetition of an eruption of Paricutin. The reader will note that this 
argument has driven us back into trying to defend the silly populations envisaged in 
Section 4.2. Hence, on each horn of the dilemma, we are compelled to recognise that any 
populations arising from the stereotypic arrays are artefacts of mathematical reasoning. 
That shows that such reasoning is trying to solve a problem of its own invention, and 
not one arising from the needs of substantive science. This concludes our proof, by di-
lemma, of Theorem 4.4.1.
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Theorem 4.4.1:
Apart from decisions arising from the accept-reject rules involved, different terms in a stereotypic array 
cannot as such be referred to in evidential terms. They can, as such, be identified in terms of non-evi-
dential labels only.
Thus, the data sets considered in Examples 1.21.4 and 1.21.5 may be distinguished by being 
labelled as W.C. Krumbein’s data and J.H. Edward’s data. And, if imbedded in a stereotypic 
array of tests, say of size α = 0.001, we may state that in each term a hypothesis test of size 
α = 0.001 using Raleigh’s test statistic, rejects the hypothesised model. However, any further 
evidential facts, such as those discussed in Section 1.21, may not be brought into considera-
tion, as that would have us stray from the normative prescriptions required for the specifi-
cation of a stereotypic array. And that, after all, is precisely why frequentists always have to 
insist that the specification of a Type I error rate must be without reference to the data.
4.5 Stereotypic arrays destroy statistical evidence
In Section 1.14 we met certain normative prescriptions. Section 4.4 enabled us to grasp 
that the prescriptions originate from reasoning that mistakes investigation for decision-
making under risk. In Sections 1.14 and 2.9 we displayed the destructive effect of such 
reasoning, both on substantive evidence and on statistical evidence. An especially re-
vealing way of grasping the destruction of statistical evidence is provided by shortfall 
testing, as the following example shows.
Example 4.5.1
Snedecor and Cochran (1989, p. 382) use covariance adjustments of the yields of six maize 
cultivars to account for differences in stand. Table 4.5.1 displays the adjusted means and 
a suite of shortfall tests for the elimination of cultivars whose yields might seem lower 
than best. 
Table 4.5.1: A suite of five shortfall tests using Dunnett’s many-one-t statistic.
Cultivar Adjusted mean Shortfall Many-one-t Leftmost co-ordinates
D  219.32   
F  213.66  5.66  0.781 (0.478, ε, 0.522)
C  193.16  26.16  3.610 (0.994, ε, 0.006)
A  191.80  27.52  3.797 (0.996, ε, 0.004)
B  190.98  28.34  3.910 (0.997, ε, 0.003)
E  189.58  29.74  4.104 (0.998, ε, 0.002)
Estimated standard error of a difference between two means = 7.247 on 14 df.
The epistemology of statistical science
184
The estimated standard error shown in the table is obtained by using the approximation of 
Finney (1946). An empirical investigation by Sadie (1996) indicates that such approxi-
mation is reliable in the case of shortfall testing, provided that the covariate treatment 
means are statistically homogenous. For the case in hand, such homogeneity is indi-
cated by F = 1.21 on 5 and 15 df., whose mental correlate is to be found at (0.65, ε, 0.35) in 
Snedecor’s test distribution. The results given in Table 4.5.1 are compelling: there is no 
evidence that D or F could be lower than best, as D gave the highest mean, and the men-
tal correlate of the standardised shortfall for F is situated almost exactly on the median 
of Dunnett’s test distribution. As for C, A, B and E, there is compelling evidence that all 
four are lower than best, as the mental correlates of their standardised shortfall values 
are all situated far down in the right-hand tail of Dunnett’s test distribution. But just 
look how destructive of this evidence the stereotypic reasoning would be. If α = 0.01, 
poor performances by C, A, B and E are revealed, but an entirely satisfactory perform-
ance by F is concealed. If α = 0.50, an entirely satisfactory performance by F is revealed, 
but poor performances by C, A, B and E are concealed. Here any specified value of α 
destroys important evidence.
4.6 Stereotypic arrays destroy substantive evidence
This hardly requires proof. Consider the array at (4.3.2) possibly arising as follows:
D1• denotes a decision taken by a botanist investigating plant dispersion.
D2• denotes a decision taken by a zoologist investigating bird navigation.
D3• denotes a decision taken by a geologist investigating volcanic eruptions.
… .
Here possible evidential contributions by botany, zoology, geology, etc. are ignored, as 
they are peculiar to individual terms. As we emphasised by way of Theorem 4.4.1, stere-
otypic reasoning cannot recognise that the substantive source of a given term will differ 
from the substantive source of every other term. Suppose, for instance, that the next 
term in the present array concerns an animal nutritionist investigating the effect on 
gained weight, of a supplemented ration for broiler chickens. Let the mean weight from 
the supplemented ration minus the mean weight from the control ration be equal to 16, 
whose estimated standard error = 10.0 on 10 df. The statistical co-ordinates directing 
us to where in Student’s distribution the mental correlate of (16-0)÷10.0 = 1.6 is to be 
found, are (0.93, ε, 0.07). The nutritionist now might well want to conclude as follows:
The supplement seems to increase weight gain because, although the co-ordina-
tion, considered in itself, is not very extreme, observations not of a statistical na-
ture, as described in the previous section of the report, indicate that the supplement 
had a beneficial effect on the metabolism of the animals involved. On physiological 
grounds, such benefits are expected to promote weight gain.
However, the airing of such opinions is forbidden by the normative prescriptions for 
constructing a stereotypic array.
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‘No! No! No!’ the referees will say. ‘It has long been the policy of our journal to 
commit to α = 0.05 Type I error rates. You must report that the supplement was 
found to have no effect on weight gain, as the value of Student’s t was not in the 
appropriate critical region.’
This is not an unrealistic scenario. It is a sad fact that many referees have been brain-
washed by the ideas of frequentist inference into adopting just such silly positions. In 
an example recently brought to this writer’s attention, the external examiner of a PhD 
thesis insisted on the normative prescriptions ‘being the scientific method’. 
4.7 Stereotypic arrays involve silly embarrassments
Frequentist inference is related to wagering. For instance, we cannot retrospectively 
wager on a certain horse to be the winner of a given race, unless we can do so without 
reference to the outcome of the race. Similarly, for given data, frequentist inference will 
allow us to specify the Type I error rate retrospectively, but only if we can do so without 
reference to the data. In the following example we show that this cannot be done with-
out courting silly embarrassment.
Example 4.7.1
In the aftermath of World War II, food relief agencies supplied powdered cow milk to 
supplement the diet of infants in certain communities in Asia. It subsequently turned 
out that in a high proportion of cases this had been extremely harmful, even mortally so, 
because of allergic reactions to cow milk (People in Asia use predominantly buffalo milk). 
In view of this tragic faux pas by the food relief agencies it is entirely realistic to consider 
an investigator who firmly believes that, as supplement in a food ration for ducks, a certain 
mineral by-product of a given industrial process can only be beneficial or harmless. The 
investigator will therefore be advised by much of the statistical literature that if δ denotes 
the effect of the supplement, a hypothesis test of H0: δ = 0 versus H1: δ > 0 would be appro-
priate. Let the investigator specify a Type I error rate of α = 0.01 for a hypothesis test using 
Student’s t on 11 df., where that rejects H0 in favour of H1 if, and only if, the observed value 
of t exceeds its upper 0.01 percentage point (t = +2.72). Let the observed value of t turn out 
to be t = -3.06, which falls short of the lower 0.01 percentage point of t (t = -2.72). So the 
investigator is embarrassed to find that the observed value of t is situated in the lower tail 
of the test distribution, which tail, as Kendall and Stuart (1961, p.182) put it, has ‘turned 
out to be the wrong one.’ In a repetition of the trial, the investigator might then heed the 
advice of Kendall and Stuart, and so, as a ‘common-sense precaution’, and without refer-
ence to the new data, use an ‘unbiased’ two-tailed test of H0: δ = 0 versus H1: δ ≠ 0, at the 
specified Type I error rate of α = 0.01. Let |t| on 11 df. for the new data then turn out to be 
|t| = |-3.07|, which falls short of the 0.01 percentage point of |t| (|t| = 3.12). Thus a doubly 
embarrassed investigator twice over obtains forceful evidence that the supplement has a 
harmful effect. However, by the normative rules of frequentist inference he must pretend 
to be unaware of that; on the contrary, he must report that the new trial has confirmed 
the finding of the previous trial, to wit: ‘The supplement has no effect.’ The source of this 
nonsense is inter alia the mistaken idea that data analysis requires to be governed by 
controlled error rates.
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4.8 Stereotypic arrays cannot avoid circular reasoning
We are now ready to take first steps toward coming to grips with what is by far the most 
serious defect in the notion of statistical inference. Such inference (and this is the case 
for all the received theories of statistical inference) simply cannot avoid a certain source 
of circular reasoning without violating some fundamental principle of scientific reason-
ing. In the case of frequentist inference that circularity is simply as follows: Neyman’s 
stereotypic arrays would have us view any hypothesis test as just one term in a progres-
sion of terms, each term taking the form of a decision made at the risk of a Type I error, 
and subject to the same specified Type I rate from term to term in that array. This in-
volves an oversight because in the case of an elimination test, at least one of the previous 
terms would involve acceptance of the class characteristic. The reasoning thus cannot 
avoid being circular, because it cannot recognise that such acceptance might be subject 
to a Type II error. The following example displays this form of circular reasoning.
Example 4.8.1
Let an investigator count the numbers of plants of species A in each of n = 4 quadrats 
and find 0, 2 and 3 of the plants in 2, 1 and 1 of the quadrats, respectively. Let the in-
vestigator also count the numbers of plants of species B in each of n = 8 quadrats and 
find 0, 1 and 2 of the plants in 4, 1 and 3 of the quadrats, respectively. For each species 
in turn, let µ denote the population mean number of plants per quadrate, and let the 
investigator wish to test
H0: µ = 0.5 versus H1: µ > 0.5. (4.8.1)
(Other pairs of alternatives would serve equally well for the present purposes, except 
that the foregoing makes for tidy arithmetic.) Let the investigator assume that the data 
sets can be represented as Poisson samples. If X denotes the sample total, then
Pr(X ≥ x) = Pr  χ²    < 2nm  , (4.8.2) 
                           
2x+2
where χ²     denotes a central chi-square random variable on 2x+2 df. 
             
2x + 2
Using this formula we find that for the alternatives at (4.8.1) and for hypothesis tests of 
size α = 0.05, the critical regions are given, in terms of the sample total, x, by
{4 ≤ x < ∞} for species A, and {7 ≤ x < ∞} for species B. (4.8.3)
In both cases the observed number of plants belongs to the critical region. So in both 
cases H0: µ = 0.5 is rejected in favour of H1: µ > 0.5, subject to a Type I error rate of α = 0.05. 
Owing to different sample sizes, the Type II error rates differ. For instance, with respect to 
µ = 2.0 as alternative, the form at (4.8.2) gives these rates as follows:
For species A: 1-Pr   χ²       < 2(4x2.0)  = 0.10, denoted by bAsay . (4.8.4) 
                                    
2(4) + 2
For species B: 1-Pr   χ²       < 2(8x2.0)  = 0.01, denoted by bB say . (4.8.5) 
                                    
2(7) + 2
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All this assumes that the data can indeed be represented as two Poisson samples of sizes 
n = 4 and n = 8, respectively. Can the assumption be tested? If so, the tests will have to be 
commencement tests. So, consider a pair of co-ordination tests based, for convenience, on 
the ordering proposed by Fisher (1950). (Any effective ordering would do for the present 
purposes. Fisher’s ordering just happens to be convenient.) For species A, the test distri-
bution is given in Table 4.8.1, where 3[1]2[1]0[2] describes the test datum whose mental correlate 
is thus found to be situated at
(0.82, 0.12, 0.06*) in the test distribution.
Table 4.8.1: Test distribution for a Poisson class characteristic
Pattern Probability Order Pattern Probability Order
5[1]0[3] 4/45 O5 3[1]1[2]0[1]∪2[1]1[3] 2(240)/45 O2
4[1]1[1]0[2] 60/45 O4 2[2]1[1]0[1] 360/45 O1
3[1]2[1]0[2] 120/45 O3
For species B, the test distribution is given in Table 1.7.2, where 2[3]1[1]0[4] describes the test 
datum whose mental correlate is thus found to be situated at
(0.82, 0.08, 0.10*) in the test distribution.
Instead of these co-ordination tests, a frequentist will perform hypothesis tests (Tallis 
1988). So, let us consider the corresponding hypothesis tests of size 0.05, using the sig-
nificance level as test statistic. Then we find:
For species A: SL = (0.12+0.06) = 0.18 > 0.05. The Poisson model is accepted.
For species B: SL = (0.08+0.10) = 0.18 > 0.05. The Poisson model is accepted.
It cannot reasonably be denied that these two acceptances might be subject to Type II 
errors. So, let us denote the error rates in respect of some or other possible alternative 
(any reasonable possibility will do for the present purposes) as:
b* for species A, and b* for species B. 
  
A
                                  
B
At (4.8.4) and (4.8.5) we saw that for the same kind of alternative, and owing to the spe-
cies A sample size being only half the species B sample size, 
bA > bB, as α was fixed at the same level for the two elimination tests.
Similarly, for the same kind of alternative, and owing to the species A sample size being 
only half the species B sample size, we must have that
b* > b*, as α was fixed at the same level for the two commencement tests. 
  
A
      
B
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In fact, we must grant that:
b* > b* > 0, otherwise what purpose do the commencement tests have? 
  
A
      
B
But the elimination tests originating at (4.8.1) denied this implicitly. In fact, they tacitly 
assumed that
b* = b* = 0, (4.8.6) 
  
A
       
B
 
so that ‘error rates’ for those elimination tests can purportedly be deduced as done at 
(4.8.3), (4.8.4) and (4.8.5) – and that is circular reasoning. The assumption at (4.8.6) begs 
the question.
The influence of the Neyman-Pearson theory makes this kind of circularity ubiquitous 
in present-day statistical practise. Consider ‘testing “the assumption of normality” in 
ANOVA. What is actually tested is whether the errors look approximately normal, where 
that tacitly admits the possibility of Type II errors with non-zero ‘error rates’, whereas 
what is actually assumed is that the errors are normal, where that tacitly takes any Type 
II ‘error rates’ to be zero. The actual assumption cannot possibly be tested.
4.9 Stereotyping in general
Who would have us reason that: ‘Nelson Mandela is an African politician, and African 
politicians are corrupt, hence Nelson Mandela is corrupt’? Who would have us reason 
that: ‘Beyers Naude was an Afrikaner, and Afrikaners are racists, hence Beyers Naude 
was a racist’? Who would have us reason that: ‘Emily Hobhouse was British, and the 
British were imperialists, hence Emily Hobhouse was an imperialist’? It reflects badly on 
our profession that so much of the statistical literature would have us reason in terms of 
stereotypes, and foists such reasoning on us as being a necessary doctrine. In effect, we 
are brainwashed into believing that such reasoning is ‘the scientific method’.
4.10 Different usage of the term ‘paradox’
Our usage of the term ‘paradox’ in subsequent sections refers to a self-contradictory as-
sertion arising from mistaken reasoning. There is another, slightly different, usage of the 
same term. Figure 4.10.1 depicts the outcome of placing two identical coins next to each 
other and then rolling the coin on the left along half the circumference of the other coin, 
as depicted by the arrow. The depiction seems to be wrong, as it would seem that the 
coin ending up on the right, having been revolved through only half its circumference 
and having started from the upright position, should then end up in the upside down 
position. Yet (paradoxically) the depiction is correct; the reasoning is wrong. However, 
in the various statistical examples that follow mistaken reasoning, rather than wrong 
reasoning, produces results that are incorrect.
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Figure 4.10.1: Example of a paradox
4.11 Pratt’s paradox
The mistaken reasoning of present interest leads to a class of paradoxes that have not 
been widely understood at all and are consequently often misinterpreted. We use the 
term ‘paradox’ in the sense of a self-contradictory proposition that arises from mistaken 
reasoning. One such paradox, introduced by Pratt (1962), arises as follows: suppose that 
an Instrument A has been used to measure the percentages of a certain ingredient in a 
number of items under investigation. The investigator consults a frequentist who learns 
that, although none of the measurements exceeded 80%, if it had happened, Instrument 
A would have indicated no more than only that 80% had been exceeded. So the frequentist 
holds that the data must be represented in terms of censored sampling. The investigator 
recalls, however, that Instrument B, usually avoided as being inconvenient to use, could 
have been used to make any measurements in excess of 80%, had that been required. 
The frequentist, thus reassured, then holds that the data must be represented in terms 
of uncensored sampling. Subsequently, however, the investigator discovers that B is in 
disrepair, upon which the frequentist, thus informed, reverts to representation in terms 
of censored sampling. Here the paradox is that the appropriate model seems to depend on 
the state of repair of Instrument B that had nothing to do with making the measurements 
in hand. The contradiction is apparent only, as it falls away when the different possibilities 
are sorted out into just three cases, as below. 
Case 1 
Suppose that, for certain reasons of the kind considered in Chapters 1 and 2, a 
population of samples is to be brought into the conceptual world of the human 
mind, there to serve as possible explanation of how a solitary, censored real-world 
data set might have come about. In such a case the explanatory model must pre-
dict (must bring into the human mind) a population of many samples, some of 
which are censored. Otherwise, the attempt at modelling how the particular data 
came about would be at fault by omission of a relevant fact – one that is explana-
tory in respect of how those particular data came about.
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Case 2
Suppose that, for certain reasons of the kind considered in Chapters 1 and 2, a 
population of samples is to be brought into the conceptual world of the human 
mind, where it is to serve as possible explanation of how a solitary, uncensored 
real-world data set might have come about. In such a case the explanatory model 
must predict (bring into the human mind) a population of many samples, none 
censored. Otherwise, the attempt at modelling how the particular data came 
about would be at fault by the inclusion of an irrelevant fact – one that is not 
explanatory in respect of how those particular data came about.
Case 3
Suppose that, for certain reasons of the kind considered in Chapter 3, repetitive 
use of Instrument A must bring a population of many data sets into the real world 
of the human body. In such a case the model employed must forecast (envisage 
in the future world) how some of those many data sets might well turn out to be 
censored. Otherwise, the model would be at fault by failure to envisage what pos-
sibly might come about.
Pratt’s paradox is a creature of mistaken reasoning: reasoning that mistakes statistical 
investigation (Cases 1 and 2) for statistical technology (Case 3). Yet, in the statistical 
literature, such reasoning is ubiquitously promoted by asking investigators to reason 
in terms of ‘such data as might be obtained if the investigation were done over and over 
again’. We must rebuff such nonsense; no data set can be done over again. When inves-
tigation has brought a population comprising many samples into the conceptual world 
of human mind, its purpose is not to forecast what ‘doing it over again’ might bring into 
the real world. Its purpose is to judge whether or not the data pattern in hand is similar 
to the patterns that typically arise under specified physical circumstances.
4.12 Berkson’s paradox
Another paradox arising from mistaken reasoning of the kind that interests us here is 
due to Berkson (1938). Consider any two singletons that are investigated as alternative 
models of how given data might have come about. Taking either one of them (either one 
will do) as the null hypothesis, Berkson considers a specified Type I error rate (any non-
zero rate will do) and notes that the Type II error rate approaches zero with increasing 
sample size. So he asks why we bother to test the null hypothesis for a fixed sample size, 
knowing that with a sufficiently large sample size the model chosen to be the null hy-
pothesis will almost surely be rejected. Here the mistake is the idea of a specified Type I 
error rate. With increasing sample size, a co-ordination test will either place the mental 
correlate of the test datum snugly within just one of the two alternative crowds, or else 
will place it on the outskirts of both.
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4.13 The vacuous-interval paradox
In general, frequentist inference (mistakenly) tries to make some of the properties of a 
collective bear upon an individual held to be one of its members whereas, as we have seen 
in previous sections, that courts paradoxical consequences. A ubiquitous form of the mis-
take tries to make confidence intervals serve the purposes of data analysis. The following 
three examples show how one then courts a certain paradox that may be described as the 
vacuous interval paradox. The reader is challenged to note that these examples draw on 
precisely the same mathematical and numerical formalities, but employ those formalities 
in very different ways.
Example 4.13.1
Consider an array of N(µ
J
, 1) random variables and corresponding hypothesis tests of
H0: µJ = 0 versus H1: µJ > 0, for J = 1, 2, 3, … .
Suppose that 0 ≤ µ
J
 < ∞ for all J. Then a uniformly most powerful array of hypothesis 
tests of size α = 0.05 is indicated by
Pr(X
J
-µ
J
 > 1.645) = 0.05, leading to the decision rule:
Accept H1 whenever XJ > 1.645, for J = 1, 2, 3, … . (4.13.1)
Recall that a uniformly most powerful array of hypothesis tests is such that for every false 
µ value the probability of rejecting it is the largest possible. The corresponding property 
for confidence intervals is that of being a uniformly most accurate array of confidence 
intervals, where for every false µ value the probability of accepting it is the smallest pos-
sible. As the array defined at (4.13.1) is uniformly most powerful, a corresponding array 
of uniformly most accurate confidence intervals is indicated by
Pr(X
J
-µ
J
 ≤ 1.645) = 0.95, leading to the decision rule:
Accept, as ‘possible’, any µ
J
 value ≥ X
J
-1.645, for J = 1, 2, 3, … . (4.13.2)
Let x denote any positive number. Inasmuch as 0 ≤ µ
J
 < ∞, it then follows that:
−x ≤ µ
J
 < ∞ implies that 0 ≤ µ
J
 < ∞, for J = 1, 2, 3, … .
So, a typical 0.95 array of confidence intervals arising at (4.13.2) might be as follows:
X1 = 1.66, so the corresponding confidence interval is +0.02 ≤ µ1 < ∞.
X2 = 1.73, so the corresponding confidence interval is +0.08 ≤ µ2 < ∞.
X3 = 1.56, so the corresponding confidence interval is        0 ≤ µ3 < ∞.
… .  (4.13.3)
Here, precisely 0.95 of the true µ
J 
values will (given the assumptions made) be bounded 
correctly by the intervals in such an array, where that is a property of the array as a col-
lective. It is not a property of any one term. The true µ
J 
value for any one term is either 
contained in the interval, or not contained in the interval. Here, however, that is no 
problem. We can envisage the use of such an array by a sampling inspector monitoring 
a commercial product to ensure a discernible presence (0 < µ) of a certain ingredient 
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measurable as a N(µ, 1) random variable X. In order for the Jth submission to be classified 
according to specification, the decision rule must classify E(X
J
) as ‘positive’. So, for the 
array at (4.13.3) the inspector must decide as follows:
according to spec, according to spec, not according to spec, … , respectively.
However, an investigator of just one, solitary real-world data set to be explained, is not 
an inspector of an array of many real-world data sets to be decided upon. So let us in our 
next example consider how the particular datum X = 1.56 given at (4.13.3), might rea-
sonably be employed to develop an informed opinion about what possible E(X) values 
might describe its particular source.
Example 4.13.2
In order to make it clear that, whereas an array comprising many x values was being brought 
into the real world at (4.13.3), there is now just one single real-world x value, we denote 
X = 1.56 as X = xobs (observed x). Our reasoning now must concern the case where circumstan-
tial details and commencement tests have brought into the human mind a class of models 
where the mental correlate of that single observed x has a corresponding value taken on by a 
N(µ, 1) random variable X, and the question to be addressed is: how does the quality of fit 
of the members of this class vary with the various possible values of µ (0 ≤ µ < ∞)? So, by 
tracing the situation of the mental correlate of xobs, when that correlate is transported from 
model to model to model in the human mind, we find the correlate being situated
at (•, ε, 0.06), (•, ε, 0.07), (•, ε, 0.09), …, when µ = 0.0, 0.1, 0.2, …, respectively,
at (0.50, ε, 0.50), when µ = 1.56, and
at (0.07, ε, •), (0.06, ε, •), (0.05, ε, •), …, when µ = 3.0, 3.1, 3.2, …, respectively.
It can hardly be thought that this is ‘uninformative data analysis’ because it tells us a great 
deal about the quality of fit of many different models in respect of the data in hand.
Example 4.13.3
A frequentist who must deal with the problem in Example 4.13.2 will mistakenly try to 
do so by means of the reasoning in Example 4.13.1. As in Example 4.13.2, the test datum 
is X = 1.56. And as in Example 4.13.1, the confidence coefficient 1-α = 0.95 is chosen 
without reference to the data. So, the frequentist must report that:
0 ≤ µ < ∞ is a 95% confidence interval for µ.
It can hardly be thought that this is ‘informative data analysis’, as it tells us absolutely 
nothing about µ that was not already known before the data in hand were obtained.
Discussion
The value of a confidence coefficient is a property of an entire array of intervals, and 
not of any one particular interval. So we court a paradox when we try – as frequentist 
inference would have us do – to make a confidence interval address a single, solitary 
real-world data set. This is shown in Example 4.13.3, where we must refer to 0 ≤ µ < ∞ as 
‘a 95% confidence interval for µ’, whilst we are so to speak ‘100% confident’ that its value 
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is contained in the interval. However, we note that, just as in the previous sections, the 
paradox arises from misused physical reasoning.
4.14 A class of fallacious arguments
A paradox is often used to bring specific principles of reason into disrepute, and so per-
suade us to accept other principles. This practice involves a pitfall in that we may be per-
suaded to replace the principles under attack with fallacious principles. So a paradox is 
not simply to be seen as an excuse for introducing alternative reasoning. Unless the source 
of the paradox is understood, we are in danger of introducing principles that are inferior 
to those we think to rectify. This has often not been understood, so that paradoxes of the 
kind we met in Sections 4.11, 4.12 and 4.13, have been used to attack frequency physics 
and thus motivate the introduction of metaphysical ideas on statistical inference. One 
must not be taken in by those arguments, as they cast doubt on the reasoning of physics 
by misusing it. An example to this effect is given by Hogg and Craig (1970, pp. 207-208): let 
{X1, X2} denote a random sample of size n = 2, drawn from a population of values uniformly 
distributed on the interval θ-½ to θ+½ (θ > 0). Let the smaller and larger of the sample 
values be denoted by X
(1) and X(2), respectively. Then (X(1), X(2)) is a 50% confidence interval 
for θ, as the probability of sample values straddling θ is given by:
Pr(X1 < θ, X2 > θ)+Pr(X1 > θ, X2 < θ) = [(½)×(½)]+[(½)×(½)], i.e. ½.
However, the sample range R = X
(2)-X(1) will often be > ½, in which cases we know for 
sure that the value of θ is contained in (X
(1), X(2)). In fact, as the density function of R for 
n ≥ 2 is given by:
f(r) = n(n-1) rn-2 (1-r) for 0 < r < 1, (4.14.1)
the probability of R being larger than ½ when n = 2, is given by:
1 
∫2(1-r)dr = ¼ 
½
So, 25% of the time we will then refer to an interval as ‘a 50% confidence interval for θ’ 
when we are so to speak 100% sure that the interval contains θ. Here the reader will rec-
ognise the vacuous-interval paradox. As in Section 4.13, it arose because of forecasting 
instead of pointing. The present example is revealing in yet another way as it involves an 
ancillary statistic, as follows: (X1, X2) is minimally sufficient for θ, and the transforma-
tion to the mean and range, i.e. the transformation:
X = (X1+X2)÷2 and R = X(2)-X(1)
is one to one. So, the mean and range are minimally sufficient for θ. However, the dis-
tribution of the range will obviously be independent of θ, as indeed shown at (4.14.1). 
R is therefore ancillary and labels alternative frames of reference. Substantive science 
must then select the frame of reference that is appropriate for the present purpose. In 
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the present chapter, that purpose is investigative, i.e. we should be pointing and asking 
‘How might this particular individual have come about?’ Now since
X
(1) = X-½ R and X(2) = X+½ R, where q-½ ≤ X(1) and X(2) ≤ q+½,
it follows that
X-½ (1-R) ≤ q ≤ X+½ (1-R). (4.14.2)
Thus if (X, R)=(x, r) for the particular individual being investigated, the value of q cannot 
fall outside the range:
x-½ (1-r) ≤ q ≤ x+½ (1-r) for that particular individual. (4.14.3)
For instance:
If r = 0.2 for that individual, we know that x-0.4 ≤ q ≤ x+0.4. (4.14.4)
If r = 0.6 for that individual, we know that x-0.2 ≤ q ≤ x+0.2. (4.14.5)
So, if our data corresponded to the case at (4.14.4) we must consider as possible that 
θ might deviate from x by as much as 0.3. But if our data corresponded to the case at 
(4.14.5), we would have to be stupid to consider as possible that θ might deviate from x 
by as much as 0.3. Clearly then, in order to investigate which possible values of θ might 
serve to explain how the particular data might have come about, the distribution of X 
conditionally on R = r is the appropriate frame of reference. That distribution is a uni-
form distribution whose density function is given by:
f(x | r) = (1-r)–1 with x ranging over θ-½ (1-r) < x < θ+½ (1-r).
A test for comparing any pair of θ values from the range of possible values indicated at 
(4.14.3) is given by the co-ordinates of the mental correlate of the datum x within this 
distribution. These are readily obtained by noting that the x value partitions the distri-
bution into a pair of ‘rectangles’ whose areas, computed as height × width, are:
U = (1-r)–1×{x-[θ-½(1-r)]} and V = (1-r)–1×{[θ+½(1-r)]-x}, respectively.
Hence for the particular individual involved, the trace of the mental correlate of x, when 
transported from model to model in the human mind, is given by:
(U, ε, V) = ½- 
q-x  , ε, ½+ q-x   , 
                        1-r               1-r
where the only possible q is such that x-½(1-r) ≤ q ≤ x+½(1-r). (4.14.6)
Approximating ε as zero, this trace is represented by a straight line between the points:
[q, (U, V)] = [x-½ (1-r), (1, 0)] and [q, (U, V)] = [x+½(1-r), (0, 1)],
as shown in Figure 4.14.1, and there is nothing anomalous about it. This resolves Hogg’s 
and Craig’s example of the vacuous-interval paradox. Like the example we developed in 
Section 4.12, the example of Hogg and Craig originates in a mistaken attempt at prediction 
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followed by forecasting instead of prediction followed by pointing. However, their example 
is especially instructive in more ways, as will be shown in the next four sections.
Figure 4.14.1: Values of θ < x-½(1-r) or of θ > x+½(1-r) are ruled out deterministically. For θ < x the 
pointing co-ordinate is V; for θ > x it is U. A trace is invariably data dependent, as is 
here the case, because the trace is a description of how the human mind envisages 
the test datum as coming about
4.15 When operating characteristics are irrelevant
For the problem in the previous section, the lower and upper bounds for a conceptual 
system of symmetric (1-α) confidence intervals for q are given by those values of q such 
that the trace at (4.14.6) reaches
[½ a, ε, 1-½ a] and [1-½ a, ε, ½ a], respectively.
The resulting system comprises intervals of the form
X-½(1-a)(1-r) ≤ q ≤ X+½(1-a)(1-r) for the various r. (4.15.1)
The form at (4.15.1) arises within the conditional frame of reference labelled by the par-
ticular value of r. However, frequentist inference will look upon it as a recipe for repetitive 
decision-making under risk, whose operating characteristics are those that refer to the 
real world, where the decision-maker does not draw X1 and X2 such that X(2)-X(1) takes a 
given value, r. In order to grasp the implications of this, let us, for the moment, reason in 
discrete terms by envisaging how an array of real-world r values would arise as
r’, r’’, r’’’, …, with frequencies f’, f’’, f’’’, …, respectively, f’+f’’+f’’’+… = 1.
For each r value, the form at (4.15.1) involves a conceptual Type I error rate equal to α, 
thus resulting in the real-world Type I error rate also equal to α, as follows:
(f’×a)+(f’’×a)+(f’’’×a)+… = a (4.15.3)
V
U
1
q
x-½ x-½(1-r) x x+½(1-r) x+½
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And, for any given alternative, the form at (4.15.1) involves different conceptual Type II 
error rates,
b’, b’’, b’’’, …, corresponding to r’, r’’, r’’’, …, respectively,
thus resulting in the real-world Type II error rate, as follows:
(f’×b’)+(f’’×b’’)+(f’’’×b’’’) … = b in the notation in Section 3.4. (4.15.4)
Welch (1939), referring to R as labelling ‘samples of the same configuration’, and to r as 
labelling ‘the actual configuration observed’, expresses this:
‘… in actual sampling from a population, we derive samples with all configurations’, 
so that, when testing against any given alternative, ‘the real power of the test will 
therefore be measured’ as ‘the weighted mean’ of those different powers arising 
‘within the separate configurations, the weights being the probabilities … of the 
configurations’. (4.15.5)
Thus Welch (quite correctly) measures ‘the real power of the test’, when simplified as at 
(4.15.4), as
[f’×(1-b’)]+[f’’×(1-b’’)]+[f’’×(1-b’’’)]+… = 1− b. (4.15.6)
Welch arrives at the procedure above for interval estimation via an interpretation of a 
principle proposed by R.A. Fisher, whom he quotes as saying that:
‘in interpreting our estimate … [we] … may take as its sampling distribution that 
appropriate to only those samples which have the actual configuration observed’ 
(Fisher 1936). (4.15.7)
In Chapter 5 we will find that Welch’s reasoning proceeds from a misinterpretation of 
Fisher’s proposal, but that need not concern us here. What concerns us now is the nature 
of frequentist inference, of which the fundamental premise is that any findings of sta-
tistical investigation are decisions made under risk, which risk is to be accounted for by 
way of the real-world error rates when making such decisions repetitively. An inexorable 
consequence of that premise is that investigators are required, in one way or another, to 
ignore certain informative facts about the particular individual under investigation on the 
grounds that any individual must be viewed only in terms of the facts that apply to a host 
of such individuals. This has been exemplified in a variety of ways in previous sections. 
Further development of Welch’s reasoning exemplifies this in yet another way, as follows: 
the equation at (4.15.3) tells us we fix the overall Type I error rate at α by fixing at α the 
Type I error rate within each of the subsidiary frames of reference. Obviously, however, 
different Type I rates α’, α’’, α’’’, … within the same subsidiaries can also yield an overall Type 
I error rate equal to the specified α, the equation at (4.15.3) then being replaced by:
(f’×α’)+(f’’×α’’)+(f’’’×α’’’)+… = α, for appropriate α’, α’’, α’’’, … .
So, the system of symmetric confidence intervals arising from Welch’s interpretation of 
the form at (4.15.1) is not the only such system available. So Welch then considers its ac-
curacy, i.e. its probability of excluding false values of q, and he shows that the following 
system is uniformly more accurate in respect of such values:
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[X-½(1-R), X+½(1-R)] whenever R ≥ √a, and                                                                        2
[X-½(1+R)+√a, X+½(1+R) - √a] whenever R ≤ √a . (4.15.7)                            2                             2                                  2
At (4.14.3) it was found that for almost any particular individual under investigation, 
certain values of q are utterly impossible, yet the recipe at (4.15.7) asks us to ignore that 
information where that would commit us to defective epistemology, as displayed by the 
following example.
Example 4.15.1
Let the data be X = 3.6 and R = 0.6. The investigator is required to specify a value of a, 
perhaps in advance, to ensure that it was done without reference to the data, and must 
ignore the fact that for the particular individual under investigation, any q value not in 
the interval 3.4 < q < 3.8 is utterly impossible. The reader will find that
if a = 0.01, the confidence interval arising at (4.15.7) is 3.4 < q < 3.8,
if a = 0.02, the confidence interval arising at (4.15.7) is 3.4 < q < 3.8,
if a = 0.03, the confidence interval arising at (4.15.7) is 3.4 < q < 3.8,
…
if a = 0.72, the confidence interval arising at (4.15.7) is 3.4 < q < 3.8. (4.15.8)
Compare this to the development in Example 3.7.1, which also mixes a determinate case 
with a statistical case. The defective epistemology displayed at (4.15.8) compels us to agree 
with Kempthorne and Folks (1971, p. 377) when they say that such a system is:
‘ineffective as an ordering of tenability of values for q for the given set of data’ 
(their italics). (4.15.9)
We take the position that a data analyst must reject Welch’s reasoning because in the dis-
course on the pursuit of knowledge, the operating characteristics of procedures for repeti-
tive decision-making in respect of a host of real-world individuals are irrelevant. The data 
analyst must be concerned instead with the separating characteristics of any method for 
ordering the tenability of alternative models a single real-world individual has brought into 
the human mind as explanations of how that solitary individual might have come about. So, 
in the next section, we re-consider the present problem from that point of view.
4.16 The data-analytic approach to Welch’s problem
A data analyst must take account of the taxonomy of a proposed class of models, and 
be wary of oversimplifications that conceal such taxonomy. The issues raised by Welch’s 
problem in the context of elimination testing are simplified without loss of principle 
by considering samples of size n = 2. But in order to account for taxonomy involved by 
commencement testing, we have to consider samples of size n > 2. Then, as (X
(1), X(n)) is 
minimally sufficient for q, the class characteristic is given by:
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the probability of the sample, conditional on (X
(1), X(n)) = (x(1), x(n)),
which amounts to taking the joint distribution of X
(2), X(3), X(4), …, X(n-1), to be that of a 
random sample of n-2 values from a population of values uniformly distributed on the 
interval ranging from x
(1) to x(n). An attractive commencement test statistic is:
S² = the conditional variance of X
(2), X(3), X(4), …, X(n-1), (4.16.1)
as its realised value tends to separate the hypothesised model (of uniform dispersion), 
from incipient alternatives involving over-dispersion, and from incipient alternatives in-
volving under-dispersion. Should the mental correlate of the datum conditional variance 
then be found situated snugly within the hypothesised crowd, we would be encouraged 
to continue with the hypothesised class of models. Note, however, (and this is crucial) 
that such continuation would commit us to discourse that abandons the idée fixe. To be-
lieve, for instance, that such continuation can be subject to ‘controlled error rates’ is utter 
nonsense, for if the continuation were at error, such an error would be in the nature of a 
Type II error, whose rate cannot possibly be accounted for. That is so because the ‘correct 
alternative’ would be utterly unknown. Therefore, to continue by ignoring the implication 
of our inability to account for any such Type II rate, would amount to assuming that the 
purported Type II rate is zero, and would thus amount to our falling victim to a vicious 
circle of the kind displayed in Section 4.8. The issue here is this:
Scientific investigation, in general, has just one instrument for the evaluation of 
given data, and that is to judge the quality of fit of alternative models brought into 
the human mind, as alternative explanations of how those given data might have 
come about. (4.16.2)
So let us consider Welch’s problem from that point of view. We begin by noting that his 
formulation envisages one of those situations where an investigator can declare: ‘The 
possible explanations of how these data might have come about can now be limited to 
those listed here.’ So, in that case, we must envisage how in the investigator’s opinion – 
as tested against circumstantial details, prior experience and theoretical reasoning – the 
possible explanations can be limited to those where the data are represented as:
A sample from a population described by one of the list of densities
f(x) = 1, on q-½ ≤ x ≤ q+½, indexed by q for 0 < q < ∞. (4.16.3)
As a further test of the tenability of this opinion, the investigator might well employ a co-
ordination test, possibly using the test statistic defined at (4.16.1), should sample size allow 
it. As the investigator would have been reluctant to persist with the class of models given at 
(4.16.3) if the hypothesised co-ordinates of the mental correlate of the datum variance had 
turned out to be extreme, we must, for Welch’s purpose, presuppose that such was not the 
case. Let us therefore envisage a commencement test with the following outcome:
The mental correlate of the datum of conditional variance was found to be situ-
ated well within the hypothesised crowd at (0.18, ε, 0.82) in the test distribution. 
So the class characteristic, thus tested, fits the given data well. (4.16.4)
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As explained above, it is utterly impossible to qualify this finding by way of an error rate, 
yet it is entirely reasonable to present it as evidence favouring the hypothesised class, 
as it exemplifies the universal method of scientific investigation described at (4.16.2). 
Since the case of n > 2 has now served its purpose, let us revert to Welch’s simplification 
by considering two investigations involving similar materials, similar circumstances 
and similar methods of measurement, such that a commencement test in one case with 
n > 2, provides acceptable evidence for the other case where n = 2. Consider obtaining, 
now with n = 2, the data X = 3.6 and R = 0.6. Many of the models listed at (4.16.3) are 
eliminated as being those models under which it would be impossible for the given data 
to have come about. The remaining models are then all those for which
x-½(1-r) ≤ q ≤ x+½(1-r), i.e., 3.4 ≤ q ≤ 3.8.
The method indicated at (4.16.2) thus enables the investigator to narrow down further 
the list of models that might explain how the given data came about, these being those 
in which the data are represented as:
A sample from a population described by one of the list of densities:
f(x) = 1, on q-½ ≤ x ≤ q+½, indexed by q for 3.4 ≤ q ≤ 3.8. (4.16.5)
It might be thought that one may describe the reasoning that has advanced us from the 
system at (4.16.3) to the system at (4.16.5) as having a zero error rate, but that would be 
a bad idea, as it would introduce a concept that is not needed. This must be thoroughly 
understood. 
Science, in all its tasks, must always strive to maintain a minimal sufficiency of con-
stituents. Never, ever introduce something that is not needed. (4.16.6)
All the models listed at (4.16.5) provide possible explanations of how the data in hand 
might have come about. Some explanations fit the data well, some awkwardly, and some 
poorly, as shown by the following abbreviated trace obtained from the form at (4.14.6):
(U, ε, V) = (•, ε, 0.05), (•, ε, 0.10), (•, ε, 0.15) at q = 3.42, 3.44, 3.46, respectively,
(U, ε, V) = (0.50, ε, 0.50) at q = 3.60, and
(U, ε, V) = (0.15, ε, •), (0.10, ε, •), (0.05, ε, •) at q = 3.74, 3.76, 3.78, respectively.
A trace is a list of facts, not forecasts; facts are not qualified by probabilities. Here all the 
models labelled by q < 3.42 or q > 3.78 fit the data poorly (observed fact) and all of the 
models labelled by q such that 3.46 < q < 3.74 fit the data well (observed fact). Moreover 
(and the argument that now follows is devastating) these facts cannot be invalidated, 
because in order to counter any attempt to do so, we need only ask:
Has an invalid method been used at commencement? (4.16.7)
An answer in the negative entails self-contradiction, as the same method has produced the 
trace. An answer in the affirmative is not possible, because, as we have explained above, when 
searching for an acceptable class of models that method is essentially the only one avail-
able. Clearly then, frequentist inference cannot survive this argument. Moreover (and this 
is where the devastation will surface), none of the received theories of statistical inference 
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is able to survive this argument. We will therefore be returning to the matter from time to 
time. In order to provide an aid to memory, let us call it the problem of achieving non-circular 
elimination. Its essence is twofold. Firstly, at commencement we must rely on co-ordination 
tests, or on some or other superficially different but essentially equivalent approach, as that 
constitutes the only scientifically valid approach. Consequently, we are unable to disparage 
as invalid any result from a continuation of that approach for elimination testing. Secondly, 
any other approach for elimination testing is incapable of defence if it requires the com-
mencement to provide a foundation that no commencement can provide. In the case of 
frequentist inference above, we have shown that it requires commencement tests capable of 
zero Type II error rates, which no commencement test can provide.
4.17 A revealing peripheral case
When, in Welch’s problem, R = 1 apart from negligible rounding, we know for a fact that 
q = x apart from negligible rounding. Yet, if we use the system given at (4.15.7), having 
specified without reference to the data, a = 0.25 say, and where it turns out that x = 7 say, 
we would in effect have to report that:
The value of q is 7 apart from negligible rounding. But mind you, this result was 
obtained by a method that is erroneous in 25% of cases. (4.17.1)
Opposed to this, any substantive investigator who has managed to avoid statistical in-
doctrination would report (correctly) that:
The value of q is 7 apart from negligible rounding. (4.17.2)
The second sentence at (4.17.1) was determined entirely by an arbitrary value chosen 
without reference to the data, and a corresponding sentence is conspicuously absent at 
(4.17.2). This clearly reveals that the system at (4.15.7) springs from a doctrine at vari-
ance with the investigative method of the substantive sciences. This is not so because 
the doctrine involves mathematical or scientific error, but because it involves epistemo-
logical error. It has mistaken an investigative problem (one in the pursuit of knowledge) 
for a technological problem (one in the use of knowledge).
We note that this section deals with a peripheral case in the sense that R = 1 positions us 
at the interface between statistics and substantive science. Hence mutual understand-
ing is tested, in that a statistical test should not disagree with the finding of substantive 
science, as expressed at (4.17.2). It is thus of considerable interest that co-ordination 
tests do not disagree with the finding at (4.17.2). A suite of co-ordination tests, precisely 
performed, would generate a trace here, where owing to rounding, the co-ordinates of 
the mental correlate of the test datum vary slightly, perhaps
from (0.990, 0.010, Ø) when q = 6.999,
through (0.495, 0.010, 0.495) when q = 7.000,
up to (Ø, 0.010, 0.990) when q = 7.001,
and where the finding at (4.17.2) agrees with this by way of the phrase ‘apart from neg-
ligible rounding’.
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4.18 A fundamental rule on ancillary statistics
Owing to the developments in Sections 3.7, 4.13, 4.14, 4.15 and 4.16, it is now clear that 
the problems raised by ancillary statistics are not problems in forecasting. As we saw in 
Section 3.7, the frame of reference when forecasting is simply that which has been speci-
fied by the forecaster. However, this fact has been obscured by the ideas of frequentist 
inference in terms of which investigative problems are (mistakenly) interpreted as fore-
casting problems. When such mistakes are ruled out, the issue is clarified to a large 
extent. Moreover, it is easy for such mistakes to be ruled out simply by recognising that 
the investigation of a data set must, as an invariable scientific rule, always take the form 
of asking: ‘How might this particular data set have come about?’ In a later chapter on 
ancillary statistics we will return to this point.
4.19 Neyman’s theory of statistical inference
Frequentists tend to be unaware of the stereotypic nature of their reasoning. This is 
because they tend not to perceive their stereotypic arrays in substantive terms, but in 
terms of the statistics of the prescribed behaviour instead. Thus for instance, a typical 
text on hypothesis tests would point out that Type I and Type II error rates do not apply 
to just one particular instance of a hypothesis test. In one such test, the text will explain, 
the decision made is either at error (‘rate’ = 1), or not at error (‘rate’ = 0). The typical text 
explains that these rates apply to the method used, which means that the properties of 
the method used become the properties of the user’s behaviour. That behaviour is then 
held forth as committing Type I errors in trifling proportions of cases, whilst minimis-
ing the rates at which any Type II errors are committed. Thus Neyman (1952, p. 209), in 
explaining his theory of confidence intervals, recommends that: 
‘ … as an act of will, not reasoning’, we are ‘ … to behave as if it were known for cer-
tain that the true value of θ  lies between the lower and the upper confidence limits 
computed from actual observations’  (original italics). (4.19.1)
He argues that:
‘The motivation behind this rule of behavior is simple: taking into account the 
operational interpretation of confidence intervals, we know that the long-run 
relative frequency of cases where our actions will be adjusted correctly, is equal 
to the (confidence coefficient) which we have selected ourselves.’ (4.19.2)
Neyman is well aware that the long-run relative frequency in question is ‘deduced from 
specified assumptions’, but is evidently unaware that such reasoning courts the vicious 
circle dealt with in Section 4.8. Nor has he been alone in this. On the contrary, such 
reasoning has turned out to be exceedingly persuasive, thus distracting attention from 
the scientific method of data analysis and beguiling statisticians instead with the idea 
that statistical inference equals ‘behaviour subject to low error rates’. This has not only 
entrenched the shortcomings discussed in previous sections, but has also lead to the 
further idea that error rates accumulate owing to ‘simultaneous statistical inference’. 
However, this need not concern us at present. For now we wish to make it clear that 
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the theory of hypothesis tests and its dual theory of confidence intervals are directed at 
the attainment of real-world error rates. For instance, Neyman (1952, pp. 210 onward), 
describes a sampling experiment that may be conducted to illustrate the operational 
interpretation of confidence intervals for an unknown parameter q, and points out that 
in a hundred repetitions of the experiment:
‘ … you will find it instructive to select for your sampling experiment a set of, say, 
100 different values (quite arbitrary) of q’. (4.19.3)
Subsequently he remarks that one will of course realise quickly that the resulting data 
are independent of those ‘100 different values’, and so one may as well have used the sin-
gle most convenient value of q. But that is beside the point here. The point here is simply 
this: the statements at (4.19.1), (4.19.2) and (4.19.3) clearly show Neyman as committed 
to the idea of trying to achieve real-world error rates.
4.20 The incoherence dilemma of frequentist inference
We return to the idée fixe. It falls under the general notion of probability inference, which 
is conveyed by Definition 4.20.1. 
Definition 4.20.1:
The term probability inference refers to the idea of developing a system of inductive logic whose fundamen-
tal concept, corresponding to that of deductive implication, would be that of probabilistic implication. It 
refers, in other words, to the idea of developing a concept that can represent the degree of rational credibi-
lity (‘probability’ in some sense) that a given body of evidence confers on a particular scientific hypothesis.
If there is to be any hope of developing a satisfactory theory of probability inference it 
would have to involve some or other form of statistical inference as a special case. The 
concept of a ‘degree of rational credibility’ as in Definition 4.20.1 would, in the statisti-
cal case, then have to be supplied by a statistical error rate, or a confidence coefficient, 
or a fiduciary probability of some sort. In this section we show that in trying to develop 
such a concept, frequentist inference falls into incoherence that constitutes one horn 
of a dilemma; the other horn being the vicious circle displayed in Section 4.8. It will in 
fact become obvious that any attempt to develop such a concept in the statistical case 
is bound to land on the horns of that dilemma. Theorem 4.20.1 states this fact in terms 
more general than frequentist terms. 
Theorem 4.20.1 (The incoherence dilemma of statistical inference).
It is not possible to unify commencement tests and elimination tests by coherent probability calculus. 
Any attempt to overcome this difficulty either fails to achieve coherence (the first horn of the dilemma), 
or else falls into circular reasoning (the second horn of the dilemma).
No satisfactory treatment of the notion of ‘statistical inference’ could possibly evade 
this dilemma. So, though Section 4.8 has in effect already provided its proof, the issue is 
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of such overriding importance that we must, at the risk of belabouring the matter, make 
sure that the limitation it imposes upon us is firmly grasped. So we now give two further 
examples to show why coherent probability calculus in the sense referred to in Theorem 
4.20.1 is generally unattainable by frequentist inference. In each example, the data in 
hand are first analysed using co-ordination tests, after which the incoherence arising 
from the introduction of frequentist ideas is shown. In each example the main thrust of 
the argument calls for a probability statement of the sort envisaged by Definition 4.20.1, 
a statement regarding the possible values of a particular parameter, denoted by θ.
Example 4.20.1
This example involves three different data sets and a problem to be solved, as follows: 
despite the presence of hundreds of sharks in the coastal waters around Cape Town, many 
between three and six metres in length, they rarely attack humans, their staple food being 
the Cape fur seal. During the 15 years 1990 to 2004 inclusive, the numbers of fatal shark 
attacks on humans in Cape waters were as follows (in sequential order):
1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 2, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 2. (Data Set 1) (4.20.1)
Thus the total numbers of fatal attacks over the five consecutive three-year periods were 
as follows (in sequential order):
1, 1, 3, 1, 3. (Data Set 2) (4.20.2)
The numbers of all shark attacks over the 15 years were as follows (in sequential order):
4, 2, 1, 4, 9, 3, 3, 5, 15, 8, 4, 3, 3, 4, 3. (Data Set 3) (4.20.3)
The problem to be solved. We must try as best we can (this is to be the main thrust of the 
development) to form an opinion about the possible values of 
θ = Pr(more than 2 fatal attacks within the same calendar year),
where that requires of circumstantial reasoning and commencement tests to bring into the 
human mind the tenable members of a class of models indexed by θ.                    (4.20.4)
A solution using co-ordination tests: To commence with, we ask, for each of the three data 
sets, whether or not the numbers of attacks might be modelled satisfactorily as a Poisson 
sample. Using the dispersion index test as explained in Examples 1.11.1 and 1.11.2, we find:
For Set 1: The datum chi-square, 12.7 on 14 df, is found to be situated at approximately 
(0.4, 0.1, 0.5*) in the test distribution. So the Poisson class characteristic, as tested, fits 
the given data well.
For Set 2: The datum chi-square, 2.67 on 4 df, is found to be situated at approximately 
(0.4, 0.2, 0.4*) in the test distribution. So the Poisson class characteristic, as tested, fits 
the given data well.
For Set 3: The datum chi-square, 36.5 on 14 df, is found to be situated at approximately 
(0.9990, 0.0001, 0.0009*) in the test distribution. So, in this case, the Poisson class char-
acteristic, as tested, fits the given data very poorly.
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Set 3 is bound to involve sources of heterogeneity that would be partly removed by re-
stricting the analysis to fatal attacks only because such attacks involve sharks of less vari-
able size and species. Also, the term ‘non-fatal attack’ is not as well defined as the term 
‘fatal attack’. Furthermore, a fatal attack is sure to be reported whereas some non-fatal 
attacks would go unreported. However, one cannot assume that Set 1 is completely homo-
geneous; the alternative possibility of some undetected heterogeneity must be conceded. 
Nevertheless, the numbers of fatal attacks is approximated satisfactorily by the Poisson 
class characteristic, thus providing for a tenable solution to the problem stated at (4.20.4). 
The same solution then holds for both Set 1 and Set 2 since, for each of these, we must 
proceed from an analysis of the form given at (1.8.1), where the first factor and the datum 
it addresses are precisely the same for sets 1 and 2, as follows: for sampling from any mem-
ber of our class models, the sample total X is distributed as a Poisson random variable 
and is minimally sufficient for the index, which may be taken as E(X÷15) = λ say. Making 
X address the corresponding real-world datum, X = 9 fatal attacks, we invariably obtain 
over all levels of co-ordination a suite of uniformly most separating co-ordination tests for 
comparing whatever pairs of alternative values of λ might be of interest, 0 < λ < ∞. In order 
to address the problem formulated at (4.20.4) we then note that: 
θ = 1-e-l(1+l+½ l2) is a one-to-one transformation.
It follows from Theorem 2.5.1 that the trace of the mental correlate of our test datum, 
X = 9 fatal attacks, expressed in terms of the probability of interest, θ, is given by:
(U, ε, V) = (0.025, ε, •), (0.050, ε, •), (0.100, ε, •), when θ = 0.004, 0.006, 0.008,
(U, ε, V) = (0.5, ε, 0.5), when θ = 0.028, and
(U, ε, V) = (•, ε, 0.100), (•, ε, 0.050), (•, ε, 0.025), when θ = 0.071, 0.089, 0.108,
respectively. In the absence of any contrary evidence, a reasonable opinion might thus 
hold that the probability of interest is not much less than 1%, and not much more than 
7%. We note, however, that this is not at all prescriptive; facts derived by statistical data 
analysis must leave room for any other facts that might bear upon the matter.
Introducing frequentist ideas: In order to give a standard two-sided confidence interval 
for the probability of interest, we must specify, without reference to the data, the value 
of the confidence coefficient as say 1-α = 0.95. And (as can be derived from the co-ordi-
nation tests given above) this specification would have us assert:
The interval bounded by θ = 0.004 and θ = 0.108 has been obtained by a method 
that would cover the true value of θ in 95% of cases. (4.20.5)
But if we try to defend this assertion we land on the horns of a dilemma: for if (and this leads 
to the first horn) we simply assume that X may be taken to be a Poisson random variable, 
we land in the vicious circle displayed in Section 4.8. If (and this leads to the second horn) 
we try to defend the assertion by citing commencement tests, we fall into incoherence, as 
follows: each of the two dispersion index co-ordination tests enables us to perform a cor-
responding hypothesis test, and we must, in each case and without reference to the data, 
specify a Type I error rate. Let us specify say α = 0.05 in each case. Then, expressing each test 
in terms of the significance level as test statistic, we find that:
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For Set 1: SL = 0.1+0.5 = 0.6 > α; so, the Poisson model is accepted.
For Set 2: SL = 0.2+0.4 = 0.6 > α; so, the Poisson model is accepted. (4.20.6)
The theory of hypothesis tests would in each case therefore have us assert that:
The decision has been reached by a method that would in 5% of cases lead to false 
rejection of the null hypothesis. (4.20.7)
But the assertion at (4.20.7) cannot provide for a coherent probability calculation that 
would culminate in the assertion at (4.20.5). That is because in the case of Set 2 the dis-
persion index test involves just four of the fourteen degrees of freedom that are involved 
by the corresponding test in the case of Set 1. So for the two different tests performed 
at (4.20.6) the probabilities of having incurred corresponding Type II errors cannot be 
equal. Coherent probability calculations would thus either have to lead to an interval 
estimate of θ for Set 2 that is wider than that for Set 1, or else would have to lead to a 
coverage probability for Set 2 that is less than that for Set 1.
Remark: One cannot simply accept Poisson sampling as obviously the correct model in 
the present case. A statistician who adopts a class of models for the representation of 
given data without as much as a cursory examination of those data does not amount 
to much. One who does do even the most cursory examination has thereby performed 
an informal commencement test. Literature that fails to come to grips with this is fun-
damentally defective – unfortunately that is the case in almost all currant literature on 
statistical inference.
Example 4.20.2
Again we consider given data and a problem to be solved, in this case as follows:
The data: Bliss (1967, p. 212) considers the healing times of skin wounds on the backs 
of 40 rats – 20 treated with medication, and 20 unmatched controls. He uses Fisher’s g1 
and g2 to test for skewness and kurtosis, and Snedecor’s F to test for heterogeneity of 
variance. That motivates an analysis of healing rate, the reciprocal of healing time, and 
the use of Student’s t for interval estimation of an additive treatment effect.
The problem to be solved: We must try as best we can (this is to be the main thrust of 
the development) to form an opinion about the possible values of:
θ = the treatment effect, as expressed on a suitable scale,
where that requires of circumstantial reasoning and commencement tests to bring into 
the human mind the tenable members of a class of models indexed by θ    (4.20.8)
A solution using co-ordination tests: The statistical co-ordinates that direct us to the situ-
ations of the hypothesised mental correlates of the observed g1, g2 and F for this example 
are given in Table 4.20.1.
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Table 4.20.1: Hypothesised co-ordinates for an analysis of data on skin wounds on the backs of 
20 rats treated with medication, and of 20 untreated control rats. Response was 
measured as healing time, or healing rate, the reciprocal of time.
Healing time Healing rate
Treated rat Control rats Treated rats Control rats
Skewness (•, ε, 0.162) (•, ε, 0.008) (0.336, ε, •) (0.114, ε, •)
Kurtosis (0.321, ε, •) (•, ε, 0.058) (0.309, ε, •) (0.180, ε, •)
Variance ratio (•, ε, 0.005) (•, ε, 0.376)
The transformation from times to rates, reduced skewness, kurtosis and heterogeneity 
of variance, all of which were evidently due to lingering wounds, resulting in skewness 
to the right, platykurtosis and inflated error variance, mainly amongst the controls. De-
noting the additive treatment effect on healing rate as θ, its estimate as d and the esti-
mated standard error of d as sd,
(d-q)÷sd = Student’s central t on (20-1)+(20-1) = 38 degrees of freedom,
where d = 1.2185 and sd = 0.1446 for the given data set. (4.20.9)
This elimination pivot generates the following abbreviated trace for various situations 
of the mental correlate of the corresponding test datum, when variation in the value of 
θ transports the correlate from model to model in the human mind:
(0.025, ε, •) and (•, ε, 0.025) are attained at θ = 0.93 and 1.51, respectively,
(0.050, ε, •) and (•, ε, 0.050) are attained at θ = 0.97 and 1.46, respectively, and
(0.100, ε, •) and (•, ε, 0.100) are attained at θ = 1.02 and 1.41, respectively.
So, as tested, the members of our class of models that fit the given data satisfactorily 
are those for which θ is not much more than 0.05 less than 1.02, and not much more 
than 0.05 more than 1.41. This is a fact; not simply an opinion. The investigator might 
also be of that opinion with regard to the substantive interpretation of θ, but we must 
distinguish the facts that help inform such an opinion from that opinion itself. If we do 
not, we risk falling victim to the idea that statistical facts require a knowing subject who 
must specify an error rate without reference to the data, and as an act of will refuse to 
admit that the case in hand might be statistically unusual. We will return to this point.
Introducing frequentist ideas: To test for normality, Bliss uses the recipe given at (1.31.2), 
thus performing ‘simultaneous statistical inference’ with regard to the four alternative 
possibilities, skewness to the left, skewness to the right, leptokurtosis and mesokurto-
sis. In respect of healing times this test leads to:
chi-square on 2 df = 1.19 for the treated rats but 8.31 for the controls,
where the latter exceeds the 0.025 critical value, 7.38. (4.20.10)
As a further test for normality of healing times Bliss uses Snedecor’s F to compare the 
variance of the healing times of treated rats to that of controls. This test leads to:
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F on 19 and 19 df = 3.45,
where that exceeds the 0.025 critical value, 2.53. (4.20.11)
Such tests lead Bliss to reject the hypothesised normality of healing times, and instead 
to consider healing rates. Instead of the results at (4.20.10) one then finds:
chi-square on 2 df = 1.16 for the treated rats and 1.45 for the controls,
where neither of these exceeds the 0.025 critical value, 5.02. (4.20.12)
And, instead of the result at (4.20.11) one then finds:
F on 19 and 19 df = 1.17,
where that does not exceed the 0.025 critical value, 2.53. (4.20.13)
Such tests prompt Bliss to accept the hypothesised normality of healing rates. Thus re-
interpretation of the test at (4.20.13) as one for homogeneity of variance given normality, 
is taken to justify the use of Student’s t for interval estimation of an additive treatment 
effect on healing rate. Hence Bliss finds that:
0.9257 < θ < 1.5113 is a 0.95 confidence interval for θ. (4.20.14)
The procedures that have culminated in the result at (4.20.14) are clearly inspired by the 
idea of ‘probability inference’ as expressed by Definition 4.19.1. At (4.20.10) for instance, 
the Type I error rates incurred in respect of healing time, say α1 and α2, are functions of 
constituent rates, say α11j, α12j,  α13j and α14j, for j = 1, 2 respectively, in respect of which we 
can show by coherent probability calculus that for the recipe used by Bliss:
α11j, α12j, α13j, α14j ≈ 
- 1+√1+a1j , for j = 1,2. (4.20.15) 
                                      6
Bliss specifies αj = 0.05, and thus by implication specifies:
α11j, α12j, α13j, α14j ≈ 0.0125, for j = 1,2. (4.20.16)
A moot point here is whether or not simultaneous statistical inference would require, 
instead of the two separate tests as at (4.20.10), just a single test based on the sum of the 
two chi-square values. The result would be chi-square = 9.40 on four degrees of freedom, 
which fails to exceed its 0.05 critical value, 9.49, and would thus force Bliss to adopt, as an 
act of will, a model that with good reason he considers inappropriate. However, whatever 
view one might take, it is nevertheless impossible to avoid incoherence. This becomes 
apparent immediately when one notes that the Type II error rates incurred at (6.19.12) 
in respect of healing rate, say β1 and β2, are functions of constituent rates, say β11j, β12j, β13j 
and β14j, for j = 1, 2 respectively, but where these rates are utterly unknown to the extent of 
not even being at all capable of some or other mathematical expressions corresponding to 
those at (4.20.15) and (4.20.16). Again, at (4.20.11) the Type I error rate incurred could be 
specified, but consider as follows the Type II rate thus incurred at (4.20.13).
Denote the variances of the data on healing rates by
s 2 for the treated rats, and s 2 for the control rats,    1                                            2
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the corresponding random variables that come into the human mind by
S 2 and S 2, respectively, with E(S 2) = s 2, and E(S 2) = s 2,    1           2                                       1          1                2         2
and the 0.0125 critical value of Snedecor’s F on 19 and 19 df by F19,19 (0.0125). Then the 
Type II error rate incurred at (4.20.13) is capable of mathematical expression as
1-Pr[F     (0.0125) ≥ (S2÷S2)÷(s2÷s2)] ≥ F -1   (0.0125)], 
           
19,19                                        1        2             1         2                 19,19
where s2÷s2, however, is an unknown value. (4.20.17)              1        2
Clearly then frequentist inference involves non-trivial probabilities by way of Type II error 
rates that cannot, in the sense of Definition 4.19.1, be brought into account by coherent 
probability calculus, i.e. by calculus able to provide ‘the probability’, in the frequentist 
sense, that given data confer on a scientific hypothesis about how those data might have 
come about.
The issue is this: Neyman’s theory of statistical inference tells us (correctly so) that the 
interval estimate at (4.20.14) was obtained by a method that, under certain hypothetical 
circumstances, would bracket the true value of interest in 95% of cases, but cannot confer 
that 95% probability onto the actual circumstances, and so cannot provide a ‘probability’ 
in the sense required by Definition 4.20.1. Its attempt to do so is incoherently eclectic. 
That its reasoning is eclectic is exemplified by the moot point raised in connection with 
the tests at (4.20.10). That its reasoning is incoherent is very simple to prove, as follows:
Specify 0.050 instead of 0.025 as the Type I error rate at (4.20.10) and (4.20.12).
Specify 0.050 instead of 0.025 as the Type I error rate at (4.20.11) and (4.20.13).
The reasoning would then lead to precisely the same confidence interval at (4.20.14). 
Bearing in mind that by altering a Type I error rate we alter any corresponding Type II 
error rate, it follows beyond any reasonable contest that the confidence coefficient at 
(4.20.14) does not arise from a coherent evaluation of the given body of evidence.
We have developed Theorem 4.20.1 in the context of frequentist inference. However, it 
is obvious that Definition 4.20.1 cannot possibly be satisfied by statistical inference of 
whatever kind for the simple reason that an elimination test is always preceded by com-
mencement testing of some or other kind so as to provide for the class of models then 
to be employed by the elimination test. That inexorably involves the possibility of Type 
II errors, the ‘probabilities’ of which cannot be provided.
4.21 The scientific status of proof by dilemma
Present-day statistical practice rests on deeply entrenched habits of thought in support 
of the notion that statistics requires its own special form of ‘inference’. These habits of 
thought are not aware of the extent to which they sustain that notion by incoherent and 
circular reasoning, and may therefore be expected to cast doubt on the scientific validity 
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of our proofs by dilemma. We must not allow that. So, let us note that a proof by dilemma 
is unexceptionable in science. This is exemplified by the scientific view on astrology. As-
trology purports to forecast the course of every individual human life on the basis of the 
positions, at the moment of inception of that life, of earth’s planets, and of the appropriate 
position of 12 astrological constellations named Aries, Taurus, Gemini, etc., comprising 
the 12 parts of the zodiac. But the question: ‘Which of the 12 constellations is appropriate 
to a given human life?’ lands astrology on the horns of a dilemma. There are two different 
schools of thought, respectively called ‘tropical’ and ‘sidereal’. The tropical school adheres 
to the concept of the zodiac as formulated by ancient astrologers thousands of years ago 
referring to charts that no longer reflect the positions of the planets or stars accurately. 
This is so because of what is known as ‘the precession’ of the earth, as a result of which 
the constellations have since shifted such that the zodiac has undergone a displacement 
equal to one whole constellation. For instance, if you are a Taurus according to the tropical 
school, you are actually an Aries according to the sidereal school, since the latter school 
takes precession into account. This brings us to the dilemma: if you are a Taurus accord-
ing to the tropical school (this leads to the first horn of the dilemma), your horoscope is 
not governed by the positions of the celestial bodies, but by an ancient authority. And 
if you are a Taurus according to the sidereal school (this leads to the second horn of the 
dilemma), your horoscope is governed by a classification principle that for thousands of 
years failed to observe that it was producing fallacious horoscopes. Thus we have a proof 
by dilemma that astrology is not a science. That is the case because science, on the one 
hand, does not employ the method of authority. And, on the other hand, science must 
look askance at reasoning that, albeit in terms of correcting for the precession of the earth, 
persists in an ancient theory of forecasting that refuses to employ the scientific method 
of systematically examining whether or not its forecasts are realised. It must be grasped 
firmly that the method of proof that here holds for astrology also holds for statistics, as 
science cannot tolerate any reasoning that is incoherent, or that proceeds from self-serv-
ing assumptions incapable of empirical defence. There can be no merit in habits of statis-
tical thought that obstinately refuse to abandon ideas and convictions that our proofs by 
dilemma have shown to amount to a meme, that is to say, to a self-replicating element of 
culture, passed on by imitation (Dawkins 2003).
4.22 The randomised test paradox
Amongst the paradoxes of present interest, the randomised test paradox is perhaps the 
most revealing. For a paradigmatic example we suppose that an investigator wishes to 
establish whether or not a certain taster can discriminate by taste between two wines. 
So in each of seven separate replicates the taster is served three specimens of wine, one 
from a randomly chosen one of the wines, and two from the other wine; one of the latter 
two is labelled ‘duplicate’. In each replicate the taster must try by taste to identify, or fail-
ing that to guess, which specimen is odd. Let the number of successful identifications 
be modelled as a binomial random variable X. Let θ denote the probability of a success 
(0.5 ≤ θ < 1). Let the given data be such that X = 6. The investigative question is:
How might these particular data have come about? (4.22.1)
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In the following we consider first how a co-ordination tester would have us deal with the 
question, and then how a frequentist would have us do so, given agreement that all of 
the possible ways in which X = x might have come about, are exhausted by the binomial 
models
[x, Pr(X = x|θ)] =  x,        
7!
        qx(1-q) 
7-x
   for x = 0, 1, 2, …, 7. (4.22.2) 
                                     x!(7-x)!
Our problem is to judge which of these models then provide tenable explanations of 
how the given datum, X = 6, might have come about.
Example 4.22.1: A co-ordination tester’s approach
X is minimally sufficient for θ, and ordering on the value of X we obtain a suite of co-
ordination tests that are most separating, uniformly so over all possible pairs of index 
values, and invariably so at every attainable level of co-ordination. Consider, for in-
stance, the pair of models indexed by θ = 1÷2 and θ = 3÷4. Expressing the model indexed 
by θ = 1÷2 as:
27Pr(X = x | θ = 1÷2) = 1, 7, 21, 35, 35, 21, 7, 1,
for x = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, respectively, (4.22.3)
the mental correlate of the given datum, X = 6, is found rather awkwardly far down at:
(U, ε, V) = (0.94, 0.05, 0.01) in the right-hand tail of that model. (4.22.4)
Expressing the alternative model indexed by θ = 3 ÷ 4 as:
47Pr(X = x|θ = 3÷4) = 1×30, 7×31, 21×32, 35×33, 35×34, 21×35, 7×36, 1×37, 
for x = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, respectively, (4.22.5)
the mental correlate of the given datum, X = 6, is found snugly within the crowd at:
(U, ε, V) = (0.56, 0.31, 0.13) in that model. (4.22.6)
Such comparisons of all possible pairs of index values are made available by the trace of 
the mental correlate of the given datum, which trace is given by:
[U(θ), ε(θ), V(θ)] = [1-7θ6(1-θ)-θ7, 7θ6(1-θ), θ7], for 1÷2 ≤ θ <1. (4.22.7)
A co-ordination tester would hold that for X = 6, this trace comprises the whole of the 
available evidence that one might bring to bear on the question at (4.22.1) and would thus 
hold that in respect of that question, there is nothing more to consider. In order to under-
stand this, we note that there are infinitely many one to one transforms of the minimal 
sufficient statistic, examples of such transforms being ln(X+1), CX for C any non-zero 
constant, 1÷(X+1), … . The distributions of different transforms have different shapes; 
so those differences in shape cannot possibly be part of the evidence to be considered. 
The whole of the evidence to be considered is therefore all that and just that which, in 
respect of the given datum, is invariant under one to one transformation, and where that 
invariant, and just that invariant, is conveyed by the statistical co-ordinates of the mental 
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correlate of the given datum. The point here is simply that X is merely a label; so, its co-
ordinates convey the whole of the evidence in a form that measures fit directly.
Example 4.22.2: A hypothesis tester’s approach
The most direct frequentist approach to the problem would be to limit interest to just 
two alternative hypotheses that are substantively expressed as
H0: no discriminative ability, versus H1: some discriminative ability,
and mathematically expressed as
H0: θ = 0 versus H1: θ > 0.
A frequentist interprets the problem to be one in decision-making under risk, the risk 
being that of erroneously rejecting one or the other of the two alternative hypotheses. The 
problem is then taken to be that of controlling those risks, insofar as possible, by specify-
ing small probabilities of erroneous decision, and of otherwise minimising the probabili-
ties of error. The choice of the alternatives H0: θ = 0, H1: θ > 0 has to some extent been 
governed by such a view of the problem, because of the Neyman-Pearson lemma for re-
petitive decision-making under risk – the lemma tells us how the probability of errone-
ously rejecting H1 can be uniformly minimised for any specified probability (α for 0 < α <1) 
of erroneously rejecting H0. Specification of α must then be without any reference to the 
data, as say α = 0.05 (a widely favoured value). It then turns out that for the data in hand
the critical region is X = 7, where Pr(X = 7 | H0) = 1÷27,
the boundary is X = 6, where Pr(X = 6 | H0) = 7÷27, and
the acceptance region is X < 6, where Pr(X < 6 | H0).= 120÷27. (4.22.8)
As 0.05 = (1÷27)+(27÷35)(7÷27), the Neyman-Pearson lemma for repetitive decision-
making under risk thus tells us that, in order to obtain a uniformly most powerful test 
of size 0.05, we must whenever X = 6, draw Y, a haphazard one of the numbers 1, 2, 3, …, 
35, and then employ the following decision rule:
If Y > 27, accept H0: θ = 0, thereby rejecting H1: θ > 0.
If Y ≤ 27, reject H0: θ = 0, thereby accepting H1: θ > 0. (4.22.9)
Here is a paradox, as follows: we have been asked to develop scientific answers to the 
question: ‘How might these data have come about?’ We respond by drawing a chip from a 
bowl containing eight chips labelled ‘H0 is the correct explanation’, and 27 chips labelled 
‘H1 is the correct explanation’. Then, following Neyman as quoted at (4.18.1), we, in an 
‘act of will’, must ‘behave as if it were known for certain’ that the explanation offered by 
the label on that chip is the true explanation. This is a paradox precisely as defined in the 
second sentence of Section 4.10: firstly because we have ‘a self-contradictory proposition’ 
as there defined, in that Y cannot possibly provide any information toward answering 
the question at (4.22.1), and secondly because, and again as defined in Section 4.10, the 
proposition arises from mistaken reasoning. In fact, it arises, as do all those paradoxes we 
dealt with previously in this chapter, from reasoning that has mistaken a problem in the 
investigation of one particular case, for a problem in repetitive decision-making in a host 
of such cases.
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Discussion
An overwhelming majority of frequentists are somehow with limited understanding 
agreed upon the objectionable nature of a randomised hypothesis test when used for the 
analysis of particular data and so would agree with Agresti (2002, p. 27) to persecute the 
notion of such use. They would also agree with him when, by way of giving his reason for 
that, he vehemently (and wrongly) declares of the auxiliary random number that:
‘ … it is absurd to let this random number influence a decision.’ (4.22.10)
There is nothing ‘absurd’ about a scientific technology achieving its stated objectives, 
and, as we have seen in Chapter 3, randomised decision rules are unexceptionable. On 
the contrary, it would be truly absurd for any informed individual to refuse using such 
technology in the case of R.A. Fisher’s example of repetitive decision-making under risk 
as described in Section 3.10. However, as Agresti’s book is obviously directed at data 
analysis, he is quite correct in refusing to countenance the use of randomised decision 
rules for such analyses. Where he goes wrong, along with other frequentists, is when he 
thinks that all that needs to be done about it, is to avoid using that particular kind of 
decision rule for the analysis of given data, thus failing to realise that any decision rule 
is inappropriate for such analysis.
4.23 An irrelevant disagreement
We note in passing that much of the literature on statistical data analysis would have 
the investigator specify the Type I error rate. Other such literature would instead have 
the investigator report the corresponding realised significance level, so that the reader 
of the report may specify his/her preferred Type I error rate. The issue is irrelevant, as in 
data analysis no such specification should be made at all. A rate can be realised in a host 
of cases; it cannot be realised in just one particular case.
4.24 A liaison between ‘knowledge’ and its ‘knower’
At (4.22.J, J = 2, 3, 4, …. 7) probability concepts give mathematical expression to a variety of 
predictive models, and to the predication of given data by those models. All the predications 
involved are facts of the form ‘such data could come about by way of …, and so these data 
might have come about thus’, — are facts that can by simulation be forced upon the human 
body, — are facts beyond reasonable contest. Instead of that, the idée fixe proposes to intro-
duce further probability concepts to give expression to the idea that statistical inference pro-
duces not facts, but uncertain knowledge. And, as that uncertainty cannot possibly spring 
from the substantive subject matter under investigation, it must spring from the knower 
of the purported knowledge. Various received theories of statistical inference thus involve 
a knower whose uncertainty is then, in some or other sense, expressed by ‘probability’. In 
the case of frequentist inference the knower must, by acts of will, treat particular decisions 
made under risk as knowledge of uncertain kind. That uncertainty is then to be expressed 
by way of the error rates of a purported host of such decisions.
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It will be found that each of various received theories of statistical inference has its own 
device for expressing ‘the uncertainty of the knower of the uncertain knowledge’, and 
the result is invariably a liaison of the purported ‘knowledge’ and its ‘knower’. In the case 
of frequentist inference, the liaison is revealed with special clarity by the randomised 
test paradox, as any such test is a liaison of three constituents, as follows in the case of 
Example 4.22.2.
Constituent 1: The display at (4.22.8) comprises facts brought forward from the 
trace displayed at (4.22.7). The knower is not involved; only the data are.
Constituent 2: The Type I error rate α = 0.05 is specified without reference to the 
data in hand. The knower, being the specifier, is involved.
Constituent 3: The random number Y is drawn to achieve the specified error rate: 
0.05 = (1÷27)+(27÷35)(7÷27). The knower, being the drawer of Y, is involved.
We have remarked that an overwhelming majority of frequentists refuse to use a ran-
domised hypothesis test for the analysis of given data. Yet, such tests enable one to 
achieve the stated objective of frequentist inference, which is to minimise Type II error 
rates whilst achieving specified Type I error rates, where it would then be silly to rule 
out any attainable error rate considered desirable. So we have to ask: ‘Why then such 
refusal?’ The only discernible answer is:
Y is adjoined to the given data after those data have already come about, and thus 
cannot possibly partake of how those data might have come about. (4.24.1)
This reasoning applies not only to Y, but also to α. So it compels us to recognise that 
Constituents 2 and 3 must both be expelled from data analysis. The outcome is then 
to remove all those constituents arising from the knower only, and thus to dissolve the 
liaison between the knowledge and its knower. This takes us back to Constituent 1 (the 
trace at (4.22.7)) as conveying all that we can learn by making the models agreed to at 
(4.22.2) address the given data. This underscores a fundamental principle of scientific 
reasoning, a principle we met at (4.16.6):
Never ever introduce a constituent that is not needed. (4.24.2)
As indicated already, various theories of statistical inference produce their own forms of 
liaison between the knowledge and its knower. We meet the liaisons in subsequent chap-
ters, and find that each one springs from some or other defective epistemology. So we 
must call for their dissolution. It is worth noting that Popper (1979) arrives at a similar 
view, but on wider grounds. He calls for ‘an epistemology without a knowing subject’, 
which he holds, is required to attain ‘objective knowledge’. In a statistical context we must, 
however, be leery of the terms objective and subjective, because these terms have come 
to be associated with a silly dispute between frequentists and Bayesians. So, let us rather 
describe developments of the kind in Example 4.22.1 as exemplifying the attainment of 
impersonal knowledge, of knowledge without a knower. Or, better still, let us note that 
knowledge without a knower is indicated whenever we speak of facts. After all, the trace at 
(4.22.7) simply conveys facts, does it not? Facts that can be forced upon the human body, 
is that not so? It cannot be said of co-ordination tests that they produce uncertain know-
ledge; it must rather be said of such tests that they produce factual knowledge.
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4.25 A persuasive diversion
Attempts at explaining how these data might have come about are by introduction of the 
knower of frequentist inference, persuasively diverted into attempts at keeping track of 
‘the knower’s error rates’. That, in turn, leads to ideas of simultaneous statistical infer-
ence. In order to come to grips with this, we now develop, instead of the co-ordination 
tests of Table 4.20.1, and in respect of healing time, corresponding hypothesis tests im-
bedded in a stereotypic array. In order to display the reasoning of simultaneous statisti-
cal inference in its most accessible form, the version of that reasoning used here differs 
slightly from the version we introduced in Example 1.31.1 and used in Example 4.20.2.
Example 4.25.1
Let the Type I error rate of the prospective stereotypic array be specified as α = 0.01, 
especially low error rates being widely recommended in cases of medical interest. We 
begin with the treated rats. Consider the test for skewness in Table 4.20.1. It employs a 
test statistic Z1 whose hypothesised distribution is:
N(θ, 1) with θ = 0, (4.25.1)
and whose distribution might, for argument’s sake, alternatively be:
N(θ, 1) with θ = -3.608 say, in case of skewness to the left, or
N(θ, 1) with θ = +3.608 say, in case of skewness to the right. (4.25.2)
If θ = +3.608 would be the only possible alternative, the appropriate decision rule for an 
array of one-sided tests of hypothesis of size α = 0.01 would be:
Reject θ = 0 when and only when Z1 ≥ +2.327. (4.25.3)
If θ = −3.608 would be the only possible alternative, the appropriate decision rule for an 
array of one-sided tests of hypothesis of size α = 0.01 would be:
Reject θ = 0 when and only when Z1 ≤ -2.327. (4.25.4)
Now note (and this is crucial) that it is utterly impossible for a solitary data set in the 
real world to come about with θ = -3.608 and also with θ = +3.608. However, frequentist 
inference would then reason that, if either the one or the other of the two alternatives is 
possible, and if the specification α = 0.01 is to be maintained by the knower, the rules at 
(4.25.3) and (4.25.4) must be replaced by:
Reject θ = 0 when and only when either Z1 ≥ +2.576 or Z1 ≤ -2.576. (4.25.5)
It appears at once that such inference has now replaced the problem of how this one 
particular data set might have come about with a different problem involving many 
different data sets, such that it might be that θ = -3.608 in some sets, and θ = +3.608 in 
other sets. The different problem now is how to construct a stereotypic array of deci-
sions by the knower in respect of many different data sets, such that the Type I error rate 
of those decisions meets the specification. The issue is crucial because, on the one hand, 
it explains why simultaneous statistical inference has no place at all in the theory of co-
ordination tests, and on the other hand, it also explains why simultaneous statistical 
Investigation mistaken for decision-making under risk
215
inference is unavoidably entailed by frequentist inference. Again: on the one hand, two 
contradictorily different explanations of how a particular real-world data set might have 
come about can serve as alternative explanations, but they cannot possibly simultane-
ously serve as an explanation. On the other hand, different terms in an array of real-
world data sets might arise in contrary ways, and so, even though each term can arise in 
one way only, the properties of the array as a whole will reflect those contrary ways. Once 
again: a frequentist will reason that when Popper’s ‘knowing subject’ uses the rule at 
(4.25.3) to test for skewness to the right, and then separately uses the rule at (4.25.4) also 
to test for skewness to the left, that knowing subject’s Type I error rate equals 2×0.01. So 
a frequentist will reason that, in order to maintain the knower’s overall Type I error rate 
at 0.01, the rates of each of the two tests must be specified separately to be α = 0.005. So, 
at (4.25.5) the value 2.576 replaces the values 2.327 at (4.25.3) and (4.25.4).
There is more to come.
Table 4.20.1 proposes not only a test for skewness, but also a test for kurtosis using a sepa-
rate N(0, 1) test statistic, say Z2. So, the reasoning that has lead us to the decision rule at 
(4.25.5), when independently applied to Z2, leads to the same rule, but with Z2 in place of 
Z1. Now, as indicated in Example 1.31.1, under the hypothesised model, Z1 and Z2 are ap-
proximately distributed as statistically independent random variables. So if the knower 
would use the rule at (4.25.5) to test for skewness, and then use the corresponding rule 
with Z2 separately to test for kurtosis, the knower’s Type I error rate would be 2×0.01. Thus, 
in order to maintain the overall Type I error rate at 0.01 when simultaneously testing for 
skewness to the left, skewness to the right, leptokurtosis and mesokurtosis, the rule at 
(4.25.5) and the counterpart rule involving Z2, must be replaced by rules such that:
(1-2α)(1-2α) = 0.99, i.e. such that α = 0.0025 per subsidiary rule.
The requisite subsidiary rule in respect of the model hypothesised at (4.25.1) and in 
respect of the second alternative at (4.25.2) is then:
Reject θ = 0 when and only when Z1 ≥ +2.810. (4.25.6)
There is more to come.
So far we have considered the treated rats only, where the foregoing reasoning is repeat-
ed in respect of the control rats only. So, the knower’s specified Type I error rate, 0.01, 
must then be maintained when a simultaneous test for skewness to the left, skewness to 
the right, leptokurtosis and mesokurtosis, is performed for both groups of rats. The rule 
at (4.25.6) and its counterpart involving the control rats must then be replaced, and the 
replacement must be such that α on the subsidiary rule satisfies
(1-2α)(1-2α)(1-2α)(1-2α) = 0.99, i.e. such that α = 0.00125. (4.25.7)
The requisite subsidiary rule in respect of the model hypothesised at (4.22.1), and in 
respect of the second alternative at (4.22.2), is then:
Reject θ = 0 when and only when Z1 ≥ +3.025. (4.25.8)
There is still more to come.
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Table 4.20.1 also proposes using Snedecor’s F as an additional commencement test, and 
under the hypothesised model F is distributed independently of Z1 and Z2. So, the speci-
fied Type I error rate of 0.01 must account for simultaneously testing, not only for skew-
ness to the left, skewness to the right, leptokurtosis and mesokurtosis in both groups 
of rats, but also for homogeneity of variance against the two alternative cases of hetero-
geneity. The recipe at (4.25.7) must therefore be replaced such that α in the subsidiary 
rule satisfies
(1-2α)(1-2α)(1-2α)(1-2α)(1-2α) = 0.99, i.e. such that α = 0.001. (4.25.9)
The requisite subsidiary rule in respect of the model hypothesised at (4.22.1) and in res-
pect of the second alternative at (4.22.2) is then:
Reject θ = 0 when and only when Z1 ≥ +3.080. (4.25.9)
The outcome of such simultaneous statistical inference in respect of the hypothesis, i.e. 
that the two sets of healing times be modelled as two independent homoscedastic normal 
samples, is then as follows:
As the smallest of the relevant significance levels in Table 4.20.1 is SL = 0.005, which 
exceeds the specification of α = 0.001 at (4.25.9), the simultaneous tests would have 
us accept the hypothesis. (4.25.10)
This lands us on the horns of a dilemma.
Source of the first horn: a knower advancing toward ‘more conservative’ policies
The reasoning in Example 4.25.1 steadily advances toward more conservative policies. 
At (4.25.3) and (4.25.4) we must turn a blind eye to normal deviates less than 2.327 
standard error units as being not significant. However, in order to conserve the overall 
Type I error rate at 0.01, that instruction is first replaced with 2.576 units as ‘not signifi-
cant’, then with 2.810 units, then with 3.025 units, and finally with 3.080 units. As a result 
the Type I error rate for any of the 2×2×2×2×2 constituent tests is reduced
from 0.01, to 0.005, to 0.0025, to 0.00125, and finally to 0.001. (4.25.11)
Source of the second horn: a knower retreating to ‘less conservative’ policies
To the unwary, the advance toward more conservative policies might well seem fine. Af-
ter all, did we not begin with the idea that, as medical research requires special ‘protec-
tion’ from committing ‘errors’, we must tolerate only satisfactorily low Type I error rates 
(such as 0.01 or even less?) This reasoning is grossly misleading because it diverts our 
attention from Type II error rates. For instance, at (4.25.2) we considered the possibility 
that θ = +3.608 owing to skewness to the right. We noted that if that were to be the only 
possible alternative in respect of that constituent amongst 2×2×2×2×2 constituent tests, 
the appropriate rule for an array of one-sided hypothesis tests of size 0.01 would be the 
one given at (4.25.3). In that case the Type II error rate for that particular constituent 
would be given by
Pr(Z1 ≥ +2.327|θ = +3.608) = 0.1. (4.25.12)
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However, when the rule at (4.24.3) is replaced by the rule at (4.25.5), this increases to
Pr(Z1 ≥ +2.576|θ = +3.608) = 0.15. (4.25.13)
Proceeding further, it will thus be found that by reducing the Type I error rate for each 
of the 2×2×2×2×2 constituent tests
from 0.01, to 0.005, to 0.0025, to 0.00125, and finally to 0.001,
as indicated at (4.25.11), the Type II error rate for the particular constituent test under 
consideration at (4.25.12) and (4.25.13), has been increased
from 0.1, to 0.15, to 0.21, to 0.28, and finally to 0.30, respectively.
Such increases accrue for each of the various 2×2×2×2×2 constituent tests, with a silly con-
sequence made glaringly obvious by Table 4.20.1, as follows; it is inconceivable that any 
competent statistician would defy that table in order, as an act of will, to conclude that 
the model, ‘two independent homoscedastic normal samples’, fits healing times better 
than it fits healing rates. Yet at (4.25.10), simultaneous statistical inference would have us 
draw precisely that conclusion. So, in order to avoid such silly conclusions, a frequentist 
is compelled to retreat to some less conservative policy. Note, for instance, that the moot 
point raised in connection with the tests at (4.20.10) arises because Bliss preferred such a 
less conservative policy.
The dilemma
If the observed value of Z1 would be for argument’s sake Z1 = 3.080, the co-ordinates of 
its mental correlate would be:
(0.999, ε, 0.001) in the hypothesised distribution, and
(0.299, ε, 0.701) in the right skew alternative distribution considered at (2.25.2).
Yet the rule at (4.25.10) would have us conclude that the hypothesised model is more ten-
able than any right skew alternative. In general, simultaneous statistical inference cannot 
avoid such difficulties because whatever device is used to conserve the overall Type I error 
rate at its specified value, will reduce the Type I error rates of subsidiary constituent tests, 
thus enlarging the Type II rates of those constituents. The larger the number of constitu-
ents, the more pronounced this effect. So the literature on simultaneous statistical infer-
ence is forever wrestling with a self-inflicted dilemma: must one (this is the first horn of 
the dilemma) pursue more conservative policies, so as to conserve a specified Type I rate? 
Or must one (the second horn of the dilemma) retreat toward less conservative policies, 
so as to avoid the more obvious of the silly consequences of such policies?
4.26 The knower is not needed
The dilemma in the previous section cannot be resolved sensibly because, in defiance 
of the principle underscored at (4.24.2), frequentist inference introduces, by way of the 
knower, a constituent that is not needed. For that reason precisely, the ‘correct extent’ 
of the influence of that constituent cannot be established. That is the case because any 
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redundancy is absolute; one redundancy cannot be more redundant, or less redundant, 
than another redundancy. Also, whilst avoiding unneeded constituents is a universal 
requirement of science, in certain sciences this is not easily accomplished. In ethology 
it is difficult to avoid the introduction of anthropomorphic constituents; in developing 
the theory of biological evolution, it is difficult to avoid the introduction of teleological 
constituents. And we have now seen that in statistical data analysis it is difficult to avoid 
the introduction of a knowing subject. So, having established that the knower of Ney-
man’s theories is redundant, nothing but an intruder in the domain of data analysis, the 
knower must be banished from that domain.
4.27 Getting it wrong from the outset in the case of  
 frequentist inference
As the various theories of statistical inference spring from great mathematical talent, it is 
not to be expected that they involve mathematical errors. They are fundamentally defec-
tive owing, instead, to epistemological errors arising at the very outset by way of defec-
tive understanding of the investigative method of substantive science. It is of the utmost 
importance to grasp this, because ours is a mathematically minded profession, and those 
who are so minded are notorious for losing track of reality. So it must be firmly grasped 
that the circular reasoning displayed in Section 4.8 is the crux of the matter. Section 4.8 
shows us how the mathematically minded, having caught sight of a class of mathemati-
cally formulated models indexed by a parameter, are so taken with the idea of getting on 
with the mathematics that the question: ‘How can such a class of models be arrived at?’ 
is overlooked. The result is an epistemology that gets it wrong from the very outset; that 
takes the first wrong step by proceeding from the idea that decision-making under risk, 
which concerns the use of knowledge, can be adapted for purposes of data analysis, which 
concerns the pursuit of knowledge. And so, as we found in Section 4.8, that epistemology 
falls at once into circularity for which there cannot be a subsequent correction. Beyond 
Section 4.8, this chapter simply concerned the consequences of that circularity. The stere-
otyping, the paradoxes, the distortion of evidence as in Example 4.25.1, the need for ‘acts 
of will’ to override common sense, the silly idea that any ‘knowledge’ has to partake of its 
‘knower’, and so on – all these defects are consequences of that first wrong step.
4.28 Neyman’s ‘knowing subject’
Measurements of the magnetism of certain dated rocks provide a data set that can be 
used to form an opinion on the possible positions of the earth’s magnetic pole at that 
date. The data set can be represented as a cluster of points on the surface of a sphere 
representing the earth, and Fisher (1953) developed a class of models indexed by the 
possible positions of the pole. By ignoring the slight curvature of the earth’s surface, a 
class of models more suitable for our purposes is obtained in the form introduced for 
the target problem in Section 3.11, except that we must then suppress the j-like count 
of real-world repetitions, as there is now just one single data set in the real world. The 
unknown position of the pole is then represented by Cartesian co-ordinates (m
1
, m
2
), and 
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the minimal sufficient statistic for (m
1
, m
2
) is given by the following triplet of statistically 
independent random variables:
X
1
, which is an N(m
1
, s2÷n) random variable,
X
2
, which is an N(m
2
, s2÷n random variable, and
2(n-1) S2, which is a s2x2 random variable on 2(n-1) degrees of freedom.
Reasoning similar to that in section 3.11 here leads to a (1-a) confidence region in the 
form of a disk centred at:
(X1, X2) with radius √2(S2÷n)F(a),
where, as before, F(a) is the value that, with specified probability a, is exceeded by Sne-
decor’s F on 2 and 2(n-1) df. But what, in this example, does ‘(1-a) confidence’ mean? 
We can answer only in terms of a population of repetitions. But that cannot be!
Earth 1 in repetition 1? Earth 2 in repetition 2? Earth 3 in repetition 3? …
So, for frequentist inference to defend its model of a forecasted probability of success in 
‘(1-a) real-world instances’, those instances have to be modelled as instances of infer-
ential behaviour by ‘a knowing subject’. We must not agree to such a model, as substan-
tive investigation asked for geological models of how these given data might have come 
about. It is then perfectly possible that such models may inter alia require statistical 
constituents; in the present case they clearly do require such constituents. Clearly also, 
in the matter of how these given data might have come about, Neyman’s knowing sub-
ject played no role, none whatsoever. 
4.29 Stereotypic arrays and decision-making under risk
We return to Section 3.13 where the idea was raised that in decision-making under 
statistical risk, not to be mistaken for data analysis, reasoning in terms of a stereotypic 
array is justified. Consider, for instance, the manager of a factory for the manufacture of 
say lawn mowers, who will continually have to deal with matters such as:
Running sampling inspections to reach a decision on whether or not to buy cer-
tain raw materials.
Running tests to reach a decision on which of five new welding plants to purchase. 
Running experiments to reach a decision on whether a new method is better than 
the old one. (4.29.1)
Does it not make sense, so the counter-argument of Section 3.13 would try to persuade 
us, to imbed the decisions in a stereotypic array so that the manager’s Type I error rate 
can be kept to, say, a trifling 1%? We must answer in the negative, because this argu-
ment is essentially circular, the principle having been pleaded by the phrase ‘not to be 
mistaken for data analysis’, in the first sentence of this section. This is so because the 
array envisaged at (4.29.1) does not comprise homogenous terms, but comprises instead 
precisely the motley circumstances that lead to the dilemma we developed in Section 
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4.4. And so, willy-nilly, the manager is a data analyst who would otherwise be prevented 
from substantive thought.
4.30 How is frequentist inference sustained despite its obvious 
 defects?
In the light of the foregoing this question would seem inescapable. The answer is that it 
survives by way of brain-washing, as follows: a typical present-day introduction to statis-
tics starts its development of statistical inference by arguing persuasively that such infer-
ences (note the plural) might, by chance, be erroneous, i.e. are subject to statistical risk. 
Typically this idea is then developed via confidence intervals ‘because they are easiest for 
the students to understand’. Then hypothesis tests are developed as the dual of confi-
dence intervals ‘because that is easiest for the students to understand’. Next, there follows 
a process of entrenchment by way of developing concepts such as the power of a test, most 
powerful tests, one-sided, two-sided and unbiased tests, monotone likelihood ratios, and 
so on, along with a wealth of illustrative examples. Then comes the point at which, having 
started with the idea of a confidence interval, the development ends with what can only be 
described as ‘an inadvertent confidence trick’ in the form of a section showing how the ‘as-
sumptions’ (sampling having been ‘assumed’ to be from binomial, Poisson, normal, etc. 
populations) can be ‘tested’ by (and this is the trick) hypothesis testing presented in such 
a way that only Type I errors are accounted for. The students have by then been dazzled 
by pretty mathematics and carefully conceived examples to the extent of not noticing that 
the ‘assumptions’ would, for their justification, require accounting for Type II errors. In 
the process, the lecturer himself/herself, having previously (as a student) undergone such 
brain-washing, becomes even more deeply entrenched in belief in the veracity of the mat-
ter. This curiously back-to-front development is reinforced by psychological reluctance 
to admit that acceptable assumptions for frequentist inference are subject to Type II er-
rors (acceptance errors) of unknown frequency, otherwise the elaborate construct called 
frequentist inference must, like Humpty Dumpty, undergo a great fall. To see this, one 
only has to reverse the back-to-front reasoning, in which case it becomes apparent at once 
that commencement tests do not justify the ‘assumptions’, because those assumptions are 
tantamount to assuming that commencement tests can, for specified Type I error rates, 
deliver Type II error rates that are equal to zero.
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Chapter 5
SIGNIFICANCE TESTS
r.a. fisher’s Method for avoiding the frequentist vicious circle
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we saw that when elimination testing is construed as a form 
of hypothesis testing, we fall into a vicious circle. This is because we cannot claim to 
achieve elimination tests at specified Type I error rates without then having to assume 
that we can discern the appropriate class characteristics without any errors of Type II. 
The purpose of the present chapter is to show that if elimination tests are construed as 
significance tests, the circularity is avoided, or so R.A. Fisher evidently believed, and in 
this chapter we, for explanatory purposes, do not challenge that belief.
5.2 Significance levels as measurements of quality of fit
We consider below three problems in data analysis. In each case we first present an analy-
sis that arrives at certain findings by means of co-ordination tests, and then we show how 
the same findings can be expressed by way of significance tests.
Example 5.2.1
Suppose that in an experiment with laying hens, each of three breeds was represented by 
100 hens individually caged in a completely randomised design, and that a record was kept 
of the numbers of eggs laid per hen per day – the more the better. Table 5.2.1 shows hypo-
thetical data and a suite of shortfall tests using Dunnett’s many-one-t statistic for the elimi-
nation of breeds whose egg production can be tenably modelled as lower than best only.
Table 5.2.1: A suite of shortfall tests for eliminating breeds as ‘lower than best’
Entry Mean number of eggs laid per hen per day Shortfall Many-one-t
Left-most hypothesised 
co-ordinates
Breed A 0.9975 -0.0816
Breed B 0.9159 +0.0816 +1.865 (0.944, ε, 0.056)
Breed C 0.8938 +0.1037 +2.371 (0.983, ε, 0.017)
Estimated standard error of an entry mean: 0.03093 on 3(100 − 1) df.
The model employed represents the raw data as three samples originating from homo-
scedastic normal populations. So, a data analyst might well use Pearson’s chi-square to 
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test for non-normality on say 30 df., and Bartlett’s chi-square to test for heterogeneity 
of variance on 2 df. Let the mental correlates of the resulting test data be found to be 
situated in the appropriate test distributions at (0.63, ε, 0.37) and at (0.24, ε, 0.76), re-
spectively. In such a case the data analyst might report as follows:
Normal errors, by the Pearson test, fit the given data well, as chi-square = 31.94 on 
30 df. is situated at (0.63, 0.37) in the test distribution. Homoscedastic errors, by 
the Bartlett test, also fit the data well, as chi-square = 0.549 on 2df. is situated at 
(0.24, 0.76) in the test distribution. By the shortfall tests, both B and C seem lower 
than best, as the corresponding many-one-t values must be co-ordinated to the 
right of (0.944, 0.056) and (0.983, 0.017), respectively, in Dunnett’s test distribution. 
So, by the tests performed, A appears to be the sole best entry. (5.2.1)
Now note (and this is crucial) that this report involves no assumptions whatsoever, as 
four distinctly different tests were used to test four distinctly different subsidiary models 
against four distinctly different subsidiary data sets. As explained in Example 2.3.2, we 
make no assumption when we point at a spoor saying: ‘The shape of this spoor is unlike 
that of an aardvark, but if it were to be that of an aardvark, the size of the spoor is like 
that of a juvenile.’ Instead of making assumptions, we thus test a model of shape against 
a datum of shape and, quite apart from that, we test a model of size against a datum of 
size. Similarly, at (5.2.1), instead of making assumptions, a model of distributional shape 
is tested against a datum of distributional shape, and apart from that a model of compara-
tive variability is tested against a datum of comparative variability, and apart from that … .
A significance tester would issue essentially the same report as the one at (5.2.1), except 
that the four sets of statistical co-ordinates would be replaced by the corresponding 
significance levels,
SL = ε+0.37, SL = ε+0.76, SL = ε+0.056, SL = ε+0.017,  (5.2.2)
respectively. A significance tester looks upon such significance levels as measures of fit, 
and holds that any reasonable interpretation of the term ‘error rate’ would make it utterly 
impossible for the four SL values at (5.2.2) to provide anything in the nature of an error 
rate for the conclusion drawn. In order to understand this view, we note that in respect of 
the substantive subject matter of the investigation, the whole conclusion is simply this:
Breed A appears, by the tests performed, to be the sole best entry (5.2.3)
Thus if the error rate in question is to be substantively relevant, it must apply to the con-
clusion at (5.2.3). But if we try to appraise the contribution of Bartlett’s test to the requisite 
rate, we must consider an acceptance error (a Type II error) whose rate is a function of 
unknown variance parameters. Worse: if we try to appraise the contribution of Pearson’s 
test to that requisite rate, we must provide for acceptance errors for which we cannot even 
provide useful mathematical expressions, as we would then be testing against various al-
ternatives that are only broadly envisaged possibilities. We cannot even know in respect 
of which of those various alternative possibilities the appraisal would have to be made – 
unless we were clairvoyant.
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Example 5.2.2
Let us revisit Table 1.1.1, which gives the results of an experiment to measure the effect of 
carbaryl treatment on the half-lives of the fruit of certain trees. Shapiro-Wilk tests for normal-
ity performed in Example 1.32.1 result in a test datum whose mental correlate co-ordinates at 
(0.18, ε, 0.82) in the test distribution. The variances of the observed half-lives are given by:
S2 = 1.126 for the treated trees, and S2 = 0.803 for the control trees.   1                                                           2
Using Snedecor’s F to test for homogeneity of variance, we find:
S2÷S2 = 1.405, where Pr(Central F on 4 and 4 df. > 1.405) = 0.38,   1    2
showing that the datum F is situated at (0.62, ε, 0.38) in Snedecor’s test distribution. 
So, using the pooled error estimate (1.126+0.803)÷2 and Student’s t, we find that at the 
(0.05, ε, 0.95) level of co-ordination, or to the left of that, the effect of carbaryl is modelled 
as reducing the half-life of the fruit by 1.7 days or more.
A significance tester, taking ε ≈ 0, would report essentially the same findings, as follows:
As tested, there is no significant non-normality (SL = 0.18) and no heterogeneity of 
variance (SL = 0.38). With Student’s t held at any level of significance ≤ 0.05, the ef-
fect of carbaryl must be modelled as hastening ripening time by 1.7 days or more.
Here again, the significance tester cites the various significance levels as measures of fit, 
and holds that in any reasonable interpretation of the term ‘error rate’ those levels can-
not supply an error rate for the conclusion drawn. In order to grasp this view, we note 
that from the point of view of substantive science, the thrust of the conclusion is:
Carbaryl appears, by the various tests performed, to shorten the half-life of such 
fruit by at least 1.7 days. (5.2.4)
Thus, if the error rate in question has to be at all substantively relevant, it must apply to 
the conclusion at (5.2.4). But in order to appraise the contribution of the test based on 
Snedecor’s F to the requisite rate, we find we must consider an acceptance error (a Type 
II error) whose rate would have to be given by:
                                                     s2                                    s2 
Pr   (Central F on 4 and 4 df.)x    2  ≥ 1.405   . However,    2   is unknown. 
                                                     s
2
                                    s
2
 
                                                       
1
                                      
1
Worse: in order to appraise the contribution of the Shapiro-Wilk tests to the requisite rate, 
we have to consider an acceptance error (a Type II error) for whose rate we are not even 
able to give a useful mathematical expression, as the test is against alternatives that are at 
best incipient. And in any case, as those alternatives cannot even be known to be of just 
one particular kind, we would not know in respect of which of them that contribution 
would have to be appraised.
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Example 5.2.3
In Example 1.15.2 we found that the volcanic action of Vesuvius, from ad 79 up to and 
including ad 1944, falls into two distinctly different eras. For each era, the waiting times 
between eruptions, as judged by the Cramer-Von Mises test, can be represented satis-
factorily as a random sample from an exponential population. For the ancient era, the 
mental correlate of the test datum is situated at (0.85, ε, 0.15*) in the Cramer-Von Mises 
test distribution, and for the modern era the mental correlate of the tests datum is situ-
ated at (0.87, ε, 0.13*) in the Cramer-Von Mises test distribution. Let the sample means 
and their expected values be denoted as follows:
For the n1 = 10 waiting times of the ancient era: X1 with E(X1) = q1.
For the n2 = 20 waiting times of the modern era: X2 with E(X2) = q2.
With exponential waiting times an elimination pivot for qJ is given by 2nJXJ÷qJ, which is 
distributed as central chi-square on 2nJ df (J = 1, 2). Hence, by specifying
U = 0.025, 0.050, 0.075 as elimination levels,
the corresponding upper elimination bounds are found to be:
q1 = 324, 286, 267 years, respectively, and
q2 = 25.6, 23.6, 22.5 years, respectively.
So, expressing these findings in terms of models that, as tested, are consonant with the 
data, a significance tester would report:
For each of the eras separately, a model of exponential waiting times, as tested, is 
consonant with the given data (SL = 0.15 for the ancient era, and SL = 0.13 for the 
modern era). For the ancient era, q1 ≤ 324, 286, 267 years, as tested, are consonant 
with those data at significance levels ≥ 0.025, 0.050, 0.075, respectively. For the 
modern era, q2 ≤ 25.6, 23.6, 22.5 years, as tested, are consonant with those data at 
those same levels, respectively.
We note in passing that in respect of the theory of significance tests, rather than that 
of hypothesis tests, a dual theory of consonance intervals, rather than confidence inter-
vals, is indicated (Kempthorne and Folks 1971, Section 13.2).
In terms of the concept ‘confidence’ rather than ‘consonance’, a subscriber to the dual 
theories of hypothesis tests and confidence intervals has to specify, without reference to 
the data, a single Type I error rate, say α = 0.05, so as to be able to claim that:
0 < q1 < 324 years, is ‘a 0.95 confidence interval for q1’, and
0 < q2 < 23.6 years, is ‘a 0.95 confidence interval for q2’. (5.2.5)
Here the expression, ‘a 0.95 confidence interval for q’, intentionally claims to have obtained 
each of the two intervals in question 
by a method for which it can be forecasted that in 0.95 of cases, the corresponding 
true value of  will be contained in the interval. (5.2.6)
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In order to defend the forecast made at (5.2.6) one must be able to provide reasons to 
believe that each of the two sets of waiting times somehow belongs to a host of cases 
that can be represented as exponential samples. But if we try to cite the results of the 
Cramer-Von Mises tests as reasons for such belief, we find ourselves forced to admit 
that those tests are open to Type II errors, otherwise we are unable to explain why we 
performed those tests in the first place. Moreover, should those Cramer-Von Mises tests 
have involved any Type II errors, we could not possibly have known that to have been 
the case. We could not even have known what alternatives would be involved. So we 
cannot possibly know what the values of the corresponding Type II error rates would 
be. Nevertheless, by simulating what would happen with this, that or the other choice 
of reasonably possible alternatives, we can show empirically that if, in respect of such a 
choice, b1 and b2 denote the Type II error rates for the ancient era and the modern era, 
respectively
0 < b1 < b2, owing to the difference in sample size (n1 = 10 versus n2 = 20).
However, in order to defend the forecasts made at (5.2.5) and (5.2.6), we are forced to 
assume that
0 = b1 = b2,
so that it can be reasoned that the class characteristic is exponential,
so that it can be reasoned that the method used has the property claimed at (5.2.6), and 
that is circular reasoning.
5.3 Concluding remark
The use of significance tests, as outlined in the foregoing examples, might seem to avoid 
the frequentist vicious circle. However, we must ask: ‘Can it do so without violating any 
fundamental principle of science?’ In the following chapter we will show that this ques-
tion can only be answered in the negative.
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Chapter 6
AN INADVERTENT CONFOUNDING ON THE PART OF  
R. A. FISHER
the seMinal source of ‘siMultaneous statistical inference’
6.1 Introduction
We are now ready to come to grips with a fundamental and irreconcilable distinction 
between significance tests and co-ordination tests. We will develop the distinction by 
uncovering a deeply hidden flaw in R. A. Fisher’s theory of significance tests. As we ex-
plained in the previous chapter, he proceeds from a population in the human mind, which 
is considered as a model of how a given data set in the real world might, or might not, 
have come about. Often a model can be analysed into several subsidiary models. Different 
significance tests can then be used to measure the quality of fit of the different subsidiary 
models. The resulting measurements are called ‘significance levels’. How are such levels 
defined? In its treatment of this question the statistical literature has been astoundingly 
careless, where, as pointed out by Freund and Perles (1993), either one or the other of two 
non-equivalent definitions is often used. Kendall and Stuart (1961) for instance, introduce 
one of these definitions for hypothesis tests, and then tacitly rely on the other one for 
confidence intervals (vol. 2, ch. 20 and 22, respectively). The two definitions are developed 
in the following section, and in the section after that we identify one of them as Fisher’s 
definition. In subsequent sections we exhibit the flaw in Fisher’s theory, and we show that 
removal of the flaw has devastating consequences.
6.2 A pair of non-equivalent definitions
Let a measurement made on the amnion fluid of a pregnant rabbit be modelled as the 
value taken on by a random variable, X, whose expectation, m, represents the number of 
foetuses present (m = 1, 2, 3, … < ∞). Write Z = X-m. Let a historical record, thus involv-
ing known values of m, provide z1, z2, z3, …, zn, capable of being modelled as a random 
sample of Z values. In order to test whether or not z1, z2, z3, …, zn, could be modelled as a 
sample from a normal population, let an investigator use an appropriate chi-square test, 
obtaining chi-square equal to say 10.5 on 8 degrees of freedom. Here 10.5 is a class mark, 
i.e. an approximation for some or other hypothesised sample value between say 10.25 
and 10.75, which value is otherwise indeterminate. Thus the chi-square test divides the 
infinite population of hypothesised chi-square values into separate parts measuring say 
U, ε and V, respectively, as depicted in Figure 6.2.1., and where
(U, ε, V) = (0.75, 0.03, 0.22) in the present case.
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Figure 6.2.1: A depiction of how, in the human mind, a chi-square test divides an infinite popula-
tion of hypothesised chi-square values into parts labelled U, ε and V, respectively
The diagram in Figure 6.2.1 depicts a good fit, thereby showing how the normal class 
characteristic, as tested, would fit the given data well, where such facts can of course be 
forced upon the human body, if needs be by simulation. The question now to be consid-
ered, and indeed to be considered throughout this chapter, is simply this:
How can we best report such facts by way of numbers? (6.2.1)
The correct answer to this question can only be:
Such a report must be fully informative; it must supply whatever information we 
require for a reconstruction of the diagram. (6.2.2)
So, at least two of the numbers U, ε and V, must be reported. For instance, identifying 
U and V as left- and right-statistical co-ordinates, respectively, we could report the co-
ordinates of the mental correlate of the given chi-square value as (0.75, 0.22). Given this 
report, the facts depicted in Figure 6.2.1 can be recovered, as the value of ε, the statisti-
cal rounding, is recovered by calculating 1-0.75-0.22. If χ² denotes the random variable 
involved, the statistical co-ordinates in question are given by:
(U, V) = [Pr(χ² < the observed chi-square), Pr(χ² > the observed chi-square)].
In practice the statistical rounding is often (even usually) very small. So, one can adopt 
a convention that tacitly understands a rounding to be negligibly small whenever only 
one of the two co-ordinates, say the right co-ordinate, is reported. In the present case 
the only value we would then report would be
Pr(χ² > the observed chi-square) = 0.22. (6.2.3)
Density Function
Test datum
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The expression at (6.2.3) corresponds to Definition 2 of Freund and Perles (1993), except 
that their definition is unrealistic with regard to rounding, as they presuppose a means 
of exact measurement of any real number values, where such a means cannot exist. The 
other of their two definitions, their Definition 1, corresponds in the present case to
Pr(χ² ≥ the observed chi-square) = 0.03+0.22. (6.2.4)
From the point of view of significance testing, this definition is the more attractive of 
the two, as a decidedly poor quality of fit is attained if and only if both the rounding 
and the pointing co-ordinate are small. (In a subsequent development it will be found 
that, from a different point of view, their Definition 1 is the more attractive. So let us not 
dismiss it out of hand.) The expressions at (6.2.3) and (6.2.4) might have arisen from an 
ordering of the form
O1 = {0 ≤ χ² < 0.5+0.25} and Ot = {0.5t-0.25 ≤ χ² < 0.5t+0.25}, t = 2, 3, 4, …,
where t = 21 for the given datum, 0.5(21) = 10.5. In the present case this ordering is right-
sensitive with regard to the usual alternatives that come to mind, in which case the inverse 
ordering is of course left-sensitive to those alternatives. In order to avoid unnecessary 
complication, the following development uses right-sensitive orderings, unless stated 
otherwise. It will be found convenient to refer to a significance level as a ‘P value’, it having 
been made entirely clear in the previous chapter that in Fisher’s theory such values are not 
specifications; they are observations. They do not belong to the discourse of forecasting; 
they belong to the discourse of pointing. This being clearly understood, the Definitions 
arising at 6.2.4 and 6.2.3 can respectively be stated very simply, as follows:
Definition 6.2.1:
The P value in any given case is the hypothesised complement of the left statistical co-ordinate in that 
case. (We will call this the inclusive definition since it ‘includes’ the rounding.)
Definition 6.2.2:
The P value in any given case is the hypothesised right statistical co-ordinate in that case. (We will call 
this the exclusive definition Since it ‘excludes’ the rounding.)
We will also require the following definition:
Definition 6.2.3:
The attainable P values in any given case are those P values that might actually be observed under either 
Definition 6.2.1 or Definition 6.2.2.
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Example 6.2.1
Consider just N independent attempts to discriminate by taste between two items. Let 
the number of successful attempts be modelled as a value taken by a binomial random 
variable, X. The appropriate ordering for testing
M0: Pr(success) = 0.5 versus M1: Pr(success) > 0.5,
is given by O
T
 = O
X+1 for X = 0, 1, 2, …, N. Using Pascal’s triangle, we then find that with 
say N = 3, the attainable P values are given by
8/8, 7/8, 4/8, 1/8, 0/8, where
8/8 is attainable under Definition 6.2.1 only,
0/8 is attainable under Definition 6.2.2 only,
and the other four P values are attainable under either of the two definitions.
We note in passing that for this example the exclusive definition is clearly defective, as 
the hypothesised right co-ordinate is evidentially vacuous whenever X = N.
6.3 R.A. Fisher’s usage of the term ‘significance level’
In R.A. Fisher’s writings small P values point at alternatives. His paper on Mendel’s data is a 
rare exception to this rule. However, he does not always make his choice of definition entire-
ly clear. For instance, in Statistical methods for research workers (1970, p.79) he informally 
introduces the notion of a P value as if by the exclusive definition. In effect he then uses such 
a value in the subsequent development of a concrete example (p. 95) when, referring to ‘a 
normal deviate 3.61 times its standard error’ he says: ‘The probability of exceeding such a 
deviation in the right direction is about 1 in 6 500.’ However, in a subsequent section enti-
tled The exact treatment of 2×2 tables, he recognises the statistical rounding and its right 
co-ordinate when he refers to ‘the probabilities of the set of frequencies observed, and the 
two possible more extreme sets of frequencies which might have been observed’ (p. 97). He 
then carefully introduces the inclusive definition by calculating the significance level as the 
sum of the three probabilities. At the bottom of p. 100, however, he reverts to the exclusive 
definition by referring to ‘the probability of χ² exceeding 11.417’. In The design of experi-
ments (1966) he develops the inclusive definition in a closely reasoned section entitled The 
test of significance (pp. 13-15). Subsequently, however, he again expresses himself in a way 
that amounts to the use of the exclusive definition (e.g. on p. 37). These, and other of his 
writings, compel us to make the following conclusions:
For closely reasoned explanations he favours examples involving a discrete test 
statistic, and then always uses the inclusive definition, and calculates the P value 
as an observed measure of quality of fit.
When using continuous approximation he often abbreviates ‘equal to or exceed-
ing’ to ‘exceeding’, thereby using the exclusive definition, but clearly not inten-
tionally so, as he uses such an abbreviation only when the statistical rounding is 
negligibly small. So Fisher’s intentional definition is the inclusive one.
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In all his writings, the term ‘significance level’ refers to just one number, which 
can be arrived at exactly only by calculation from given data, but which is never-
theless intended by him to be interpreted as a hypothetical probability.
We are compelled to the third conclusion when we ask: ‘Why does Fisher insist on the 
replacement of the three numbers U, ε and V with just one number, P?’ We will find that 
the only answer capable of defence is that he wishes to make a formal probability state-
ment, where a probability can only take the form of just one number, not of two or three 
numbers. Nevertheless, as our first conclusion states, he wants the probability to serve 
as a calculated measure of the tenability of a conceptual singleton under test to explain 
how a given real-world data set might or might not have come about. All this is made 
abundantly clear by Fisher himself when he says (1973, p.47):
‘In general tests of significance are based on hypothetical probabilities calculated 
from the null hypotheses. They do not generally lead to any probability statements 
about the real world, but to a rational and well-defined measure of the reluctance 
to the acceptance of the hypotheses they test.’ (original italics) (6.3.1)
Furthermore (and this is a crucial point) Fisher uses a behavioural interpretation when 
considering the importance of a calculated significance level. This point has been care-
fully explained by Cox and Hinkley (1974) and Cox (1977) and, as we will show in subse-
quent development, their explanation is correct beyond reasonable contest. They employ 
the notations T and t = tobs (observed t) to underscore that T denotes a test statistic in the 
human mind, whose range includes a value denoted by tobs, which value is also that of a 
test datum computed from a given real-world data set. Ordering is on the magnitude of 
T, and the corresponding ‘observed significance level’ is then calculated in terms of the 
inclusive definition as
pobs = Pr(T ≥ tobsM0), where M0 denotes the hypothesised model. (6.3.2)
We note in passing that this equation transforms T into an equivalent, but left- sensi-
tive, test statistic P, for which the corresponding test datum is pobs. Thus also
pobs = Pr(P ≤ pobsM0), where M0 denotes the hypothesised model. (6.3.3)
Fisher, as quoted at (6.3.1), would have us look upon the calculated significance level 
as a measure of our reluctance to accept the hypothesised model it tests. Moreover, we 
will find that Fisher attaches to this measure a well-defined physical meaning, which 
meaning is behavioural, and which meaning Cox and Hinkley (1974, p. 66), using the 
notation H0 instead of M0, have carefully spelled out in terms of the inclusive definition 
(of Fisher), as follows:
‘Suppose that we were to accept the available data as evidence against H0. Then 
we would be bound to accept all data with a larger value of t as even stronger 
evidence. Hence pobs is the probability that we would mistakenly declare there to 
be evidence against H0, were we to regard the data under analysis as just decisive 
against H0.’ (6.3.4)
Here we must of course understand that a small P value is vacuous unless pointing 
at a substantively conceivable alternative. Fisher (1970, p. 95) reminds us of this when 
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referring to a test datum as deviating ‘in the right direction’. Note also that at (6.3.4) the 
expressions: ‘suppose we were to’, ‘then we would be bound to’ and ‘were we to regard’, 
serve to underscore that the behaviour referred to and the probability attached to it, 
are purely hypothetical. Stated otherwise, pobs does not denote ‘an error rate in the real 
world’, but rather ‘an error rate in a conceptual world that might have been’. For this rea-
son Cox and Hinkley (p. 66) hasten to explain further, that as a general rule:
‘… we are not especially interested whether pobs exceeds some preassigned value, 
like 0.05. That is, we do not draw a rigid borderline between data for which 
pobs > 0.05 and data for which pobs ≤ 0.05.’ (6.3.5)
So pobs is given a two-fold meaning:
Firstly, as explained at (6.3.4), pobs is the probability that certain behaviour would, 
under given hypothetical circumstances, lead to false rejection of the hypoth-
esised model. Secondly, as explained at (6.3.5), pobs must also serve as a measure-
ment of fit on a scale higher than dichotomous. (6.3.6)
We propose to prove, in subsequent sections, that this attempt at a two-fold meaning 
inadvertently confounds two irreconcilably different concepts. But before proceeding to 
that, we must first show, in this section, that the explanations at (6.3.4) and (6.3.5) cor-
rectly render R. A. Fisher’s idea of ‘a significance test’. So, to begin with, we note that, as 
eluded to by the first sentence at (6.3.1), significance levels resemble Type I error rates 
that might have been, rather than Type II error rates that might have been. This is so 
because in Fisher’s usage, significance levels must be calculable, as they must serve as 
measurements. The incipient alternatives of commencement testing, for instance, can-
not provide for calculations. So, as a general principle, significance levels are calculated 
from hypothesised models only. In the theory of significance testing as such, this princi-
ple also applies to elimination testing. Also, apart from calculability, a significance level 
must satisfy two further requirements:
Firstly, it must convey a physical meaning; one that is capable of being forced onto 
the human body, if needs be by simulation. Secondly, the meaning conveyed must 
show in some sense whether the hypothesised model is, on the measurement made, 
more appropriate, or less appropriate, than the alternative one has in mind. (6.3.7)
This much is recognised by Cox (1977, p.50) when he states that a statistical test must 
produce an evidential concept with a physical meaning that is appropriate to the use 
of the test, and the explanations given at (6.3.4) and (6.3.5) are clearly aimed at these 
requirements. It then remains only to show that Fisher would have to agree with those 
explanations. In order to do so, consider how we might try to understand Fisher’s book, 
Statistical methods for research workers (1970), if we knew all about co-ordination tests, 
but nothing at all about significance tests. We might find the book easy reading up to 
say p. 60 where it might then seem that in the case of a very small rounding, the result of 
a test is to be summarised by reporting the value of the pointing co-ordinate only. This 
interpretation might be accepted till we reach p. 97 where Fisher computes a ‘signifi-
cance level’ as the sum of the rounding and the pointing co-ordinate. Giving this some 
thought, we might find it to be an acceptable further recipe for summarising the results 
of a test where, for instance, we need not bother to distinguish between say
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(0.96, 0.3, 0.1*) and (0.96, 0.1, 0.3*),
even though the co-ordination on the left does allow for slightly more extreme placing of 
the modelled datum than does the co-ordination on the right. Next, on p. 120, ‘the Table 
for t’ in fact refers to a table for |t|, where we would then think of that as a very odd way 
of tabulating t co-ordinates. Why tabulate 2V rather than V, and then have to say: ‘If it is 
proposed to consider the chance of exceeding the given values of t, in a positive (or nega-
tive) direction only, then the values of P should be halved?’ Has the table he provides, so 
we might wonder, also some other purpose? Subsequently (pp. 121-122) he analyses the 
results of an experiment with ten patients on the efficacy of two different supposedly sop-
orific drugs in producing sleep. For Student’s t from ten paired comparisons, he obtains
tobs = 4.06 in favour of drug B over drug A, (6.3.9)
and he declares that, on 9 degrees of freedom,
‘only one value in a hundred will exceed 3.250 by chance, so that the difference 
between the results is clearly significant’. (6.3.10)
At first there might seem to be an error. He forgets, we might think, that V equals half 
of P; the correct co-ordinate equals one in two hundred. And when he then says, ‘will 
exceed’, he also forgets, we might think, to say ‘in the right direction’ (as, we might recall, 
he did remember to say on p. 95). However, it then promptly appears that such is not at 
all the case, when Fisher proceeds to remark that by a sign test applied to the nine non-
zero differences obtained from the selfsame ten paired comparisons in question,
‘we should, in this case, have been led to the same conclusion with almost equal 
certainty; for if the two drugs had been equally effective, positive and negative 
signs would occur with equal frequency. Of the 9 values other than zero, however, 
all are positive, and it appears from the binomial distribution, 
(½+½)9,
that all will be of the same sign, by chance, only twice in 512 trials.’
Moreover, this is immediately followed by a further remark telling us that the t test is 
here to be preferred to the sign test. This tells us that Fisher is explaining his principle of 
testing, rather than his choice of test statistic. So it will then dawn on us that Fisher did 
not forget that ‘V equals half of P’, or forget to ask whether or not the deviation is ‘in the 
right direction’, but that he deliberately used a |t| ordering rather than a t ordering. The 
reader should note that our discussion leads to this point via a pedestrian route, because 
we wish to underscore that Fisher introduces two-tailed tests without explanation, both 
in Statistical methods for research workers and in The design of experiments. In the 
latter book, two-tailed tests are introduced on p. 38, and it is again precipitately done, 
without explanation. Yet both books otherwise provide careful and detailed explana-
tions. We are thus compelled to recognise that the explanation for Fisher using |t| as test 
statistic at (6.3.10) is the direct and obvious one of extending the behavioural reasoning 
at (6.3.4) in the following manner, where H0 now denotes a normal population of differ-
ences with mean equal to zero:
The epistemology of statistical science
234
Suppose that we were to accept tobs as evidence against H0. Then we would be 
bound to accept -tobs as equally strong evidence against H0. So we would be bound 
to accept any larger value of |t|obs as even stronger evidence against H0. Hence, 
the probability that we would mistakenly declare there to be evidence against H0 
were we to regard the data under analysis as just decisive against H0, is given by
pobs = Pr(|T| ≥ |t|obsH0). (6.3.11)
That this correctly interprets Fisher’s notion of ‘a two-tailed test’, and that he thereby intro-
duced the notion of ‘simultaneous statistical inference’, is beyond any reasonable contest.
6.4 Proof of an inadvertent confounding
Often the index of a class of statistical models is a real-valued parameter whose range 
includes, and is bounded by, one of the values that parameter might take, for instance 
if θ represents the probability of success when trying to discriminate by taste between 
two items, 0.5 ≤ θ. Again, a mineral supplement in a feed ration for dairy cows might be 
harmless or beneficial, so if δ represents its effect on milk production, 0 ≤ δ. Once again, 
if µ represents the number of foetuses borne by a pregnant rabbit, 1 ≤ µ. In this section 
we use such an example to prove that R. A. Fisher’s idea of a significance test involves 
an inadvertent confounding of two incompatibly different concepts. Consider for that 
purpose, the counts given in Table 1.15.1. Recall that the angular transform in degrees, 
of a binomial count out of n, has variance
820.7÷n, where n = 5 syllables per response in Table 1.15.1.
However, counts such as those in Table 1.15.1 often involve some variation in excess of 
the binomial. So, consider, as a class of models for the error sum of squares arising from 
the standard analysis of variance of their angular transforms
[(820.7÷5)+σ²]×[χ² on 14 degrees of freedom] where 0 ≤ σ².
Let us ask:
What are the σ² values for which the given data might reasonably be modelled?
The observed value of the error sum of squares for the present example is 3 014.4. So, for 
a co-ordination test of say σ² = 0.04 we find
3.014.4÷[(820.7÷5)+0.04] = 18.36, where Pr(χ² on 14 df ≥ 18.36) = 0.2028,
showing that the mental correlate of the datum chi-square is then situated at 
(0.7972, ε, 0.2028) in the chi-square test distribution.
By testing different hypothesised values in this way we obtain the following array, where 
the co-ordinates are rounded to the nearest 0.00005 for convenient reading:
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Hypothesised value Statistical co-ordinate
σ² = 0.03 (0.79725, ε, 0.20275)
σ² = 0.02 (0.79730, ε, 0.20270)
σ² = 0.01 (0.79735, ε, 0.20265)
σ² = 0 (0.79740, ε, 0.20260)         (6.4.1)
We must now consider a corresponding array of significance tests, for which purpose we 
must carefully note that the form of our question is: ‘How much might the value of σ² 
be?’, not ‘At least how much …?’ or ‘At most how much …?’ When a substantive investi-
gator asks us ‘How much  …?’, then that is the question we must try to answer. So if our 
hypothesised model is say σ² = 0.04, alternatives both of the form σ² > 0.04 and of the 
form σ² < 0.04 must be considered. Recalling that the value of the observed error sum of 
squares is 3 014.4, the relevant facts are now
3 014.4÷[(820.7÷5)+0.04] = 18.36, where Pr(χ² on 14 df ≥ 18.36) = 0.2028,
and where 0.2028 is also the value of Pr(χ² on 14 df ≤ 9.42).
Reasoning as at (6.3.11) then leads to a two-tailed significance test, as follows:
Suppose that we were to accept chi-squareobs = 18.36 as evidence against σ² = 0.04, 
and in favour of σ² > 0.04. Then we would be bound to accept chi-squareobs = 9.42 
as equally strong evidence against σ² = 0.04, and in favour of σ² < 0.04. And so we 
would be bound to accept any value of chi-squareobs that is more than 18.36, or 
less than 9.42, as even stronger evidence against σ² = 0.04, and in favour of σ² > 0.04 
or σ² < 0.04, respectively. Hence, the probability that we would mistakenly declare 
there to be evidence against σ² = 0.04, were we to regard the data under analysis 
as just decisive against σ² = 0.04, is given by
pobs = Pr(χ² ≥ 18.36σ² = 0.04) + Pr(χ² ≤ 9.42σ² = 0.04)
       = 0.2028+0.2028
       = 0.4056.
By reasoning in this way we can obtain the significance level of the evidence against any 
non-zero hypothesised value of σ². When the hypothesised value is zero however, we are 
forced to modify the reasoning in such a way that a one-sided test is obtained, otherwise 
the reasoning would not make sense. We thus obtain the following array: 
Hypothesised value Significance level
σ² = 0.03 pobs = 0.40550
σ² = 0.02 pobs = 0.40540
σ² = 0.01 pobs = 0.40530
σ² = 0.0000000001 pobs = 0.40520
σ² = 0 pobs = 0.20260        (6.4.2)
The discontinuity that separates the last term from its immediate predecessor at (6.4.2) 
has no counterpart at (6.4.1), as the discontinuity has derived from the introduction of 
an additional epistemological concept above and beyond the essential epistemological 
concept used at (6.4.1). The concept used at (6.4.1) is just that of pointing and saying:
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‘See for yourself how snugly within the hypothesised crowd (or awkwardly upon 
its outskirts) the mental correlate of the test datum is being situated.’ (6.4.3)
The additional concept is then introduced at (6.4.2) by reasoning of the kind:
‘Hence, the probability that we would mistakenly declare there to be evidence against 
the hypothesised model, were we to regard the data under analysis as just decisive 
against that model, is … ’ (6.4.4)
It is well worth noting that ‘See for yourself …’ is predicative, whereas ‘Hence, the prob-
ability …’ is predictive. So unquestionably, two distinctly different concepts are involved. 
Recall also, as was explained in the previous chapter, why the explanations at (6.3.4) and 
(6.3.5) carefully avoid making a forecast. Significance testing, just like co-ordination 
testing, concerns problems in pointing, and not problems in forecasting (hypothesis 
testing concerns problems in forecasting.)
The arrays at (6.4.1) and (6.4.2) strongly disagree about the solution to a given episte-
mological problem. This is so despite broad agreement on the nature of the problem it-
self. In order to come to grips with the disagreement, we must proceed from that broad 
agreement. There is broad agreement that we are pointing at a solitary data set in the real 
world, and trying to eliminate some of the members of a matching class of models in the 
human mind. It is agreed that those models are predictive in the sense of providing for the 
prediction of physical (bodily) experiences. It is agreed that the models are to be tested 
by testing predicted experiences against the corresponding experiential data. It is agreed 
that the outcomes of such tests must be capable of being forced upon the human body, if 
needs be by simulation. This brings us to the crux of the disagreement when we ask: ‘What 
might one then need to simulate?’ Clearly, all that might need simulation is the array at 
(6.4.1), as the array at (6.4.2) is then simply derived from the initial one at (6.4.1) by the 
introduction of a further concept. Equally clearly, that further concept is not needed, as 
the question to be answered has already been answered at (6.4.1) in terms of that which 
was agreed upon. And equally clearly, the further concept is incompatible with the initial 
concept, as its introduction results in widely different descriptions of the quality of fit of 
the two infinitesimally different models indexed by
σ² = 0.0000000001 and σ² = 0, (6.4.5)
respectively. It must be grasped firmly that for all practical purposes the two models 
indexed at (6.4.5) fit the given data equally well, and that must be shown to be so by any 
reasonable procedure. It remains only to note that there is no merit in replacing the ar-
ray at (6.4.2) with a ‘conservative’ array based on two-tailed tests only. This is because 
there is no merit in replacing a given test with a less sensitive test – especially if that is 
being done in order to hide an unwelcome fact.
6.5 Another proof
The main thrust of the proof given in the previous section is an incongruity that arises 
in consequence of the inadvertent confounding. For a proof where the confounding 
and its immediate consequences are displayed directly at source, consider all the 2.×2 
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contingency tables whose 1st and 2nd row totals, and whose 1st and 2nd column totals, are 
fixed at 8 and 5, and at 6 and 7, respectively. Consider M(0): ‘No association’ as hypoth-
esised model, and let OT denote the ordering
  T   8-T  =  1  7  ,  2  6  ,  
3  5
  ,  
4  4
  ,  
5  3
  ,  6  2  . (6.5.1) 
6-T  T-1      5  0     4  1     3  2     2  3     1  4     0  5
The recipe at (1.30.3) then shows that, under the hypothesised model, the probabilities 
of the ordered configurations at (6.5.1), conditional on the row and column totals, are
  2    ,  35  , 140  , 175  ,  70  ,   7   , (6.5.2) 
429    429   429    429    429   429
respectively. Suppose now that each one of the two alternatives:
M(-): ‘Negative association’ and M(+): ‘Positive association’
is, in its own right, substantively conceivable. Then a co-ordination test based on OT is 
left-sensitive to M(-) and right-sensitive to M(+). Under this ordering the situation of, 
for instance, T = 2 in the test distribution, is given by
  2    ,  35  , 140   = (0.01, 0.08, 0.91), 
429    429   429  
pointing weakly toward the left at M(−), (6.5.3)
and the situation of for instance T = 6 in the test distribution is given by
422  ,  17  ,   0      = (0.98, 0.02, ∅), 
429    429   429  
pointing strongly toward the right at M(+). (6.5.4)
The problem Fisher wants to solve must now be grasped firmly. In Chapter 4 we saw 
that when investigation is mistaken for decision-making under risk, circular reasoning 
cannot be avoided. In Chapter 5 we saw how Fisher avoids such circular reasoning by 
using realised significance levels, not as forecasted frequencies, but as measurements 
of qua lity of fit. So the problem that significance testing proposes to solve, is that of 
appropriately measuring the quality of fit of alternative models brought to mind, so as 
to judge their tenability when considered as alternative explanations for how a given 
real-world data set might (or might not) have come about. In addition of course, it is 
required that those measurements be provided in terms that are physically meaningful, 
i.e. terms that can, if needs be, be explained by simulation. In short, we must devise an 
instrument that can physically measure the tenability of our three alternative models in 
respect of a given real-world data set. This is directly comparable to, for instance, devis-
ing an instrument that can physically measure the tenability of three alternative models 
called ‘low’, ‘normal’, or ‘high’, in respect of a real-world patient’s blood pressure – that 
being the case because ‘physical’ here simply means ‘can be grasped by the human body’. 
True, the patient is directly present, whereas the 2×2 table represents something not di-
rectly present. However, that need not concern us here, as we need not distinguish here 
between measurements directly made and measurements derived from the historical 
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record, that is to say, from previous measurements directly made. Also true, statistical 
co-ordinates are explicitly imprecise, whereas one measurement of blood pressure is 
only implicitly imprecise, as repeated measurement of such blood pressure would show. 
However, that is beside the point here, as our analogy does not concern the particular 
physical meanings involved but only the physicality of those meanings.
Co-ordination tests provide, in the required sense, a solution to the foregoing problem. 
In order to grasp this the reader should note that we have brought into mind an in-
cipient class comprising just three models, {M(-), M(0), M(+)}. Though M(0) is the only 
mathematically explicit member of that class, the other two members are sufficiently 
well defined for us to grasp how, in respect of given data, the ordering at (6.5.1) might 
well separate the different causative explanations we associate with the different mem-
bers; in cases of strong association, as follows:
For T values arising from negative association, the human body can, by simulation, 
be physically forced to grasp that the mental correlates of such values tend mostly 
to be situated snugly within the M(-) crowd, but awkwardly so upon the left-hand 
outskirts of the other two.
For T values arising from no association, the human body can, by simulation, be 
physically forced to grasp that the mental correlates of such values tend mostly to 
be situated snugly within the M(0) crowd, but awkwardly so upon the right-hand 
outskirts of the M(-) crowd, and upon the left-hand outskirts of the M(+) crowd.
For T values arising from positive association, the human body can, by simulation, 
be physically forced to grasp that the mental correlates of such values tend mostly 
to be situated snugly within the M(+) crowd, but awkwardly so upon the right-hand 
outskirts of the other two. (6.5.5)
Our co-ordination test thus clearly provides a solution to the given problem. We note 
in passing that, for that problem, it does not seem possible that a better co-ordination 
test could be devised. This is, however, irrelevant at present, as the present development 
concerns our principle of testing, not our choice of test statistic. What will prove to be 
relevant is that the purpose of the ordering at (6.5.1) is analytical in the sense of trying 
to distinguish the three different models by separating, as far as possible, the sample 
patterns that point at this, that or the other respective model. This concludes the first of 
three developments that together comprise the present proof.
The foregoing development involved the concept of measuring quality of fit, but not 
that of the probability of mistaken conclusion. This must be grasped firmly. So, let us 
note that a co-ordination tester may grant, without involving any behavioural concepts, 
that it is convenient, though slightly imprecise, to summarise the statements made at 
(6.5.3) and (6.5.4) by saying:
If T = 2, then U+ε = 0.09, pointing weakly at M(-). (6.5.6)
If T = 6, then ε+V = 0.02, pointing strongly at M(+). (6.5.7)
An inadvertent confounding on the part of R.A. Fisher
239
And let us note further that a co-ordination tester may also grant, without involving 
any behavioural concepts, that it is correct, though irrelevant for the purposes of co-
ordination tests, to say that it follows from the statements at (6.5.6) and (6.5.7) that:
The probability under M(0) that T = t points as strongly, or more strongly, at M(-) 
than T = 2 does, is given by U+ε = 0.09.
The probability under M(0) that T = t points as strongly, or more strongly, at M(+) 
than T = 6 does, is given by ε+V = 0.02.
The point here is that a co-ordination test involves no behaviourism whatsoever. This is 
important because, by way of contrast, significance testing relies, for its physical meaning, 
on the behavioural concept explained in (6.3.4), which entails, as explained in (6.3.11), 
the further notion of ‘simultaneous statistical inference’ as an inescapable logical conse-
quence. Cox and Hinkley (1974, p. 77) have tried to motivate that notion by arguing that 
one must make allowance for behaviour amounting to
‘selection of [the] test in the light of [the] data’. (6.5.9)
This leads them to remark (p. 79) that the recipe at (6.3.11) is available when
‘t and -t represent essentially equivalent departures from H0’, but that (6.5.10)
‘commonly, however, large and small values of t indicate quite different kinds of de-
parture and, further, there may be no very natural way of specifying what are equally 
important departures in the two directions’. (6.5.11)
The only immediate relevance of these remarks is that many orderings are incapable of 
adequately precise symmetric representation. So they argue that
‘it is best to regard the tests in the two different directions as two different tests, 
both of which are being used’. (6.5.12)
(See also Cox 1984.) In the case of the present example the two different tests they refer to 
are obtained by considering the ordering at (6.5.1) as being right-sensitive to M(+), and 
the inverse of that ordering also as being right-sensitive, but to M(-), not M(+). The test 
statistic for the inverse ordering is say 7-T = S. The two orderings are then as follows: 
OT is right-sensitive to M(+), the hypothesised probabilities being given by
  2    ,  35  ,  140  ,  175   ,  70  ,   7    for T = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, respectively. 
429    429   429    429    429   429     
OS is right-sensitive to M(−), the hypothesised probabilities being given by
  7    ,  70  ,   175  ,  140  ,   35  ,   2    , for S = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, respectively. 
429    429    429     429    429   429
The behavioural concept with its leitmotiv of this, that or the other possibility of ‘a mistak-
en conclusion’, here in respect of M(0), together with its entailed concept of ‘simultaneous 
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statistical inference’, here in respect of M(-) and M(+) simultaneously, is then introduced 
by the following kind of reasoning where the phrase ‘then we would be bound’ means 
‘then we would be bound by way of a smaller probability of mistaken conclusion’, and 
where the word ‘hence’ announces the entailment:
Suppose we were to consider S = 6 as just decisive against M(0) in favour of M(-). 
Then we would be bound to consider that no value of T is decisive against M(0) in 
favour of M(+). Hence, the probability that we would mistakenly declare there to 
be evidence against M(0) in favour of either M(-) or M(+) is pobs = (2+0)÷429.
Suppose we were to consider T = 6 as just decisive against M(0) in favour of M(+). 
Then we would be bound to consider S = 6 as even more decisive against M(0) in 
favour of M(-). Hence the probability that we would mistakenly declare there to be 
evidence against M(0) in favour of either M(-) or M(+) is pobs = (7+2+0)÷429.
Suppose we were to consider S = 5 as just decisive against M(0) in favour of M(-). 
Then we would be bound to consider T = 6 as even more decisive against M(0) in 
favour of M(+), and bound to consider S = 6 as still more decisive against M(0) in 
favour of M(-). Hence the probability that we would mistakenly declare there to be 
evidence against M(0) in favour of M(-) or M(+) is pobs = (35+7+2+0)÷429.
And so on. (6.5.13)
Cox and Hinkley (1974, p.79) note that such probabilities of ‘mistaken’ behaviour can as 
a general rule be obtained as the attainable significance levels when the test statistic is 
taken to be the sum of the original rounding and corresponding lesser co-ordinate. In our 
example, for instance, the values of the sum of the rounding and corresponding lesser 
co-ordinate for T = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, are seen from the hypothesised probabilities at (6.5.2) 
to be given by:
0+2 , 0+2+35 , 0+2+35+140 , 175+70+7+0 , 70+7+0 , 7+0 , amounting to 
429      429             429                   429              429      429
   2  ,  44  , 254 , 429 , 114 ,  9   , respectively. 
429   429   429   429   429  429
So, by re-ordering on the magnitude of these probabilities, the original ordering, is replaced 
by a re-ordering, , given by:
T’= 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, for T = 4, 3, 5, 2, 6, 1, respectively. (6.5.14)
Table 6.5.1 shows how the behavioural probabilities arising at (6.5.13) then arise as the 
set of attainable significance levels for the re-ordering at (6.5.14). This completes
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Table 6.5.1: The attainable significance levels of a two-tailed significance test of association in a 
2 × 2 contingency table whose 1st and 2nd row totals, and 1st and 2nd column totals are 
fixed at 8 and 5, and fixed at 6 and 7, respectively
Pr[T’ ≥ 6 |M(0)] = Pr(T = 1 |M(0)] =   2 
                                                             429
Pr[T’ ≥ 5 |M(0)] = Pr(T = 1 or 6 |M(0)] = 2+7 
                                                                     429
Pr[T’ ≥ 4 |M(0)] = Pr(T = 1 or 6 or 2 |M(0)] = 2+7+35 
                                                                                 429
Pr[T’ ≥ 3 |M(0)] = Pr(T = 1 or 6 or 2 or 5 |M(0)] = 2+7+35+70 
                                                                                            429
Pr[T’ ≥ 2 |M(0)] = Pr(T = 1 or 6 or 2 or 5 or 3 |M(0)] = 2+7+35+70+140 
                                                                                                        429
Pr[T’ ≥ 1 |M(0)] = Pr(T = 1 or 6 or 2 or 5 or 3 or 4 |M(0)] = 1
the second part of our proof. It shows how the significance test arises by replacing an 
initial ordering based on non-behavioural concepts of ‘ordering according to fit’, with 
an entirely different ordering based on behavioural concepts of ‘ordering according to 
hypothesised probabilities of mistaken conclusion’.
Note that the first part of our proof now implies that the behavioural concept is un-
necessary. This is the case because, as we explained at (6.5.5), the problem can be solved 
without its introduction. That brings us to the third part of our proof, which is simply 
to note that the introduction of the behavioural concept is not merely unnecessary, but 
has in fact destructive consequences when measuring quality of fit. The present case ex-
emplifies such destruction inasmuch as the significance level decreases as T’ increases, 
but by way of a scrambled ordering with
T’ = 1 favouring M(+) as having the better quality of fit,
T’ = 2 favouring M(-) as having the better quality of fit,
T’ = 3 favouring M(+) as having the better quality of fit,
T’ = 4 favouring M(-) as having the better quality of fit,
T’ = 5 favouring M(+) as having the better quality of fit, and
T’ = 6 favouring M(-) as having the better quality of fit. (6.5.15)
The ordering at (6.5.15) is clearly not compatible with the notion of a discriminative order-
ing that tries, as far as possible, to separate and place into three different parts of the order-
ing, those data patterns that point at M(-), or M(0), or M(+), respectively. A co-ordination 
tester might in fact object, with good reason, to our having described the result at (6.5.14) 
as a re-ordering; might in fact call, with good reason, for it to be described as a ‘disorder-
ing’. And, of course, when that disordering is viewed as an ordering for a co-ordination 
test, its separating characteristics can be shown by simulation to be inferior to those of the 
original ordering. That completes the present proof, and we note that, although it differs 
in detail from the proof developed in the previous section, the same underlying reasoning 
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is used. In each proof we begin with a concrete example requiring assessment of quality 
of fit in physically understandable terms. In each proof, we show how that is achieved 
directly by the use of statistical co-ordinates. And in each proof we show that the use of 
significance levels for the same problem in measuring fit then requires the introduction 
of a further concept, which is both unnecessary and destructive.
6.6 A watershed
We can now finally come to grips with the definitive distinction between significance 
tests and co-ordination tests. It will be helpful to consider the following situation. Sup-
pose that a family physician is consulted by a patient complaining of dizziness, and that 
the physician makes a measurement, X = x, of the patient’s blood pressure. We sup-
pose that such measurements on many individuals have provided a scale on which, for 
normal blood pressure, X is a N(0, 1²) variable, and for abnormal blood pressure X is a 
N(θ, 1²) variable, with θ < 0 (low blood pressure) or with θ > 0 (high blood pressure). We 
now consider this situation in terms of four different scenarios. 
Scenario 1
The physician will be concerned about the possibility of high blood pressure, as that 
is a serious condition. So, supposing that the physician practises hypothesis testing, a 
one-sided hypothesis test of H0: θ = 0 versus H1: θ > 0 is specified without reference to 
the data. The physician will be concerned by the possibility that slight tendencies might 
be overlooked. In order to rather be safe than sorry, a fairly high Type I error rate, say 
α = 0.10, is specified without reference to the data. So the critical region for the test is
1.28 ≤ x < ∞.
Let the observed blood pressure be X = -1.55. The physician will then be embarrassed 
by perhaps having, as Kendall and Stuart (1961, p. 182) express it, ‘located the critical 
region in the tail of the statistic’s distribution which turned out to be the wrong one for 
the true value of θ’. ‘How silly of me,’ the physician might think, ‘for not having consid-
ered the possibility of low blood pressure. After all, dizziness is a symptom of low blood 
pressure. Yet, I will now have to pretend that I have not the foggiest notion of what 
causes my patient’s complaint, whereas in fact the observed X value gives me a clear 
indication of what the cause may be.’
Scenario 2
The physician will be concerned about the possibility of high blood pressure, as that is 
a serious condition, but might also consider dizziness as being more indicative of low 
blood pressure. So, suppose that the physician practises hypothesis testing and is also 
mindful of a recommendation by Kendall and Stuart (1961, pp. 182, 201, 202) that, as ‘a 
common sense way of insuring against’ the possibility of certain embarrassing outcomes, 
an ‘unbiased’ hypothesis test is preferred. So a two-sided hypothesis test of H0: θ = 0 versus 
H1: θ ≠ 0 with the ‘unbiased’ apportionment of half the Type I error rate in each tail is 
specified without reference to the data. The physician will be concerned by the possibility 
that slight tendencies might be overlooked. So as rather to be safe than sorry, a fairly high 
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Type I error rate, say α = 0.10, is specified without reference to the data. Hence the critical 
region for the test is:
the union of −∞ < x ≤ -1.645 and +1.645 ≤ x < +∞.
Recall that the observed blood pressure turned out to be X = -1.55. So, having sought 
protection against the embarrassment of an extreme value in the ‘wrong’ tail area, the 
physician will instead suffer the embarrassment of having been overly cautious. ‘How 
silly of me,’ the physician might think, ‘for not having used a “biased” apportionment of 
say 0.75 of the Type I error rate in the lower tail area and then only 0.25 thereof in the up-
per tail area. After all, low blood pressure was in the first place indicated by the patient’s 
complaint.’ The critical region would then have been:
the union of −∞ < x ≤ -1.44 and +1.96 ≤ x < +∞.
So, low blood pressure would have been diagnosed. Yet, as it is, I will now have to pre-
tend that I have not the foggiest notion of what causes my patient’s complaint, whereas 
in fact the observed X value gives me a clear indication of what that cause may be’.
Discussion of Scenarios 1 and 2
In both scenarios the physician has mistaken a problem in investigation for a problem in 
decision-making under risk. So, in both scenarios the physician begins by reasoning as if 
the patient is just one of a host of patients arriving in the real world. In both scenarios the 
physician then reasons (correctly in terms of that mistake) how, in such a case, there can 
be adjoined to each patient, a decision such that amongst those who are healthy the deci-
sion will be erroneous in a specified proportion of cases, and such that amongst those who 
are ill in a specified sense the decision will be correct in a larger proportion of cases. In 
each scenario the reasoning leads to embarrassment, not for being incorrect, but for being 
mistaken. As the problem is clearly an investigative one, the patient must be viewed as a 
single, solitary real-world individual, and not as one of a host of real-world individuals. So 
the population should, as an explanatory host, be brought into the human mind, and not, 
as a fabricated host, be brought into the real world. R. A. Fisher, as quoted at (6.3.1), clearly 
understood that, and we take account of that understanding in the next scenario.
Scenario 3
The physician will be concerned about the possibility of high blood pressure, as that is 
a serious condition, but should also consider dizziness as being more indicative of low 
blood pressure. So, supposing that the physician practises significance testing, a two-sid-
ed significance test of M0: θ = 0 versus M1: θ ≠ 0 is indicated. The theory of significance 
testing would then have the physician reason that if X = -1.55 were to be regarded as just 
decisive against θ = 0 and in favour of θ < 0, then X = +1.55 would have to be regarded as 
just decisive against θ = 0 in favour of θ > 0. Therefore, the probability that the physician 
would mistakenly declare there to be evidence against M0, were the physician to regard the 
given data as just decisive against M0, is given by:
pobs = Pr(X ≤ -1.55M0)+Pr(X ≥ +1.55M0)
      = 0.06+0.06
      = 0.12
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As the physician will be concerned by the possibility that slight tendencies might be over-
looked, the significance level of pobs = 0.12 coupled with the substantive fact that dizziness is 
a symptom of low blood pressure, might well lead the physician to advise certain dietary pre-
cautions and to arrange a subsequent appointment, so as to keep the matter under observa-
tion. Note that this is very much with reference to all of the data, both the datum of pressure 
and the datum of dizziness. Note also that although the physician might act upon the given 
facts, there is no prescriptive rule that might impose an embarrassing decision.
Discussion of Scenarios 1, 2 and 3
Scenario 3 makes better sense than do Scenarios 1 and 2. However, here that is not the 
purpose for introducing the three scenarios. Here the purpose is to attract attention to 
something they have in common, namely if each of them is trying to explain how these 
data might, or might not, have come about, which is what they should be doing, why does 
each of them give an ‘explanation’ that, as it were, partakes of a statistician? In Scenarios 1 
and 2, that partaking of the statistician is made glaringly obvious by the notion of specifi-
cations to be made without reference to the data. So we are offered an explanation involv-
ing a specified α, and a specified one-sided test, or a specified unbiased two-side test, or a 
specified biased two-sided test, etc., and these specifications are to be made without refer-
ence to the data. Each explanation thus involves a statistician in the guise of a physician 
who is unable to avoid embarrassing consequences that might arise from those specifica-
tions. The point here is that the purpose of data analysis is to provide an explanation of 
how given data might have come about. In the present case, those data are an experienced 
dizziness and a measurement of blood pressure, which data are not properly ‘explained’ 
by reasoning that partakes of a statistician who had absolutely nothing to do with the 
origin of those data. In Scenario 3 the specifications are avoided by replacing the notion 
of a specified Type I error rate with the notion of a significance level as measuring fit. 
However, as explained at (6.3.11), that measurement is by way of simultaneous statistical 
inference given a meaning that partakes of the behaviour of a hypothetical statistician. So 
the reasoning again leads to a model that contains a statistician! That is the case despite 
the fact that no statistician was involved in that which caused the datum of dizziness, or 
in that which caused the blood pressure measurement to be low. The idea of such a model 
must be firmly rebuffed. No matter how pretty its mathematics, a model that partakes of 
irrelevancy is bad science and bound to cause confusion and error. So the hypothetical 
statistician must, figuratively speaking, be seized by the scruff of the neck – and by the 
seat of the pants – and frog-marched from model, leaving us with Scenario 4.
Scenario 4
The physician will be concerned about the possibility of high blood pressure, as that is a 
serious condition, but should also consider dizziness as more indicative of low blood pres-
sure. So, supposing that the physician practises co-ordination testing, such a test of M0: θ = 0 
versus M1: θ < 0 or M2: θ > 0 is indicated. Given X = -1.55 as the datum of measurement, it will 
be found that the mental correlate of that datum is situated at (0.06, ε, 0.94) in the test dis-
tribution. That finding, coupled with the substantive fact that dizziness is a symptom of low 
blood pressure, will lead the physician to make certain dietary prescriptions and to arrange a 
subsequent appointment to keep the matter under observation. Note that this is very much 
with reference to all the data, both the datum of pressure and the datum of dizziness. Note 
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also that even though the physician acts on the given facts, there is no prescriptive rule 
that might impose an embarrassing decision – no rule that runs contrary to the physician’s 
rational opinion. And note, finally, that the physician’s reasoning proceeds from a model 
that does not partake of a statistician’s specifications or behaviour, as such specifications or 
behaviour, having been adjoined post hoc, cannot be part of any defendable model of how 
the patient’s symptoms might have come about.
We have arrived at a watershed on which the reader is now compelled to take a stance. 
We have seen that significance tests are not intended to produce real-world frequency 
forecasts. They are intended to produce formal probabilities, so-called significance levels 
that are calculated from hypothesised models in respect of given data so as to measure the 
quality of fit of those models when viewed as possible explanations of how those particu-
lar data might, or might not, have come about. An inescapable question now arises:
‘Why measure “quality of fit” in that particular way?’ (6.6.1)
Cox and Hinkley (1974, p. 209) reply that one requires an evidential concept whose ‘physical 
interpretation’ gives ‘an empirical meaning, which in principle can be checked by experi-
ment’. Cox (1977, p. 50) states further that the interpretation in question must be
‘relevant to the use to be made of the test’. (6.6.2)
These explanations posit two distinctly different requirements:
Requirement 1: The concept must be physically meaningful.
Requirement 2: That meaning must be ‘relevant to the use to be made of the test’.
Requirement 1 is unexceptionable and clearly met, as the meaning of ‘the significance 
level’ can in any instance of its use be forced upon the human body by a simulation of that 
meaning. The same, however, is also true of the concept ‘statistical co-ordinates’, which 
brings us to Requirement 2, where Cox’s phrase ‘of the test’ refers of course to a signifi-
cance test, but could equally well be made to refer to a co-ordination test. So, going back to 
the question at (6.6.1), we must consider, not just one, but two different ways to measure 
that quality of fit. We must also note that the outcome of the significance test can be de-
rived from that of the co-ordination test by adjoining the further concept of the knowing 
subject who, apart from this possible mistake, might also make that possible mistake and 
therefore compels the significance tester to adjoin yet a further concept of simultaneous 
statistical inference. However, we have developed proof beyond any reasonable contest 
that the two further concepts are not needed for measuring quality of fit. By adjoining 
those concepts, significance testing violates a fundamental principle of science:
Never, ever introduce a constituent that is not needed.
6.7 Fisher’s ‘knowing subject’
In Section 1.1 we cautioned that development of co-ordination tests would ultimately 
lead to a devastating outcome. So, it would not have done to precipitately dismiss such 
tests, as one colleague inanely did with the comment that co-ordination tests ‘are just 
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significance tests with frills’ – inanely, as it is the other way round; it is significance tests 
that adjoin the unneeded embellishment of a ‘knowing subject’. And it would not have 
done to precipitately dismiss such tests, as another colleague short-sightedly did with 
the comment that ‘this is just a shift of emphasis’ – short-sightedly, as that fails to grasp 
that inasmuch as our removal of the knowing subject destroys simultaneous statistical 
inference at source (at the two-tailed level), further destruction cannot be escaped. This 
must be firmly grasped. So, let us develop two examples of that further destruction.
Example 6.7.1
Some 50 years ago Barbara McClintock discovered the existence in maize of what she 
called a travelling gene. Such a gene has, so to speak, two ‘houses’ – shall we say a town 
house and a country house. A travelling gene in the vinegar fly leads to the following 
problem (Boussy and Kidwell 1987): in order to establish, in any particular case, in which 
‘house’ the gene is currently ‘staying’, one determines the proportions of sterile offspring 
in each of two different test crosses. If we examine a number n of offspring in each cross, 
we obtain a pair of proportions (p, q) that might be modelled satisfactorily as realisations 
of independent binomial random variables with estimated variances
s2 = p(1-p)÷n and s2 = q(1-q)÷n, 
 
p
                             
q
respectively. The proportion pair (p, q) estimates the location of a point in one or the 
other of the two rectangular regions labelled P and Q in Figure 6.7.1. That point is not
Figure 6.7.1: Possible locations of a point defined by a pair of binomial proportions
expected to be situated in either one of the two square regions labelled M and M*; but its 
estimated location (p, q) does sometimes stray into the region labelled M. So, we need a 
statistical method to judge such and other doubtful cases. For that purpose, we first de-
velop a significance-test procedure, and then a co-ordination test procedure, as follows.
q
1
Q M*
M P
0
0 1 p
An inadvertent confounding on the part of R.A. Fisher
247
The significance test procedure for Example 6.7.1
Kempthorne and Folks (1971) develop what they call consonance (not confidence) re-
gions, the general idea being to avoid a specified Type I error rate (or what amounts to the 
same thing, a specified confidence coefficient) allowing instead for significance levels that 
range over a number of different values of interest. Thus, for instance, we might use the 
standard normal approximation for the binomial to respectively obtain (1-0.10) = 0.90 and 
(1-0.05) = 0.95 upper bounding, one-sided consonance regions for E(p) in the travelling 
gene problem. Those regions are given by:
0 < E(p) < p+1.264 sp and 0 < E(p) < p+1.645 sp, respectively. (6.7.1)
Here, the knowing subject of significance testing knows that the probabilities of a mis-
taken conclusion would be 10% and 5%, respectively. These would then also be the 
probabilities for the lower bounding, one-sided consonance regions given by
p-1.264 sp < E(p) < 1 and p-1.645 sp < E(p) < 1, respectively. (6.7.2)
However, in respect of just one solitary data set, it is impossible for any investigator, 
whether real or imaginary, to be mistaken as at (6.7.1) and also at (6.7.2). In order for both 
kinds of mistakes to be simultaneously relevant, those mistakes, whether real or imagi-
nary, must refer to different data sets arising from possibly different E(p). And so, by way 
of very subtle slippage, we fall into reasoning that no longer tries to explain ‘how the given 
data might have come about’, but instead is trying to explain ‘how often an investigator 
might be “mistaken” in repetitive investigations of many different sets of such data’. And 
so, in order for the rates of those possible mistakes to be maintained at 10% and 5%, the 
forms at (6.7.1) and (6.7.2) are to be replaced by
p-1.645 sp < E(p) < p+1.645 sp, and 
p-1.960 sp < E(p) < p+1.960 sp, respectively. (6.7.3)
There is more to come.
Our problem is how an observed proportion pair (p, q) might enable knowledge of an 
unknown proportion pair [E(p), E(q)]. In order to maintain the 10% and 5% norms in 
respect of rectangular consonance regions of the form
[p-Z sp < E(p) < p+Z sp]×[q-Z sp < E(q) < q+Z sp], (6.7.4)
we must take Z to be the α percentage point of the N(0, 1) distribution for
α = 1-√1-(0.10÷2) and α = 1-√1-(0.05÷2), i.e. α = 0.0253 and α = 0.0126,
respectively. The corresponding values of Z, instead of those at (6.7.3), are
Z = 1.955 and Z = 2.238, respectively. (6.7.5)
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The co-ordination test procedure for Example 6.7.1
The normal approximation used for the significance test procedure can also be used to 
obtain abbreviated traces for E(p) and E(q). For E(p) we find that
(0.10, ε, 0.90) and (0.90, ε, 0.10) are attained at
E(p) = p-1.264 sp and p+1.264 sp, respectively, and
(0.05, ε, 0.95) and (0.95, ε, 0.05) are attained at
E(p) = p-1.645 sp and p+1.645 sp, respectively.
For E(q) we obtain the same expressions but with q instead of p. The results can be ex-
pressed in terms of rectangular regions of the same form as that given at (6.7.4), but the 
meaning is of course a very different one, and instead of the Z values at (6.7.5) we now 
have, for precisely the same physical norms, 10% and 5%,
Z = 1.264 and Z = 1.645, respectively. (6.7.6)
Discussion of Example 6.7.1
There is a vast difference in the size of the regions arising from the formal expression at 
(6.7.4) when values, for precisely the same physical norm, are inserted from (6.7.5) or 
(6.7.6), respectively, the difference in area being of the order
(2 × 1.955)² = 15.3 versus (2×1.264)² = 6.4 when the norm is 10%, and 
(2 × 2.238)² = 20.3 versus (2×1.645)² = 10.8 when the norm is 5%.
This of course reflects vastly different meanings. However, there is one meaning that is 
absolutely identical in the two cases, namely the meaning of a given physical norm. This 
must be firmly grasped. So, consider a significance tester who must simulate the physi-
cal meaning of the 10% norm for significance testing, and a co-ordination tester who 
must simulate the physical meaning of the 10% norm for co-ordination testing.
The significance tester will challenge us to set up 1 000 different population pairs for 
as many different [E(p), E(q)] value pairs as we wish, will draw a sample pair from 
each population pair, calculate the 90% consonance region in each case, check 
whether or not the value of [E(p), E(p)] is covered, deposit a red chip in one bowl 
for each failure, a white chip in another bowl for each success, and then point at the 
two bowls for us to see for ourselves that about 10% of the deposits are red.
The co-ordination tester will challenge us to set up just a single population pair for 
any [E(p), E(q)] value pair we wish, and to indicate any pointing co-ordinate we 
wish from amongst the four possibilities (two left and two right), will then draw 
a 1 000 sample pairs from the single population pair we set up, calculate the value 
of the indicated pointing co-ordinate in each case, check whether or not that co-
ordinate exceeds 10%, deposit a red chip in one bowl for each one that does, a white 
chip in another bowl for each one that does not, and then point at the two bowls for 
us to see for ourselves that about 10% of the deposits are red. (6.7.7)
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Each of these two simulations is entirely correct for what it explains. But they explain dif-
ferent reasoning. This is underscored by considering, how the two kinds of testers might 
express that difference, as follows: 
Significance tester: When the coverage probability of your rectangle should be 90%, it is 
merely
1-[2(0.10)+2(0.10)-2(0.10)2(0.10)] = 0.64, i.e. 64%,
and when it is should be 95%, it is merely
1-[2(0.05)+2(0.05)-2(0.05)2(0.05)] = 0.81, i.e. 81%.
Co-ordination tester: By calculating the overall probability of possible mistakes on the part 
of your knowing subject, you blunt the instruments of investigation. For each of four instru-
ments, your rectangle says the pointing co-ordinate equals 10%, when in fact it equals
Pr(Z > 1.955) = 0.025, i.e. 2.5%,
and says it equals 5%, when in fact it equals
Pr(Z > 2.238) = 0.013, i.e. 1.3%. (6.7.8)
The simulation procedures at (6.7.7) and the corresponding calculations at (6.7.8) are each 
in its own right correct for the reasoning it explains; but the reasoning cannot be appro-
priate in both cases. So we have to ask which of the two is appropriate. The question can-
not be answered by mathematical statistics as such; it must be answered by substantive 
science. And, given substantive science that has escaped indoctrination by present-day 
literature on statistical methods for substantive investigation, there can surely be but one 
answer, as follows: any instrument of investigation that would have us confound data pat-
terns pointing at large values of E(p) with data patterns pointing at small values of E(p), 
and have us confound data patterns pointing at large values of E(q) with data patterns 
pointing at small values of E(q), and further, for good measure, have us confound all four 
of the different kinds of patterns with each other, cannot be appropriate for our problem, 
because E(p) cannot at once be both large and small, and E(q) cannot at once be both 
large and small, not to mention that the pair [E(p), E(q)] cannot all and at once be [large, 
large], [small, large], [large, small], and [small, small].
Example 6.7.2
We revisit the problem of trying to establish the location of the earth’s magnetic pole. We 
use the same class of models as in Section 4.28, first to develop a significance test proce-
dure, and then to develop a co-ordination test procedure.
Significance test procedure for Example 6.7.2
Recall that if (m1, m2) denotes the position of the pole in two-dimensional Cartesian space, 
and our data are a number, n, of (X1, X2)-like measurements of that position, we suppose 
that our data can be modelled satisfactorily via a between-within analysis of variance as a 
realisation of three independent random variables, as follows.
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a N(m1, s
2÷n) variable X1, which is the mean X1-like measurement,
a N(m2, s
2÷n) variable X2, which is the mean X2-like measurement, and
a s2χ2÷2(n-1) variable S2, which is the pooled error variance on 2(n-1) df.
Reasoning similar to that used in Sections 3.11 and 4.28 here leads to a nested array of 
(1-P) consonance regions for (m1, m2) centred at
(m1, m2) = (X1, X2) with radii √2(S
2÷n)F(P), for 0 < P < 1,
where F(P) denotes the value that is exceeded with probability P by Snedecor’s F on 2 and 
2(n-1) degrees of freedom. Let n = 10. Then, choosing as norms P = 0.10 and P = 0.05, the 
radii of the corresponding circular consonance regions are given by
√2(S2÷10)2.62 and √2(S2÷10)3.55, that is to say,
0.724S and 0.843S for the 10% and 5% norms, respectively. (6.7.9)
Co-ordination test procedure for Example 6.7.2
Consider an arbitrary degree of freedom of the form
T = l1X1+l2X2, where l
2+l2 = 1 and E(T) = l1m1+l2m2. 
                                      
1      2
Then (T, S2) is minimally sufficient for E(T). Consider, as elimination pivot
t = [T-E(T)]÷√S2÷n, distributed as Student’s t on 2(n-1) df. (6.7.10)
With n = 10 as in the previous procedure, an abbreviated trace for E(T) is given by: 
T±1.330 √S2÷10, when the pointing co-ordinate equals 0.10, and
T±1.734 √S2÷10, when the pointing co-ordinate equals 0.05,
thus
T-0.421S and T+0.421S at (U, ε, V) = (0.10, ε, •) and (• , ε, 0.10), respectively, and
T-0.548S and T+0.548S at (U, ε, V) = (0.05, ε, •) and (• , ε, 0.05), respectively.
Note that
T-E(T) = l1(X1-m1)+l2(X2-m2).
So, for every choice of (l1, l2) such that l
2 + l2 = 1, the test statistic, t, takes the value zero when 
                                                              
1      2
(m1, m2) = (X1, X2), in which case (U, ε, V) = (0.50, ε, 0.50).
This tells us that the variation of the abbreviated trace for all the possible variations of
(l1, l2) such that l
2 + l2 = 1, 
                               
1         2
takes the form of two of concentric circles centred at (m1, m2) = (X1, X2) with radii
0.421 S and 0.548 S for the 10% and 5% norms, respectively. (6.7.11)
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Discussion of Example 6.7.2
Here again, as in the case of the rectangular regions of the previous example, the two 
different kinds of test produce, in terms of the self-same norms of physical judgement, 
regions of the same form, but of vastly different size. For the regions arising at (6.7.9) 
and (6.7.11), respectively, the difference in area is of the order
π(0.724)² = 1.65 versus π(0.421)² = 0.56 when the norm is 10%, and 
π(0.843)² = 2.23 versus π(0.548)² = 0.94 when the norm is 5%.
This again reflects the differences in meaning explicated in Example 6.7.1. We need not 
repeat that explication here. Instead, let us use graphical means to underscore the dif-
ferent meanings. The formal mathematics of the matter was introduced to deal with the 
target problem of Section 3.11, where we developed a recipe for providing, in each of a 
series of repetitions, a circular confidence region for the centre of the target’s position 
in that particular repetition. Suppose the target was mounted against a wall in of course 
different positions from repetition to repetition. Following each repetition, we might 
then use our recipe to draw on the wall the circular confidence region for that particular 
repetition, maintaining say a 95 % confidence coefficient. Now bear in mind that the 
centre of the region would, in accordance with Section 3.11, vary from repetition to 
repetition, as would in fact also the radius. Figure 6.7.2 depicts the kind of display our 
drawings would provide.
m2
m1
Rep. 3Rep. 4
Rep. 2
Rep. 5
Rep. 1
Figure 6.7.2: Depicting confidence regions from repetitive attempts at locating a target 
Next, consider the present co-ordinate test procedure for using a solitary, real-world data 
set in order to develop an informed opinion on the current position of the earth’s magnetic 
pole, and consider how we might then graphically display our evidence as in Figure 6.7.3;
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m2
m1x1
x2
Figure 6.7.3: Depicting a suite if co-ordinating traces, given a data set for locating a target
any line through the centre of the concentric circles provides an abbreviated trace for 
the position of the pole on that line via its intersections with those circles. For instance, 
if n = 10, Student’s t is based on 2(10-1) = 18 degrees of freedom. So if the circles must 
give the hypothesised positions of the pole (on that line) corresponding to the mental 
correlate of the test datum being situated in Student’s test distribution, at say:
(0.01, •) and (•, 0.01) for the outer circle,
(0.05, •) and (•, 0.05) for the intermediate circle, and
(0.10, •) and (•, 0.10) for the inner circle,
then we must insert t = 2.55, 1.73 and 1.33, respectively, into the elimination piv-
ot at (6.7.10). This holds for any line through the centre, i.e. for any line through 
(m1, m2) = (x1, x2). If we rotate such a line through 180°, we obtain the concentric circles 
displayed in Figure 6.7.3. The following questions and answers now arise from contrast-
ing Figures 6.7.2 and 6.7.3:
Question: Why do the circles in Figure 6.7.2 have different centres?
Answer: Because they arise from different data sets.
Question: Why do all the circles in Figure 6.7.3 have the same centre?
Answer: Because they arise from the self-same data set.
Question: Why do the circles in Figure 6.7.2 have different radii?
Answer: Because they arise from different error estimates.
Question: Why do the circles in Figure 6.7.3 have different radii?
Answer: Because they arise from different levels of co-ordination.
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The reader should make sure that he or she clearly understands these questions and an-
swers, as they concern the fundamental distinction between decision-making under risk, 
which is what hypothesis tests and confidence regions are intended for, and data analysis, 
which is what co-ordination tests and co-ordinate traces are intended for. This brings us 
to a further question: corresponding to Figures 6.7.2 and 6.7.3, where hypothesis tests and 
co-ordination tests are depicted, respectively, how can we depict significance testing? To 
begin with, let us copy Figure 6.7.3, but with the larger radii indicated at (6.7.9) instead of 
those indicated at (6.7.11). However, this is insufficient because the reasoning that would 
have us account not only for possible ‘mistakes’ as envisaged at (6.3.4), but also for con-
trary ‘mistakes’ as envisaged at (6.3.11), cannot involve just a single, solitary data set, just 
as one cannot, at one and the same time, make a ‘mistake’ and a contrary ‘mistake’. So yes, 
we must for any given data set draw concentric circles with wider radii than those depicted 
in Figure 6.7.3, but in order to depict the different data sets involved by the reasoning, we 
must then also draw other, differently centred sets of concentric circles, in order to depict 
the behaviour of Fisher’s knowing subject in respect of this, that and the other possible 
data set. The result would then be a sort of hybrid between Figures 6.7.2 and 6.7.3, thus 
depicting how significance testing tries to enjoy the best of both of two different worlds by 
occupying a sort of half-way station between hypothesis tests and co-ordination tests.
6.8 Further confounding
We have seen how two-tailed tests arise from confounding indicative data patterns with 
counter-indicative data patterns, and we have seen how that is motivated by the notion of 
the possible mistakes of a knowing subject. Inasmuch as a data pattern in actual evidence is 
confounded with a data pattern not in actual evidence, there is no clear principle of relevan-
cy that limits the nature of the latter pattern. All that is needed for its introduction is that it 
must be capable of being envisaged as one that might cause a knowing subject, when viewed 
as a hypothetical investigator, to make a mistake in such an investigation. In this regard, the 
familiar F test of the analysis of variance is revealing, as the following examples will show.
Example 6.8.1
Table 6.8.1 displays the mean yields of k = 6 cultivars of lettuce averaged over n = 4 re plicates 
(Mead and Curnow 1987, pp. 100-103); the error mean square arose from a wider source.
Table 6.8.1: Mean yields of six lettuce cultivars in a completely randomised design
Cultivar No. 1 2 3 4 5 6
Mean of n = 4 replicates 12.6 11.7 11.6 11.2 10.1 9.3
Error mean square = 5.050 on 45 degrees of freedom, drawn from a wider source
We assume that the fixed model for analysis of variance is appropriate. First we consider how 
a data analyst would employ co-ordination tests to try to make sense of these data, and then 
we show that much confounding leads to the usual F test of the analysis of variance. 
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Co-ordinate tests applied to the lettuce data in Table 6.8.1
Let mi denote the population mean for the ith cultivar, where interest is in mi-mj for all 
i < j (i, j = 1, 2, 3, …, k). The minimal sufficient statistic for mi-mj is the corresponding 
sample difference and the sample error variance. The expected error variance is a nui-
sance parameter, and is removed by using Student’s t as elimination pivot. Consider try-
ing to eliminate M0: mi-mj = 0 for all i < j. For the lettuce data there are then 6-choose-2, 
i.e. 15 such elimination tests in total, these being, in obvious notation, as follows, in 
order of magnitude of the estimated differences in mean yield:
x1-x6 = +3.3 x1-x5 = +2.5 x2-x6 = +2.4 x3-x6 = +2.3
t = +2.077 t = +1.573 t = +1.510 t = +1.447
(•, ε, 0.022) (•, ε, 0.061) (•, ε, 0.069) (•, ε, 0.077)
x4-x6 = +1.9 x2-x5 = +1.6 … x2-x3 = +0.1
t = +1.196 t = +1.007 … t = +0.063
(•, ε, 0.118) (•, ε, 0.160) … (•, ε, 0.475) (6.8.1)
Such differences are of course not algebraically independent, and that often motivates 
poor epistemology because of a tendency to reason as if the given numerical data were 
the investigator’s only source of knowledge. Such epistemology tends to reason that all 
the available information is accounted for by just 6-1 degrees of freedom. The reason-
ing often begins to go wrong by labelling the entries (cultivars in the present case) with 
numbers or letters, rather than with specific names, thus discounting any substantive 
knowledge. Concerning lettuce for instance, Wilson (1975, p. 57) lists four types, name-
ly leaf or loosehead lettuce, butterhead lettuce, Romaine lettuce and head lettuce, with 
recommended varieties described as follows: 
Leaf varieties: Black Seeded Simpson (fast growing; outer leaves have a crum-
pled texture), Early Prizehead (brownish red leaves), Grand Rapids (slow to go 
to seed; will grow in a greenhouse in winter), Green Ice (glossy dark green leaves; 
slow to go to seed), Oakleaf (heat resistant), Ruby (reddish bronze leaves), Salad 
Bowl (slow to go to seed), Slo-bolt (compact dwarf plants; slow to go to seed)
Butterhead varieties: Bibb (Limestone), Buttercrunch (heat-resistant Bibb), 
Butter King (disease resistant; slow to go to seed), Deer Tongue (slow to go to 
seed), Fordhook, Great Lakes (very productive, even under adverse conditions; 
resistant to tipburn and heat), Tom Thumb (miniature; good in containers)
Romaine (Cos) varieties: Paris White, Valmaine (disease resistant)
Head varieties: Iceberg (vigorous), Imperial No. 44 (forms good heads in warm 
weather), Premier Great Lakes (resistant to tipburn and heat)
As all these varieties are recommended, there must be reasons why none of them could 
be discarded without potential loss. Thus, supposing that Table 6.8.1 concerns six newly 
developed varieties of say leaf lettuce, there might be similar reasons for one to consider 
more than 6-1 comparisons amongst them. Amongst just three entries, say A (not resist-
ant to tip burn), B (slow growing), and C (not slow to bolt), three contrasts, A vs. B, A vs. 
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C, and B vs. C, can be justified, and if in addition there exists conditions under which 
tip-burn, slow growth and early bolting are not of any concern, shortfall testing for those 
conditions bring the number of justifiable independent contrasts up to five, where algebra 
can find but two. So, instead of trying to derive an epistemology by counting degrees of 
freedom, we must instead establish just what the customer’s questions are. For instance, 
we might find that the customer is interested in just seven different contrasts amongst the 
six population means, where the contrasts need not necessarily all be of the form indicat-
ed at (6.8.1). If each of those seven different contrasts were substantively well motivated, 
there would be no redundancy. All we then need to establish, one by one for each com-
parison in turn, would be just what the minimal sufficient statistic for that comparison is, 
and then make our statistical analysis rest on that statistic only.
The F test applied to the lettuce data in Table 6.8.1
Snedecor’s F ratio for testing whether the cultivar means differ significantly is usually 
expressed as:
F = (cultivar mean square)÷(error mean square),
but it can also be expressed in an unusual form as 
F =  
k 
-1
  ∑      
x
i
-x
j     
2
, in obvious notation. (6.8.2) 
        2     i<j  √2s2÷n
Here F is expressed as the mean square of all the values of Student’s t listed at (6.8.1). The 
test is essentially due to R.A. Fisher, as F is a one to one transformation of a statistic that 
he originally developed for the same purpose. The form at (6.8.2) displays an extension of 
the confounding that we first met in Section 1.27, and that resurfaced at (6.3.11). At (6.8.2) 
each of the values of Student’s t listed at (6.8.1) is squared, thus bringing about k-choose-2 
instances of the confounding in Section 1.27. By computing the mean of those squared t 
values, all of those k-choose-2 instances of confounding are then also confounded with 
each other. Thus any positive value of say x2 - x3 is, by squaring, confounded with the 
corresponding negative value of x2 - x3, and any positive value of say x4 - x6 is, by squar-
ing, confounded with the corresponding negative value of x4 - x6. Then, by averaging the 
squares, all those confounded pairs are confounded with each other. The confounding 
leads to possible contradictions that Fisher tried to reconcile. In the case of the lettuce 
data, for instance, the F test for cultivar differences is given by
cultivar mean square ÷ error mean square = 5.686 ÷ 5.050, i.e. 1.126 on 5 and 
45 df, whose mental correlate is situated at (0.640, ε, 0.360) in Snedecor’s test 
distribution. (6.8.3)
Here the F test for cultivar differences does not produce a shred of evidence in favour of 
such differences, whereas the first four of the fifteen tests at (6.8.1) point quite strongly 
at the possibility of such differences. Note that in respect of the first of the 15 tests at 
(6.8.1) the contradiction is not removed by replacing the 15 co-ordinate tests with the 
corresponding two-tailed t tests. Fisher was aware of such possible contradiction. So he 
tried to reconcile the matter as follows (1966, p. 59):
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‘When … the F test … does not demonstrate significant differentiation, much caution 
should be used before claiming significance for special comparisons. Comparisons, 
which the experiment was designed to make, may, of course, be made without hesi-
tation. It is comparisons suggested subsequently, by a scrutiny of the results them-
selves, that are open to suspicion, for if the variants are numerous, a comparison of 
the highest with the lowest observed value, picked out from the results, will often 
appear to be significant, even from undifferentiated material. Properly, such un-
foreseen effects should be regarded only as suggestions for future experimentation, 
in which they can deliberately be tested. To form a preliminary opinion as to the 
strength of the evidence, it is sometimes useful to consider how many similar com-
parisons would have been from the start equally plausible. Thus, in comparing the 
best with the worst of ten tested varieties, we have chosen the pair with the largest 
apparent difference out of 45 pairs, which might equally well have been chosen. We 
might, therefore, require the probability of the observed difference to be as small as 
1 in 900, instead of 1 in 20, before attaching statistical significance to the contrast.’ 
(‘1 in 900’ should be ‘1 in 90’.) (6.8.4)
We shall eventually come to disagree with almost all, if not all, of the ideas expressed 
in this proposal. Let us begin with the caution expressed in the opening sentence. And 
in doing so, let us avoid any misgivings that might arise from an involvement of more 
contrasts than there are degrees of freedom. So, consider say:
C1= x1-x5 and four further contrasts, C2, C3, C4, and C5, so chosen that the five 
contrasts form an orthogonal set. There might for instance possibly be interest in 
C1= x2-x6 and C2= x3-x4, with the remaining two contrasts simply chosen to com-
plete the set, where (and this is a mathematical fact) that is always possible.
Let the jth contrast be expressed as:
Cj = ∑ljixi, where ∑lji = 0, and let ∑l
2
ji = Dj, for j = 2, 3, 4, 5.
Instead of the form at (6.8.2), we then obtain:
                          2    5                     2 
F =   1      
x1-x5   + ∑          
Cj          . (6.8.5) 
      6-1  √2s2÷n    j=2   √Djs2÷n
Here the contrast of interest is m1-m5, where the second term at (6.8.1) amounts to evidence 
that points quite strongly at m1-m5 > 0 – evidence that was obtained by employing the mini-
mal sufficient statistic for m1-m5. At (6.8.5), however, the first term amounts to employing 
instead an insufficient statistic obtained by squaring the contrast in the minimal suffi-
cient statistic, thereby confounding the sample pattern that did point at m1-m5 > 0 with the 
contrary sample pattern that in fact was not in evidence. To that is then added the sum of 
four further terms involving irrelevant statistics only, statistics that convey nothing what-
soever by way of relevant evidence to the possible value of m1-m5. Instead, the further terms 
have simply swamped the evidence of interest, resulting in the misleading F obtained at 
(6.8.3). Returning now to the opening sentence of the attempted reconciliation at (6.8.4), 
we might ask: ‘Has Fisher not cautioned the wrong way round?’ Surely the caution should 
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be that when the F test does not demonstrate significant differentiation, much caution 
should be used before claiming insignificance for special comparisons.
There is more to come.
Example 6.8.2
Table 6.8.2 displays the mean yields of k = 6 cultivars of lettuce averaged over n = 4 re-
plicates, when cultivated under two different sets of microclimatic circumstances.
Table 6.8.2: Mean yields of six lettuce cultivars × two different microclimates 
Cultivar 1 2 3 4 5 6
Climate 1  8.8  13.2  12.8  9.6  8.8  9.2
Climate 2  11.1  13.3  13.4  3.5  7.4  7.3
Error mean square = 5.050 on 45 degrees of freedom, drawn from a wider source.
The data are adapted from the same source as the data of the previous example, and we 
assume again that the fixed model for analysis of variance is appropriate. Again we first 
consider how a data analyst would employ co-ordination tests to try and make sense of 
the data, and then show that much confounding leads to the usual F test of the analysis 
of variance. 
Co-ordinate tests applied to the lettuce data in Table 6.8.2
We must begin by testing for interaction of cultivars × climates. Let mil denote the 
po pulation mean for the ith cultivar under the  lth climate, where interest is now in 
(mi1-mj1)-(mi2-mj2) for all i < j (i, j = 1, 2, 3, …, k). The minimal sufficient statistic for 
(mi1-mj1)-(mi2-mj2) is the corresponding sample difference and the sample error variance. 
The expected error variance is a nuisance parameter removed by using Student’s t as 
elimination pivot. Consider trying to eliminate:
M0: (mi1-mj1)-(mi2-mj2) = 0 for all i < j.
For the given data there are then (6-choose-2)(2-1) = 15 such elimination tests in total 
and, in an obvious notation, these are as follows in order of absolute magnitude of the 
estimated interaction:
(x11-x41)-(x12-x42) (x31-x41)-(x32-x42) (x21-x41)-(x22-x42) 
t = -3.738 t = -2.982 t = -2.759 
(0.00026, ε, •) (0.00230, ε, •) (0.00418, ε, •) 
(x41-x51)-(x42-x52) (x41-x61)-(x42-x62) (x11-x61)-(x12-x62) 
t = +2.092 t = +1.869 t = -1.869 
(•, ε, 0.02106) (•, ε, 0.03407) (0.03407, ε, •)
(x11-x51)-(x12-x52) (x31-x61)-(x32-x62) … 
t = -1.647 t = -1.113 … 
(0.05326, ε, •) (0.13581, ε, •) … (6.8.6)
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These tests reveal seven interactions arising from a simple pattern: the yield of Cultivar 
4, contrary to the other 5 cultivars, drops sharply from Microclimate 1 to 2, whereas that 
of Cultivar 1, contrary to Cultivars 5 and 6, rises sharply from Microclimate 1 to 2.
The F test applied to the lettuce data in Table 6.8.2
Snedecor’s F ratio to test for significant interaction is usually obtained as
F = (cultivars × climates mean square)÷(error mean square),
but it can also be expressed in unusual form as: 
F =  
k 
-1
∑   
(xi1-xj1)-(xi2-xj2) 
2
 . (6.8.7) 
       2   i<j         √4s2÷n
Here F is expressed as the mean square of all the values of Student’s t listed at (6.8.6), 
thus displaying extensive confounding of the kind displayed in the previous example. 
Using the usual computational formula, we find the F value as
cultivar × climates mean square ÷ error mean square = 16.64÷5.050, i.e. 3.295 on 5 
and 45 df, whose mental correlate is situated at (0.987, ε, 0.013) in Snedecor’s test 
distribution.
In this example, contrary to the previous one, the F test has revealed significance of 
some constituents of F. But how might we identify those constituents? There is just 
one way. We must scrutinise the treatment means. And have we not already done so at 
(6.8.6) and in the best possible way? You disagree? Are you saying that inasmuch as the 
co-ordinate for Cultivars 1 and 6 for instance might well be (0.03407, ε, •) due to error, 
that co-ordinate might equally well have been (•, ε, 0.03407) due to error? So are you say-
ing that if a knowing subject considers that co-ordinate value to be ‘just decisive’ against 
the possibility of no interaction, the probability of that subject being mistaken in that 
regard would be 2×0.03407? And, are you saying that inasmuch as the knowing subject 
then considers (0.03407, ε, •) and (•, ε, 0.03407) the ‘just decisive’ co-ordinate values, the 
probability of a similar mistaken judgement in respect of for instance Cultivars 2 and 4 
would also be 2×0.03407? And so, are you therefore saying that for instance for all four 
these possible mistakes to be accounted for, etc.?
6.9 A further development of the F test
If we express each difference between a pair of means in the expression at (6.8.2) as a 
deviation from its expected value, we obtain: 
F =  
k 
-1
 ∑  
(xi-xj)-(mi-mj) 
2
. 
       2    i<j      √2s2÷n
which is distributed as Snedecor’s test statistic. So if Pr[F ≥ F(α)] = α, the solution of 
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k 
-1
 ∑  
(xi-xj)-(mi-mj) 
2
≤ F(α), 
       2    i<j     √2s2÷n
for the differences mi-mj (i < j), is a 1-α simultaneous confidence region for those differ-
ences. By reasoning similar to that used in Example 6.7.2, the region in fact provides simul-
taneous confidence intervals for all possible contrasts amongst m. This idea was outlined by 
Fisher (1966, p. 206) and developed by Scheffé (1953), owing to which it has become known 
as Scheffé’s multiple comparison procedure. We return to this matter in Chapter 13.
6.10 A different question
The developments in Section 6.8 might lead one to think (wrongly) that in any fixed-model 
analysis of variance situation the F test for differentiating means is worthless. Certainly 
the examples of that section show that the F test is grossly overused. However, there are 
certain problems in which the test is appropriate, as the following example shows.
Example 6.10.1
Hald (1952, pp. 441-444) reports the CaCO3 contents of 40 specimens of raw meal, as 
determined by duplicate titrations. The specimens were collected at regular intervals 
while emptying a mixer, but Hald shows that the order of collection may be ignored. In-
terest is in the possible incompleteness of mix from specimen to specimen. Hald finds:
The between-specimens mean square = 0.06827 on 39 df.
The within-specimens mean square = 0.008813 on 40 df.
So, to test for incompleteness of mix his datum is
F = 7.75 on 39 and 40 df.,
whose mental correlate is situated to the right of (0.9999, ε, 0.0001) in Snedecor’s test 
distribution. The evidence for incompleteness of mix is overwhelming. Note that this 
conclusion does not presuppose the random model. (Hald makes a good case for such a 
model, but that is irrelevant for the present purposes.) Note also that we do presuppose 
that there is no interest whatever in drawing conclusions that distinguish between this, 
that or the other particular specimen. Interest is only in a hypothesis concerning their 
common source. Our test is valid for the fixed model. (That it would also be valid for the 
random model is irrelevant for the present purposes.)
6.11 The Studentised range test
Instead of using the F test in the fixed-model analysis of variance situation, we could for 
similar purposes use the Studentised range statistic, defined for k sample means as
W =  
X(k)-X(1), where X(k) is the largest and X(1) the smallest sample mean. 
        √S2÷n
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The hypothesised model and the alternatives are the same as for the F test, but the two 
tests differ in sensitivity. We consider two examples, followed by a discussion.
Example 6.11.1
For the data in Example 6.8.1 we find the test datum is given by
w =   
12.6-9.3
   = 2.94 for k = 6 means on 45 df, 
       √5.050÷4
whose mental correlate is at approximately (0.89, ε, 0.11) in the test distribution. So 
again, just as in Example 6.8.1, there is not a shred of evidence to warn us of the substan-
tial differences that are indicated by the analysis at (6.8.1). The Studentised range test is 
here just as inappropriate as the F test was in Example 6.8.1.
Example 6.11.2
For Hald’s data referred to in Example 6.10.1, the W test datum turns out to be
w =     
0.85-0.10
      = 11.3 for k = 40 means on 39 df,, 
       √0.008813÷2
whose mental correlate is co-ordinated very far out to the right of (0.99, ε, 0.01) in the 
test distribution. So again, just as in Example 6.10.1, the evidence for incompleteness of 
mix is overwhelming. The Studentised range test is here just as appropriate as the F test 
was in Example 6.8.1.
Discussion of examples 6.11.1 and 6.11.2
Examples 6.11.1 and 6.11.2 differ from Examples 6.8.1 and 6.10.1, respectively, only by 
the use of W instead of F. In Example 6.11.1, as in Example 6.8.1, the W and F tests, re-
spectively, are inappropriate for the same reasons. And in Example 6.11.2, as in Example 
6.10.1, the W and F tests, respectively, are appropriate for the same reasons. 
6.12 A further development of the Studentised range test
Similar reasoning to that in Section 6.9, but applied to the Studentised range statistic 
instead of the F statistic, provides simultaneous confidence intervals for all possible 
contrasts amongst m. The method was developed by J.W. Tukey owing to which it has 
become known as Tukey’s multiple comparison procedure (Scheffé 1959). We return to 
this matter in Chapter 13.
6.13 Simulation of a disagreement
Much confusion could be avoided if only all of us could come to understand that any 
findings by statistical data analysis in respect of a solitary data set, is fully as capable 
of laboratory demonstration as would be any findings by another physical science in 
respect of the solitary individual involved – even more so, as the tackle required for the 
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statistical demonstration is no more than a facility for simulating random numbers. So 
let us use this in order to explain why a data analyst must disagree with the reasoning at 
(6.8.4). The reasoning is supposed to concern the development of tenable values of pa-
rameters of interest, given a class of models as possible explanations of how given data 
might have come about. So, we must consider how to simulate different reasoning that 
in Section 6.8 leads to disagreement on the tenability of parameter values accountable 
for the differences in the mean performances of the six lettuce cultivars in Table 6.8.1. It 
is then worthwhile to identify the cultivars by name, as a reminder that the questions to 
be dealt with originate in substantive science. So, let the cultivars be:
(1) Fiesta     (2) Dillie     (3) Millie     (4) Crispy     (5) Billie     (6) Beauty.
In Table 6.8.1 the cultivars are arranged in order of magnitude of the mean yields that 
happened to have been observed in the particular trial. And at (6.8.4) Fisher wants us 
to reason about the difference between the largest and the smallest of those means. It 
then appears here, at the very outset, that a disagreement is surfacing. At (6.8.4) Fisher’s 
reasoning would have us model that difference as the realisation of an order-statistical 
quantity involving all six cultivars, whereas at (6.8.1) our co-ordination test models that 
difference as the realisation of a statistic that involves just two cultivars. Note that nam-
ing the varieties has underscored the disagreement, as it underscores the substantive 
nature of the question: ‘How do the means of Fiesta and Beauty compare?’ as compared 
to the statistical nature of the question: ‘Is the largest difference amongst the six ob-
served means too large to justify an order-statistical explanation?’
Simulating the co-ordinate tester’s reasoning
First we simulate the hypothesised model: let the cultivars be modelled as six normal 
populations with common variance s² to which we may assign an arbitrary value, as its 
contribution is eliminated by Student’s t. Adjoin a 7th normal population also with vari-
ance s² to provide a wider source for the error estimate. Assign an arbitrary, but com-
mon, value to the means of the populations named Fiesta and Beauty. Assign arbitrary 
values to the means of the other five populations. Draw samples of size n = 4 from each 
of the first six populations, and draw a sample of size n = 28 from the wider source. Cal-
culate the sample means for Fiesta and Beauty, respectively, and calculate the error vari-
ance based on 6(4-1)+(28-1) = 45 df. In the previous notation, the parameter of interest 
is m1-m6, and the minimal sufficient statistic for that parameter is
{X1-X6, S
2}, with realised value {x1-x6, s
2}. (6.13.1)
Calculate the realised value of the minimal sufficient statistic indicated at (6.13.1) and 
discard the rest of the data, as those data cannot tell us anything whatsoever about the 
value of m1-m6. Then calculate the simulated value of
 
Student’s t =   x1-x6    , and store that value. 
                       √s2÷n
Repeat this simulation say 50 000 times. Display the stored values in a histogram. Pick 
out the bar that represents the value t = +2.077, which is that obtained from the actual 
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data as reported at (6.8.1). Shade that bar. Compute the proportions of the 50 000 simu-
lated t values that are < +2.077, are = +2.077, and are > +2.077, respectively, and note 
that these are for all practical purposes the statistical co-ordinates given at (6.8.1) as 
(•, ε, 0.022). Now, in order to simulate different alternative models, let a full set of (6-1) 
orthogonal contrasts among the six population means comprise m1-m6 and four other 
contrasts. This may be done in many different ways, where the set shown in Table 6.13.1 
will do as well as any other. The values of such a set determine (this is simply a mathe-
matical fact) the value of any other contrast we might wish to consider.
Table 6.13.1: Contrasts among population means representing different cultivars
Cultivar Fiesta Dillie Millie Crispy Billie Beauty
Population mean m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6
Contrast q1 +1 -1 0 0 0 0
Contrast q2 0 0 +1 -1 0 0
Contrast q3 0 0 0 0 +1 -1
Contrast q4 +1 +1 -1 -1 0 0
Contrast q5 +1 +1 +1 +1 -2 -2
For instance, 
m2-m3 = (q4-q2-q1)÷2,
m
4
-m5 = (q5-q4-2q3-2q2)÷2,
[(m2-m3)÷2]-m5 = (q5-2q3+q2-q1)÷4,
and so on.
The contrast of interest, Fiesta versus Beauty, is represented by:
m1-m6 = (-q6+q4+2q3+2q1)÷4,
and if we now repeat the simulation with the q values specified such that the value 
of m1-m6 remains zero as before, but the contrasts between the population means are 
otherwise given any arbitrary values, we will obtain precisely the self-same statistical 
co-ordinates as in the previous simulation. But if we then also specify non-zero values 
of m1-m6, the co-ordinates deviate from those previously obtained. Thus:
If we specify m1-m6 > 0, the co-ordinates will be to the left of (•, ε, 0.022).
If we specify m1-m6 = 0, the co-ordinates will be exactly (•, ε, 0.022).
If we specify m1-m6 < 0, the co-ordinates will be to the right of (•, ε, 0.022).
This is as it should be and shows that our tests at (6.8.1) are untrammelled by irrelevant 
values.
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Simulating the reasoning proposed in (6.8.4) 
Proceed with the same instructions used before, until reaching the situation indicated 
at (6.13.1). The next instruction for the previous simulation then reads:
‘Calculate the realised value of the minimal sufficient statistic indicated at (6.13.1) 
and discard the rest of the data, as those data cannot possibly be telling us any-
thing whatsoever about the value of m1-m6.’
But if we now try to follow this instruction, we will not be able to simulate the F test, 
and so will not be able to simulate the reasoning at (6.8.4). Clearly then, the reasoning 
at (6.8.4) involves irrelevancy, and the source of that irrelevancy is the idea of trying to 
account for the possible mistaken inferences on the part of a knowing subject.
6.14 A source of confusion peculiar to statistics
There can be no question that the origins of the notion of simultaneous statistical infer-
ence are largely to be found in the work of R.A. Fisher, as evidenced for instance at (6.8.4) 
where he advances the idea that comparisons an experiment was designed to make, may 
be made without hesitation; but that comparisons suggested subsequently, by scrutiny 
of the results, are themselves open to suspicion. Nowhere in substantive science does 
one find this idea. Consider, for instance, the evidential role of a hominid fossil known 
as Turkana Boy in Richard Leakey’s theories about human evolution (Leakey and Lewin 
1993). Is it at all sensible to hold that the tenability of his theories depend in some way 
or another on whether Leakey formulated them before or after he found Turkana Boy? 
Did it detract from Johan Kepler’s theories that he developed them in the light of Tycho 
Brahe’s data? And are Jane Goodall’s theories about social behaviour in chimpanzees 
open to suspicion because she did not formulate them prior to collecting the observa-
tions on which they are based? The point here is simply that any investigative science 
is directed at trying to explain how given data came about, and any successful outcome 
must invariably take the one and/or the other of just two possible forms, namely:
‘This model fits the data’ or ‘This model does not fit the data’.
Whether we arrived at a model before or after obtaining the data is evidentially vacuous. 
This is not to say that an investigator cannot usefully proceed in certain ways that will be-
come part of the data and influence the value of the data. It is only to emphasise that the 
data is a record of real-world events. It can be relevant to ask how the data were recorded, 
whether a properly randomised design was used, why certain plots are missing, which 
commencement tests were performed, and with what results, as these questions concern 
real-world acts and events that tell us how the data addressed by the minimal sufficient 
statistic came about, or might have come about. But in respect of the thoughts of a know-
ing subject, whether pre hoc or post hoc, we have to ask how those thoughts contribute to 
the model under test, and we must hasten to point out that those thoughts are not to be 
confused with any acts that might well be part and parcel of the data to be explained. In 
order to fend off the silly notion of simultaneous statistical inference, it is worth empha-
sising seven principles that help prevent us from being beguiled by those notions:
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It cannot possibly make scientific sense to reason in ways that confound indica-
tive data patterns with counter-indicative data patterns.
It cannot possibly make scientific sense to reason in ways that confound indica-
tive data patterns with irrelevant data patterns.
Scientific evidence can be found in the real world, and the record of the real 
world, only. Any thoughts about evidence that might have been, but in fact was 
not, are irrelevant. If thoughts prompted acts, only the acts are relevant.
A scientific model might well be a predictive model; indeed that is more often 
than not the case. The method of gathering data against which such a model 
might be tested could well have been planned in advance; indeed that is often 
the case. But ultimately any relevant evidence can be found in the record of past 
events and in that record only.
A forecast is not proper evidence, because evidence cannot at present be found in 
the future. Forecasted error rates of Type I and Type II can at best be a muddled 
way of reporting alternative statistical co-ordinates.
Science as evidenced by the substantive sciences tries to avoid the investigation 
of complex models as such. Any model is preferably to be analysed into as many 
self-contained subsidiary models as possible, which are to be tested separately, 
rather than simultaneously.
As explained in the case of the liberty ship in Example 2.14.1, a purely numerical mo-
del without substantive content is of little, if any, interest to substantive science.
The last of these principles concerns a popular notion that Fisher, quoted at (6.8.4), 
expresses when he states that: ‘comparisons suggested subsequently, by a scrutiny of 
the results themselves … are open to suspicion’. This requires careful thought. What 
are ‘the results’? If the results are interpreted as ‘the numerical data’, nonsense arises; 
what statistician has ever come across a substantive investigator asking how to test the 
significance of a purely numerical pattern noticed upon scrutiny of the data? In fairness 
to Fisher, what he had in mind when referring to ‘scrutiny of the results’ was more likely 
‘retrospective conjecture about possible causes’, and as our example of the liberty ship in 
Section 2.14.1 shows, he is right in warning us to be very leery of explanations not sup-
ported by outside evidence and facts. However, he is wrong in thinking that there can 
be purely statistical recipes that would ‘protect’ us from errors arising from such con-
jecture. No such recipes can exist. The belief that simultaneous statistical inference can 
protect us against such errors, rather than to simply propel us into alternative errors, is 
a snare and a delusion. It is true that scientists sometimes draw erroneous conclusions, 
but the only protection science has against that is the self-correcting nature of science, 
owing to repetitive investigation to check important findings, and to science practising 
a sharp look-out for anomalous ‘findings’.
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6.15 Concluding remark
We have seen in Chapter 5 that Fisher tries to evade the frequentist vicious circle by 
interpreting significance levels as measurements that are the realised values of certain 
statistics. Arguably, however, the knowing subject of significance testing, that is to say, 
the hypothetical investigator whose potential for mistaken conclusions leads to the in-
troduction of simultaneous statistical inference, fails to achieve that.
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Chapter 7
OPTIMAL ELIMINATION TESTS
their derivation by drawing on existing literature
7.1 Introduction
In Chapter 1, commencement tests with good separating characteristics were contrived 
by the following method. All the sample patterns arising from a fully specified model 
were ordered in such a way that patterns broadly envisaged as occurring ‘more frequently’ 
under an alternative of interest, were placed in a specified extreme of the ordering. In this 
chapter we consider methods of finding elimination tests with good separating charac-
teristics. As the alternatives are then an array of fully specified models, the notion ‘more 
frequently’ becomes capable of being expressed in terms of a measure of comparative 
frequency. In a so-called likelihood ratio ordering, that measure is a ratio of alternative 
frequencies, that is to say, the likelihood ratio ordering for separating models Mj and Mk 
(j ≠ k) from one another is obtained by ordering all the sample patterns according to the 
magnitude of the ratio
Pr(the sample pattern|Mj)÷Pr(the sample pattern|Mk) for different patterns.
Recall that a test statistic is an ordinal label. So, any order-preserving transformation of 
a test statistic yields an equivalent test statistic, and any order-preserving transforma-
tion of the ordinal label arising from a likelihood ratio ordering may be taken to be the 
likelihood ratio test statistic. The array of models involved should then be capable of be-
ing viewed as the members of a substantively sensible class of models, as many a motley 
collection of alternative models can be considered, purely as a mathematical possibility. 
This is shown by the following example.
Example 7.1.1
Let a data set comprising n positive fractions x1, x2, x3, …, xn bring to mind:
M1: Sampling from the density f(x) = exp(-x) on 0 < x < ∞.
M2: Sampling from the density f(x) = 1 on 0 < x < 1, and f(x) = 0 on 1 ≤ x < ∞.
Then the probability of a sample in
  n                          n                                              n 
 ∏ dxj is given by ∏ exp(-xj)dxj for M1, and by ∏ (1)dxj for M2. 
j=1                        j=1                                           j=1
Let S denote the set on which the probability of any sample under M2 is non-zero. Then 
the likelihood ratio is given by:
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  n                 n                                  n 
[∏ (1)dxj]÷[∏ exp(-xj)dxj] = exp   ∑  xj  on S, and zero otherwise. (7.1.1) 
 j=1             j=1                                j=1
Let X denote the sample total. As X is an order-preserving transform of exp(X), it may be 
taken to be the likelihood ratio test statistic. This choice is convenient, as 2X under M1 
is distributed as chi-square on 2n df. For instance, by reading the numbers in the first 
n = 5 rows of Table A1 of Snedecor and Cochran (1989) as fractions, we simulate M2. 
Then, rounding at the second decimal, we obtain the following data set:
(x1, x2, x3, x4, x5) = (0.54, 0.15, 0.86, 0.61, 0.05). (7.1.2)
For these data, X = 2.21. Interpreting 2×2.21 as a chi-square value on 2×5 degrees of free-
dom, we find that under M1 the co-ordinates of
X = 2.21 are (U1, V1) = (0.076, 0.924), a poor fit of M1, as is to be expected from 
simulating M2.
Under M2 the sample total is approximately normal with expectation equal to n÷2 and 
variance equal to n÷12, in which case, with n = 5, the co-ordinates of:
X = 2.21 are (U2, V2) ≈ (0.327, 0.673), a good fit of M2, as is to be expected from 
simulating M2.
For any data, the sample space will be discrete because of rounding. The investigator 
might thus report the foregoing co-ordinates as being approximately
(U1, ε1, V1) = (0.08, ε1, 0.92) under M1, and
(U2, ε2, V2) = (0.33, ε2, 0.67) under M2.
Here adequately precise measurement of the original data points would ensure that the 
values of ε1 and ε2 would round to zero. Consider, as a third model for this example,
M3: Sampling from the density f(x) = 2x on 0 < x < 1, and f(x) = 0 on 1 ≤ x < ∞.
The probability of a sample in
  n                          n 
 ∏ dxj is given by ∏ 2xjdxj for M3. 
j=1                        j=1
In order to separate models M1, M2 and M3 from each other, we then have three quite differ-
ent likelihood ratio tests, as follows: for separating M1 and M2 we found the requisite likeli-
hood ratio at (7.1.1); for separating M1 and M3 the requisite likelihood ratio is given by
  n                n                                n               n 
[∏ 2xjdxj]÷[∏ exp(-xj)dxj] = 2
n   ∏ xj   exp  ∑ xj   on S, 
 j=1             j=1                             j=1             j=1
and zero otherwise; (7.1.3)
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for separating M2 and M3 the requisite likelihood ratio is given by:
  n                  n                      n 
[∏ (1)dxj] ÷ [∏ 2xjdxj] = 2
n ∏ xj. (7.1.4) 
 j=1               j=1                    j=1
The likelihood ratio orderings arising at (7.1.1), (7. 1.3) and (7.1.4) are very different, 
and that is the point of this example. The example goes to show that a likelihood ratio 
ordering as such is a method for the pair-wise separation of singletons. This of course 
presents no difficulty for the theory of co-ordination tests, as that theory is in the first 
place a theory for pair-wise separation of singletons. In order to separate models M2 and 
M3, for instance, the likelihood ratio statistic arising at (7.1.4) may be taken to be:
                n              n 
Y = − ln[∏ xj] = − ∑ ln xj, as  – ln[2–n(•)] is an order-preserving transformation. 
             j=1         j=1
The expected value and the variance of Y are given by:
E(Y) = n(1) and variance(Y) = n(1) under M2, and
E(Y) = n(0.5) and variance(Y) = n(0.25) under M3.
Y = 6.47 for the data given at (7.1.2). Using normal approximations, we find that the co-
ordinates of Y = 6.47 are approximately (0.6446, 0.3554) under M2, and approximately 
(0.9998, 0.0002) under M3.
Here again the separation is as expected, as the data simulates M2.
7.2 The Neyman-Pearson lemma for data analysis
In Section 3.6 we remarked that several variants of the Neyman-Pearson lemma on op-
timal tests can be developed. The variant appropriate to the use of significance tests is 
developed by Kempthorne and Folks (1971, pp. 318-320) and we now wish to draw on 
it, so as to derive the variant appropriate to the use of co-ordination tests. As noted at 
the outset of Section 1.29, we can use Definitions 1.19.1 and 1.19.2 to obtain a pair of 
formal significance levels, as follows, where T denotes the test statistic, and M0 denotes 
the hypothesised model:
SLU(T|M0) = U(T|M0)+ε(T|M0).
SLV(T|M0) = ε(T|M0)+V(T|M0).
When T = 3 say, we may denote the values taken by the various constituents in these two 
expressions, as follows:
SLU(T = 3|M0) = U(T = 3|M0)+ε(T = 3|M0).
SLV(T = 3|M0) = ε(T = 3|M0)+V(T = 3|M0).
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Some such notation is needed, as we will wish to distinguish between for instance
SLU(T = 3|M0) and SLU(S = 3|M0), where T and S denote different statistics.
Corresponding forms in SLU and SLV can be obtained from one another by inverting the 
ordering, and the variant of the lemma appropriate to the use of significance tests can in 
terms of one or the other of these forms, be given as follows:
Let T denote the likelihood ratio test statistic for a significance test of M0 versus 
M1, and let S denote any other statistic that could be used for the same purpose. 
Let T = t and S = s for the data in hand. Then, by choosing one or the other direc-
tion of ordering, or by re-labelling the two models, we can arrange that:
     SLV(T = t|M1) ≥ SLV(T = t|M0), (7.2.1)
that is to say, we can arrange for the likelihood ratio test, if sensitive, to be a right-
sensitive test, in which case the theorem states that
     if SLV(T = t|M0) = SLV(S = s|M0), (7.2.2)
     then SLV(T = t|M1) ≥ SLV(S = s|M1). (7.2.3)
Also, by choosing one or the other direction of ordering, or by re-labelling the 
two models, we can arrange that
     SLU(T = t|M1) ≥ SLU(T = t|M0), (7.2.4)
that is to say, we can arrange for the likelihood ratio test, if sensitive, to be a left-
sensitive test, in which case the theorem states that
     if SLU(T = t|M0) = SLU(S = s|M0), (7.2.5)
     then SLU(T = tM1) ≥ SLU(S = sM1). (7.2.6)
The inequalities at (7.2.1) and (7.2.4) merely serve to remind us that for any ordering 
such that the significance level arises in the right-hand tail of the test distribution, the 
inverse of that ordering is such that the same significance level arises in the left-hand 
tail of the test distribution. So the hypothesis of the theorem can be stated as at (7.2.2) 
or as at (7.2.5), whereupon the conclusion of the theorem is stated as at (7.2.3) or (7.2.6), 
respectively. Measuring ‘sensitivity’ as in our Definition 1.29.1, Kempthorne and Folks 
(p. 318) formulate the theorem in words. We reproduce the same theorem in slightly 
different words, as follows:
The likelihood ratio significance test is a most sensitive significance test for test-
ing a hypothesised singleton M0 against an alternative singleton M1, at every level 
of significance that is attainable by the likelihood ratio test.
The theorem says ‘a most’ rather than ‘the most’, meaning that at any of the levels in 
question, another test could be equally sensitive, but not more so. The levels in question 
are described as only those that are ‘attainable by the likelihood ratio test’, meaning that 
other tests might well attain levels of significance not attainable by the likelihood ratio 
test. We will presently encounter such examples.
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We derive (below) the following theorem:
Theorem 7.2.1 (The Neyman-Pearson lemma for data analysis): 
Let given data retrospectively bring to mind an array of singletons M1, M2, M3, … , as possible models of 
how those data might have come about. Let T denote the likelihood ratio test statistic for separating any 
given pair of those models Mj and Mk (j ≠k). Let S denote any other test statistic selected for that same 
purpose. Let T = t and S = s for the data in hand. Let Vj(T = t) and Vk(T = t) denote the right co-ordinates 
of T = t under Mj and Mk, respectively, and let Vj(S = s) and Vk(S = s) denote the right co-ordinates of S = s 
under Mj and Mk, respectively. Let the direction of ordering be chosen so that:
Vk(T = t) ≥ Vj(T = t).
Under this arrangement,
if Vj(T = t) = Vj(S = s),
then Vk(T = t) ≥ Vk(S = s).
Stated otherwise, let Uj(T = t) and Uk(T = t) denote the left co-ordinates of T = t under Mj and Mk, re-
spectively, and let Uj(S = s) and Uk(S = s) denote the left co-ordinates of S = s under Mj and Mk, respec-
tively. Let the direction of ordering be chosen so that:
Uk(T = t) ≥ Uj(T = t).
Under this arrangement,
if Uj(T = t) = Uj(S = s),
then Uk(T = t) ≥ Uk(S =s).
To summarise: When trying to explain how given data might (or might not) have come about, the 
likelihood ratio co-ordination test is a most sensitive co-ordination test of any explanatory singleton 
Mj, against any other explanatory singleton Mk, at any level of co-ordination attainable by that test, and 
regardless of whether that test is sensitive toward the right or the left.
(In the formulation of this theorem the reader might well prefer the description ‘a most separating 
co-ordination test’ instead of the description ‘a most sensitive co-ordination test’, as the former better 
describes what one is trying to achieve. We will use these expressions synonymously.)
As explained in Section 1.29, the ordering for a significance test is usually arranged so as 
to be right-sensitive rather than left-sensitive. So, consider the right-sensitive orderings 
involved at (7.2.1), (7.2.2) and (7.2.3) as given by:
O
T
 for T = 1, 2, 3, …, t, …, k, and OS for S = 1, 2, 3, …, s, …,
such that for the given data T = t and S = s, and such that the two tests then attain the 
same significance level. Let us express the foregoing in terms of roundings and right co-
ordinates, as follows, where the subscripts 0 and 1 indicate ‘under M0’ and ‘under M1’, re-
spectively. Then the hypothesis of the theorem as stated at (7.2.2) can be expressed as
ε0(T = t)+V0(T = t) = ε0(S = s)+V0(S = s),
where possibly V0(T = t) = Ø, and also possibly V0(S = s) = Ø,
and the conclusion of the theorem as stated at (7.2.3) can be expressed as:
ε1(T = t)+V1(T = t) ≥ ε1(S = s)+V1(S = s),
where possibly V1(T = t) = Ø, and also possibly V1(S = s) = Ø.
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The theorem is trivially true for t = 1. For t = 2, 3, 4, …, k, the recurrence relations of 
Theorem 1.23.1 imply that the hypothesis and the conclusion of the theorem can be 
restated as follows:
If V0(T = t) = V0(S = s) then V1(T = t) ≥ V1(S = s), for t = 1, 2, 3, …, k − 1. (7.2.7)
The inequality at (7.2.7) expresses sensitivity as defined in our Definition 1.23.4, and 
not as defined in our Definition 1.23.3, which goes to show that the Neyman-Pearson 
lemma is most satisfactorily a theorem for continuous test statistics. We may anticipate 
that care is needed in extending its use to discrete test statistics. Henceforth we will use 
Definition 1.23.4 unless stated otherwise. So, noting that M0 and M1 may be relabelled 
M1 and M0, respectively, without further consequence if done throughout, we now draw 
on the foregoing to obtain, as Theorem 7.2.1 overleaf, another variant of the Neyman-
Pearson lemma. Note that the summary sentence in Theorem 7.2.1 states the theorem 
completely. However, we have used a formulation involving much redundancy in order 
to invite comparison of the wording of the present version of the lemma with that of 
the version previously given as Theorem 3.6.1. Bear in mind that the different versions 
rest on the same underlying mathematical facts. Even the auxiliary random numbers 
of the previous version do not represent a difference in mathematical facts because 
such numbers are available to anyone. In the previous version their availability must be 
recognised, as that might serve the statistician’s purpose. In the present version their 
availability must be ignored, as that is irrelevant to the statistician’s purpose. The issue 
is this: beyond mathematical facts, there is a vast difference between the employment 
of certain predictive concepts for forecasting, and the employment of those selfsame 
predictive concepts for predicating. Section 3.6 concerned problems in forecasting. The 
present section concerns problems in predicating.
We note that Theorem 7.2.1 does not say that the likelihood ratio test statistic is the same 
statistic for different pairs of models. Example 7.1.1 shows that the likelihood ratio test 
statistic can differ from pair to pair.
7.3 Likelihood ratio tests in relation to commencement tests
Consider the class of models that arises if independent Bernoulli trials with a constant 
probability of success θ are performed until exactly m successes have occurred. The sam-
ple pattern will comprise success (S) and failure (F), and the probability of, for instance,
FFFSFS … S, is given by (1-θ)×(1-θ)×(1-θ)×θ×(1-θ)×θ×…×θ.
Thus, for this class of models in general the probability of the sample is given by:
θm(1-θ)X for X failures, X = 0, 1, 2, … .
The class is known as the negative binomial class. Its different members are indexed 
by  θ (0 < θ < 1) and there are (X+m-1)-choose-(m-1) different ways in which the first 
m − 1 successes can precede the mth success, at which point the sampling stops. So the 
probability of the sample can be expressed as: 
Optimal elimination tests
273
   
X+m-1
 qm(1-q)X  x   
X+m-1
 
-1 
 for X = 0, 1, 2, … < ∞. (7.3.1) 
     m-1                            m-1
Here the first factor in square brackets gives the statistic that is minimally sufficient for 
the index, and the second factor in square brackets gives the statistic that is minimally 
sufficient for the characteristic. A commencement test would be based on the second 
factor. Consider, for instance, how this class of models might be used to form an opinion 
on the frequency of occurrence of a certain rare characteristic in plants of a given species. 
Proceeding in a straight line through a field of plants, an investigator might identify any 
plants of the species of interest and, starting from a plant with the rare characteristic, 
might thereafter, in each specific case, record whether the characteristic is present (S) or 
absent (F). In order to ensure that at least a modicum of suitable data will be obtained, 
recording might be continued until say just m = 10 successes after the start have been re-
corded. The numbers of failures straddled by successive successes might then turn out to 
be as follows, in order of occurrence:
2, 11, 0, 7, 21, 8, 37, 11, 14, 43.
Should there retrospectively arise concern that, contrary to the chosen class of models, 
these data might be reflecting a downward trend in the value of q, a commencement 
test might address that, as follows: compute the product moment correlation between 
the inter-event numbers and their ordinal positions, and then refer the result to the test 
distribution arising from random assignment of the 10 inter-event numbers to the 10 
ordinal positions. For instance, with m = 3 the inter-event numbers might be 5, 9, 0, in 
that order, where the characteristic factor at (7.3.1) then assigns equal probabilities to 
the following six ordered sets of inter-event numbers:
(0, 5, 9)     (0, 9, 5)     (5, 0, 9)     (5, 9, 0)     (9, 0, 5)     (9, 5, 0).
Should we then be satisfied with the commencement, we will proceed to eliminate. So, 
consider testing M1: q = q1 versus M1: q = q2. The likelihood ratio is given by:
   
X+m-1
 qm(1-q2)
X  ÷   
X+m-1
 qm(1-q1)
X , X = 0, 1, 2, … . (7.3.2) 
      m-1    
2
                        m-1     
1
We note that the factor representing the class characteristic at (7.3.1) cancels when the 
likelihood ratio is formed and from the development in Section 1.12 it appears at once 
that such will always be the case, no matter what class of models might be considered. 
Consider for instance any likelihood ratios that arise from the forms at (1.8.1), (1.8.2) 
and (1.12.1). Hence we obtain Theorem 7.3.1, which follows so directly from the defini-
tions given in Section 1.12 that formal proof would be repetitious. Nevertheless, the 
theorem is very important, as it conveys an inescapable consequence of the taxonomy of 
statistical models – a consequence that the following example underscores.
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Theorem 7.3.1:
A likelihood ratio co-ordination test is an elimination test when used to find the range of tenable values 
of the index of a class of models.
Example 7.3.1
Consider, as a class of models of how a given positive integer might have come about: 
Prq(X = x) for q = 1, 2, where:
Pr1 (X = x) =   
1 ,  1 ,  1 ,   1  ,    1  ,   1  , …, x = 1, 2, 3, …, respectively, and 
                        2    4    8    16    32    64
Pr2 (X = x) = 
1  , 1 ,   1  ,  1  ,  1  ,  1  , …, x = 1, 2, 3, …, respectively. (7.3.3) 
                      4     2    16    8    64   32
The likelihood ratio ordering for separating the two models is obtained from:
Pr2 (X = x) ÷ P1 (X = x) =   
1  , 2,  1 , 2,  1  2, …, x = 1, 2, 3, …, respectively.  
                                            2         2        2
The likelihood ratio ordering classifies the set of all possible sample patterns into just 
two mutually exclusive and exhaustive subsets, the one when X is even, and the other 
when X is odd. The likelihood ratio test statistic may therefore be taken to be:
T = T(X) where T = 1 when X is odd, and T = 2 when X is even.
Let the range of X be partitioned into the pairs (1, 2), (3, 4), (5, 6), … . For q = 1, the odd 
member of any given pair accounts for two thirds of the samples contributed to the popu-
lation by that pair. For q = 2, the even member of any given pair accounts for two thirds of 
the samples contributed to the population by that pair. So:
Pr1(T = t) = 
2 and 1 for t = 1 and t = 2, respectively, and 
                     3         3
Pr2 (T = t) = 
1 and 2 for t = 1 and t = 2, respectively. (7.3.4) 
                     3
         3
Let the pairs (1, 2), (3, 4), (5, 6), …, be enumerated by:
C = C(X) where C = 1, 2, 3, …, for (x, x+1) = (1, 2), (3, 4), (5, 6), …, respectively.
Then X        (T, C) is a one to one transformation, as follows:
1  (1, 1), 2  (2, 1), 3  (1, 2), 4  (2, 2), 5  (1, 3), 6  (2, 3), … .
So
Prq(X = x) = Prq[(T, C) = (t, c)].
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As (2c−1, 2c) is the pair of values enumerated by C = c, it follows from (7.3.3) that:
Pr
1
[(T, C) = (t, c)] =  1  
2c-1
 and   1  
2c
 for t = 1 and t = 2, respectively, and 
                                    
2                     2
Pr2[(T, C) = (t, c)] =   
1 
2c
  and   1 
2c-1
 for t = 1 and t = 2, respectively. (7.3.5) 
                                    2                2 
Referring back to (7.3.4) we now see that these probabilities factor as follows:
Pr1[(T, C) = (t, c)] =  
2  x   3 1  
2c
  and 1  x  3 1 
2c
  for t = 1 and t = 2, 
                                   3           2                 3          2 
respectively, and:
Pr2[(T, C) = (t, c)] =  
1  x   31 
2c
  and  2  x  31 
2c
  for t = 1 and t = 2, 
                                    3          2                 3         2 
respectively. So we have found that the probability of the sample can be expressed as
Prq[(T, C) = (t, c)] = Prq(T = t) x Pr(C = c | T = t),
where the first factor on the right depends on q, and the second one is independent of q. 
The factorisation also shows that C is independent of T, with distribution given by:
Pr(C = c) =  3  ,  3  ,  3  … , for c = 1, 2, 3, …, respectively. 
                    4
1
    4
2
    4
3
T is minimally sufficient for the class index. So C is minimally sufficient for the class 
characteristic. The distribution of C shows that large values of C are uncharacteristic of 
the class of models as a whole, at least to the extent that a very large value of C would 
prompt us to wonder whether re-investigation would produce another similarly large 
value of C. So, consider the co-ordinates of C as providing a commencement test for the 
present problem. For C = c these co-ordinates are given by:
  1 -  1  
c-1
, 3  1  
c
,  1  
c
 (7.3.6) 
         4              4       4
The co-ordinates of T = t provide a likelihood ratio elimination test, for which test the 
co-ordinates are obtained from the distributions given at (7.3.4) as
 
(Ø, 2 ,1 ) under M1, and (Ø, 
1 , 2 ) under M2, for T = 1, and 
      3   3                                    3   3
( 2 ,  1 , Ø) under M1, and (
1 , 2 , Ø) under M2, for T = 2. (7.3.7) 
  3    3                                    3   3
Using the formulae given at (7.3.6) and (7.3.7), we obtain the co-ordinates displayed in 
Table 7.3.1.
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Table 7.3.1: Co-ordinates of some values of an elimination test statistic T, and of a commence-
ment test statistic C, for a given data set under different models
X (T, C) Co-ordinates of C Co-ordinates of T under M1 Co-ordinates of T under M2
1 (1, 1) (∅, 0.75, 0.25) (∅, 0.67, 0.33) (∅, 0.33, 0.67)
2 (2, 1) (∅, 0.75, 0.25) (0.67, 0.33, ∅) (0.33, 0.67, ∅)
3 (1, 2) (0.750, 0.19, 0.06) (∅, 0.67, 0.33) (∅, 0.33, 0.67)
4 (2, 2) (0.750, 0.19, 0.06) (0.67, 0.33, ∅) (0.33, 0.67, ∅)
5 (1, 3) (0.938, 0.05, 0.02) (∅, 0.67, 0.33) (∅, 0.33, 0.67)
6 (2, 3) (0.938, 0.05, 0.02) (0.67, 0.33, ∅) (0.33, 0.67, ∅)
7 (1, 4) (0.984, 0.01, 0.00) (∅, 0.67, 0.33) (∅, 0.33, 0.67)
8 (2, 4) (0.984, 0.01, 0.00) (0.67, 0.33, ∅) (0.33, 0.67, ∅)
We find that:
If X = 1 or 2: 
C test: The class characteristic, as tested, fits the data very well.
T test: Both members, as tested, fit the data very well.
If X = 3 or 4:
C test: The class characteristic, as tested, fits the data well.
T test: Both members, as tested, fit the data very well.
If X = 5 or 6:
C test: The class characteristic, as tested, fits the data poorly.
T test: Both members, as tested, fit the data very well.
If X = 7 or 8:
C test: The class characteristic, as tested, fits the data very poorly.
T test: Both members, as tested, fit the data very well.
Etc.
The issue here is this: if substantive science and commencement testing have failed to 
bring a suitable class of models into the human mind, elimination tests are useless, if 
not misleading. This concerns a universal principle of taxonomy. Thus, for instance, ac-
cording to Roberts’ birds of southern Africa (Maclean, 1985), pipits (the species of the 
genus Anthus) ‘are among the hardest of all birds to identify with certainty in the field; 
some are hard to identify even in the hand.’ Cisticolas (the species of the genus Cisti-
cola) too, ‘are among the hardest of all small southern African passerines to identify 
by sight alone’. So, when pipits are mistaken for cisticolas, or vice versa, any criteria for 
separating species of the same genus are useless, if not misleading.
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Remark on the wording of Theorem 7.3.1
Consider testing for homogeneity of variance, as a commencement test preceding the 
use of Student’s t for the comparison of the means of two data sets being modelled as 
independent normal samples. Typically we then use Snedecor’s F to test whether the 
two variances can tenably be modelled as equal. Such a test is a commencement test, not 
an elimination test, because we are then interested in the tenability of just a single value 
for the ratio of those two variances, not in a range of such values.
7.4 Likelihood ratio rounding
In this section we display certain circumstances under which likelihood ratio ordering is 
defective. We present this by way of three examples followed by a discussion.
Example 7.4.1
Consider a life-testing problem where the lifetimes of just n items under test can be 
modelled as a random sample from a population with density function
e-(x-q) for 0 < θ ≤ x, and zero otherwise.
As the probability of failure before θ is zero, θ represents a threshold. So the smallest 
sample value, say S, cannot be less than θ. In fact S is minimally sufficient for θ, and it 
turns out that for a sample of size n, its density function is:
ne-n(s-q) for 0 < θ ≤ s, and zero otherwise.
Consider:
M1: θ = θ1 versus M2: θ = θ2, labelled such that θ2 < θ1,
where such models cannot be sensibly put forward until the data have been examined 
because, letting sobs denote the observed value to be assigned to the range of S for the 
data in hand, we must have:
0 < θ 2 < θ 1 ≤ sobs.
Otherwise we would be ‘modelling’ our datum in self-contradictory terms as one that 
could not have occurred. The thrust of this is that we are pointing at a solitary datum 
in the real world, and striving to bring to mind the matching members of a given class 
of models. The situation is depicted in Figure 7.4.1. In order to test the quality of fit of 
the models as depicted, it is appropriate to order on the values of S, as the values of S tend 
toward θ. The right co-ordinate of S = s is then given by:
Pr(S > s|θ) = e-n(s-q) for 0 < θ ≤ sobs < ∞.
For the two models being considered, the co-ordinates of the mental correlate of sobs are 
thus given, in terms of a token ε, by:
 1-e-n(sobs-qj), ε, e-n(sobs-qj)  for j = 1, 2. (7.4.1)
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Figure 7.4.1: Two alternative models indexed by θ2 and θ1, respectively, brought to mind as pos-
sible explanations of how a solitary datum sobs came into the real world. The sta-
tistical co-ordinates of the situation within each model of the mental correlate of 
datum sobs are the areas under the density function, and to the left and right of sobs 
Inspection of Figure 7.4.1 shows that the possible co-ordinates of the mental correlate
range all the way from (0, ε, 1) to the right under M1, (7.4.2)
but only from  1-e-n(q1-q2), ε, e-n(q1-q2)   to the right under M2, (7.4.3)
as sobs cannot be to the left of q1.
Now consider the likelihood ratio test for this problem. The likelihood ratio equals
zero for θ2 < s <θ1, and ne
-n(s-q2)÷ne-n(s-q1) for s ≥θ1,
that is to say,
zero for θ2 < s < θ1, and e
-n(q1-q2) for s ≥ θ1. (7.4.4)
Recall that the actual values taken by the likelihood ratio are irrelevant here. It is only 
the ordering that matters. So all that matters here is that the likelihood ratio is
zero for θ2 < s < θ1, and a positive constant for s ≥ θ1,
which means that the ordering for the likelihood ratio test statistic can be taken to be 
the subscript of O
T
 when
O1 = {S = s|θ2 < s < θ1}, and O2 = {S = s|s ≥ θ1}. (7.4.5)
The mental correlate of sobs is necessarily situated in the ordinal class on the right, as sobs 
cannot be modelled to the left of θ1. Thus, no matter what the value of sobs might be, the 
corresponding value of T is necessarily tobs = 2. So, the co-ordinates of the mental cor-
relate of tobs in the T test distribution are given by
Density 
function
0
q2 q1 Sobs S
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(0, 1, Ø) under M1, and (1-e
-n(q1-q2), e-n(q1-q2), Ø) under M2. (7.4.6)
Consider
n = 5, θ1 = 0.4, and θ1 = 0.1, when 0.4 ≤ sobs.
Then, no matter what the value of sobs might have been (apart from being ≥ 0.4), the T 
test tells us that tobs = 2, whose mental correlate in the T distribution is, according to 
(7.4.6), found at
(0, 1, Ø) under M1, and (0.78, 0.22, Ø) under M2. (7.4.7)
Thus, no matter what the value of sobs might have been (apart from being ≥ 0.4), the T 
test would have us conclude that
both models, as tested, fit the data very well.
The form at (7.4.1) shows, as follows below, that for values of sobs close to θ1 the S test 
essentially agrees with this conclusion, but the form at (7.4.1) also shows that for certain 
larger values of sobs the S test strongly disagrees:
If sobs = 0.40, its mental correlate in the S test distribution is to be found at
(0, ε, 1) under M1, and (0.78, ε, 0.22) under M2. (7.4.8)
If sobs = 0.45, its mental correlate in the S test distribution is to be found at
(0.22, ε, 0.78) under M1, and (0.83, ε, 0.17) under M2. (7.4.9)
If sobs = 0.65, its mental correlate in the S test distribution is to be found at
(0.71, ε, 0.29) under M1, and (0.94, ε, 0.06) under M2. (7.4.10)
Compared to the pair of directions given at (7.4.10), the pair of directions given at (7.4.7) 
is extremely misleading. The immediate reason for this is that a continuum of possible S 
values have at (7.4.5) been rounded into just two discrete classes to which two arbitrary 
class marks (1 and 2) have been assigned. The effect of this rounding is displayed when 
we express the co-ordinates given at (7.4.6) as
(0, ε+1, Ø) under M1, and (1-e
-n(q1-q2), ε+1-e-n(q1-q2), Ø) under M2,
showing how they arose from those at (7.4.2) and (7.4.3), respectively, by a rounding which, 
in effect, rounds sobs down to sobs = θ1, regardless of the actual value of sobs. Consequently, 
instead of being given the actual co-ordinates of the mental correlate of sobs, we are in ef-
fect given the leftmost of its possible right co-ordinates. The fundamental reason for this 
is that when different sample patterns have the same likelihood ratio, they are put into 
the same ordinal class by a likelihood ratio ordering, though such patterns might never-
theless differ significantly with regard to the quality of fit of the different models under 
test. Thus, in the case of our example, any sample patterns such that s ≥ θ1 are put into the 
same ordinal class at (7.4.3). Yet, the results given at (7.4.8), (7.4.9) and (7.4.10) show that 
this groups together patterns that have a very different bearing on the quality of fit of the 
different models under test. 
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Example 7.4.2
In the problem on the number of buses in Example 2.3.2, the minimal sufficient statis-
tic for θ (the population number of buses) is S = X
(n)
 (the largest sample bus number) 
and the corresponding real-world datum is sobs = x(n) (the largest observed bus number) 
where θ cannot be < sobs. The expression at (2.3.2) then shows that for 
M1: θ = θ1versus M2: θ = θ2, labelled such that θ1 < θ2,
the likelihood ratio is
a positive constant for s ≤ θ1, and zero for θ1 < s < θ2. (7.4.11)
So, the likelihood ratio test statistic may be taken to be T in O
T
 when
O1 = {S = s|s ≤ θ1}, and O2 = {S = s|θ1 < s < θ2}.
The mental correlate of sobs is necessarily found in the ordinal class on the left, as θ 
cannot be < sobs; so the value of the likelihood ratio test statistic is tobs = 1. Consider for 
instance any value of sobs ≤ 10. Then θ1 = 10 and θ2 = 12 are possible values of θ, and tobs = 
1. Using the expression at (2.3.2) we find that the likelihood ratio test then tells us that 
the mental correlate of tobs is situated in the T test distribution at
(Ø, 1, 0) under M1, and at (Ø, 0.227, 0.773) under M2. (7.4.12)
Thus if sobs ≤ 10, the likelihood ratio test tells us that no matter what the value of sobs 
might otherwise be,
M1 and M2, as tested, both fit the data very well.
However, again using the expression at (2.3.2), we find that the S test tells us:
If sobs = 10, its mental correlate is situated within the S test distribution
at (0.400, 0.600, 0.00) under M1, and at (0.091, 0.136, 0.773) under M2. (7.4.13)
If sobs = 9, its mental correlate is situated within the S test distribution
at (0.133, 0.267, 0.600) under M1, and at (0.030, 0.061, 0.909) under M2. (7.4.14)
If sobs = 8, its mental correlate is situated within the S test distribution
at (0.033, 0.100, 0.867) under M1, and at (0.007, 0.023, 0.970) under M2. (7.4.15)
By expressing the pair of T co-ordinates given at (7.4.12) as
(Ø, 0.4+0.6, 0) under M1, and (Ø, 0.091+0.136, 0.773) under M2,
we display their relationship to the S co-ordinates given at (7.4.13), thus showing that all 
the values of sobs that are possible under both models are in effect rounded up to sobs = 10 
(the value of θ1) by the likelihood ratio ordering. Thus, for that particular sobs value, the 
S and T tests essentially agree. However, whenever sobs deviates from that value, for in-
stance as at (7.4.14) and (7.4.15), the two kinds of tests disagree, owing to the likelihood 
ratio ordering having misleadingly rounded away informative variation in the minimal 
sufficient statistic. Certainly the pair of directions given at (7.4.12) is a misleading ver-
sion of the pair given at (7.4.15).
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Example 7.4.3
In Example 2.3.3 the vector S = (X
(1), X(n)) is minimally sufficient for the class index θ (an 
unknown integer). As explained in Example 2.3.3, the class of models involved can only 
be introduced retrospectively. Thus if n = 3 and sobs = (12, 15) for given data, any value of 
θ other than 8, 9, 10, 11, is impossible, as we must necessarily have
θ+1 ≤ x
(1) and x(n) ≤ 2θ-1, implying θ+1 ≤ 12 and 15 ≤ 2θ-1 for those given data.
Consider, say
M1: θ = 9 versus M2: θ = 11.
Using the formulae at (2.3.3) we previously found the distribution of S under M2, as given 
in Table 2.3.3. Using the same formulae we find the distribution of S under M1 as given 
in Table 7.4.1. Hence, the values of the likelihood ratio
Pr(the sample pattern|M2)÷Pr(the sample pattern|M1),
are those given in Table 7.4.2. 
Table 7.4.1: Joint and marginal distributions of X
(3) and X(1) for θ = 9 and n = 3. X(1) ranges from 
θ+n-2 to 2θ-n inclusive, i.e., from 10 to 15 for θ = 9 and n = 3. X
(3) ranges from θ+n to 
2θ-1 inclusive, i.e., from 12 to 17 for θ = 9 and n = 3.
X
(1) 10 11 12 13 14 15 Total
X
(3)
12 1/56 1/56
13 2/56 1/56 3/56
14 3/56 2/56 1/56 6/56
15 4/56 3/56 2/56 1/56 10/56
16 5/56 4/56 3/56 2/56 1/56 15/56
17 6/56 5/56 4/56 3/56 2/56 1/56 21/56
Total 21/56 15/56 10/56 6/56 3/56 1/56 1
The epistemology of statistical science
282
Table 7.4.2: Values of Pr(the sample when θ = 11)÷Pr(the sample when θ = 9)
X
(1) 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
X
(3)
12 0
13 0 0
14 0 0 7/15
15 0 0 7/15 7/15
16 0 0 7/15 7/15 7/15
17 0 0 7/15 7/15 7/15 7/15
18 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
19 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
20 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
21 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
The likelihood ratio test statistic may be taken to be T in O
T
, as follows:
T = 1 when the likelihood ratio is 0, as indicated in Table 7.4.2.
T = 2 when the likelihood ratio is 56/120 = 7/15, as indicated in Table 7.4.2.
T = 3 when the likelihood ratio is ∞, as indicated in Table 7.4.2.
For the given data, the sample pattern corresponding to sobs is necessarily ∈ O2, and so, 
no matter what that pattern might otherwise be, tobs = 2, whose mental correlate in the 
T test distribution will be found to be situated
at (36/56, 20/56, Ø) under M1, and at (Ø, 20/120, 100/120) under M2,
that is to say,
at (0.64, 0.36, Ø) under M1, and at (Ø, 0.17, 0.83) under M2.
Thus if sobs ∈ O2, the likelihood ratio test will tell us that no matter what the value sobs 
might otherwise be,
M1 and M2, as tested, both fit the data very well. (7.4.16)
Now consider two tests separately based on the two components of S, respectively, as 
developed in Example 2.3.3. Here the test datum for an X
(1) test is x(1) = 12, of which the 
mental correlate in the X
(1) test distribution will be found to be situated
at (36/56, 10/56, 10/56) under M1, and at (Ø, 36/120, 84/120) under M2, (7.4.17)
and the test datum for an X
(3) test is x(3) = 15, of which the mental correlate in the X(3) test 
distribution will be found to be situated
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at (10/56, 10/56, 36/56) under M1, and at (1/120, 3/120, 116/120) under M2, i.e.: 
at (0.18, 0.18, 0.64) under M1, and at (0.01, 0.02, 0.97) under M2. (7.4.18)
The results at (7.4.18) cannot be described as at (7.4.16), and the disagreement cannot 
be brushed aside by the phrase ‘as tested’. Instead, we must note that likelihood ratio 
ordering in this case destroys evidence in two different ways, as follows: firstly, as es-
tablished from the outset in Section 1.12, and further explicated in Section 2.3, each of 
the two statistics X
(1) and X(n) tells us something about the value of θ  that the other one 
cannot tell us. More specifically, when we choose a θ  value that is too large only X
(1) can 
tell us that, and when we choose a θ  value that is too small only X
(n)
 can tell us that. Thus 
the tests at (7.4.17) are uninformative in the present case; it is the tests at (7.4.18) that 
inform us in this case. Secondly, as shown in Table 7.4.2, much evidence is destroyed by 
rounding X
(1) and X(n) into dichotomous variables, thereby replacing the original sample 
space with the Cartesian product:
{X
(1) < 12, X(1) > 11} × {X(n) <18, X(n) > 17}.
Discussion
Let us remind ourselves that ultimately any scientific model must be tested against its 
predictions. In the case of co-ordination testing, those predictions take the form of the 
predicted frequencies we refer to as left and right statistical co-ordinates. A likelihood 
ratio ordering will recognise, as different under different models, only those predicted 
frequencies whose variation under the different models is concomitant to variation in 
the likelihood ratio. However, our examples show that predicted co-ordinates can vary 
in ways that have a significantly different bearing on the tenability of certain alternative 
models, without there being any concomitant variation in the likelihood ratio. In much 
of the literature on statistical methods such examples are not found; for instance, there 
do not seem to be any such amongst the hundreds of examples given by Snedecor and 
Cochran in Statistical methods (1989). Nevertheless, Example 7.4.1 indicates the utility 
of such models in a specialised field. That, however, is not the reason for having dealt 
with them here. The reason for the present section is that certain literature tries to use 
such examples to persuade us to abandon the principle of testing statistical models 
against predicted frequencies (Jeffreys 1961, Edwards 1972, Basu 1975). In subsequent 
chapters we will have to consider the alternative epistemologies proposed in that lit-
erature. For the present it must suffice to note that when a particular principle fails to 
satisfactorily separate two models in terms of the predictions derived by means of that 
principle, we must try to find another principle to separate those models in terms of 
predictions. What we must not do, is fall into the fallacy of thinking that there can be 
non-empirical tests that can stand in for empirical tests. This is not to deny that a theory 
must be tested for inherent ambiguity, self-contradiction, or incoherence in some or 
other sense that would prevent us from establishing what in fact is being predicted by 
that theory. Such tests, however, are not empirical tests, whereas data analysis concerns 
the analysis of empirical data, and tests of the empirical kind.
Concluding remark
For a clear understanding of this section, the following is worth noting. Consider co-or-
dination tests of alternative singletons M1 versus M2 as models of how given data might 
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have come about. Let the co-ordinates of the mental correlate of the test datum in dif-
ferent test distributions for the likelihood ratio ordering then be:
C1 = (U1, ε1, V1) under M1, and C2 = (U2, ε2, V2) under M2,
and for some other ordering be:
c1 = (u1, e1, v1) under M1, and c2 = (u2, e2, v2) under M2.
Let it, for each ordering, be arranged that should the situation of the mental correlate 
deviate under M2 from its situation under M1, that deviation will be toward the right. 
The Neyman-Pearson lemma then tells us that if C1 and c1 coincide, C2 and c2 either co-
incide or else C2 is further to the right than c2. So, consider the possibility that c1 is to the 
left of C1. Could it then happen that c2 is further to the right than C2? The reader should 
verify that Examples 7.4.1, 7.4.2 and 7.4.3 produce no such cases. In general, such cases 
do not exist (Kempthorne and Folks 1971, Theorem 12.2, p. 321).
7.5 Exhaustively continuous test statistics
At (7.4.2) the co-ordinates of S = s range continuously from (0, ε, 1) to (1, ε, 0), as the 
value S = s ranges from q1 to +∞, but at (7.4.3) no co-ordinate can be to the left of:
 1-e-n(q1-q2), ε, e-n(q1-q2) .
This motivates an asymmetry between the hypothesised model and the alternative in 
Definition 7.5.1.
Definition 7.5.1:
A test statistic is said to be exhaustively continuous if the co-ordinates of its values under the hypothe sised 
model range continuously from (0, ε, 1) to (1, ε, 0).
Theorem 7.5.1 follows directly from this definition and the Neyman-Pearson lemma for 
data analysis.
Theorem 7.5.1:
If a likelihood ratio statistic for testing a hypothesised singleton Mj, against an alternative singleton Mi, is 
exhaustively continuous, then the test is a most sensitive test, invariably so over all levels of hypothesised 
co-ordination, and regardless of whether the test is sensitive toward the right or the left.
Example 7.5.1
Let circumstantial facts, a data set Sx = {x1, x2, x3, …, xn}, and commencement tests bring 
into the human mind a random sample S
X
 = {X1, X2, X3, …, Xn}, from an N(m,1) popula-
tion, where m is of interest. The raw data may then be replaced with the data mean x, as 
the sample mean X is minimally sufficient for m. The distribution of X is N(m, n–1). So, 
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the likelihood ratio for testing any two distinct index values mi and mj against each other 
is given by:
     1       exp[-(X-mj)
2÷ 2]÷       1     exp[-(X-mi)
2÷ 2], 
√2π÷n                          n     √2π÷n                        n
that is to say, by exp[Xn(mj-mi)] x exp[-(m
2-m2)÷ 2]. 
                                                                    
j     i     
n
Here the likelihood ratio test statistic may be taken to be X, as the transformation
[ln(•)+(m2-m2)÷ 2]÷n(mj-mi) 
                         
n
is order preserving. Since X is an N(m, n–1) random variable, it follows that no matter what 
value might be assigned to m, the co-ordinates of the values that x might take range con-
tinuously from (0, ε, 1) to (1, ε, 0) as X ranges continuously from -∞ to +∞. Hence, an X 
test of mi against mj is a most separating test, invariably so over all levels of co-ordination, 
and regardless of whether the test is sensitive toward the right or the left.
7.6 Monotone likelihood ratios
An elimination tester would like a co-ordination test to be uniformly most separating 
over all parameter value pairs of interest and all levels of hypothesised co-ordination, 
regardless of whether the test is sensitive to the left or to the right. We are now ready to 
develop a large class of such tests for the case of a single parameter whose range is any 
set of values that are ordered in some or other substantively meaningful way, and where 
the probability of the sample differs for those different parameter values. This includes 
numerous problems of practical interest. And, as will appear in a subsequent section, 
it extends to further development in the case of nuisance parameters. The following 
example will help us come to grips with the matter.
Example 7.6.1
Let a solitary real-world data set, Sx, bring into the human mind, as explanatory model 
of how those data might (or might not) have come about, a random sample, S
X
, from 
one or other member of a class of Poisson populations indexed by a parameter, q, which 
ranges over a set of values ordered in some or other a substantively meaningful way. Let 
t = t(x) and T = T(X) denote the sum of the data values and the sum of the sample values, 
respectively. Then the likelihood ratio ordering for a test of q = qi versus q = qj, for any 
qj ≠ qi, is obtained by ordering on the magnitude of
 
[exp(-qj)q
t÷t!]÷[exp(-qi)q
t÷t!] = exp[-(qj-qi)]x(qj÷qi)
t.                 j                         i
Given any qj > qi, this likelihood ratio is a monotone increasing function of t, and the larger 
qj is in relation to qi, the larger the increase. So, the co-ordinates of t might (by way of a 
small right co-ordinate) point to the right of qj in favour qi. Conversely, given any qj < qi, 
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the likelihood ratio is a monotone decreasing function of t, and the smaller qj is in rela-
tion to qi, the larger the decrease. So, the co-ordinates of t might (by way of a small left 
co-ordinate) point to the left of qj in favour qi. Here (qi, qj) is any pair such that qj > qi, in the 
first instance, or any pair such that qj < qi in the second instance, and the tests in question 
are likelihood ratio tests, as t is an order-preserving one to one transform of the likelihood 
ratio. Recall that according to the Neyman-Pearson lemma for data analysis, when trying 
to explain how a given data set might (or might not) have come about, a likelihood ratio 
co-ordination test is a most separating test of any explanatory singleton, here indexed by 
qi, versus any other explanatory singleton, here indexed by qj, at any level of co-ordination 
attainable by that test, and regardless of whether the test is sensitive toward the right or 
the left. It then becomes apparent that the foregoing has exemplified Theorem 7.6.1. 
Theorem 7.6.1:
Let a class of statistical models indexed by a scalar parameter θ posses a monotone likelihood ratio test 
statistic T = T(X). Then an ordering on the magnitude of T will provide a most separating co-ordination 
test of θ = θi vs θ = θj, invariably so over every level of hypothesised co-ordination attainable by the test, 
uniformly so over all (θi, θj) pairs, and regardless of whether the test is sensitive toward the right or the 
left. (If T is exhaustively continuous, the phrase ‘attainable by the test’ falls away.)
This theorem applies to a great many examples. It is in fact rather difficult to find an exam-
ple of any substantive interest where a suitable class of statistical models is to be indexed 
by a scalar, but where the class does not posses a monotone likelihood ratio. And indeed, 
Theorem 7.6.2, being a consequence of Theorem 7.6.1, displays a fundamental form of 
many of those examples
Theorem 7.6.2:
Let a solitary real-world data set Sx = {x1, x2, x3, …, xn}, bring into the human mind a class of explanatory 
models of how those data might have come about by way of a random sample S
X
 = {X1, X2, X3, …, Xn}, 
drawn from a population whose density f(x; θ) is indexed by a scalar, θ, and is of the ‘Koopman-Darmois’ 
form, i.e. one of the many forms covered by:
 f(x; θ) = a(θ)b(x)exp[c(θ)d(x)],
when
 a(θ) is any function of θ whose value is independent of x,
 b(x) is any function of x whose value is independent of θ,
 c(θ) is any monotone function of θ whose value is independent of x, and
 d(x) is any function of x.
If so, that class of explanatory models will posses a monotone likelihood ratio test statistic T = T(X), 
which in fact will be given by:
 T(X) = d(X1) + d(X2) + d(X3) ... + d(Xn).
We note in passing that ‘Koopman-Darmois’ is a misnomer; the form originated in the 
work of R.A. Fisher. Theorems 7.6.2 and 7.6.1 hold for the following examples, in each 
of which we give a conventional expression for f(x; q), and then use square brackets to 
exhibit the constituents a(q), b(x), c(q), d(x), in that order.
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Example 7.6.2
For sampling a binomial population, f(x; θ) is given by: 
  n
  qx(1-q)n-x = [(1-q)n]   
n
    exp {  1n    q     [x] }.   x                                        x                     1-q   
Example 7.6.3
For sampling a negative binomial population, f(x; θ) is, as at (7.3.1), given by: 
  x+m-1
  qm(1-q)x = [qm]   
x+m-1
    exp {[1n(1-q)][x]}. 
   m-1                                     m-1
Example 7.6.4
For sampling a Poisson population, f(x; θ) is given by: 
exp{-q}qx
 = [exp{-q}]     
1     exp{[1nq][x]}. 
       x!                             x!
Example 7.6.5
For sampling an exponential population, f(x; θ) is given by:
qexp{-qx} = [q][1] exp{[-q][x]}.
Example 7.6.6
For sampling a Pareto population when modelling a distribution of incomes exceeding 
a specified income x0, f(x; θ) is given by: 
  q      x0   
q+1
 =    
q    [1]exp  {[(q+1)] 1n  x0   } .  x0      x               x0                                      x
Example 7.6.7
For sampling an N(θ, k²) population (where k is any known constant), f(x; θ) is given by: 
     1       exp{- (x - q)
2
} = [exp{-  
q
2  
}][     
1       exp {-   x
2   
}]exp{[ 
q ][ x ]}. 
√2πk2              2k2                     2k2     √2πk2               2k2              k     k
Example 7.6.8
For sampling an N(k, θ²) population (where k is any known constant), f(x; θ) is given by:
       1    exp{- (x-k)
2
} = [ 
1 ][    1   ] exp {[-   1   ][(x-k)
2
]}. 
√2πq2              2q2           q    √2π                 2q2
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In all these examples, and in numerous others covered by Theorem 7.6.1, we thus have 
a completely satisfactory solution to the elimination problem – a solution that simply 
cannot be improved upon. 
7.7 Unbiased hypothesis testing
By ‘unbiased hypothesis testing’ we mean that the frequency in repetitive testing with 
which a given null hypothesis is rejected whenever it is false, is expected to be at least as 
large as the frequency with which it is rejected whenever it is true. For instance, if k = 1 
in Example 7.6.7, the likelihood ratio statistic may be taken to be:
[d(X1)+d(X2)+d(X3)…+d(Xn)]÷n = X, which is an N(θ, 1÷n) random variable.
So, following Kendall and Stuart (1961, p. 182), consider three possible recipes for an 
array of repeated hypothesis tests of H0: θ = θ0 based on this statistic, as follows:
Test a: The critical region is in the lower tail of the test distribution. For instance, 
in order to test θ = θ0 repetitively we specify the Type I error rate as α = 0.050. 
So the critical region is X ≤ θ0-1.645(√1÷n).
Test b: The critical region is in the upper tail of the test distribution. For instance, 
in order to test θ = θ0 repetitively we specify the Type I error rate as α = 0.050. 
So the critical region is X ≥ θ0+1.645(√1÷n).
Test c: The critical region is in both tails of the test distribution and equally so. 
For instance, in order to test θ = θ0 repetitively we specify the Type I error rate in 
each of the two tails equally as 0.025, the overall the rate thus being α = 0.050. So 
the critical region is X ≤ θ0-1.960(√1÷n) and X ≥ θ0+1.960(√1÷n) jointly.
Note that here we speak of tests labelled a, b and c, as if singular, though in reality each 
‘test’ is an array of such tests, otherwise it would be meaningless to refer to frequen-
cies or rates associated with that test. Such ambiguity is ubiquitous in the language of 
hypothesis testing, and must at all times be grasped firmly because, as we have seen in 
Chapter 4, it is the ambiguous language of a profoundly mistaken discourse. We must 
note for instance that Test c involves simultaneous statistical inference, because in the 
case of just a single, solitary data set, the realised value x of X, cannot belong to one tail 
area while at the same time belonging to the opposite tail area. Bearing this in mind, we 
now note that the frequency of rejecting θ = θ0 is, for each of these tests, a function of θ, 
the so-called power function of that test. The three power functions are compared dia-
grammatically in Figure 7.7.1, where a single fixed value of n and a single fixed value of α 
are illustrated. The power at θ = θ0, which is the Type I error rate, equals α for each test.
Test a is biased in that the power is < α for any θ > θ0.
Test b is biased in that the power is < α for any θ < θ0.
Test c is unbiased in that the power is > α for any θ ≠ θ0.
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Figure 7.7.1: Power functions of three infinite arrays of hypothesis tests, where the critical region 
is (a) in the lower tail, (b) in the upper tail, and (c) in both tails equally
Now if, within the restricted class of unbiased tests for any given problem, there is a test 
that is uniformly most powerful, then we say it is a uniformly most powerful unbiased test 
(a UMPU test). In fact, Test c is such a test. However, the problem of finding a UMPU test, 
if extant in any given case, is often (even usually) not at all as simple as our example might 
lead one to suppose. In fact, there is an elaborate theory for finding such UMPU tests (see 
Lehmann 1986). However, we must note that the concept of ‘an unbiased hypothesis test’ 
can have no counterpart in co-ordination testing, as any co-ordination test involves only 
a single, solitary real-world data set. For instance Tests a, b and c above concern a certain 
paradigm in repetitive decision-making under risk. But they might be considered (in fact, 
they often are considered) by a mistaken view of a superficially similar, but profoundly 
different, paradigm in data analysis. For instance, commencement testing, substantive 
reasoning and circumstantial facts might make a data analyst investigate the quality of 
fit of the members of an N(θ, 1÷n) class of models (-∞ < θ < +∞) as explanations of how 
just a solitary datum, X = x, might (or might not) have come about. In that case a suite of 
co-ordination tests that, for that solitary datum, are the most separating over all pairs of 
possible θ values, over all levels of hypothesised co-ordination, and are so regardless of 
whether sensitivity is to the left or to the right, is given by tracing the mental correlate of 
X = x when that correlate is transported from model to model in the human mind. That 
trace is computed as:
[U(θ), ε, V(θ)] = [Pr(X < x | θ), ε, Pr(X > x | θ) for various θ (-∞ < θ < +∞),
and its general form is shown diagrammatically in Figure 7.7.2, where on the left it tends 
toward (1, ε, 0), thus pointing toward better fitting values of θ on the right, and on the 
right it tends toward (0, ε, 1), thus pointing toward better fitting values of θ on the left. In 
between it tends of course toward (0.5, ε, 0.5) thus pointing at θ = x as the index of the best 
fitting model. Comparisons between the diagram in Figure 7.7.2 and those in Figure 7.7.1 
are well worthwhile. Thus, for instance, the diagram in Figure 7.7.2 depends on x, which 
is a datum, whereas the diagrams in Figure 7.7.1 depend on α, which is a specification. 
α
1
0
(a)
(b)
(c)
θ0
θ
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Figure 7.7.2: The trace of the mental correlate of just a solitary real-world datum, x, whose men-
tal correlate is being transported from model to model in the human mind
The datum concerns a single real-world item, whereas the specification concerns a host of 
many real-world items. Thus in each of the three diagrams given in Figure 7.7.1, θ = θ0 is a 
fixture that applies to a host of many cases, whereas in case of the diagram in Figure 7.7.2, 
different values called θ0 can be inserted on the θ axis in order to read off the correspond-
ing co-ordination applicable to the solitary case under investigation. Such comparisons 
help us grasp how very different the matters are that these two different kinds of diagram 
depict, and thus to grasp that an array of hypothesis tests and a suite of co-ordination tests 
involve incompatibly different ideas, owing to which the idea of ‘unbiased testing’, just like 
the wider idea of ‘simultaneous statistical inference’ under which it resorts, simply has no 
place at all in a sound discourse on data analysis. The reader might also find it instructive 
to compare an ‘ideal’ array of hypothesis tests as depicted in Figure 7.7.3, to an ‘ideal’ suite 
of co-ordination tests as depicted in Figure 7.7.4.
0
power
1
q0q
•
Figure 7.7.3: A depiction of the operating characteristics of an infinite array of ideal hypothesis 
tests of size α nearly = 0. The depiction imagines α = 0 as a possible specification.
U = V
V = O
U = O
x
q
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V = O
q
x
•U = V
U = O
Figure 7.7.4: A depiction of the separating characteristics of a single suite of ideal co-ordination 
tests. All outcomes depend on just one, solitary real-world datum, x.
7.8 Similar tests
Example 7.6.7 might interest an investigator of animal dispersion. A number of snails 
might for instance be released at a point represented as k in N(k, θ²), and the model might 
then be used to represent the variance after a period of time, of the distances of individual 
snails from point k. Example 7.6.8 might interest an investigator when k² is known owing 
to a variance-stabilising transformation of given data, who might then wish to represent 
the data as a sample from an N(θ, k²) population. A more commonly occurring problem 
arises when we wish to represent a given data set as a sample from an N(µ, σ²) population 
with µ and σ² both unknown, and when σ² is a nuisance in case we are only interested in 
eliminating the untenable values of µ. A familiar solution to this problem using Student’s t 
test, exemplifies the use of a similar test, the essence of the matter being that the problem 
is reduced to one involving only the parameter of interest when we condition on the ob-
served value of a minimal sufficient statistic for the nuisance parameter. We have already 
met a very simple example of such a test in Example 2.5.2, as follows: given data mod-
elled satisfactorily by independent Poisson samples indexed by µ1 and µ2, respectively, we 
wish to test the quality of fit of the model for different values of θ1 = µ1÷µ2, in which case 
θ2 = µ1+µ2 is a nuisance. If X1 and X2 denote the total counts for the two samples, respec-
tively, we find (as shown in Example 2.5.2) the problem reduced to one where a binomial 
sample is indexed by a 1-1 transform of the parameter of interest, i.e. the problem is thus 
reduced to the one considered in Example 7.6.2. We will not pursue this matter further, as 
the developments are rather technical. Suffice it to say that similar tests greatly extend the 
scope of the development presented in Section 7.6.
7.9 Concluding remarks
We gave a brief explication of how optimal elimination tests of co-ordination can be 
derived from the existing literature. In Section 7.6 we saw that if the density sampled is 
one for which the likelihood ratio is monotone in some or other statistic, a completely 
satisfactory solution is obtained. In Section 7.8 we saw that the ideas in Section 7.6 can 
be made applicable to more complicated problems by sensibly restricting the class of 
tests to be considered. It is of course not to be expected that every problem in testing 
quality of fit will have a uniquely best solution. So, we might find we have to select two 
or more co-ordination tests that offer different separating characteristics, as we saw in 
for instance Example 2.3.3. The main trick in exploiting the existing literature for the 
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purpose of finding co-ordination tests is to be very leery of two-sided tests, unbiased 
tests, and other such ideas arising from notions of simultaneous statistical inference. It 
will in fact be found that we have in this and previous chapters provided an understand-
ing of co-ordination tests that should be sufficient to enable for instance the customers 
of Snedecor and Cochran (1989) to page through that book and readily see how almost 
all, if not all, of the hundreds of tests it recommends for the analysis of this, that and the 
other given data, can be replaced by suitable co-ordination tests.
7.10 Economy of presentation
In developing the theory of co-ordination tests we have insisted that the statistical co-
ordinates of the mental correlate of a given test datum cannot be conveyed precisely in 
terms of fewer than two numbers. This insistence is motivated by the need to make ut-
terly clear that a set of statistical co-ordinates is intended to give directions, and is not at 
all intended to convey a probability. However, such insistence would burden statistical 
reportage unattractively; so to avoid that, we introduce Definition 7.10.1. 
Definition 7.10.1:
Let (U, ε, V) denote a given set of statistical co-ordinates. The augmented left co-ordinate and the aug-
mented right co-ordinate are given by:
 u = U + ε and v = ε + V, respectively,
where the notations ‘u’ and ‘v’, instead of ‘U’ and ‘V’, respectively, would allow tacit understanding to 
omit the term ‘augmented’ when referring to u or v.
Example 7.10.1
In an experiment on the effects of crowding on phenotypic variation in wheat, 1 000 
plants were grown in pots (15.24 cm in diameter) with two plants per pot. Circumstan-
tial details and commencement tests brought the standard random model of analysis of 
variance into the human mind. Results of analyses of the variance of number of seeds 
per ear and of number of ears per plant are given in Table 7.10.1. 
Table 7.10.1: Analyses of variance of the two components of numbers of seeds/plant, obtained 
from an experiment on the effects of competition on phenotypes in wheat
Source df MS (seeds/ear) MS (ears/plant)
Between pots 499 86.82 0.1213
Within pots 500 81.65 0.9248
F = 1.063 F = 0.131
v = 0.248 u = 0.000
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For each one of the two analyses in this table, the expected mean squares in terms of the 
intraclass correlation ρ and the total variance σ² are as follows:
E(‘between-pots’ mean square) = [(1-ρ)+nρ]σ², and
E(‘within-pots’ mean square) = (1-ρ)σ²,
where 0 < σ² < ∞, and, with n plants per pot, -1÷(n-1) < ρ < 1. From the F tests shown 
in the table, the competition between plants occupying the same pot seems to result in 
negative intraclass correlation for the number of ears per plant, but not for the number 
of seeds per ear. In order to develop an opinion about the magnitude of the intraclass 
correlation for the number of ears per plant, by way of an abbreviated trace, note that 
the pair of mean squares is minimally sufficient for the pair of parameters ρ and σ². The 
nuisance parameter, σ², is removed by forming the F ratio, which is distributed as
Snedecor’s F × [1+n(ρ÷(1-ρ))].
So, by solving for ρ from equations of the form
observed F ÷ [1+n(ρ÷(1-ρ))] = an appropriately specified percentage point of F,
the mental correlate of the observed pivotal value is found to be situated in Snedecor’s 
test distribution
at v, u = 0.01 for ρ = -0.80, -0.73, respectively, and
at v, u = 0.05 for ρ = -0.79, -0.74, respectively.
Augmented co-ordinates are formal significance levels. However, when using such co-
ordinates our notation and language must avoid the terms ‘significance test’ and ‘sig-
nificance level’ for two reasons – firstly, because those terms are already being used 
ambiguously in the current statistical literature, and it can serve no positive purpose for 
us to add to that confusion, and secondly, because the current usage posits ‘probabilities 
of “mistaken inference” by some or other knowing subject’, whereas such a ‘knowing 
subject’ and corresponding probabilities of ‘mistaken conclusion’ have no place at all 
in the theory of co-ordination tests. Hence, our response to any attempt at interpreting 
augmented co-ordinates in probabilistic terms must be to revert at once to reasoning 
in terms of the (U, ε, V) presentation, it being imperative to grasp that statistical data 
analysis is not at all about ‘how to take a chance’.
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Chapter 8
STATISTICAL INTERVALS
contriving to accoMModate the idée fixe
8.1 Introduction
It is not at all uncommon for various members of a class of models to fit a given data 
set satisfactorily. In fact, in certain problems that will necessarily be the case. For in-
stance, it is inconceivable that a well-planned data set on the difference in productive 
potential of two rooibos tea cultivars will not have the investigator conclude that the 
difference is for instance ‘anything from say 10 kg/ha to say 15 kg/ha’. Hence the idée fixe 
of mathematical statistics has prompted ‘statistical inference’ to try to invent some or 
other recipe according to which such an investigator might add: ‘… and there is a 95 % 
probability that this conclusion is correct’. In Chapter 4 we saw how a mathematically 
ingenious but scientifically ham-fisted and ultimately circular attempt at incorporating 
this idea, leads to the dual theories of ‘hypothesis tests’ and ‘confidence intervals’. In 
Chapter 5 we met R.A. Fisher’s method for trying to evade that circularity. However, in 
Chapter 6 we saw that his method fails to avoid the introduction of another version of 
‘the knowing subject’, and thereby relapses into transforms of the very defects it tries 
to avoid. In this chapter we display a further defect of that method, and we use that as a 
platform from which to show that a probabilistic idea of interval estimation, as an inves-
tigative tool, is inherently defective, regardless of the approach used. That is so because 
it contrives to foist an entirely unnecessary and ill-conceived statistical embellishment 
onto the discourse of investigative science.
8.2 A proposal of Kempthorne and Folks
Let Xj for j = 1, 2, 3, ..., denote an infinite array of independent N(µj, 1²) random variables 
(-∞ < µj < +∞). An array of hypothesis tests of size α for any hypothesised value µ of µj 
versus larger values of µj rejects the hypothesised µ whenever
Xj-µ > zα for zα such that Pr(Xj-µj > zα) = α for j = 1, 2, 3, … . (8.2.1)
A corresponding array of 1-α confidence regions is obtained by re-expressing this as
Pr(Xj-µj ≤ zα) = 1-α no matter what the value of µj, for j = 1, 2, 3, … . (8.2.2)
The confidence interval when Xj = xj is thereby bounded from below by:
xj-zα, for j = 1, 2, 3, … . (8.2.3)
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We thus obtain the array of intervals
xj-zα ≤ µj < ∞ for j = 1, 2, 3, … . (8.2.4)
A decision-maker might thus bring into the real world an array of such intervals made 
to specification. Kempthorne and Folks (1971, p. 364 and onward) propose that a data 
analyst employ the same formal mathematics to envisage, for one solitary real-world 
datum x, a system of consonance intervals (not confidence intervals) in the human mind 
(not in the real world). This is accomplished by replacing the specified constants (α, z
α
) 
with the observed values (p, zp) for any hypothesised value µ, as follows:
Pr(X-µ > zp) = p for variable µ (-∞ < µ < +∞). (8.2.5)
The system of consonance intervals is obtained by re-expressing this as
Pr(X-µ ≤ zp) = 1-p for variable µ (-∞ < µ < +∞). (8.2.6)
The consonance intervals envisaged for X = x are thereby bounded from below by
x-zp for -∞ < µ < +∞. (8.2.7)
We thus obtain the system of intervals
x-zp ≤ µ < ∞ for -∞ < µ < +∞. (8.2.8)
Thus, if p = 0.100, 0.050, 0.025, then x-zp = x-1.282, x-1.645, x-1.960, respectively, and 
vice versa. Kempthorne and Folks (1971, p. 366) graphically display a system of such 
intervals. The reader should note that the development at (8.2.1), (8.2.2), (8.2.3) and 
(8.2.4) belongs to the discourse of decision-making under risk, which is the discourse of 
forecasting, whereas the development at (8.2.5), (8.2.6), (8.2.7) and (8.2.8) belongs to the 
discourse of data analysis, which is the discourse of pointing.
8.3 An epistemological consideration
Each interval at (8.2.8) includes its own boundary because at (8.2.5) we have used the 
exclusive Definition 6.2.2 of a significance level. If the inclusive Definition 6.2.1 were to 
be used at (8.2.5), each interval at (8.2.8) would exclude its own boundary. In the case of 
a continuous parameter space that might seem to be of little consequence. We will find, 
however, that in the case of a discrete parameter space, it does not make sense for an in-
terval of interest to exclude its own boundary. The issue arises because habitual thought 
will try to achieve a set that includes the unknown parameter value, thereby neglecting 
the implication of a complementary set that excludes the unknown parameter value. In 
either case it will be found that sound epistemology requires a set that includes its own 
boundary. So we will have to reason in terms of a partition of the parameter space into two 
complementary intervals that may be called ‘the consonance interval’ and ‘the dissonance 
interval’, respectively, where these intervals will have to be constituted as follows:
The values that comprise the consonance interval are its boundary and all those 
values that, by the tests performed, are as consonant or more consonant with the 
data, than the boundary is.
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The values that comprise the dissonance interval are its boundary and all those 
values that, by the tests performed, are as dissonant or more dissonant with the 
data, than the boundary is.
We will thus strictly maintain that such intervals always contain their own boundaries. 
We subsequently give examples showing that to reason otherwise, sows confusion. It 
will also be found that the ensuing development rests more easily on the term ‘region’ 
rather than on the term ‘interval’.
8.4 Consonance regions and dissonance regions
We revisit the pregnant rabbit of Section 6.2. To simplify matters, suppose that by sub-
jecting extensive historical records to suitable commencement and elimination testing, it 
has been found that any given amnion measurement x can be modelled satisfactorily as a 
realisation of an N(µ, 1²) random variable X, where µ (µ = 1, 2, 3, …) denotes an unknown 
number of foetuses present. For the present purposes we avoid the notion of simultane-
ous statistical inference. So consider, for a given datum X = x, how to obtain tenable lower 
bounds for the possible values of µ. This is a problem in elimination testing, and it must 
be firmly grasped that such testing is subject to the following two constraints.
The reasoning behind a commencement test whose purpose it is to provide a basis 
for elimination tests, cannot rely upon the notion that one can (somehow) arrive 
at ‘the “probability” of having drawn a correct conclusion’. The very essence of any 
such real-world commencement problem is that it is utterly impossible to arrive 
at such a probability. Such a commencement test can provide nothing more than 
factual knowledge about quality of fit in a particular case. (8.4.1)
It then follows inexorably that should our commencement tests (and there might be 
several of them) encourage us to adopt a particular class of models, any subsequent 
elimination tests cannot in turn arrive at anything in the nature of ‘the “probability” 
of having drawn a correct conclusion’. So, owing to the commencement tests that 
they rely upon, elimination tests in turn can also provide nothing more than further 
factual knowledge about quality of fit in the particular case. (8.4.2)
It is precisely these constraints that motivate the methods of Chapters 1, 2 and 5, respec-
tively. A further matter to be firmly grasped is that any exemplifying paradigm is always 
at best deliberately chosen so as to be of such extreme simplicity that the conclusions to 
be drawn from it are from the very outset obvious beyond reasonable contest. That is ac-
complished here by taking a given amnion measurement to be X = 4, its standard error 
to be σ = 1, and by adopting the following familiar norms, whose familiarity testifies to 
it that they can be forced upon the human body:
Firstly, the model indexed by µ = 3 fits the given data well, µ = 3 being a mere one 
standard error unit less than X = 4 (the observed X value). (8.4.3)
Secondly, the model indexed by µ = 2 fits the given data poorly, µ = 2 being all of two 
standard error units less than X = 4 (the observed X value). (8.4.4)
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We must maintain these norms throughout the following development otherwise the is-
sues are confused with different norms. Subject to the constraints recognised at (8.4.1) and 
(8.4.2) we must establish how different instruments of investigation try to correctly partition 
the parameter space with respect to the real-world pregnant rabbit at which we are pointing. 
And so, for each instrument in turn, we must establish whether or not it delivers an equiva-
lent to the correct answers, that is to say, the answers already given at (8.4.3) and (8.4.4). So, 
given the class of models
Z = X-µ is a N(0, 1²) random variable, µ ∈ {1, 2, 3, …},
and given the datum:
X = 4 in the particular case,
we must, using different instruments in turn, try to choose the appropriate partition of 
the parameter space from amongst the following partitions, where the models indexed 
to the left of the partition must, as tested, fit the given data poorly, and those indexed to 
the right of the partition must, as tested, fit the given data well:
… µ ∈ {1, |2, 3, 4, …}, µ ∈ {1, 2, |3, 4, 5, …}, µ ∈ {1, 2, 3, |4, 5, 6, …}, … .
The parameter space is of course correctly partitioned by our choice of norms as
µ ∈ {1, 2, |3, 4, 5, …}. (8.4.5)
Now, if for instance our instrument is co-ordination testing, we would consider the co-
ordinates of Z = X-µ for various possible values of µ, and we would judge the better 
fitting of any two of the µ values to be the one giving Z co-ordinates that are nearest to 
(U, V) = (0.5, 0.5). In the present case one then cannot disagree with the following:
Given that X = 4, the co-ordinates of the Z values arising from µ = 3 and µ = 2 are 
(0.84, 0.16) and (0.98, 0.02), respectively. So there would seem to be three or more 
foetuses, and not two or less. (8.4.6)
In the present context, one cannot disagree with the statement at (8.4.6), as it is just a 
re-statement of the partition and motivating norms agreed upon at (8.4.3) and (8.4.4).
We are now ready to tackle the rabbit problem by means of the instruments indicated 
in Sections 8.2 and 8.3. So, consider Z = (X-µ)÷σ and let P = p be the P value arising 
from Z = z when Z is an N(0, 1²) random variable. Two distinctly different recipes for 
a 1-p lower bound for µ then arise from Definitions 6.2.1 and 6.2.2, as in the follow-
ing, where those recipes appear on the extreme right at (8.4.7) and (8.4.8), respectively: 
Pr   X-m > z   = p. So Pr(X-m ≤ zs) = 1-p. Recipe: m ≥ X-zs. (8.4.7) 
         s
Pr   X-m ≥ z   = p. So Pr(X-m < zs) = 1-p. Recipe: m > X-zs. (8.4.8) 
         s
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The recipe arising at (8.4.7) places the limit inside the region. The recipe arising at (8.4.8) 
places the limit outside the region. A useful mnemonic arises:
The exclusive definition of the P value leads to an inclusive region. The inclusive 
definition of the P value leads to an exclusive region.
Now, if p = V is attained at (8.4.7), then p = ε+V is attained using the same class mark z 
at (8.4.8). So let us take the co-ordinates given at (8.4.6) to have arisen as follows:
(0.840, 0.159) ≈ (0.84, 0.16) by rounding (ε = 0.001).
(0.980, 0.019) ≈ (0.98, 0.02) by rounding (ε = 0.001).
Bearing in mind that σ = 1, we now derive certain terms from each of the two systems of 
regions arising at (8.4.7) and (8.4.8), respectively. First we consider the system of regions 
arising from the exclusive definition and leading to the recipe at (8.4.7), thus obtaining 
the following two terms of that system:
µ ∈ {3, 4, 5, …} is a 0.841 inclusive region where the limit (µ = 3) is inside the re-
gion, and p = 0.159 at the limit.
µ ∈ {2, 3, 4, …} is a 0.981 inclusive region where the limit (µ = 2) is inside the re-
gion, and p = 0.019 at the limit. (8.4.10)
Next we consider the system of regions arising from the inclusive definition and leading 
to the recipe at (8.4.8), thus obtaining the following two terms of that system:
µ ∈ {4, 5, 6, …} is a 0.840 exclusive region where the limit (µ = 3) is outside the 
region, and p = 0.160 at the limit.
µ ∈ {3, 4, 5, …} is a 0.980 exclusive region where the limit (µ = 2) is outside the 
region, and p = 0.020 at the limit. (8.4.11)
The two systems are completely distinct; no term from the one system can be obtained from 
the other system. It follows from Section 8.3 that two consonance regions arise at (8.4.10) 
and two dissonance regions arise at (8.4.11) albeit that habitual thought has made the latter 
two regions arise awkwardly, as if expressing consonance. In order to clarify the matter we 
reformulate as follows: at (8.4.10) the two terms of the system are better expressed as:
µ ∈ {3, 4, 5, …} is a 1-p = 1 − 0.159 consonance region where p = 0.159 at the limit 
and p is larger for larger µ.
µ ∈ {2, 3, 4, …} is a 1-p = 1 − 0.019 consonance region where p = 0.019 at the limit 
and p is larger for larger µ. (8.4.12)
At (8.4.11) the two terms of the system are better expressed as follows:
µ ∈ {1, 2, 3} is a 1-p = 1-0.160 dissonance region where p = 0.160 at the limit and p 
is smaller for smaller µ.
µ ∈ {1, 2} is a 1-p = 1-0.020 dissonance region where p = 0.020 at the limit and p is 
smaller for smaller µ. (8.4.13)
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It then appears that, in terms of the norms agreed upon, the P values at (8.4.12) point 
at the first of the two regions as the appropriate consonance region, and the P values 
at (8.4.13) point at the second of the two regions as the appropriate dissonance region. 
Thus the correct partition, as expressed at (8.4.5), is attained. However, it is attained by 
a means that contrives concomitantly to introduce unneeded concepts. The following 
two examples and a discussion of their import will help make that clear.
Example 8.4.1
An appropriate partition of the entries in Table 4.5.1 is {D, F, |C, A, B, E}, as can be 
seen directly by inspection of the co-ordinate trace given in the table. We must use 
the exclusive definition of the P value, so as to include F as the boundary of the 1-0.522 
consonance region for the identity of the best entry. That leaves the status of C open to 
question. So we also have to use the inclusive definition of the P value, to include C as 
the boundary of the 1-0.006 dissonance region for the identity of the best entry. 
Example 8.4.2
Two distinctly different, but both appropriate, partitions of the entries in Table 2.9.1 are 
{A, B, C, D, |E, F} and {A, B, C, D, E, | F}, as can be seen directly by inspection of the co-
ordinate trace given in the table. To obtain the first partition we must use the exclusive 
definition of the P value, so as to include D as the boundary of the 1-0.126 consonance 
region for the identity of the best entry. That leaves the status of E open to question. 
So, we also have to use the inclusive definition of the P value for the first partition in 
order to include E as the boundary of the 1-0.055 dissonance region for the identity of 
the best entry. That still leaves the status of F open to question. So we again have to use 
the inclusive definition of the P value in order to include F as the boundary of a further 
1-0.012 dissonance region for the identity of the best entry. The complement of this 
further dissonance region is an unwanted consonance region.
Discussion of the import of Examples 8.4.1 and 8.4.2
Both examples are of practical interest, but that is not the reason for introducing them 
here. They are introduced here because the partitions of interest are seen directly by 
inspection of the co-ordinate traces given in Tables 4.5.1 and 2.9.1, are indeed made 
glaringly obvious by those traces. So we are compelled to ask:
Considering that in each case the given problem is from the very outset solved by 
inspection of the trace, what does a consonance-dissonance development then 
add to or subtract from that solution as such?
We are compelled to answer that it neither adds to nor subtracts from that solution as 
such. It merely contrives to express the solution in terms of coverage probabilities, which 
are formal probabilities that, as such, cannot be taken seriously in any case, lest we fall 
into a vicious circle of the kind developed in Section 4.8. So here again, just as in Chapter 6, 
‘probability inference’ violates one of the most fundamental principles of science:
Never, ever introduce a constituent that is not needed. (8.4.14)
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8.5 An unneeded embellishment
At (8.4.14) we paraphrased William of Occam’s principle of paucity: ‘Never try to do with 
more, what can be done with fewer.’ Our customers in substantive science will know it 
as an indispensable principle. It is for instance the reason why the notion of intelligent 
design can find no place in science. It should also prevent various kinds of statistical 
regions (confidence regions, consonance regions, fiduciary regions, likelihood regions, 
credibility regions, etc.) from invading the discourse of investigative science. The fol-
lowing two examples and the ensuing discussion will help clarify this.
Example 8.5.1
Bliss (1967, p. 154) considers the survival times of 19 mice infected with tubercle bacilli. 
He notes that: ‘From the evidence of this and other similar series, a suitable metameter 
is y = log days.’ Of course he refers here to circumstantial evidence, data inspection 
and experience. The numerical data, in [ln(days)-1]×1 000 code, are given in Table 8.5.1 
and are plotted against the expected values of corresponding normal-order statistics in 
Figure 8.5.1; the requisite order-statistical values are given by Harter (1961). Such a plot
Table 8.5.1: Survival times of 19 tubercle infected mice [ln(days)-1] × 1 000 code
Code 161 290 312 332 352 371 389 406 439 455
Frequency 1 1 1 3 1 3 5 2 1 1
Figure 8.5.1: Order-statistical plot of the linearly coded survival times of 19 mice infected with 
tubercle bacilli
Expected values of standard normal order statistics
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would tend to scatter round a straight line for sampling from a normal population. So 
the observed plot encourages one to model the data as
‘… a sample from a normal population, except for the earliest death as premature, 
that is to say, as an outlier’. (8.5.1)
Bliss uses significance tests to test more incisively whether or not the earliest death is 
indeed modelled satisfactorily as an outlier. But, inasmuch as those tests complement 
normal sampling, let us first test, more incisively, whether or not the model expressed 
in words at (8.5.1) can account satisfactorily for the 18 longer survival times. Using the 
facilities of D’Agostino (1970) and D’Agostino and Tietjen (1971), we then find:
The mental correlate of Pearson’s observed measure of skewness, √b1 = -0.06612, is 
situated at (0.420, ε, 0.580) in the test distribution. (8.5.2)
The mental correlate of Pearson’s observed measure of kurtosis, b2 = 2.623, is 
situated at (0.496, ε, 0.504) in the test distribution. (8.5.3)
So the model expressed at (8.5.1), as tested, fits the 18 longer survival times very well. 
Turning now to whether the earliest death is to be modelled as an outlier, let us follow 
Bliss using the tests of Dixon (1950, 1951). If the observed values, arranged in order of 
magnitude and starting with the suspected outlier, are denoted by y1, y2, y3, …, yn the 
test datum is
y2-y1 for 3 ≤ n ≤ 8,   y3-y1   for 9 ≤ n ≤ 13,   y3-y1   for 14 ≤ n ≤ 30, …  
yn-y1                       yn-1-y1                          yn-2-y1
where the numerator, referred to as the gap to be tested, is taken to be the larger of two 
possible candidates in absolute value. For instance, in Table 8.5.1, the candidates are 
the earliest death with corresponding gap 312-161 = 151, and the latest death with cor-
responding gap 406-455 = -49. So the earliest death is identified as the suspected outlier. 
Using Dixon’s gap test and prepared tables for the test distribution, we find that:
The test datum is (312-161)÷(406-161) = 0.616, whose mental correlate is situated 
far to the right of (0.995, ε , 0.005*) in Dixon’s test distribution.
Whenever an outlier is indicated, as in this case, we must test whether or not there might 
be another outlier. So we consider the n =18 remaining observations for which the two 
gaps are now 332-290 = 42 and 406-455 = -49, and where the latter is now the gap to be 
tested. We find that:
The test datum is (406-455)÷(332-455) = 0.398, whose mental correlate is situated 
at approximately (0.906, ε, 0.094*) in Dixon’s test distribution.
The fit is slightly awkward but tolerable. We note in passing that the current statisti-
cal literature would have us double the pointing co-ordinates obtained in any Dixon 
test if an outlier could occur at either extreme; however, a co-ordination tester must of 
course ignore that. Turning now to the various members of the class of models, each 
member comprising a sample of size n = 18 from an N(µ, σ²) population and one outlier 
(the latter is part of each member model), we test for tenable values of µ treating σ² as 
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a nuisance parameter. The appropriate test statistic is Student’s t as applied to the 18 
longer survival times, and the mental correlate of the test datum is found in Student’s 
test distribution at (0.500, ε, 0.500) for µ = x, the observed mean survival time, and
at (0.080, ε, 0.920) and (0.920, ε, 0.080) for µ = x-15 and µ = x+15, respectively,
at (0.040, ε, 0.960) and (0.960, ε, 0.040) for µ = x-19 and µ = x+19, respectively,
at (0.020, ε, 0.980) and (0.980, ε, 0.020) for µ = x-22 and µ = x+22, respectively,
at (0.010, ε, 0.990) and (0.990, ε, 0.010) for µ = x-26 and µ = x+26, respectively,
at (0.005, ε, 0.995) and (0.995, ε, 0.005) for µ = x-29 and µ = x+29, respectively,
 … . (8.5.4)
Cox and Hinkley (1974) would have us report these same facts as follows in terms of con-
sonance intervals, except that they would have us refer to the consonance intervals as 
confidence intervals:
x-15 < µ < x+15 is a 1-2(0.080) consonance interval for µ,
x-19 < µ < x+19 is a 1-2(0.040) consonance interval for µ,
x-22 < µ < x+22 is a 1-2(0.020) consonance interval for µ,
x-26 < µ < x+26 is a 1-2(0.010) consonance interval for µ,
x-29 < µ < x+29 is a 1-2(0.005) consonance interval for µ, … . (8.5.5)
Note that the facts at (8.5.4) and (8.5.5) are one to one transforms of each other. An ad-
vocate of confidence intervals in the original sense intended by Neymann, as explained 
in Chapter 4, would have us specify without reference to the data a Type I error rate, say 
α = 0.020 for argument’s sake, and then dichotomise the parameter space as follows:
We must, as an act of will, conclude that the true value of µ can be, and can only 
be, one of those in the interval x-22 < µ < x+22, where such conclusions are true 
in 1-2(0.020) of cases, i.e. 96% of cases. (8.5.6)
Despite continuing to use the term ‘confidence’, as not intended by Neymann, rather than 
following the usages proposed by Kempthorne and Folks (1971), Cox and Hinkley (1974) 
would nevertheless object (and rightly so) to the idea exemplified in (8.5.6). They say for 
instance (pp. 207-208): ‘… in general, interval estimates cannot be taken as probability state-
ments about parameters, and foremost is the interpretation “such and such parameter val-
ues are consistent with the data”.’ This is precisely why Kempthorne and Folks characterise 
an acceptable model as ‘consonant with the data’. The advocates of consonance intervals are 
entirely correct in rejecting Neymann’s notions of specifying error rates without reference 
to the data, and of performing acts of will, where instead an understanding of factual evi-
dence is required. So, we have to concede that the presentation of factual evidence at (8.5.5) 
serves investigative needs better than does the reasoning at (8.5.6) because the latter has 
mistaken a problem in investigation for a problem in forecasting. But, having agreed to that, 
and inasmuch as the presentations at (8.5.4) and (8.5.5) are one to one transforms of each 
other, we must ask why advocates of consonance intervals employ a presentation that, as at 
(8.5.5), courts the very misunderstanding they wish to avoid. The answer is simply that we 
are as much the victims of our education, as we are its beneficiaries. When Cox and Hinkley 
explain (p. 209) that the coverage probability is a ‘key requirement’ that ‘gives a physical 
interpretation to the confidence limits’ because, though it is only ‘a hypothetical statement’, 
it ‘gives an empirical meaning, which in principle can be checked by experiment’, they have 
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fallen victim to their education; it does not occur to them that for a statistical statement to 
have a physical meaning, does not imply that it must necessarily take the form of a forecast-
ed frequency ‘which in principle can be checked by experiment’. The presentation at (8.5.4) 
comprises statements whose meanings can by simulation be forced onto the human body – 
not just in principle, but by simulation that provides the actual evidence. It should be noted, 
however, that significance testers are justified in being leery of Neymann’s reasoning, that is 
to say, of reasoning that interprets the coverage probabilities as real-world probabilities. In 
order to grasp that we merely have to note that whereas at (8.5.4) it is explicitly the case that 
a very wide variety of models fit the given data well, at (8.5.2) and (8.5.3) it is implicitly the 
case that there too a very wide variety of models would fit the given data well. So, to think 
that any Type II-like errors at (8.5.2) and (8.5.3) can be made to have zero probability by 
means of reasonable assumptions or acts of will, would be extremely unrealistic. Here the 
reader should note that the assumptions seem to be reasonable because there is nothing in 
evidence to make us think otherwise. So the crux of the argument is simply this: Why court 
a fallacy by the introduction of an assumption that is not needed?
Example 8.5.2
The differences in yield between the n = 14 sprayed strips of corn and their unsprayed controls, 
given in Table 2.4.1, might at first seem to present a very similar problem to the one we dealt 
with in the previous example, but it turns out to be fundamentally different. If we proceed, 
without forethought, to test for outliers as in the previous example, we find that Dixon’s test 
points strongly at the largest difference, 24.0, and at the smallest difference, -5.7, as outliers, 
whilst for the second largest difference, 8.8, we find the mental correlate of the test datum 
placed at approximately (0.94, ε, 0.06*) in Dixon’s test distribution. However, given the pur-
poses of the experiment, we have to deal with the mean of all 14 differences, because there is 
no reason to suspect that the outliers do not measure actual differences in yield satisfactorily. 
Also note that inasmuch as the differences are from 14 different farms, the outliers represent 
an understandable heterogeneity. In this respect the experiment resembles a survey, suggest-
ing that we might simply judge the observed mean difference in yield, 4.70 bu./acre, in relation 
to its estimated standard error, 1.73 bu./acre. However, the data are from an experiment that 
was conducted by means of a properly randomised design. And we also know that Student’s t 
test for a mean of paired differences is remarkably robust. So it was reasonable for Snedecor to 
consider the use of Student’s t in this case. What must concern us here is whether an interval 
estimate, when it is adjoined to an informative co-ordinate trace, contributes positively, vacu-
ously, or negatively to whatever the trace has already supplied for investigative needs. The trace 
of present interest is given by the following, where δ denotes the effect of the spray, the D-like 
symbol denotes conceptual difference in yield, the d-like symbol denotes real difference in 
yield, and the notation is otherwise obvious:
Pr t <  d-d  , ε, Pr t > d-d    for d = 4.70, sD = 1.73, and for 0 ≤ d < ∞.            sD                   sD
Hence the mental correlate of the test datum is situated in Student’s test distribution
at (•, ε, 0.009) for d = 0.0 bu./acre,
at (•, ε, 0.026) for d = 1.0 bu./acre,
at (•, ε, 0.071) for d = 2.0 bu./acre,
at (•, ε, 0.172) for d = 3.0 bu./acre, (8.5.9)
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and the co-ordinates for any other d values that might be of interest may of course be 
adjoined to this abbreviated trace. We have seen that the reasoning leading up to this 
trace is by rough and ready approximation. Nevertheless, the trace can hardly be said to 
be uninformative, as the error estimate is appropriately modelled as inflated. So the trace 
clearly shows that the models indexed by values of the order d = 2.0 bu./acre or less, fit 
the data poorly, requiring larger values for satisfactory fit. Now let us consider the corre-
sponding consonance regions. They are of course one sided. But inasmuch as the notion 
of a two-sided region is entailed by the more basic notion of a coverage probability, it is 
appropriate to evaluate here just the more basic notion. So, by a one to one transforma-
tion of the abbreviated trace at (8.5.9) we obtain the following four terms of a system of 
one-sided consonance intervals:
0.0 bu./acre ≤ d is a 1-0.009 consonance region for d.
1.0 bu./acre ≤ d is a 1-0.026 consonance region for d.
2.0 bu./acre ≤ d is a 1-0.071 consonance region for d.
3.0 bu./acre ≤ d is a 1-0.172 consonance region for d. (8.5.10)
If we select, without reference to the data, just one such consonance region it would be 
interpretable as a confidence region, but as explained in Chapter 4, we then fall into 
circular reasoning. Hence, as explained in Chapter 5, an advocate of consonance would 
have us avoid interpreting a consonance coefficient as an actual (real-world) probability 
and would instead have us interpret the coefficient as a measure of fit that, for want of a 
better form, is expressed as a formal (conceptual) probability. However, if we do agree to 
that interpretation, then whatsoever is conveyed at (8.5.10) has already been conveyed at 
(8.5.9), which means that we are trying to ‘do with more, what can be done with fewer’. 
8.6 The notion of ‘interval estimation’ in general
In the foregoing, confidence intervals and consonance intervals provided sufficient ex-
emplification of the general idea of interval estimation. Further exemplification is not 
needed, as it suffices to note that the general idea is that a coverage probability must 
characterise the tenability of many parameter values comprising an interval (or region) 
of such values. This is bound to have silly consequences, as those values are not equally 
tenable. Typically, values on or near the boundary of the interval are less tenable than 
those in or near the centre of the interval. Seemingly, this defect might be removed 
whilst retaining the notion of coverage probability, by a series of nested intervals with 
a range of different coverage probabilities. However, each one of the nested intervals by 
itself residually retains the defect. So, the only way to remove the defect entirely is to 
utterly abandon the notion of coverage probability in favour of descriptions of the ten-
ability of the individual parameter values. In retrospect we see that the idea of interval 
estimation contrives to somehow accommodate the idée fixe, and it thereby introduces a 
constituent that is not needed – and that is bad science. To prove that that is indeed bad 
science is very easy. All one has to do, is to show how, under certain circumstances, the 
idea inexorably leads to the replacement of one-sided intervals by two-sided intervals, 
and to show how that amounts to replacement of each test in an array of co-ordination 
tests, with a corresponding co-ordination test whose separating characteristics are uni-
formly inferior to those of the test it replaces.
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Chapter 9
ANCILLARY STATISTICS
selecting the correct fraMe of reference for data analysis
9.1 Introduction
In Section 1.5 we met the mixed sampling problem. One version of the problem is as 
follows: the outcome of a Bernoulli trial, A, determines one or the other of two further 
Bernoulli trials, B and C, with equal probability. The conditional probability of success 
for the further trial is 0.2 for B, and 0.8 for C. We ask:
For B arising from A, must the probability of success be taken to be conditionally 
0.2, or taken to be unconditionally 0.5?
For C arising from A, must the probability of success be taken to be conditionally 0.8, 
or taken to be unconditionally 0.5? (9.1.1)
These questions are meaningful in the logic of mathematical statistics without having to 
resort to anything beyond that logic; yet they cannot be answered in that logic and thus 
exemplify the incompleteness of that logic. Each question posits, as possible, one or the 
other of two different frames of reference, and asks for ‘the correct one of the two’ to be 
supplied, where that can only be supplied by substantive science. These facts can be forced 
upon us in that, depending on substantive science, any one of three different frames of 
reference might in its own right be the correct one, as shown in Example 9.1.1.
Example 9.1.1
A decision-maker must classify each one of a host of many items as ‘good’ (send it off 
to market) or as ‘bad’ (send it off to waste). A regulatory authority allows at most 5% of 
marketed items to be bad. Machine A misclassifies only 1% of items, but is more expen-
sive to use than Machine B, which misclassifies 9% of items. So, for each item in turn, 
the decision-maker flips an unbiased coin to determine which machine makes the clas-
sification, and then erases any record of which machine was used (because otherwise 
the regulatory authority would rule out any items classified by machine B). So the deci-
sion-maker’s intention is that the items sent off to market will constitute a host of items 
of which 5% are bad. However, in a particular case, a customer purchases an item and 
discovers that by oversight a mark, showing that that item was classified by machine B, 
was not erased. So, supposing the customer understands the significance of the mark, it 
would require a rather stupid customer not to realise the advantage of demanding a re-
placement from the pool of unmarked items. Thus the correct frame of reference is that 
that particular item is known to belong to a population where 9% of items are bad. Simi-
larly, if oversight left a mark showing that a particular item was classified by machine A 
it would require a rather stupid customer not to realise the disadvantage, in such a case, 
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of demanding a replacement from the pool of unmarked items. Thus the correct frame 
of reference is then that that particular item is known to belong to a population of which 
1% of items are bad. The reader should note also that for any particular item, whenever 
the tell-tale mark has been erased, we would know that that particular item belongs to 
a population where 5% of the items are bad. 
Several remarks are in order:
(1) The example is not intended to exemplify problems of practical importance. It is a 
paradigmatic example; it is intended to display, in the simplest possible terms, certain 
principles of reasoning. The paradigm is a good one inasmuch as it compels us to recog-
nise from the outset that in each of the three possible cases there can, in respect of the 
particular item being pointed at, be only one satisfactory answer as to what is known about 
that particular item.
(2) It is crucially important to grasp (and this is difficult to the extent that we have to keep 
returning to it) that although the questions at (9.1.1) display, in mathematical logic, the 
possibility of three distinctly different frames of reference, they do not – and they cannot 
– supply in that logic, any principle or rule by which they can be answered. We have to 
note (and this is difficult) that whether a particular item is marked A, is marked B, or is 
unmarked, refers to the substance (the bodily experiences) of the matter; it is not part of 
the logic (the mathematical statistics) of the matter.
(3) The decision-maker’s intention to create to specification a host of many items is of 
trivial importance. Since we understand it completely, there is nothing further to explain 
or to disagree about. The thrust of the example is what we come to know about how, in 
any particular instance, a single solitary item has come about. Hence, here and in the rest 
of this chapter, we are concerned with a problem in investigative statistics. This point is 
crucial, because the problem of ancillary partitions is one of a number of problems in 
investigative statistics that are aggravated by the ubiquitous use of a certain device in sta-
tistical teaching. Typical examples of that device are given below. 
Question: To what does the standard error of the mean refer? 
Answer: Suppose you were to do this over again, many times, and to calculate the 
mean in each case. Then the standard deviation of the population comprising those 
many means will be … .
Question: To what does the Type I error rate refer? 
Answer: Suppose you were to do this over again, many times, and to employ this ac-
cept-reject rule in each case. Then the long-run frequency of Type I errors will be …
Question: To what does confidence coefficient refer? 
Answer: Suppose you were to do this over again, many times, and to use this recipe 
for an interval estimate in each case. Then the proportion of intervals that include 
the true value will be …
There is an inadvertent miss-education imbedded in the phrase ‘suppose you were to 
do this over again’. The phrase conditions one to the ‘frequentist’ notion of ‘statistical 
evidence’ as a forecast of what ‘will be’, which notion is wrong; whatsoever evidence 
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we can point at cannot belong to what ‘will be’ in the future. So it must be very firmly 
grasped that an investigator of given data cannot ‘do this over again’. Investigation of any 
particular data set must always ask how this single, solitary, real-world individual might 
have come about, and one cannot properly answer such a question by turning a blind eye 
to anything that is known about that particular individual. In short, we have to proceed 
from Definition 1.2.1, and not from Definition 1.2.2, because investigative problems in 
science belong to the discourse of predicting and pointing; such problems do not belong 
to the discourse of predicting and forecasting.
9.2 A proposal that fails
An ancillary statistic is a function of the minimally sufficient statistic for the index of a 
class of models, but is independent of that index. By thus restricting the definition to 
that minimal sufficient statistic, the concept of ‘an ancillary statistic’ is prevented from 
being confused with that of ‘a class characteristic’. The concept ‘an ancillary statistic’ is 
due to R.A. Fisher. He noticed that amongst the simplest examples of such statistics are 
indicators of sample size. For instance, imagine flipping two unbiased coins successively 
and letting the outcomes in terms of heads (H) or tails (T) determine the size of samples 
to be drawn from some or other population of interest, as follows:
For outcomes (H, H), (H, T), (T, H), and (T, T),
draw samples of size n = 1, n = 10, n = 100, and n = 1000, respectively.
Define a statistic,
Y = 1, 2, 3, 4, for outcomes (H, H), (H, T), (T, H), (T, T), respectively.
Then Y is an indicator of sample size, and is ancillary, since its distribution, given by
Pr(Y = y) = ¼ for y = 1, 2, 3, 4,
is independent of any parameter, θ, that might index the members of a class of models 
for the sample in question. If the variance of the population is given by σ², what is the 
variance of the sample mean?
Is it σ²÷n for the particular n?
Or is it ¼(σ²÷1)+¼(σ²÷10)+¼(σ²÷100)+¼(σ²÷1 000) for any particular n?
In the discourse of investigative statistics, the only sensible answer to this question is:
σ²÷n for n = 1, or 10, or 100, or 1 000, depending on the particular data set.
So here the correct frame of reference is conditional on the ancillary. Returning to Exam-
ple 9.1.1 we find that there too the correct frame of reference for any particular marked 
indivi dual is conditional on an ancillary, as follows: if X = 0 or 1 denotes the state of a 
random item as good or bad, respectively, X is a Bernoulli variable with Pr(X = 1) = θ 
say (0 ≤ θ ≤ 1). So if Y = A or B then denotes the use of machine A or B, respectively, and 
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Z = 0 or 1 denotes correct classification or misclassification, respectively, the sample 
space is given by the following possible values of (X, Y, Z)
(0, A, 0), (0, A, 1), (1, A, 0), (1, A, 1), (0, B, 0), (0, B, 1), (1, B, 0), (1, B, 1),
whose probabilities are:
(1-θ)½(0.99), (1-θ)½(0.01), (θ)½(0.99), (θ)½(0.01), …, (θ)½(0.91), (θ)½(0.09)
respectively, where Pr(Y = A) and Pr(Y = B) are of course given by:
(1-θ)½(0.99) + (1-θ)½(0.01) + (θ)½(0.99) + (θ)½(0.01) =½,
(1-θ)½(0.91) + (1-θ)½(0.09) + (θ)½(0.91) + (θ)½(0.09) =½, respectively.
Thus, Y is ancillary, and by conditioning on Y = A, or on Y = B, we obtain the correct 
frame of reference for a particular item marked A, or a particular item marked B, respec-
tively. For a particular item that is unmarked the relevant ancillary is the entire sample 
space and the empty set, with probabilities 1 and 0, respectively (independent of θ). 
Another example where conditioning on ancillary statistics corresponds to the correct 
frame of reference for investigative statistics is developed by Basu (1964), as follows: the 
variance of the mean of a random sample drawn with replacement from a finite popula-
tion of values with variance σ², is given by σ²÷n, where n denotes sample size. However, 
owing to the population being finite, some items might then be drawn more than once, 
where, of course, investigative statistics must ignore any such replicates as additionally 
uninformative. Since the number of times any particular item is drawn does not depend 
on its value, or on that of any of the other N-1 items, replicate items are accounted for 
by ancillary statistics (see for example Table 9.2.1). Basu shows that by ignoring any such
Table 9.2.1: An example of sample size as an ancillary statistic. {X1, X2} sampled at random with 
replacement from{x1, x2, x3}. The sample space comprises 3×3 = 9 equally likely cases.
X1 x1 x1 x1 x2 x2 x2 x3 x3 x3
X2 x1 x2 x3 x1 x2 x3 x1 x2 x3
n 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1
Pr(n = 1) = 1/3, Pr(n = 2) = 2/3, regardless of the values x1, x2, x3. If one conditions on n, sampling is 
without replacement; then the sample space comprises 3-choose-n equally likely cases.
replicates we are in effect conditioning on those ancillaries. So, if m of the N different 
items are drawn (m ≤ n ≤ N) their values comprise, in terms of the conditioning, a ran-
dom sample of size m drawn without replacement from the population, where the vari-
ance of the mean of such a sample is given by the well-known formula:
s2  1-m  . (9.2.1) 
m     N
311
Ancillary Statistics
Yet another case of the correct frame of reference for investigation being obtained by 
conditioning on an ancillary statistic was developed in Sections 4.14, 4.15, 4.16 and 4.17. 
Various such examples caused Fisher (e.g. 1935, 1936, 1973) to propose that the correct 
frame of reference for investigative statistics in the presence of any ancillary statistics 
will, as a general principle, always be found by conditioning on the ancillary statistics.
He was mistaken.
He was trying to make a logical principle supply the answer to a substantive problem, 
and thus mistook a problem in substantive science for a problem in logical reasoning. 
This runs counter to Gödel’s incompleteness principle, and therefore cannot be viable. 
That the proposal is not viable was uncovered and demonstrated by Basu (1964) using 
remarkably simple paradigms involving dice.
Example 9.2.1
Let X model the outcome of just one roll of a biased tetrahedral die, as in Table 9.2.2.
Table 9.2.2: A class of models for the outcome of rolling a biased tetrahedral die.
Outcome X (value on bottom) X = 1 X = 2 X = 3 X = 4
Probability of outcome X
1-2q 
4
1-q 
4
1+q 
4
1+2q 
4
Ancillary label Y Y = 1 Y = 2 Y = 2 Y = 1
Maximum likelihood estimate q -½ -½ +½ +½ 
                                                                                           -½ < q < + ½
In order to convey the import of this example, we have to ensure that the substantive 
context of the problem is firmly grasped. So we suppose that the biased die was made 
by covering the four different sides of an unbiased tetrahedral die with appropriately 
weighted triangular sheets, without distorting its tetrahedral shape. And we suppose 
also that the biased die is rolled in the usual way. X is minimally sufficient for θ, the in-
dex of the class of models displayed in Table 9.2.2. The table displays an ancillary statis-
tic Y. We note that the maximum likelihood estimator of θ is insufficient for θ. However, 
a one to one transform of the minimal sufficient statistic for θ is given by
(Y, θ), where θ denotes the maximum likelihood estimator of θ. (9.2.2)
To see that this is a one to one transform, note that for X = 1, 2, 3, 4, Table 9.2.2 shows that:
(Y, q) = (1, -½), (2, -½), (2, +½), (1, +½), respectively, (9.2.3)
and vice versa. So, by expressing the minimal sufficient statistic in the form at (9.2.2), the 
expressions at (9.2.3) and the probabilities in Table 9.2.2 show that the minimal sufficient 
statistic for θ, conditional on Y = 1, is given by (1, q) for
q = -½ or +½ with probabilities 1 - 2q or 1 + 2q, respectively, (9.2.4)                                                          2             2
ˆ
ˆ ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
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and the minimal sufficient statistic for θ, conditional on Y = 2, is given by (2, q) for
q = -½ or +½ with probabilities 1 - q or 1 + q, respectively, (9.2.5)                                                         2           2 
However, Basu would object (rightly so) to using the model at (9.2.4) or the model at 
(9.2.5) to represent how, by rolling the biased tetrahedral die, any particular outcome 
was brought about, because (so he would object) each conditional model requires the 
rolling of the die to have been such that the ancillary would take its observed value, but 
that could not have been the case because the die was rolled in the usual way, that is to 
say, we placed the die in a cup, we shook the cup, and we tossed the die from the cup. 
Basu calls that ‘a performable experiment’, whereas rolling the die such that Y = 1, as 
required by the model given at (9.2.4), or such that Y = 2, as required by the model given 
at (9.2.5), are ‘non-performable’. In order to make this entirely clear, Basu also considers 
as follows, how models such as those at (9.2.4) and (9.2.5) might represent ‘performable 
experiments’: Suppose the substantive investigator has two bent coins, each of which is
marked q = -½ on one side, and marked q = +½ on the other side,
and suppose that when Coin 1 is flipped, the probabilities are as given at (9.2.4), and 
when Coin 2 is flipped, the probabilities are as given at (9.2.5). If the investigator then 
flips an unbiased coin to determine which one of the two bent coins is to be flipped, a 
performable experiment has been performed, and its outcome would validly be repre-
sented by a performable subsidiary experiment corresponding to one or the other of the 
two conditional models at (9.2.4) and (9.2.5). But that is not at all the case for the tetra-
hedral die because, as Basu (rightly) observes, the investigator had ‘a die to experiment 
with, but where are the coins?’ So he concludes that the ‘trouble lies in our failure to rec-
ognise the difference between a real (performable) and a conceptual (non-performable) 
statistical experiment’. In short: Basu holds that if conditioning on an ancillary statistic 
fails to pick out any performable subsidiary experiment, we must ignore the ancillary as 
substantively vacuous for investigative purposes. In the present example he would have 
us consider Y to be substantively vacuous, and so would have us use the unconditional 
model. We subsequently find the requirement ‘performable’ somewhat too restrictive; 
but for the time being that need not concern us.
9.3 Conditional models that are ‘performable’, even  
 ‘performed’, yet vacuous
Any consulting statistician learns to distrust a substantive investigator’s understanding of 
the protocol that produces a randomised design, and so learns that instead of describing the 
protocol, it is wiser to supply the field plan. So we can well imagine the following example.
Example 9.3.1
A substantive investigator knows that statisticians ‘are inclined to make a fuss’ about fail-
ure to randomise, and tries to make ‘doubly sure’ that ‘the completely randomised design’, 
as instructed, is used. So, through muddled understanding, the substantive investiga-
tor divides 15 units at random into three ‘blocks’ of five units each, and then randomly 
ˆ
ˆ
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assigns, separately for each block, each of just five treatments to a different unit of that 
block. The statistician might at first be dismayed. But on second thoughts would be re-
lieved to realise that after all the completely randomised design was used, as the muddled 
procedure replicates each of the field plans of the completely randomised design exactly 
(3!)5 times, as follows:
The procedure used generates one of
 
 15    10    5
 
  5      5     5
sets of blocks, and assigns one of 5!5!5! treatment patterns to that set, which 
amounts to altogether 15! possible field plans involving each appropriate plan 
just (3!)5 times as follows: the number of possible field plans for a completely 
randomised design is given by 
  
 15   12    9    6     3
  =   
15!  x  12!  x  9!  x  6!   x   3!   amounting to  15!   field plans 
  3     3     3    3     3      3!12!    3!9!    3!6!    3!3!    3!0!                          (3!)5
where (3!)5 is the number of ways in which the units of any given one of those field 
plans can be grouped into three complete blocks, i.e., (3)5 ways to form the first block, 
times (2)5 ways to form the second block, times (1)5 ways to form the third block.
This example shows that ‘a performable subsidiary experiment’, and even ‘an actually 
performed subsidiary experiment’, might, with good reason, be ignored as one that is 
substantively vacuous. So we are compelled to interpret Basu’s position as demanding ‘a 
performable subsidiary experiment’ if and only if that subsidiary is substantively non-
vacuous. This example also shows that every-day statistical practice often involves mod-
els that embrace several, even a great many, different ancillary statistics, which suggests 
that statistical practice already has an intuitive understanding of how to deal with such 
ancillary statistics. So, when considering purely mathematical theories of how we are 
to deal with an ancillary statistic, it is advisable to keep our feet firmly on substantive 
ground, which is precisely what Basu (1964) would have us do.
9.4 Another proposal that fails
Cox (1971) has proposed, at least in certain cases, to disagree with Basu (1964). In order to 
explain this, he considers a simplified version of Basu’s main example. We now present the 
simplified example, first as Basu would have us view it, next as Cox would have us view it, 
and we then consider how we ought to view it.
Example 9.4.1
Let X model the outcome of just one roll of a biased tetrahedral die, as in Table 9.4.1.
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Table 9.4.1: A class of models for the outcome of rolling a biased tetrahedral die
Outcome X (value on bottom) X = 1 X = 2 X = 3 X = 4
Probability of outcome X
2 - q 
6
1 - q 
6
1 + q 
6
2 + q 
6
Ancillary label Y1 Y1 = 1 Y1 = 2 Y1 = 2 Y1 = 1
Ancillary label Y2 Y2 = 1 Y2 = 2 Y2 = 1 Y2 = 2
Maximum likelihood estimate q -1 -1 +1 +1
                                                        -1 < q < +1
In order to convey the import of the present example we must, as we did in Example 
9.2.1, make sure that the substantive context of the problem is clearly understood. So 
we suppose that the biased die is carefully made by covering the sides of an unbiased 
die with appropriately weighted triangular sheets, without distortion of the tetrahedral 
shape of the die. We also suppose that the resulting biased die is rolled in the usual way, 
i.e. we put the die in a cup, shake the cup, and toss the die from he cup. Table 9.4.1 dis-
plays two different ancillary statistics denoted by Y1 and Y2, respectively, and also shows 
that the maximum likelihood statistic is insufficient for θ. In this example, the minimal 
sufficient statistic, X, may alternatively be represented by (Y1, q), which is a one to one 
transform of X, or by (Y2, q), which is also a one to one transform of X. If we condition on 
the value of Y1, a pair of formal models arise, as follows: 
q = -1 or +1 with probabilities 2-q or 2+q, respectively, when Y1 = 1, and 
                                                     4         4
q = -1 or +1 with probabilities 1-q or 1+q, respectively, when Y1 = 2. (9.4.1) 
                                                     2         2
If we condition on the value of Y2, a different pair of formal models arise, as follows:
q = -1 or +1 with probabilities 2-q or 1+q, respectively, when Y2 = 1, and 
                                                     3         3
q = -1 or +1 with probabilities 1-q or 2+q, respectively, when Y2 = 2. (9.4.2) 
                                                     3         3
Basu’s view
All of the reasoning of Example 9.2.1 repeats for the pair of models at (9.4.1), and all of the 
reasoning of Example 9.2.1 repeats for the pair of models at (9.4.2). Moreover, the present 
example shows that Fisher’s proposed rule, i.e. ‘condition on the value of the ancillary’, 
cannot, in general, simply be applied because there might be, as is the case here, differ-
ent ancillaries involving contradictorily different conditional models. It follows that for 
Fisher’s rule to be applicable, such non-uniqueness must be removed, i.e. it must some-
how be made possible to pick out an ancillary that is uniquely ‘the correct one’ on which 
to condition. It will prove to be worthwhile to adapt Basu’s bent-coin examples in order to 
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
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ˆ
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show how the conditional models obtained at (9.4.1) and (9.4.2) might, in a setup different 
to the biased-die setup, represent performable experiments. So, suppose an investigator 
has two pairs of bent coins:
a Y1 pair named (1, 4) and (2, 3), respectively, and
a Y2 pair named (1, 3) and (2, 4), respectively,
where these coins might be flipped with possible outcomes as follows:
(1, 4): outcome X = 1 or X = 4 with probabilities 2-q and 2+q, respectively. 
                                                                                   4            4
(2, 3): outcome X = 2 or X = 3 with probabilities 1-q and 1+q, respectively. 
                                                                                   2            2
(1, 3): outcome X = 1 or X = 3 with probabilities 2-q and 1+q, respectively. 
                                                                                   3            3
(2, 4): outcome X = 2 or X = 4 with probabilities 1-q and 2+q, respectively. 
                                                                                   3            3
In order to investigate the value of q, the investigator flips an unbiased coin to choose 
between the Y1 pair and the Y2 pair. If the Y1 pair is chosen the investigator rolls a six-
sided unbiased die, flips coin (1, 4) if the die yields 1, 2, 3 or 4, and flips coin (2, 3) if 
the die yields 5 or 6. If the Y2 pair is chosen, the investigator flips the unbiased coin to 
choose between flipping coin (1, 3) and flipping coin (2, 4). This procedure amounts to 
a performable experiment with performable subsidiaries named Y1 and Y2, respectively. 
Each subsidiary in turn comprises further subsidiaries performable by flipping coin (1, 4) 
or coin (2, 3) in the case of Y1, or else by flipping coin (1, 3) or coin (2, 4) in the case of Y2, 
all of which together have the following possible outcomes:
X = 1 with probability   1   2  2-q + 1  1   2-q  =  1  (2-q) 
                                        2   3    4      2  2    3        6
X = 2 with probability   1   1  1-q + 1  1   1-q  =  1  (1-q) 
                                        2   3    2      2  2    3        6
X = 3 with probability   1   1  1+q + 1   1  1+q  = 1  (1+q) 
                                        2   3    2      2   2     3       6
 
X = 4 with probability   1   2  2+q +  1  1  2+q  = 1  (2+q) (9.4.3) 
                                        2   3    4       2  2     3       6 
In Basu’s view any frame of reference is vacuous if non-performable. In the case of the 
tetrahedral die, Y1 and Y2 are indicators of non-performable subsidiaries whose existence 
must therefore be ignored as being vacuous, and the data must be analysed in terms of the 
unconditional model. Suppose for instance the data are X = 3. Then:
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For X = 3 obtained by rolling the die, the maximum likelihood estimate is given by 
q = +1, the situations of whose mental correlate can, from Table 9.4.1, be traced at
 
    2-q  + 1-q  ,  1+q  +  2+q  , • , i.e. at 
      6        6        6           6
   3-2q , 3+2q , •  for -1 ≤ q ≤ +1. (9.4.4) 
     6         6
In case of the bent coins, however, we must condition on the performable initial flip of 
the unbiased coin choosing a bent-coin pair. We must then condition on the perform-
able choice between the members of the chosen pair, and so must analyse the given data 
in terms of the performable flipping of that chosen member. Then:
For X = 3 obtained by flipping coin (1, 3), the maximum likelihood estimate is given 
by q = +1, the situations of whose mental correlate can, from the first of the two 
conditional distributions given at (9.4.2), be traced at
  2-q , 1+q  , • for -1 ≤ q ≤ +1. (9.4.5) 
    3      3
The traces at (9.4.4) and (9.4.5) are distinctly different. For instance, consider testing q = 0. 
They differ because they arise from different performable experiments.
Cox’s view
Cox holds that ‘It is fairly compelling that the probability distributions used in inference 
should be conditional on the observed value of the ancillary statistic’, but recognises that 
‘there may be alternative ancillary statistics for the same problem’, for instance, Y1 and Y2 
in the present example. He is evidently aware that such ‘non-uniqueness’ is resolved by 
Basu’s requirement that we may condition in terms of a performable experiment only, but 
he regards that as ‘tentatively suggested’ only. He notes that Barnard and Sprott (1970) 
claim to have ‘resolved the non-uniqueness of Basu’s main example by appeal to invariance 
under a natural group of transformations’, but he proposes to outline a resolution ‘that is 
more generally applicable than an invariance argument’. (The proposal of Barnard and 
Sprott, which we consider in a subsequent section, does not resolve the non-uniqueness 
of Y1 and Y2 in the present example.) Turning now to the present example, Cox notes that 
by conditioning on Y1 or on Y2, ‘the data are considered as two independent binomially 
distributed observations, the associated probabilities in the binomial distributions being 
respectively’ as at (9.4.1) and (9.4.2). He considers testing the consistency of any given 
data with ‘an arbitrary value q = q0 by examining the exact distribution of the efficient 
score statistic’, i.e. of the partial derivative of the log-likelihood at q = q0. ‘In this way,’ he 
says, ‘confidence regions for q can be formed having at least a local optimum property.’ He 
therefore considers the distributions of the score statistic when evaluated conditionally 
on Y1 and Y2, respectively, and he measures the dispersion of each of the two distributions 
by way of the variance of the information expected in each case. It turns out that
ˆ
ˆ
317
Ancillary Statistics
the variance =            
2
             when conditioning on Y1, and (9.4.6) 
                          [(1-q
2) (4-q2)]2 
                                  
0                 0
 
                                    q2 
the variance =             0             when conditioning on Y2 . (9.4.7) 
                          [(1-q
2)(4-q2)]2 
                                      0               0 
Cox points out that the more dispersed the distribution of the score statistic is under the 
ancillary variation, the more informative the conditioning is on that ancillary; that the 
dispersion, as measured, is greater at (9.4.6) than at (9.4.7); and that this is uniformly 
true for all values of q0. So he concludes that we must condition on Y1. He also shows 
that these results are generalised to an arbitrary multinomial distribution with a scalar 
parameter, and in the case of a vector parameter the measures at (9.4.6) and (9.4.7) can 
be replaced by, for instance, the variance of the information determinant.
But look at what this leads to! There seems to be nothing in Cox’s proposal to prevent us 
from applying it to the bent-coin example. So suppose, for the moment, that we may do so. 
We saw at (9.4.3) how the bent-coin experiment then leads to the model displayed in Table 
9.4.1, which is in fact the model Cox considers, and for which he would have us analyse any 
given data conditionally on Y1, rather than on Y2. Cox  would thus have us model the given 
datum, X = 3, as if it were obtained via the more informative one of the two model-pairs at 
(9.4.1) and (9.4.2), that is to say, he would in effect have us reason as if the given data set had 
been obtained by flipping coin (2, 3) rather than by flipping coin (1, 3). Before continuing, 
let us note that flipping (2, 3) is indeed more informative than flipping (1, 3):
For X = 3, if it had been obtained by flipping coin (2, 3), the maximum likelihood 
estimate would have been q = +1, the situations of whose mental correlate would, 
from the second conditional distribution given at (9.4.1), have been traced at 
 
 1-q  ,  1+q  , •   for -1 ≤ q ≤ +1. (9.4.8) 
   2        2
Figure 9.4.1 overleaf shows that for any two hypothesised values, the trace at (9.4.8) is in-
deed more separating than the trace at (9.4.5). So one would indeed prefer investigation 
via flipping (2, 3) rather than flipping (1, 3). In order to then defend the co-ordinates at 
(9.4.8) in the case of the bent-coin experiment, we would have to reason
that X = 3 was obtained by flipping coin (1, 3) must be ignored,
so that X = 3 can be viewed unconditionally as in Table 9.4.1,
so that we can condition on Y1 = 1,
so that we can then reason as if X = 3 were obtained by flipping coin (2,3).
And that is circular reasoning.
Such reasoning is bad enough to be utterly unacceptable. If it were to be argued that 
the reasoning does not apply in the case of performable subsidiaries such as those in 
the bent-coin setup, but only to non-performable subsidiaries such as those in the 
ˆ
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biased tetrahedral-die setup, the reasoning becomes even worse, since it is then con-
founded with the arcane notion of a principle of reasoning that does not apply to an 
experiment that can be performed physically, but that applies only to metaphysical 
‘experiments’ that cannot be physically (actually) performed. (9.4.9)
Figure 9.4.1: Two alternative suites of co-ordination tests
Although we have presented the foregoing in terms of a random sample of size n = 1, the 
reasoning repeats for a random sample of any size, because a random sample of any size 
n comprises n independent replicates of size n = 1. So the proposal can be applied to the 
separate replicates, and the results can then be combined.
9.5 Yet another proposal that fails
Barnard and Sprott (1970) propose that, at least in certain cases, any non-uniqueness of 
ancillaries can be resolved by appeal to invariance principles. They motivate this using 
Basu’s main example, which is reproduced below. We first consider how Basu would 
have us view the example, then we consider how Barnard and Sprott would have us view 
the example, and finally we consider how we ought to view the example.
 
  Trace 1 (lower graph) (U, ε, V) =  [1 - q, 1 + q, Ø]                             2       2           
  Trace 2 (upper graph) (U, ε, V) = [2 - q, 1 + q, Ø]                                 3       3           
 Given attainable co-ordinates Ui and Uj (Ui ≠ Uj) the lower graph depicts  
 the more separating tests, as qijl - qjl < qij2 - qj2.
q = -1
U = 0 U = 0.3 Ui Uj U = 1
q = qi2
q = qj2
q = +1
q = qi1
q = qj1
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Example 9.5.1
Table 9.5.1 gives the original version of Basu’s main example.
Table 9.5.1: A class of models for the outcome of one roll of a biased cubic die
X (value on top) X = 1 X = 2 X = 3 X = 4 X = 5 X = 6
Probability
1-q 
12
2-q 
12
3-q 
12
1+q 
12
2+q 
12
3+q 
12
Ancillary Y1 0 1 2 0 1 2
Ancillary Y2 0 1 2 0 2 1
Ancillary Y3 0 1 2 1 0 2
Ancillary Y4 0 1 2 1 2 0
Ancillary Y5 0 1 2 2 0 1
Ancillary Y6 0 1 2 2 1 0
Max. like. est. q -1 -1 -1 +1 +1 +1
−1 ≤ q ≤ +1
As before, we consider how the model might represent one or the other of two different 
but substantively meaningful experiments. A first possibility, as indicated in the heading 
of Table 9.5.1, is one roll of a biased cubic die, where we must ensure that the substance 
of the action is clearly understood. So we assume that the die was made by covering the 
six sides of an unbiased cubic die with appropriately weighted squares, and without any 
distortion of the cubic shape. We also suppose that the resulting biased die is rolled in 
the usual way by placing the die in a cup, shaking the cup, and tossing the die from the 
cup. In that case conditioning on any one of the six ancillary statistics, labelled Y1, Y2, Y3, 
…, Y6, in Table 9.5.1, corresponds to a non-performable experiment, because one cannot 
roll the die such that any of the ancillaries will take on a particular value. A second pos-
sibility involves three bent coins with the following outcomes, when flipped:
Coin 1: outcome -1 or +1 with probability 1-q and 1+q, respectively. 
                                                                         2            2
Coin 2: outcome -1 or +1 with probability 2-q and 3+q, respectively. 
                                                                         5            5
Coin 3: outcome -1 or +1 with probability 3-q and 2+q, respectively. 
                                                                         5            5
Note that any outcome is the maximum likelihood estimate of q. Let the investigator roll 
an ordinary six-sided die twice in succession. Let the random variables, Z1 and Z2, re-
spectively, represent successive outcomes, where (Z1, Z2) = (z1, z2) represents a particular 
outcome (z1, z2 = 1, 2, 3, …, 6):
ˆ
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If z1 = z2 let the investigator flip Coin 1.
If z1 < z2 let the investigator flip Coin 2.
If z1 > z2 let the investigator flip Coin 3.
Let X = 1, 2, 3, …, 6, respectively, label the following, where (Cj, q) denotes that Coin j is 
flipped with the indicated outcome:
(C1, -1), (C2, -1), (C3, -1), (C1, +1), (C3, +1), (C2, +1). (9.5.1)
Note that at (9.5.1) the order of C2 and C3 in the 2nd and 3rd terms are reversed in the 5th 
and 6th terms. X is a minimal sufficient statistic for q, and at (9.5.1) we have a one to one 
transform of X. Hence at (9.5.1) we have alternatively labelled the minimal sufficient 
statistic for q, where those alternative labels explicate the following:
Pr(X = 1) equals   6   x 1-q = 1-q, and Pr(X = 4) equals   6  x 1+q = 1+q. 
                              36      2      12                                       36       2       12
Pr(X = 2) equals   15  x  2-q = 2-q, and Pr(X = 4) equals  15  x 2+q = 2+q. 
                              36        5      12                                        36      5        12
Pr(X = 3) equals   15  x  3-q = 3-q, and Pr(X = 4) equals  5   x 3+q = 3+q. 
                              36        5      12                                       36       5       12
This exemplifies a fact worth recalling at this point. The range of any statistic is a set of 
labels for a mutually exclusive and exhaustive partitioning of a sample space. Any arbitrary 
one to one re-labelling of the range produces an equivalent statistic. It is often the case 
that the labels are chosen in some informative way, as done at (9.5.1). However, all the 
statistical information always derives from the probabilities of whatever labels we use and 
not from the labels themselves. For instance, in each of Tables 9.2.1, 9.4.1, and 9.5.1 the 
values of the maximum likelihood estimator derive from the probabilities, not from the 
values of X.
Basu’s view:
As a first possibility, suppose that the given data are X = 5 obtained from one roll of the bi-
ased cubic die. Then a model conditional on any of the ancillaries represents a metaphysi-
cal experiment that cannot be performed physically. The only performable experiment, 
which was then in fact performed, is given by the unconditional model. So the maximum 
likelihood estimator’s distribution in this case is
Pr(q = -1) = 1-q + 2-q + 3-q, i.e., 2-q, and 
                     12     12      12           4
Pr(q = +1) = 1+q + 2+q + 3+q, i.e., 2+q . 
                      12      12       12            4
Therefore we find:
For the given data, X = 5 obtained by ‘rolling’ the die, the maximum likelihood 
estimate is q = +1, whose mental correlate is traced within the distribution of the 
estimator to be at
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
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      2-q, 2+q, •  for 0 ≤ q ≤ 1. (9.5.2) 
        4      4
As a second possibility, suppose that the given data are X = 5 obtained from the bent 
coin experiment. Then the model conditional on the outcome of rolling the unbiased 
die represents the performable subsidiary experiment ‘flip Coin 3’, which was then in 
fact performed. So the maximum likelihood estimator’s distribution in this case is
Pr(q = -1) = 3-q and Pr(q = +1) = 2+q. 
                      5                                 5
Therefore we find that:
For the given data, X = 5 obtained by flipping Coin 3, the maximum likelihood 
estimate is q = +1, whose mental correlate is traced within the distribution of the 
estimator to be at 
  3-q, 2+q, • for 0 ≤ q ≤ 1. (9.5.3) 
   5      5
The traces at (9.5.2) and (9.5.3) differ; consider for instance testing q = 0. They differ 
because they arise from different data, as a statistical datum is not just a number; it is a 
number arising from a specific sampling scheme.
Barnard’s and Sprott’s view:
The first two rows of Table 9.5.1 show that the unconditional model is invariant under the 
transformation X      X+3 (modulo 6) and the induced transformation q      -q. In fact, the 
first three rows show as follows that [X, Pr(X = x), Y1] is invariant under the transforma-
tion, in that the transformation replaces the given information:
[1, 1-q, 0], [2, 2-q, 1], [3, 3-q, 2], [4, 1+q, 0], [5, 2+q, 1], [6, 3+q, 2], 
      12              12             12               12               12              12
with
[4, 1+q, 0], [5, 2+q, 1], [6, 3+q, 2], [1, 1-q, 0], [2, 2-q, 1], [3, 3-q, 2], 
      12               12              12               12              12              12
which is merely a rearrangement of the given information. We note in passing that the 
value X = 5 belongs to the conditional distribution of X given Y1 = 1, as follows:
Pr(X = 2 given Y1 = 1) = 
2-q and Pr(X = 5 given Y1 = 1) = 
2+q
. (9.5.4) 
                                          4                                                    4
With regard to the other ancillary statistics, we find that none of [X, Pr(X = x), Yj] for 
j = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 are invariant under the transformation in question. For instance, in the 
case of [X, Pr(X = x), Y2] the transformation replaces the given information, i.e. 
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[1, 1-q, 0], [2, 2-q, 1], [3, 3-q, 2], [4, 1+q, 0], [5, 2+q, 2], [6, 3+q, 1], 
      12              12             12               12               12               12
with
 
[4, 1+q, 0], [5, 2+q, 1], [6, 3+q, 2], [1, 1-q, 0], [2, 2-q, 2], [3, 3-q, 1], 
      12               12               12              12              12              12
where X = 5 then turns out to belong to the conditional distribution of X given Y2 = 1, 
as follows:
Pr(X = 3 given Y2 = 1) = 
3-q
 and Pr(X = 5 given Y2 = 1) = 
2+q
. (9.5.5) 
                                          5                                                    5
Barnard and Sprott proceed from the premise that one must condition on an ancillary 
statistic, and in the event of non-uniqueness, the ambiguity must be removed by way of 
some or other criterion that picks out ‘the correct’ ancillary for conditioning. If a model 
with several ancillary statistics is invariant under any particular transformation, they ar-
gue that ‘the correct’ ancillary for the conditioning will also be invariant under that trans-
formation. So, inasmuch as Y1 is the only one of the six ancillaries that, in the present 
example, satisfies this requirement, it must be the correct one. For the given datum, X = 5, 
the ‘correct conditional distribution’ is then picked out by conditioning on Y1 = 1, and thus 
turns out to be the one given at (9.5.4). Hence Barnard and Sprott would have us find:
For the given data, X = 5, the maximum likelihood estimate is found to be q = +1, 
whose mental correlate is then traced within the distribution of the estimator 
given Y1 = 1, to be situated at
  2-q, 2+q, • for -1 ≤ q ≤ 1. (9.5.6) 
   4      4
Reasoning similar to that which leads to Figure 9.4.1, shows that this trace is the more 
informative of the two traces at (9.5.2) and (9.5.3) respectively.
But look at what this leads to! Suppose the given data, X = 5, was from the bent-coin 
experiment. Then the given data would have to have been ‘X = 5 obtained by flipping 
Coin 3’, whereas the statistical co-ordinates given at (9.5.6) are for ‘X = 5 obtained from 
flipping Coin 1’. So, in order to defend the co-ordinates at (9.5.6) for the bent-coin ex-
periment, we would have to reason that:
X = 5 was obtained by flipping Coin 3 must be ignored,
so that X = 5 can be viewed unconditionally as in Table 9.5.1,
so that we can condition on Y1 = 1,
so that we can reason as if X = 5 were obtained by flipping a more informative coin.
And that is circular reasoning.
For the same reasons given at (9.4.9), it cannot be argued that the reasoning does not apply 
in the case of performable subsidiaries, such as those in the bent-coin setup, but only to 
non-performable subsidiaries, such as those in the biased tetrahedral-die setup.
ˆ
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9.6 Conditioning rules that are bound to fail
The failed proposals in Sections 9.2, 9.4 and 9.5 founder on a common source. Each of 
them has failed to understand that answers to the investigative question, ‘How might 
these particular data have come about?’ can be ruled out by scientific evidence only. Each 
proposal assumes that in case of ancillaries, we must, as a mathematical principle for sta-
tistical inference, condition on an ancillary, thus forgetting that conditioning rules out 
certain possibilities, when as a scientific principle, such possibilities can be ruled out by 
virtue of scientific facts only. Cox’s development shows us how to plan a more informative 
rather than a less informative experiment, but it cannot retrospectively decide upon the 
best choice ‘because that would have been the best choice’, without as much as a shred of 
evidence to show that such a choice had in fact been exercised, the bent-coin examples 
being cited to show how there could have been such evidence. Similar objections apply to 
the development of Barnard and Sprott. Like Cox they too put the cart before the horse. 
This must be firmly grasped, as any attempt at explaining ‘how these given data might 
have come about’ is bound to be circular if it tries to restrict its answers to ‘how one would 
have liked the data to have come about’. Basu’s bent-coin examples show us how it might 
in fact not be ‘as we would have liked it to be’. In other words: Cox (1971) reasons in effect: 
‘Let us assume without any evidence that the data came about in a subsidiary way, so as 
then to be able to reason that the data came about in this subsidiary way, rather than in 
that subsidiary way, as this rather than that would have been the more informative way for 
it to have come about.’ Similarly, Barnard and Sprott (1970) reason in effect: ‘Let us assume 
without any evidence, that the data came about in a subsidiary way, so as then to be able to 
reason that the data came about in this subsidiary way, rather that that subsidiary way, as 
this rather than that is mathematically more like the non-subsidiary way in which it came 
about.’ The point here is this: the ‘best way’ for data to have come about, cannot determine 
how the data in fact did come about, regardless of whether ‘best’ then refers, as Cox would 
have it, to an operating characteristic, or refers, as Barnard and Sprott would have it, to an 
invariance property, or refers to … . The issue is this: for analysis of given data the statisti-
cal analyst must draw the frame of reference as tightly as possible by ruling out whatever 
can be ruled out on substantive grounds, and on substantive grounds only. So, if a frame of 
reference would then be found to formally involve ancillary statistics that do not convey 
any substantively meaningful subsidiary models, they must be ignored if the analyst is not 
to risk falling victim to statistical fictions that arise from circular reasoning.
9.7 Subsidiary models that are not performable yet are not 
 substantively vacuous
Basu (1964, p .13) adjoins a footnote to the example here given in Table 9.5.1, saying:
‘Of course the experiment of rolling the die repeatedly until, say, either 2 or 5 ap-
pears (and then observing only the final score) is essentially equivalent to once 
tossing a biased coin with probabilities (2-q)/4 and (2+q)/4. But who is interested 
in such a wasteful experiment? The author would classify such experiments under 
the conceptual (non-performable) category.’ (9.7.1)
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This seems to be overly restrictive. What if some simpleton has actually carried out such 
an experiment? For instance, this writer once advised that, in order to compare three ra-
tions for dairy cows, cows coming into milk should successively be grouped in blocks of 
three cows each, and the rations randomly assigned to cows in each block separately; a 
field plan did not seem to be required. In the event, the outcome was a completely ran-
domised design, with each experimental unit comprising three cows. So if, after all, given 
data can be fruitfully analysed, the statistician must do so. A more serious interpretation 
of the statement at (9.7.1) is that together with the ordinary-language interpretation of 
the term ‘performable’ it implies that we may condition on an ancillary only if we can in 
one fell swoop fix its value at the value observed, and did so. Consider, however, the analy-
sis of Example 1.31.4, where we employed
a subsidiary model of a contrast Y1, obtained by conditioning on the total of three 
of the 2×2 counts in the body of the contingency table, the first of the two counts 
on the main diagonal being omitted,
a subsidiary model of a contrast Y2, obtained by conditioning on the total of two 
of the 2×2 counts in the body of the contingency table, both of the counts on the 
main diagonal being omitted, and
a subsidiary model of a contrast Y3, obtained by conditioning on the total of three 
of the 2×2 counts in the body of the contingency table, the second of the two counts 
on the main diagonal being omitted.
None of these three models corresponds to an experiment that is performable in one fell 
swoop because, given the manner in which data comprising such a contingency table 
are obtained, one could not, in respect of any one of the three models, have fixed the 
value of the ancillary involved at the value observed. In fact, the only count that could 
have been fixed at its observed value is the grand total count of n = 1 301 as in Table 
1.31.1. So we either have to reject the analyses advocated in Example 1.31.4 as invalid, or 
we have to reject the notion that ‘performable in one fell swoop’ is a necessary require-
ment for conditioning on an ancillary, where we are then forced by the present example 
to rule out the one-fell-swoop notion, because the three analyses advocated in Example 
1.31.4 are utterly unexceptionable, as follows:
The conditioning for Y1 picks out the non-deficient and singly deficient plants as 
the relevant data for testing the (non-deficient):(singly-deficient) ratio.
The conditioning for Y2 picks out one and the other of the two kinds of singly 
deficient plants as the relevant data for testing the (striped):(gold) ratio.
The conditioning for Y3 picks out the singly deficient and doubly deficient plants 
as the relevant data for testing the (singly-deficient):(doubly-deficient) ratio.
In each case we are distinguishing the data that are relevant for testing a substantively 
meaningful model, from data that are irrelevant for that test. So, though the distinction 
Basu draws between performable and non-performable experiments distinguishes be-
tween substantively meaningful and substantively meaningless models in the case of his 
particular examples, it is the latter distinction that resolves the problem of whether or not 
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to condition on an ancillary statistic. Note that this also shows that the notion of the con-
ditional model having to correspond to an experiment now also falls away, as a substan-
tively meaningful model need not be that of an experiment. (See Example 9.7.1 below.)
Example 9.7.1
A Mendelian polymorphism in humans involves the distinguishable blood types MM, 
MN and NN. Genetic polymorphisms are usually caused by heterozygous advantage, 
which might be of many different kinds. An investigator might for instance wish to test 
whether the rate of prenatal survival is higher for MN individuals than for NN individu-
als, and so might determine the blood types of n = 317 new-born infants from MN×NN 
parents, modelling the data as in Table 9.7.1. 
Table 9.7.1: A class of models for the blood type of offspring of MN×NN parents, interest being 
in whether the value of q1 is non-zero; q2 is a nuisance parameter
X (blood type) X = MM X = MN X = NN
Number of infants 6 169 142
Probability q2
            1-q1  (1-q2) 
               1
            1+q1  (1-q2) 
               1
Ancillary Y 0 1 1
                                                                                  -1 < q1 < +1                             0 < q2 < 1
We note in passing that the values q1 = -1, +1 and q2 = 0, 1 are ruled out by the given data, 
which will serve to remind us that in data analysis, as opposed to forecasting, the model 
is data dependent. Now in order to test
M0: q1 = 0 versus M1: q1 ≠ 0,
the investigator will condition on the ancillary, so as to eliminate q2, rather than give 
credence to the idea that it might have been Mendel’s principles that had gone astray. 
The resulting analysis would then be based on the subsidiary model 
Pr(X = MN |Y = 1) = 
1-q1 and Pr(X = NN |Y = 1) = 
1+q1 (-1 < q1 < +1). 
                                     2                                                2
The estimated value of q1, 1-2[169/(169 +142)], is negative, pointing at heterozygous 
advantage, and a co-ordination test would measure the strength of that evidence. Such 
an analysis would be unexceptionable, yet not based on a model that can be described as 
that of a performable experiment, the numerical data set having been obtained by ‘sur-
vey’ rather than ‘experiment’. However, the crux of the matter is that one cannot in one 
fell swoop ensure that the subsidiary data is fixed at 169+142 relevant observations. But 
there can be no question that the proposed co-ordination test relies on a substantively 
meaningful subsidiary model.
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9.8 Every-day examples of conditioning on ancillary statistics
In Section 9.3 we saw that owing to the use of randomised experimental design, every-
day statistical practice often involves ancillary statistics, indicating that such practice 
has developed an understanding of the general principles for validly dealing with such 
statistics. So before trying to formulate such principles, let us consider and discuss the 
following two paradigmatic examples of that understanding.
Example 9.8.1
Consider a horticulture trial in which a treatment T, aimed at improvement of yield in citrus, 
is to be compared to a control, C. If each treatment is replicated three times in a completely 
randomised design, one of 20 equally frequent field plans will be obtained (Table 9.8.1).
Table 9.8.1: The 20 possible field plans for three replications of two treatments in a completely 
randomised design
Plan 1: T T T C C C Plan 8:   T C C T T C Plan 14: C T C T T C
Plan 2: T T C T C C Plan 9:   T C C T C T Plan 15: C T C T C T
Plan 3: T T C C T C Plan 10: T C C C T T Plan 16: C T C C T T
Plan 4: T T C C C T Plan 11: C T T T C C Plan 17: C C T T T C
Plan 5: T C T T C C Plan 12: C T T C T C Plan 18: C C T T C T
Plan 6: T C T C T C Plan 13: C T T C C T Plan 19: C C T C T T
Plan 7: T C T C C T Plan 20: C C C T T T
Let the data be 2, 1, 7, 5, 8, 9, arising from Plan 10. Consider the model
M0: Treatment, as compared to control, does not improve yield.
In order to test the tenability of this hypothesised model, consider a partial ordering of 
all the possible samples under this model, according to the value of the test statistic
X = the total yield from the treated plots – the total yield from the control plots.
Under M0 the value of X equals
-12 with Plan 1, -16 with Plan 2, -10 with Plan 3, …, -3 with Plan 20.
The test datum arising from Plan 10 is X = +6, whose mental correlate co-ordinates
at (13/20, 1/20, 6/20) in the test distribution. (9.8.1)
Suppose, however, that the investigator has subsequently discovered that, in the case of 
the first two plots, the soil cover is very shallow on underlying bedrock. The given yields 
for Plan 10 might be adjusted for this as follows, for an appropriate value of θ:
2+θ, 1+θ, 7, 5, 8, 9.
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Considered as a source of extraneous variation, the bedrock effect could be eliminated 
by conditioning on an ancillary statistic, as follows: let Y = 0 for Plans 1, 2, 3, 4, and Plans 
17, 18, 19, 20. Let Y = 1 otherwise. Let the treatment effect be modelled as an additive 
effect τ, so that the expected yields are given by:
µ+θ+τ,   µ+θ+τ,   µ+τ,   µ,         µ,       µ,   in the case of Plan 1,
µ+θ+τ,   µ+θ+τ,   µ,         µ+τ,   µ,       µ,   in the case of Plan 2,
µ+θ+τ,   µ+θ+τ,   µ,         µ,       µ+τ,   µ,   in the case of Plan 3, … .
Y is ancillary because, for any values of θ and τ, the distribution of Y is given by
P(Y = 0) = 8/20 and P(Y = 1) = 12/20.
Y = 1 for the given data set, and conditionally on Y = 1 there are 12 equally frequent field 
plans, numbered 5, 6, 7, …, 14, 15, 16. The test datum is X = +6 as before, but its mental 
correlate now co-ordinates
at (11/12, 1/12, Ø*) in the conditional test distribution. (9.8.2)
Which of the two tests (at (9.8.1) and (9.8.2)) is the correct one? The problem is one of 
investigative statistics, not one of decision-making under risk and so the test at (9.8.2) is 
the correct one because the investigative question (as we saw in Definition 1.2.1) is:
How might these particular data have come about?, (9.8.3)
where the discovery that the first two plots were on shallow ground, is an informative 
constituent of those particular data. Stated otherwise, the investigator simply cannot in 
any appropriate manner at all be answering the question at (9.8.3) by pretending not to 
know about those two plots.
We note in passing that the present paradigm concerns problems that are usually dealt 
with by analysis of covariance. However, the principles of reasoning that here concern 
us are more clearly exposed in terms of randomisation theory.
Example 9.8.2
Consider an enlarged version of the previous example by supposing that the original layout 
called for five replications of each treatment in a completely randomised design, thus gen-
erating 252 field plans. As before we suppose that two treated plots, T and C, respectively, 
are subsequently found to involve very shallow soil owing to underlying bedrock. Addi-
tionally, let us suppose that there was some concern that the treatment might discourage 
visitation by bees, which would have an adverse effect on apiary as a secondary source of 
income for the citrus farmers. So, one each of ten available bee traps were allocated to the 
ten experimental plots, respectively. The ten traps comprised five of each of two kinds, A 
and B. We suppose that it was known from the outset that A traps are more effective than 
B traps. So the placing of the traps was not randomised. Consider the following field plan, 
in which the underlining indicates the shallow soil:
(T, A)     (C, A)     (T, B)     (C, B)     (C, B)
(C, A)     (T, A)     (T, A)     (C, B)     (T, B)
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For analysis of the fruit yields, an investigator should recognise that fruit yield might be 
affected by soil differences, but not by the different kinds of traps. So the fruit yield data 
should be conceived of as originating from two blocks: one of size two units on shallow 
soil, and the other of size eight units on deep soil. This picks out 2×70 = 140 of the original 
252 equally frequent field plans as sampling frame of reference. The analysis would be 
as in the previous example. For the analysis of the bee counts, the investigator should 
recognise that bee counts might be affected by yield, and so indirectly also by soil differ-
ences and the different kinds of traps. The bee counts should therefore be conceived of as 
originating from three blocks; one block of size two units on shallow soil with A-like traps, 
a second block of size three units on deep soil with A-like traps, and a third block on deep 
soil with B-like traps. This conception picks out 2×3×10 = 60 of the original 252 equally fre-
quent field plans as appropriate frame of reference. Table 9.8.2 shows how those 60 plans 
are generated by the Cartesian product of the possible patterns within the three blocks. 
Table 9.8.2: Cartesian product for generating 2×3×10 field plans
     TTCCC
     TCTCC
     TCCTC
     TCCCT
 TC
  TTC  CTTCC
 CT
 × TCT × CTCTC
   CTT  CTCCT
     CCTTC
     CCTCT
     CCCTT
Let the realised field plan and bee counts be as follows:
Block 1: (T, 3) (C, 4).
Block 2: (C, 6) (T, 8) (T, 7).
Block 3: (T, 7) (C, 9) (C, 8) (C, 7) (T, 9).
We consider as hypothesised model:
M0: bee counts are not affected by treatment differences.
The effect, if any, of treatment on bee count is estimated within each block as the mean 
count per plot for treatment minus the mean count per plot for control. Under M0, the 
variances of these estimates are proportional to 2, 2/3 and 5/6 for Blocks 1, 2 and 3, re-
spectively. Using an obvious notation for treatment totals per block, the usual weighted 
combination of the three estimates turns out to be proportional to
[(15T1+10T2+18T3)-(15C1+20C2+12C3)]÷5.
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For the given data set we find for instance that, under the hypothesised model, the cor-
responding test statistic, say Z, takes the value
Z = [(15(3)+10(15)+18(16))-(15(4)+20(6)+12(24))]÷5, which equals 3.
The distribution of the central test statistic is given in Table 9.8.3, where we find that the 
mental correlate of the datum value, Z = 3, is situated at (36/60, 9/60, 15/60) in the central 
test distribution, giving no indication of adverse effects on visitation by bees.
Table 9.8.3: Distribution of a test statistic arising from 60 equally frequent cases 
Value -21 -19 -15 -13 -9 -7 -5 -3 -1 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 19 21
No. of 
cases
1 1 3 3 7 6 0 9 6 0 9 3 0 7 1 0 3 0 1
This example involved conditioning on two different ancillary statistics, Y1 and Y2, as follows:
Y1 = 0 for those 2×70 amongst 252 equally frequent plans, that have T and C once each 
in conjunction with shallow soil; Y1 = 1 otherwise.
Y2 = 0 for those 2×3×10 amongst 2×70 equally frequent plans, that have T twice and 
C thrice in conjunction with B-like traps; Y2 = 1 otherwise.
The analysis of yields is conditional on Y1 = 0. The analysis of counts is conditional on 
(Y1, Y2) = (0, 0).
Again, as in the previous example, we have considered analyses using randomisation 
theory only, because by doing so the reasoning in respect of the ancillary statistics is 
brought forward untrammelled by other considerations. Whether or not the analyses 
considered are best in any other sense need not concern us here.
Discussion of Examples 9.8.1 and 9.8.2
These examples show that the randomisation theory of even so mundane a design as a 
completely randomised one for say 16 replicates of each of eight different treatments, will 
involve a mind-boggling variety of ancillary partitions, even if limited to those arising from 
subsidiary designs recognised by Cochran and Cox (1957) or by Hinkelmann and Kemp-
thorne (2007). Yet numerous statisticians analyse such data, day in and day out, using 
analysis of variance without being aware of having ignored ancillary partitions involved, 
or using analysis of co-variance without being aware of having conditioned on certain an-
cillary partitions involved. How then (and this question is a crucial one) do they manage 
to achieve correct results without awareness of the ancillary statistics involved? There can 
be only one answer: they choose their model on the ground that it that makes substan-
tive sense, for which no insight into the mathematics of ancillary statistics is needed. 
Looking back at our examples involving ancillary statistics, it will be found that in each 
example an unexceptionable analysis could be justified on the grounds that it relied on a 
model that makes substantive sense. In each example it was also possible to choose from 
different ancillary partitions, but in each example we found that such a choice could not 
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be justified on purely mathematical grounds. On the contrary, for each of several purely 
mathematical principles considered, that principle could by the use of counter-examples, 
be shown to fail. Owing to that, we found that such principles in general either fall into 
circular reasoning, or must resort to arcane metaphysics.
9.9 Conclusion
Our examples provide justification for three different investigative possibilities, as follows:
Sometimes substantive science must ignore the possibility of conditioning on an 
ancillary statistic because that would try to introduce a substantively meaning-
less subsidiary class of models of how given data came about.
Sometimes substantive science must condition on an ancillary statistic because 
that would introduce a substantively meaningful subsidiary class of models of 
how given data came about.
Sometimes substantive science must condition on one ancillary statistic in order 
to model one particular aspect of a given data set, and condition on another an-
cillary statistic in order to model another aspect of the same data set.
In all three cases particular data are involved because we are pointing, not forecasting, 
and whether or not we condition, depends on substantive science, not on mathematical 
statistics. All this is straightforward enough to make an outsider wonder what the fuss 
was all about. The answer is revealing: substantive science develops models of physical 
experience, where such models often involve subsidiary models. So, a statistical model 
required by substantive science will often involve subsidiary models, where such a sub-
sidiary model will comprise a subsidiary part of the sample space. However, any sta-
tistical model comprises a sample space whose probabilities sum to a constant; so any 
subsidiary model will comprise a subsidiary sample space whose probabilities sum to a 
constant; and so the result is discernable to mathematical statistics as a formality called 
‘an ancillary statistic’. The fuss arises simply because mathematical statistics has failed 
to notice that the converse does not follow, that is to say, it has failed to notice that the 
formality might be without substance. In fact, it has failed to notice that a randomised 
design often involves thousands of such formalities without any substance whatsoever.
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Chapter 10
LIKELIHOOD INFERENCE
a seMinal source of MetaPhysical views
10.1 Introduction
Likelihood inference concerns the problem of forming opinions about the tenability of 
alternative values of the index of some or other class of models thought appropriate for 
the representation of given data. It shares much by way of fundamental ideas with Baye-
sian inference. In fact almost all, if not all, of the present chapter also applies to Bayesian 
inference, the main distinction between the two forms of inference being that likelihood 
inferences do not partake of a knowing subject. That being the case, it is questionable 
whether likelihood inference is at all appropriately named, because an inference is surely 
something that has been inferred by a knowing subject. We will develop reasons for rather 
referring to likelihood inference as odds-ratio testing.
Edwards (1972) and Kalbfleisch (1979) have provided introductory accounts of likelihood 
inference, and we will draw on those accounts. It will be sufficient for the present purposes 
to consider examples in which the index is a scalar. Recall also that all the fundamental 
principles of statistical data analysis are capable of exhaustive development in terms of 
discrete sample spaces only, as real data cannot be recorded in any other way than on a 
discrete and essentially finite grid of class marks.
10.2 The basic ideas
Edwards’s usage of statistical terms is revealingly idiosyncratic; so much so that it is 
rewarding to introduce the basic ideas of likelihood inference in his terms. Thus, for 
instance, if a data set Sx is modelled as a sample SX from some or other member of a class 
of models indexed by a scalar θ, where θ ∈ {θ1, θ2, θ3, …}, his definition of the likelihood 
function (1972, p. 9), when expressed in this notation, is:
‘The likelihood of the hypothesis θj given data Sx, and a specific model, is propor-
tional to Pr(Sx | θj), the constant of proportionality being arbitrary.’ (10.2.1)
When the constant of proportionality is chosen to be 1 (unity) the likelihood is said to 
be in kernel form. At (10.2.1) Edwards’s usage of the word ‘hypothesis’ and of the phrase 
‘given … a specific model’ implies that likelihood inference is restricted to elimination 
testing. In fact this appears in so many words (on pp. 3-4) when he states:
‘A sufficient framework for the drawing of inductive inferences is provided by the 
concepts of a statistical model and a statistical hypothesis. … By model we mean that 
part of the description which is not at present in question, and may be regarded 
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as given, and by statistical hypothesis we mean the attribution of particular values 
to the unknown parameters of the model … these parameters … being in question, 
and the subject of the investigation’ (original italics). (10.2.2)
He calls the members of a class of models ‘a model’. However, he recognises (correctly) 
that the class characteristic may be ‘a matter for dispute’ when he says (wrongly):
‘There is no absolute distinction between the two parts of the model, for what is 
on one occasion regarded as given, and hence part of the model, may, on another 
occasion, be a matter for dispute, and hence part of a hypothesis …’ (10.2.3)
and when he continues (even more wrongly):
‘Every statistical inference is conditional on some model, and the universality 
with which it is accepted depends upon the general acceptability of the model.’  
 (10.2.4)
So how would he then test the model ‘random numbers’ in respect of a given data set? 
Note that whenever he uses the term ‘hypothesis’, he refers to the possible values of a 
parameter, and so he begins to go wrong when, as at (10.2.3), he says: ‘and hence part 
of a hypothesis’. The point here is that he assumes (wrongly) that any statistical test 
concerns the value of some or other parameter. In other words, he is unaware that a 
commencement test need not involve a parameter. This failing is not peculiar to him; it 
is a universal failing of all the received theories of statistical inference, and so causes all 
of them to fall into circular reasoning or incoherence of the kind we met in Sections 4.8 
and 4.20. However, before going into that in the present instance, let us at first follow 
his explanations, so as to grasp what is meant by ‘likelihood inference’. To clarify his next 
definition (1972, p.10) we insert two parenthetic phrases, as follows:
‘The likelihood ratio of two hypotheses on some data (i.e. on the same data) is the 
ratio of their likelihoods (in kernel form) on that data.’ (10.2.5)
Let ‘the likelihood of the hypothesis θj’ as defined at (10.2.1), be denoted by L(θj). If two 
different hypotheses are denoted by θ1 and θ2, respectively, let their likelihood ratio on 
the same data, as defined at (10.2.5), be denoted by L(θ1/θ2), the denominator being the 
likelihood of θ2.
Example 10.2.1
Let a data set comprising successes and failures bring into mind a sample comprising 
the number, n, of independent Bernoulli trials needed to obtain a given number, m, of 
failures, the probability of success, θ, being constant from trial to trial (0 < θ < 1). The 
probability of a sample involving just x successes then factors as follows, where the first 
factor in square brackets shows that the class members are negative binomial distribu-
tions and the second factor in square brackets conveys the class characteristic:
     
n-1
      θx (1-θ)n-x   x      
n-1
   
-1 
 . (10.2.6) 
   n-x-1                                n-x-1
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According to the definition at (10.2.1) ‘the likelihood of θ’, given the data, is then any 
function of θ that is in constant proportion to this probability, and is thus given by:
q
x
 (1-q)n-x x C, where C is any arbitrary non-zero constant. (10.2.7)
By choosing C = 1, the likelihood is expressed in kernel form, i.e. in the form
L(q) = q
x
 (1-q)n-x. (10.2.8)
We note (and this is crucial) that the phrase any arbitrary at (10.2.7) emphasises that 
by definition the likelihood does not intentionally convey any information on the class 
characteristic. So one may as well restrict any mention of a likelihood function to its 
kernel form, and we will tacitly do so. From the expression at (10.2.8) we find that, if 
θ1 and θ2 denote two different hypotheses on the same data, their likelihood ratio, as 
defined at (10.2.5), is given by:
L(θ1/θ2) = θ
x
 (1-q1)
n-x ÷ qx (1-q2)
n-x. 
                     
1                    2                 
For instance, if n = 2, x = 2, θ1 = 0.50 and θ2 = 0.25, we find that L(θ1/θ2) is given by:
(0.50)2(1-0.50)0÷(0.25)2(1-0.25)0 = 4. (10.2.9)
In the language of likelihood inference this says that on the given data, ‘θ = 0.50 is four 
times “more likely” than θ = 0.25’. We refer to such a comparison of two different index 
values as an odds ratio test.
On p. 30, Edwards formulates the Law of Likelihood (below referred to as the law), as 
follows, using his italics:
‘Within the framework of a statistical model, a particular set of data supports one 
statistical hypothesis better than another if the likelihood of the first hypothesis, 
on the data, exceeds the likelihood of the second hypothesis.’ (10.2.10)
He then immediately adjoins the Likelihood Principle (below referred to as the principle) 
as follows, using his italics:
‘Within the framework of a statistical model, all the information which the data 
provide concerning the relative merits of two hypotheses is contained in the likeli-
hood ratio of those hypotheses on the data.’ (10.2.11)
In passing we again note failure to recognise any need whatsoever for commencement 
testing. And we note this yet again when he remarks that:
according to the principle ‘there cannot be … facets of the data which are informative, 
but which the likelihood does not cover’. (Our italics.) (10.2.12)
Likelihood inference would have us reason that for greater support of θ1 over θ2, it is suf-
ficient, according to The Law, and necessary, according to The Principle, that
L(θ1/θ2) > 1.
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So Edwards joins the Law and the Principle together into a single statement he calls the 
Likelihood Axiom, as follows, using his italics:
‘Within the framework of a statistical model, all the information which the data pro-
vide concerning the relative merits of two hypotheses is contained in the likelihood 
ratio of those hypotheses on the data, and the likelihood ratio is to be interpreted as 
the degree to which the data support the one hypothesis against the other.’ (Original 
italics.) (10.2.13)
Here again, the reader should carefully note that when he says ‘a statistical model’, he 
refers to the alternative members of a class of models, and not to the class as a whole.
Example 10.2.2
Let a data set comprising successes and failures bring into mind a sample comprising 
a fixed number, just n, of independent Bernoulli trials, the probability of success, θ, 
being constant from trial to trial (0 < θ < 1). The probability of a sample comprising 
x successes and n − x failures then factors as follows, where the first factor in square 
brackets shows that the class members are binomial distributions and the second factor 
in square brackets conveys the class characteristic:
   
n
  θx (1-θ)n-x  x    
n
  
-1 
 . (10.2.14) 
   x                             x
In kernel form, the likelihood of θ given the data, is:
L(q) = θ
x
 (1-θ)n-x. (10.2.15)
This likelihood is identical to the one at (10.2.8). Thus, should it just happen that the 
number of trials, n, and the number of successes, x, for different data sets corresponding 
to Examples 10.2.1 and 10.2.2, respectively, turn out to be identical, likelihood inference 
would have us draw numerically identical conclusions – despite the two different data 
sets having originated from two quite different sampling rules.
The rule in Example 10.2.1 is ‘Sample till just m failures (a specified number of fail-
ures) have occurred, then stop’. (10.2.16)
The rule in Example 10.2.2 is ‘Sample just n times (a specified number of times), then 
stop’. (10.2.17)
All else being equal, ought we then to agree to numerically identical conclusions? This 
question has divided the statistical profession into two irreconcilably different schools 
of thought.
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10.3 Remarks on terminology
The terms ‘class of models’ and ‘class characteristic’ have no equivalent counterparts in 
Edward’s usage, none at all. Although he recognises the concept of a statistic that is suffi-
cient for the index of a class of models, he does not recognise the complementary concept 
of a statistic that is sufficient for the class characteristic. In fact, on p. 24 he defines the 
concept ‘sufficient statistic’ as simply ‘any contraction of the data which leaves the likeli-
hood unchanged except for a constant’. This views the concept as one whose ‘repeated 
sampling properties’ cannot contribute to what we might learn from any given data set 
– holding that such properties contribute to ‘decision procedures’ only (p. 38). Thus likeli-
hood inference cannot account for commencement testing. In a subsequent chapter we 
find that Bayesian inference has the same shortcoming. Henceforth we will dispense with 
Edwards’s idiosyncratic terminology, reverting to the terminology of other chapters.
10.4 Tests of meaning
‘Simulation’ in the broad sense of ‘showing the human body how’, is very much the bed-
rock of science. Geologists, for instance, if challenged to clarify their explanation (model) 
of say how Table Mountain came about, appeal to laboratory simulation of the mechani-
cal, thermal, chemical and other subsidiary constituents (sub-models) of that explana-
tion. Note also that simulation, thus employed, serves to clarify scientific meaning. It then 
appears that simulation can also serve as a test for, and of, scientific meaning. Indeed, as 
shown in Sections 1.34 and 1.36, such tests are especially forceful in the statistical case, 
as they can be put into the form of operational instructions that might turn out either to 
be meaningful, or to be meaningless, depending on whether or not they are capable of 
being carried out. Such tests are of crucial importance when employed as guarantors of 
scientific meaning, and in the statistical case simulation is particularly simple –certainly 
much more so than in for instance geology. We must therefore refuse to entertain any 
explanatory statistical model of how these given data might have come about if it cannot 
be simulated.
10.5 ‘Likelihood’: What does it mean?
Statistical use of the term ‘likelihood’ originally referred to a well-defined constituent of 
the discourse of physical (bodily) experience. However, its meaning is not directly experi-
ential, as its meaning cannot be put directly to the human body by pointing, and saying: 
See for your self that likelihood there. So, it does not as such have a physical meaning, 
and so cannot as such have evidential meaning. Likelihood inference has therefore been 
criticised as an attempt, by persuasive psychology of the word ‘likely’, to invest its peculiar 
usage with some or other metaphysical meaning. Edwards (1972, p. 33) refutes such criti-
cism, by choosing an interpretation in terms of frequencies, as follows (our italics):
‘There is … a perfectly simple “operational interpretation” of a likelihood ratio 
for two hypotheses on some data. It is, of course, the ratio of the frequencies with 
which, in the long run, the two hypotheses will deliver the observed data.’ (10.5.1)
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This choice of interpretation has three far-reaching consequences:
Firstly, it must be granted that it does indeed choose to convey physical meaning, 
as the human body can, by simulation, be forced to grasp that meaning. And so it 
is possible for scientific reasoning to deal with the consequences of that choice, as 
will be done in the rest of this chapter. (10.5.2)
Secondly, by choosing to convey physical meanings, likelihood inference is set apart 
from Bayesian inference, which chooses to convey metaphysical meanings, where 
metaphysical meanings are difficult to deal with by scientific reasoning. But that is a 
matter to be dealt with in a later chapter. (10.5.3)
Thirdly, it provides for the physical meaning of any given likelihood value relative 
only to any other value of the same likelihood. So it does not, and indeed cannot, 
provide for any likelihood to have an absolute bodily meaning. (10.5.4)
The point made at (10.5.4) is crucial, as it defines both the scope and limits of odds-ratio 
testing. This is nicely exemplified by the following adaptation of an example of Kalb-
fleisch (1979, p.43).
Example 10.5.1
Consider a population comprising a single replicate of each of k denominations and m 
replicates (m >1) of a further denomination, θ, which is an unknown one of the k + 1 
denominations. Let X = x denote the denomination of a random one of the k + m items 
comprising the population. We wish to use the datum x to develop an opinion about the 
identity of θ.
First we employ a co-ordination test:
As m > 1, the hypothesised model M0: θ = θ0 (θ0 = x) is the most likely model, and a 
likelihood ratio co-ordination test against a given alternative, M1: θ = θ1 (θ1 ≠ x), then 
compares the statistical co-ordinates of the situations of the mental correlate of X = x 
under the two alternatives. Let us choose the direction of ordering as: 
O1 = {X = x}, O2 = {X ≠ x}, thus pointing to the left.
Then the required co-ordinates are given by:
[*Ø, m/(k+m), k/(k+m)] for M0, versus
[*Ø, 1/(k+m), (k+m-1)/(k+m)] for M1.
These are exemplified by:
[*Ø, 0.90, 0.10] versus [*Ø, 0.10, 0.90] if m = 9 and k = 1, 
[*Ø, 0.45, 0.55] versus [*Ø, 0.05, 0.95] if m = 9 and k = 11, and
[*Ø, 0.09, 0.91] versus [*Ø, 0.01, 0.99] if m = 9 and k = 91. (10.5.5)
Here the hypothesised model invariably provides a relatively better quality of fit than 
the alternative. However, the absolute quality of fit of the hypothesised model, being
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excellent for k = 1, satisfactory for k = 11, and awkward for k = 91,
becomes extremely poor for yet larger values of k. All this makes perfectly good sense, 
as follows: the relatively better quality of fit obtained with the hypothesised denomina-
tion is an obvious consequence of hypothesising more than just one single replicate 
for that denomination, as apposed to hypothesising just one single replicate for the 
alternative denomination. The decline in the absolute quality of fit of any particular one 
amongst the increasingly many denominations is then also an obvious consequence of 
the ‘swamping effect’ of such an increase (of course this holds for any fixed sample size, 
which is just n = 1 in this example).
Next we employ an odds-ratio test:
The probability of the sample is given by:
1/(m+k) if x ≠ θ, and m/(m+k) if x = θ.
So, the likelihood ratio is given by:
L(θ ≠ x/θ = x) = 1/m, whatever the value of k.
Thus, corresponding to the three cases at (10.5.5), odds-ratio testing tells us that:
if k = 1 then θ = θ0 (θ0 = x) is ‘9 times more likely’ than θ = θ1 (θ1 ≠ x),
if k = 11 then θ = θ0 (θ0 = x) is ‘9 times more likely’ than θ = θ1 (θ1 ≠ x), and
if k = 91 then θ = θ0 (θ0 = x) is ‘9 times more likely’ than θ = θ1 (θ1 ≠ x). (10.5.6)
Here again the hypothesised model is invariably shown to provide a relatively better 
quality of fit than the alternative model. But these tests give no indication of how the 
absolute quality of fit of either of the two models deteriorates with increasing k.
10.6 Physical (bodily) norms of discrepancy
We must take the position that strictly speaking the explanation at (10.5.1) does not 
convey a physical meaning for likelihood, or even convey a physical meaning for likeli-
hood ratio; it conveys the physical meaning of the corresponding frequency ratio. In 
order to grasp this we must note that when we conduct odds-ratio tests we must be 
able to exemplify meanings such as ‘extreme ratio’ and ‘very extreme ratio’. Thus if 
(0.95, ε, 0.05*) and (0.99, ε, 0.01*) exemplify extreme and very extreme co-ordinates, 
then by virtue of the selfsame physical norms, 1-in-20 and 1-in-100 exemplify extreme 
and very extreme ratios, respectively. In the case of statistical co-ordinates, a familiar 
rough-and-ready version of these norms is:
‘a discrepancy of two standard error units on the test statistic scale.’ (10.6.1)
Edwards (p.35) tries to justify for odds-ratio testing a similar rough-and-ready version 
of these norms as being:
‘a discrepancy of two units on the ln-likelihood-ratio scale’. (10.6.2)
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However, a discrepancy of two units at (10.6.2) is physically equivalent to a discrepancy 
of only 1.1 units at (10.6.1), which discrepancy in turn is equivalent to (0.86, ε, 0.14*) 
on the co-ordinate scale. Edwards refers to the norm at (10.6.1) as conventional, which 
is beside the point here. What is at issue here is not the conventionality of the norm, 
but the physicality of the norm. It is for instance not possible to persuade the human 
body that if a stick of length 5 cm is short compared to one of length 95 cm, then a 
chain of length 14 cm is equally short compared to one of length 86 cm. The point here 
is that norms of physical magnitude have meanings that stand apart from the physical 
constituency of any objects of such magnitude. For instance, the smallness of a one-
twentieth part of a glass of water, is also the smallness of a one-twentieth part of a loaf of 
bread, and is also the smallness of a one-twentieth part of a population of samples. This 
must be firmly grasped because it enables us to set comparable physical norms for the 
import of certain quite different statistical measures of tenability. For instance, a 1-in-20 
likelihood ratio measures the ratio of the frequencies with which, in the long run, two 
alternative models for the same data would deliver the observed data pattern, whereas a 
1-in-20 significance level measures the absolute frequency with which, in the long run, 
the hypothesised model for those same data would deliver a data pattern as extreme 
or more so than the observed pattern – and where those two measures are of precisely 
the same smallness, despite being the measures of certain quite different constituent 
parts of two possibly different pools of conceptual samples. That is the case because the 
smallness involved is to be understood as being a smallness of bodily perception.
10.7 Statistically vacuous likelihood ratios
All the examples considered so far have involved statistically informative likelihood ra-
tios. However, the next three examples show that a likelihood ratio might well convey 
no statistical evidence – none at all. 
Example 10.7.1
Let a real-world datum x = 0 be modelled in the human mind as a realisation of X, a 
random variable whose distribution is a member of the class of models:
Pr(X = x|q) = 1+xq , 
                          5
with -2.5 < x < +2.5 and rounded to x ∈ {-2, -1, 0, +1, +2},
and q ∈ {-0.4, 0, +0.4}. (10.7.1)
The likelihood of q, given the datum, is
L(q) = 
1+(0)q
 , which equals 0.2 identically in q. (10.7.2) 
                5
So, in respect of the comparative tenability of the three alternative ‘hypotheses’, this is 
an utterly uninformative likelihood. In the human mind, however,
Likelihood inference
339
the mental correlate of the given datum is being situated at: 
(0.64, 0.20, 0.16), (0.40, 0.20, 0.40), (0.16, 0.20, 0.64)
within the members indexed by q = -0.4, 0, +0.4, respectively. (10.7.3)
In respect of the comparative tenability of the three alternatively explanatory models, 
these are clearly not uninformative co-ordinates. Let us consider the precise nature of 
the physical (bodily) evidence reported at (10.7.3). Figure 10.7.1 represents the three al-
ternative models in full detail, where the shaded area in each case displays the situation
Figure 10.7.1: Testing the quality of fit of three alternative models (depicted with frequency labels) 
for the source of a given datum X = 0. The models are indexed by θ = -0.4 (top), θ = 0 
(middle) and θ = +0.4 (bottom)
of the mental correlate of the given datum. Thus the figure provides all the facts that 
anyone might require in order to address the question: ‘How do these three models 
compare as alternative explanations of how the given datum might have come about?’ 
We have two competitive answers to this question:
The answer at (10.7.3) is physically meaningful and clearly appropriate. In effect it 
points at Figure 10.7.1 for the reader to ‘See for yourself that the model indexed by 
q = 0 fits the data exceptionally well, and that either one of the other two models 
also fits the data well, though not quite as well as does the one indexed by q = 0.’
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Figure 10.7.1 represents perceptual facts that could be obtained by simulation. 
Yet, owing to the likelihood displayed at (10.7.2), likelihood inference would have 
us defy those facts by insisting instead that the three explanatory models pre-
sented in Figure 10.7.1, are equally ‘likely’.
Example 10.7.2
An axiom must be comprehensive, and so must never be made to rely on a plausibility 
imparted by the peculiarities of certain examples only. Apart from different notation, 
the following attempt at such persuasive use of the peculiarity of a particular example is 
taken verbatim from Edwards (1972, p. 35):
‘A chain has n links, and has been made up by choosing each link at random 
from a large population of links of which half are made of silver, and half of 
gold. If it has two silver links, what is n? 
Pr(2 silver | n) =  
n
    1   =  n(n-1) 
                              2  2
n
      2
n+1
This is therefore the likelihood for n, given two silver links, and at n = 2, 3, 4, 5, … 
takes the values:
 1 , 3 ,  3 ,  5  , ••• 
4   8    8   16
which are in the ratio 4 : 6 : 6 : 5 … . The solutions n = 3 and n = 4 are equally well 
supported; is this reasonable?’ (10.7.4)
Edwards is of course confident that we will answer his question in the affirmative, as 
he evidently reasons that with X = 2 silver links from n = 3 links all told, the addition 
of a further link such that we still have just two silver links, determines that the extra 
link is of gold. So he is pleased to discover that his ‘axiom’ would have us judge that the 
models with n = 3 and n =4, respectively, fit the given datum X = 2 equally well, because 
Pr(X = 2 | n) equals 6 ÷ 24 for both n = 3 and n = 4, as follows:
Pr(X = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, … | n = 3)  = (1, 3, 3, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, …)÷23
 = (2, 6, 6, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, …)÷24.
Pr(X = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, … | n = 4) = (1, 4, 6, 4, 1, 0, 0, 0, …)÷24.
But we must reject such a judgement because the statistical co-ordinates of the mental 
correlate of the datum, X = 2 silver links, are distinctly different for the two models.
For n = 3 the co-ordinates are (U, ε, V) = (8, 6, 2)÷24.
For n = 4 the co-ordinates are (U, ε, V) = (5, 6, 5)÷24. (10.7.5)
Similarly to the result at (10.7.2), the statistical roundings (likelihoods in Edwards’s ter-
minology) are equal (both being equal to 6÷24 in the present case). Similarly also to the 
result at (10.7.3), however, the statistical co-ordinates at (10.7.5) show that one of the 
models (here the one with n = 4) fits the datum slightly better than does the other. (We 
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note in passing that, for reasons to be explained in Section 10.9, it will be found that, in 
the foregoing, the reasoning:
‘with X = 2 silver links from n = 3 links all told, the addition of a further link 
such that we still have just two silver links, determines that the extra link is one 
of gold’ (10.7.6)
involves a subtle error.)
Example 10.7.3
Let a data set comprising n numbers bring into the human mind a random sample of 
size n drawn from an infinite population of numbers uniformly distributed from zero to q 
(0 < q < ∞). The largest sample number, X
(n), is the minimally sufficient statistic for q, and 
so its realisation, x
(n), conveys all the given data concerning the value of q. We note that 
those data comprise two distinctly different parts, which we may call determinate and sta-
tistical, respectively – the determinate part being that no sample value can be larger than 
q, and the statistical part being that there then also remains room for statistical variation 
in the value of X
(n), where ignoring that variation would be tantamount to ignoring the 
statistical part of the given data. Now the density function of X
(n) is given by:
f[x
(n)] =   
n  [x
(n)]
n-1, where 0 < x
(n) ≤ q, as no sample value can be > q. 
              q
n
So Pr[x
(n)-0.5dx(n) < X(n) < x(n)+0.5dx(n)] =  
n   [x
(n)]
n-1dx
(n) for 0 < x(n) ≤ q. 
                                                                    q
n    
So, the likelihood of q, for the given datum x
(n), is expressed in kernel form as: 
L(q) =  
1  , where 0 < x
(n) ≤ q < ∞, as no sample value can be > q. (10.7.7) 
           q
n
Let q1 and q2 denote two of the different hypotheses that are possible on the same datum, 
x
(n), where q1 < q2. Then their likelihood ratio is given by:
L(q1/ q2) =    
q2   
n
, where 0 < x
(n) ≤ q1 < q2 < ∞, as x(n) cannot be > q1. 
                     q1 
Thus, for instance, if q1 = 4, q2 = 8, and n = 3, the likelihood ratio on whatever the value 
of x
(n) (apart from not being > 4) then happens to be, is given by:
8  3= 8, which, in the language of likelihood inference, would have us infer that: 
4
q = 4 is eight times more likely than q = 8 is.
But, apart from the determinate information conveyed by the inequality x
(n) ≤ θ, a co-
ordination tester will also consider the statistical import of the two alternative models, 
and thus also consider that the mental correlate of a given x
(n) datum is situated within 
the two alternative test distributions at:
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(U, ε, V) =   
x(n)   
n
, ε, 1 -   
x(n)   
n
  , for J = 1, 2. 
                      qJ                     qJ
So we might have any one of the situations below.
Situation 1: The relevant data is x(n) = 1.7.
Co-ordination testing knows that q ≥ 1.7, and finds further that the mental cor-
relate of x(n) = 1.7 is situated at:
(0.03, ε, 0.97) in the test distribution for q = 4, and at
(0.01, ε, 0.99) in the test distribution for q = 8.
Co-ordination testing therefore concludes that, as tested, both q = 4 and q = 8 fit 
the data poorly.
Situation 2: The relevant data is x(n) = 2.2.
Co-ordination testing knows that q ≥ 2.2, and finds further that the mental cor-
relate of x(n) = 2.2 is situated at:
(0.17, ε, 0.83) in the test distribution for q = 4, and at
(0.02, ε, 0.98) in the test distribution for q = 8.
Co-ordination testing therefore concludes that, as tested, q = 4 fits the data well, 
and q = 8 fits the data poorly.
Situation 3: The relevant data is x(n) = 3.8.
Co-ordination testing knows that q ≥ 3.8, and finds further that the mental cor-
relate of x(n) = 3.8 is situated at:
(0.86, ε, 0.14) in the test distribution for q = 4, and at
(0.11, ε, 0.89) in the test distribution for q = 8.
Co-ordination testing therefore concludes that, as tested, both q = 4 and q = 8 fit 
the data well.
Now consider likelihood inference in the same three situations, as follows, where the 
information conveyed by the inequality q ≥ x(n), as such, is determinate only.
Situation 1: The relevant data is x(n) = 1.7.
Likelihood inference notes the determinate import of the inequality q ≥ 1.7, but 
ignores the statistical import of the alternative models, and so finds only that:
L(q1/q2) = 8.
Likelihood inference therefore concludes only that q = 4 is eight times more likely 
than q = 8.
Situation 2: The relevant data is x(n) = 2.2.
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Likelihood inference notes the determinate import of the inequality q ≥ 2.2, but 
ignores the statistical import of the alternative models, and so finds only that:
L(q1/q2) = 8.
Likelihood inference therefore concludes only that q = 4 is eight times more likely 
than is q = 8.
Situation 3: The relevant data is x(n) = 3.8.
Likelihood inference notes the determinate import of the inequality q ≥ 3.8, but 
ignores the statistical import of the alternative models, and so finds only that
L(q1/q2) = 8.
Likelihood inference therefore concludes only that q = 4 is eight times more likely 
than q = 8.
Discussion of Examples 10.7.1, 10.7.2 and 10.7.3
Any scientific model can be tested empirically, only by comparing predictions derived 
from it to corresponding empirical data and, in each of our three examples, statistical 
co-ordinates were used to prove that such tests were both possible and informative. The 
statistically vacuous nature of the corresponding likelihood ratios involved therefore 
proves that in each of our examples, those ratios failed to provide information concomi-
tant to the available statistical information. In our Examples 10.7.1 and 10.7.2 that just 
happens to be the case for particular data. However, in our Example 10.7.3 that would be 
the case for any possible data. The reader will note that for Example 7.4.1 too, that would 
be the case for any possible data.
10.8 A vicious circle
Axiomatic development is extremely slippery, for two reasons. The first reason is that 
the human mind tends to cast around for a deduction, whereas the validity of an axiom 
is not established by deduction; it is established by demonstration because it is a first 
principle. That involves the second reason: just what constitutes a valid demonstration? 
The slippery nature of any such development is exemplified by attempts on the part of 
Birnbaum (1962) and of Basu (1975) to derive the Strong Likelihood Axiom (henceforth 
referred to as the strong axiom) from more basic principles. This axiom is as follows:
Let datum x1 be appropriately modelled as having been sampled from a member of a 
class of models, E1, and let another datum x2 be appropriately modelled as having been 
independently sampled from a member of another class of models, E2, where E1 and 
E2, share a parameter space. Let the likelihoods of x1 and x2 have the same kernel form. 
Then x1 and x2 must lead to identical conclusions about the parameter.
A simple example might be that a bent coin is spun just three times and the outcome, 
x1, is appropriately modelled as a binomial sample (E1). The same coin is spun until the 
first success (as opposed to failure) is obtained, and the outcome, x2, is appropriately 
modelled as a geometric sample (E2). Let Pr(Success) = θ (0 < θ < 1). Then we have:
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If x1 = just 2 failures, then Pr(X1 = x1) = 3(1-θ)²θ. The kernel is L(θ) = (1-θ)²θ.
If x2 = just 2 failures, then Pr(X2 = x2) = (1-θ)²θ. The kernel is L(θ) = (1-θ)²θ.
So the strong axiom would have x1 and x2 lead to identical conclusions about θ. A co-ordi-
nation tester would disagree. For instance, when testing θ = 0.25 as hypothesised model, 
the situations of the mental correlates of x1 and x2 in the test distributions are at: 
[••• , 3(0.75)2(0.25), (0.75)3] = (0.16, 0.42, 0.42), and at
[(0.25)+(0.75)(0.25), (0.75)2(0.25), •••] = (0.44, 0.14, 0.42),
respectively. We must also consider the Weak Likelihood Axiom (henceforth referred to 
as the weak axiom), as follows:
Let datum x1 be appropriately modelled as having been sampled from a member of 
a class of models E, and let another independent datum x2 also be sampled from a 
member of the same class of models. Let the likelihoods of x1 and x2 have the same 
kernel form. Then x1 and x2 must lead to identical conclusions about the parameter.
A simple example might be that the bent coin is spun just three times and the outcome, 
x1, is appropriately modelled as a binomial sample. The same coin is again spun just 
three times and the outcome, x2, is appropriately modelled as an independent binomial 
sample. Then we have:
If x1 = SFS, then Pr(X1 = SFS) = θ×(1-θ) × θ. The kernel is L(θ) = (1-θ)θ².
If x2 = SSF, then Pr(X1 = SSF) = θ×θ×(1-θ). The kernel is L(θ) = (1-θ)θ².
So the weak axiom would have x1 and x2 lead to identical conclusions about θ. When two 
likelihoods have the same kernel form, Basu refers to them as equivalent (his Definition 
6). Corresponding to the strong likelihood and weak likelihood principles, Basu formu-
lates two principles called the Invariance Principle and the Weak Invariance Principle, 
respectively. They differ from the two axioms only inasmuch as they call for identical 
likelihoods instead of equivalent likelihoods. Basu also formulates two further princi-
pals called the Conditionality Principle and the Weak Conditionality Principle, where 
only the latter principle need to concern us here. It concerns any class of models E, 
which is a ‘mixture’ of two classes of models, E1 and E2, which share a parameter space. 
The mixture is made by using a random device to select one or the other E-like compo-
nent with known selection probabilities. For instance:
Roll a true die to choose between:
E1 = binomial sampling (just three spins of the bent coin), and 
E2 = geometric sampling (spinning the bent coin until the first success is obtained), 
with probabilities say 1/6 and 5/6, respectively. (10.8.1)
The Weak Conditionality Principle may be stated as follows:
If E is a mixture of E1 and E2 as described above, and the data
[E, (Ei, xi)] for either i = 1 or i = 2, is a realisation of E,
then the data are equivalent simply to the realisation (Ei, xi) for the given i.
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For instance:
If at (10.8.1) the die selects geometric sampling, the appropriate model is simply 
the geometric model (without any reference to the mixture).
Again, in the mixed sampling problem of Section 1.5, the appropriate model ac-
cording to the Weak Conditionality Principle refers only to the instrument that 
was actually used.
This brings us to what Basu calls the ‘centre-piece’ of his essay: a theorem stating that:
The Weak Invariance Principle and the Weak Conditionality Principle together 
imply the Strong Likelihood Principle.
Basu’s ‘proof’ of this theorem may be paraphrased as follows:
Let data (E1, x1) and (E2, x2) generate equivalent likelihood functions, L1(θ) and 
L2(θ), respectively, that is to say, let L1(θ) and L2(θ) have the same kernel form. 
Then there exists a known positive constant C such that
CL1(θ) = L2(θ) for any of the possible values of θ. (10.8.2)
Let us then contemplate the mixture E obtained by mixing (E1, x1) and (E2, x2) in the 
proportions:
  C   and   1    , respectively. (10.8.3) 
1+C        1+C
Then (1, x1) and (2, x2) are descriptions in the sample space of the mixed class of models, 
E. In view of the equation at (10.8.2) and of our choice at (10.8.3), the data [E, (1, x1)] and 
[E, (2, x2)] generate identical likelihood functions,
  C   × L1(θ) and   
1    × L2(θ), respectively. (10.8.3) 1+C                    1+C
So it follows from the Weak Likelihood Principle that the data [E, (1, x1)] and the data 
[E, (2, x2)] must lead to identical conclusions about the parameter. Now applying the 
Weak Conditionality Principle to each of these two sets of data, it follows that data (1, x1) 
and data (2, x2) must lead to identical conclusions about the parameter, which is what Basu’s 
theorem says.
Basu notes that Birnbaum advances a slightly different ‘proof’ in that, instead of ap-
pealing to the  Weak Likelihood Principle, he appeals to a more general rule implying 
that principle. In effect this claims to have ‘improved’ Birnbaum’s ‘proof’ by removing a 
redundancy. But both of the ‘proofs’ rely on circular reasoning. The circularity is intro-
duced when we are asked to ‘contemplate the mixture E obtained by mixing (E1, x1) and 
(E2, x2)’; this mixes two data sets, whereas the reasoning must then proceed as if having 
mixed two classes of models. To grasp this very firmly, let us resort to our old standby: 
simulation. Let E1 denote the binomial class ‘spin the coin just three times’ and E2 de-
note the geometric class ‘spin the coin until the first success’. Let S denote success and F 
denote failure. Then (E1, x1) denotes a data set, possibly as follows:
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1st spin: F. 2nd spin: S. 3rd spin: F. Hence (E1, x1) denotes (binomial class FSF).
That means that (E2, x2) must denote (geometric class FFS). So, let us simulate:
1st spin: F. 2nd spin: S. Ah shucks! We will have to try again.
1st spin: F. 2nd spin: F. 3rd spin: F. Ah shucks! We will have to try again.
1st spin: S. Ah shucks! We will have to try again. 
Etc.
This tries to procure a geometric datum whose likelihood has a given kernel form, so that 
its ‘likelihood’ will have the self-same kernel form as that of the given binomial datum, so 
that an appropriate mixing ration can be selected, so that the likelihoods emerging from 
the mix will be identical, so that it can be said that they are as alike as Tweedle Dee and 
Tweedle Dum, so that it can be said that they must then lead to identical conclusions. 
That is circular reasoning.
Concluding remark
The reader will find that odds-ratio tests rely on the Weak Likelihood Axiom. This is in 
fact implied by the interpretation at (10.5.1).
10.9 Another vicious circle
We are now ready to come to grips with an argument that some statisticians hold to be 
utterly compelling while others hold it to be utterly silly. The argument in question, 
which we may refer to as the Stopping-Rule Argument, tries to persuade us that the 
distinction between the two stop-sampling rules at (10.2.16) and (10.2.17) respectively, 
is entirely irrelevant for the purposes of data analysis, and thereby tries to motivate the 
Likelihood Axiom. The argument often abbreviates ‘stop-sampling rule’ as ‘stopping 
rule’ rather than ‘sampling rule’, which will turn out to be revealing. We now present 
that argument, then we develop a counter-argument, which we call the Sampling-Rule 
Argument and which leads to a counter-axiom.
The Stopping-Rule Argument
Let θ denote the probability of outcome S when spinning a bent coin marked S and F on 
opposite sides (0 < θ < 1). Let an investigator spin the coin repeatedly until that outcome 
occurs, thus obtaining a data set on the value of θ. Suppose, for the sake of simplicity, 
that just three repetitions are needed. The following sample space then describes all 
the outcomes that could have occurred, where the underlined description is that of the 
outcome that did occur: 
S, FS, FFS, FFFS, FFFFS, ••• (10.9.1)
Now let the investigator consider that if the stopping rule had been ‘stop after just three 
repetitions’ instead of ‘stop as soon as an S is obtained’, then the following sample space 
would describe all the outcomes that could have occurred, where the underlined de-
scription would again be that of the outcome that did occur:
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FFF, FFS, FSF, SFF, FSS, SFS, SSF, SSS (10.9.2)
At both (10.9.1) and (10.9.2) the data obtained are described (so it is argued) by FFS, 
whereas the other descriptions at (10.9.1) and (10.9.2) do not describe any data that were 
actually obtained. So, it is argued, the investigator should avoid reasoning in terms of 
outcomes that could have occurred, but did not occur, and should reason only in terms 
of the outcome that did occur (Birnbaum 1962, p. 271). The persuasive thrust of this 
argument is encapsulated in the question:
How can a stopping rule the investigator had in mind only, be a constituent of the 
actual evidence that as such can arise in the real world only? (10.9.3)
The argument represents the beginnings of a metaphysical view that has, by way of Baye-
sian inference been able to mount a mathematically sophisticated and hugely influential 
attack on scientific reasoning – an attack against which our profession has been remark-
ably inept at defending itself.
The Sampling-Rule Argument
Let us recall how Example 10.7.2 exemplifies the pitfalls of trying to derive a general prin-
ciple from the peculiarities of a particular example. Recall, especially, the phrase at (10.7.6) 
showing how the peculiarity of Example 10.7.2 tricks one into deterministic reasoning 
where statistical reasoning is actually required. Then note that the reasoning leading up 
to the question at (10.9.3) relies on a similarly deceptive peculiarity in that it tricks one into 
thinking in mechanical terms – in this particular instance of how, at (10.9.1), the bent coin 
topples over to produce the first F, the second F, and then, toppling over to the other side, 
the S. We are thereby tricked into thinking (entirely correctly) that those events could 
just as well have occurred at (10.9.2). In this our thinking is not wrong; it might in fact be 
entirely correct in some other context, but it is irrelevant in the present context because 
it makes us forget that the investigator, when spinning the coin, does not exercise a deter-
ministic control over the outcome. Thus, entirely correctly simulated mechanics of how 
FFS might have come about would nevertheless be irrelevant, because here simulation of 
a statistical event is required. So, consider instead how we might, somewhat naïvely, try 
to perform the appropriate simulation by stopping and restarting whenever one of the 
outcomes, S, FS, FFS, and FFF, occurs. Then the likelihood of FFS would be given by:
(1-θ)²θ÷[θ+(1-θ)θ+(1-θ)²θ+(1-θ)3], which is ≠ (1-θ)²θ, the required likelihood.
The reader will note that we here arrive at the wrong likelihood because of employ-
ing the wrong stop-sampling rule. More importantly, however, the reader should note 
that the mechanical simulation and the statistical simulation described above are both 
inappropriate because of trying, in both attempts, to simulate a particular sample pat-
tern, whereas only the simulation of a particular population of samples is possible. So 
it dawns on us that we cannot simulate ‘a sample’. And so it dawns on us that we can 
simulate ‘a population’ only. And so it dawns on us that we cannot stage the requisite 
simulation without a sampling rule. Thus Axiom 10.9.1 appears.
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Axiom 10.9.1 (The sampling-rule axiom):
Any purported statistical model that is incapable of simulation is incapable of a scientific defence and, 
as it is impossible to simulate how a purported statistical sample pattern might have come about without 
simulating how the entire statistical population to which it belongs comes about, it is impossible to 
simulate the model without involving its particular sampling rule.
It is in the nature of axiomatic reasoning that an axiom cannot be deduced by logical rea-
soning; it can be defended – or refuted – by examples only. Therefore, in order to compel 
the reader to accept Axiom 10.9.1, we must challenge the reader to try, by way of examples, 
to refute the axiom. It will then be found that one is incapable of devising such examples. 
This is hardly surprising in view of Section 1.4, where the discourse of statistical science 
was seen to originate in an inseparable pair of ultimate concepts called ‘sampling’ and 
‘long-run frequency’, respectively, and where we now see that Axiom 10.9.1 is just a re-
assertion of the ultimate nature, and of the inseparability, of the two members of that pair. 
Thus we can see that Axiom 10.9.1 may appropriately be called ‘The Fundamental Axiom 
of Statistical Reasoning’. It shows why willy-nilly appropriate simulations for the matters 
in hand must necessarily involve the sampling rules given at (10.2.16) and (10.2.17). It can 
also now be seen that the term ‘sampling rule’ is more appropriate than ‘stopping rule’, as 
different sampling rules need not be distinguished by different stopping rules. In other 
words, the two ‘stopping rules’ at (10.2.16) and (10.2.17) are peculiar to Examples 10.2.1 and 
10.2.2, respectively, and we must be exceedingly leery of trying to draw a general principle 
from anything that is peculiar to particular cases only. Clearly then our point of departure 
must here be to invoke the sampling rules that bring to the human mind the two differ-
ent populations whose sample spaces are indicated at (10.9.1) and (10.9.2), respectively, 
and then to establish how the data are alternatively modelled in the two cases, noting, of 
course, that in the light of the fundamental axiom, one or the other pseudo-sampling rule 
is inexorably part and parcel of those ‘data’. For the present purposes it will be sufficient to 
summarise each model by giving the statistical co-ordinates of the mental correlate of the 
given datum (just one success) thus modelled. Those co-ordinates are:
[U1(θ), ε1(θ), •] = [θ+(1-θ)θ, (1-θ)²θ, •] (10.9.4)
in the negative binomial case, and
[U2(θ), ε2(θ), •] = [(1-θ)3, 3(1-θ)²θ, •] (10.9.5)
in the binomial case. (At (10.9.5) the data patterns FFS, FSF and SFF must be taken to be 
evidentially equivalent, as the correct likelihood always requires derivation from a statistic 
that is sufficient for the index.) The likelihood ratio for θ1 versus θ2 is then obtained from:
(10.9.4) as ε1(θ1)÷ε1(θ2) = (1-θ1)²θ1÷(1-θ2)²θ2, or from
(10.9.5) as ε2(θ1)÷ε2(θ2) =(1-θ1)²θ1÷(1-θ2)²θ2,
being of course the same in either case, where the Likelihood Axiom would then have 
us discover a general principle. However, whenever particular examples seem to lead to 
a general principle, we must carefully test that principle on further examples from the 
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general domain in which that principle would have to apply. So, apart from the two stop-
ping-rule examples, consider also Example 10.7.1, letting the data for that example be 
denoted by x = 0, where underlining again denotes an outcome that did occur. Thus the 
notations FFS and x = 0 denote constituents of the real world (out there) whereas one 
reasons (up here) in terms of the constituents of the human mind only. It follows that 
a ‘principle’ that tells us to avoid reasoning in terms of any outcomes that could have 
occurred but that did not occur, thus to reason in terms only of outcomes that did occur, 
does not make sense. For instance, in order to reason about certain real-world bananas 
(out there) we can hardly bring the real bananas to mind (up here) by stuffing them up 
our ears; instead, it is their mental correlates that must then be brought to mind. Simi-
larly, FFS and x = 0 denote real-world objects whose mental correlates must be brought 
to mind. Axiom 10.9.1 shows how, and how only, that can be accomplished by way of a 
model that is capable of simulation. Thus the best we can possibly do to accommodate 
The Stopping-Rule Argument, is to bring to mind, not FFS, but its mental correlate, and 
necessarily in some way indicated by Axiom 10.9.1. We then find that the mental cor-
relate is not a specifiable one of the infinitely many samples that comprise the statistical 
rounding, as we cannot for instance specify it as sample number 1 733 from the left. We 
can but describe the rounding it belongs to. And so, willy-nilly the outcome that did oc-
cur is replaced by an infinite pool of samples called the statistical rounding. Moreover, 
for any present purposes the only useful description of that rounding is its measure, 
and that measures the rounding as a proportion of the entire population of samples. So, 
willy-nilly we are then reasoning in terms of all the samples comprising the population, 
both those comprising the rounding, and those comprising the two co-ordinates. Now, 
taking stock of our situation, for each of the two data sets denoted by FFS and x = 0, 
respectively, we find that in both cases:
We have a given datum in the data record, for which we have brought a variety of 
explanatory models into the human mind.
For each model, we have to judge quality of fit of that model as a possible expla-
nation of how the given datum might have come about.
For each judgment, the present purposes will find that sufficient information on 
which to base that judgement is conveyed by a set of statistical co-ordinates.
Each of those sets of statistical co-ordinates comprises just three numbers, but 
involving at most only two independent variables (because U+ε+V = 1).
Likelihood inference would have us replace those two variables with just a single 
variable called the ‘likelihood ratio’.
We must then ask: ‘Why only one variable?’
It then appears that The Stopping-Rule Argument is circular, because it would have us
draw on example FFS to motivate, as a binding principle, that ‘all the relevant in-
formation that the data provide …  is contained in the likelihood ratio’, and then 
have us apply that principle also to example x = 0,
where we must then surely ask (proceeding the other way round): Why not 
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draw on example x = 0 to motivate, as a binding principle, that ‘none of the rel-
evant information that the data provide …  is contained in the likelihood ratio’, 
and then have us instead apply that principle to example FFS.
In fact, neither motivation would be correct because, in order to arrive at the correct 
principles we must draw on that which is common to both of the two examples, as well 
as to all other examples where the question ‘How might these data have come about?’ 
calls for a statistical answer.
Resumé
The investigative question of science in general is always: ‘How might these data have 
come about?’, and a satisfactory answer must necessarily take the form of a model, or 
several alternative models, in the human mind, where mental correlates of the given 
data describe how, in the real world, those data might have come about. So we must be 
able to explicate the models we have in mind by simulation, or otherwise we might find 
ourselves reasoning, as in Sections 1.34 and 1.36, about purported ‘experiences’ inca-
pable of actually being experienced. This is absolutely crucial and so it must be firmly 
grasped that simulation, and its close relative experimentation, are of overwhelming 
importance in science. It simply will not do to try and evade such importance. So, in 
order to ensure that a statistical model is scientifically meaningful it must be capable 
of simulation, and so necessarily comprise a sampling rule and a population of samples 
arising from that rule. As asserted by Axiom 10.9.1, it is impossible to separate a popula-
tion from its sampling rule. An investigator must therefore necessarily reason in terms 
of a population of infinitely many samples that a sampling rule has brought into the 
human mind. A single one of those many samples provides the mental correlate of the 
given data (of what did take place). That correlate is, however, an unidentified member 
of a pool called ‘the rounding’, and so that correlate, being of measure zero, can be dealt 
with only via the measure of the rounding. However, the measure of the rounding is its 
measure relative to the entire population, and so willy-nilly we have to reason in terms 
of all the samples the model brings to mind. The many samples can then be partitioned 
into three disjointed sample pools called ‘the left co-ordinate, ‘the rounding’, and ‘the 
right co-ordinate’, respectively, being of measures U, ε, and V, respectively. But, inas-
much as U+ε+V = 1, those measures can at most involve just two independent variables. 
So we find that the Likelihood Axiom, now stripped of its psychologically persuasive 
language and ‘tricky’ supportive examples, simply asserts that:
only one of the two independent variables, namely the likelihood ratio, conveys 
all the informative variation.
This assertion is refuted by countless examples such as those given in sections 10.5 and 
10.6, and yet further examples to be given in the sequel. The assertion is in fact refuted 
as follows by the favourite example of advocates of the Likelihood Axiom.
Example 10.9.1
Consider negative binomial sampling as developed in Example 10.2.1, and binomial 
sampling as developed in Example 10.2.2, with, in each case, n = 6 trials comprising 
x = 5 failures and n-x = 1 success. Let θ denote the probability of failure, where we wish 
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to test the quality of fit of alternative models indexed by θ. Using the number of failures 
in the sample, X, as our test statistic, the trace of the mental correlate of the datum, 
X = 5, in the case of negative binomial sampling is found to be given by:
[(1-θ)(1+θ+θ2+θ3+θ4), (1-θ)θ5, (1-θ)(θ6+θ7+θ8+… )], 
and in the case of binomial sampling by:
[1(1-θ)6θ0+6(1-θ)5θ1+15(1-θ)4θ2+20(1-θ)3θ3+15(1-θ)2θ4, 6(1-θ)1θ5, 1(1-θ)0θ6].
These traces are, for various values of θ, evaluated in Table 10.9.1, with very different results.
Table 10.9.1: Tracing the mental correlate of five failures, in case of negative binomial sampling 
till just one success, or binomial sampling till just six trials
Pr(Success) X co-ordinates negative binomial X co-ordinates regular binomial L(θ, 0.1 6)
0.75 (0.999, 0.001, 0.000) (0.995, 0.004, 0.000) 0.01
… … … …
0.55 (0.981, 0.010, 0.008) (0.931, 0.061, 0.008) 0.15
0.50 (0.969, 0.016, 0.016) (0.891, 0.094, 0.016) 0.23
0.45 (0.950, 0.023, 0.028) (0.836, 0.136, 0.028) 0.34
0.40 (0.922, 0.031, 0.047) (0.767, 0.187, 0.047) 0.46
0.35 (0.884, 0.041, 0.075) (0.681, 0.244, 0.075) 0.61
0.30 (0.832, 0.050, 0.118) (0.580, 0.302, 0.118) 0.75
… … …
0.1 6 (0.598, 0.067, 0.335) (0.263, 0.402, 0.335) 1.00
… … …
0.10 (0.410, 0.059, 0.531) (0.114, 0.354, 0.531) 0.88
0.05 (0.226, 0.039, 0.735) (0.033, 0.232, 0.735) 0.58
… … …
0.01 (0.049, 0.010, 0.941) (0.002, 0.057, 0.941) 0.14
The differences are especially forceful in the range from about θ = 0.50 up to about 
θ = 0.40, where the negative binomial models fit the data poorly, whereas the binomial 
models fit the data well, and even very well. As the test statistic, X, is in both cases a 
most separating test statistic for comparing alternative values of θ, a co-ordination test-
er cannot possibly agree that the differing importance of the different sampling rules is 
vacuous. On the contrary, as the different explanatory models described in Table 10.9.1 
are easy to simulate – we could point at such simulations and say to our fellow scien-
tists: ‘Here see for yourself the alternative explanatory processes of how these given data 
might have come about’. And we could ask: ‘Do you have other explanatory processes in 
.
.
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mind? If so, please go ahead and simulate those processes for us, so that we can under-
stand what you have in mind. How is that? Are you saying that you cannot simulate the 
processes you have in mind? In that case we cannot take you seriously.’
10.10   Likelihood inference and the idée fixe
It is worth noting that we have now met three different theories of inference, each of 
which try to develop an epistemology that uses just one informative variable amongst U, 
ε and V. Significance tests try to base an epistemology on the sum of the rounding and 
the pointing co-ordinate, where that might be defended by arguing that both measures 
must be small in order to be significant. However, that overlooks the fact that such tests 
cannot avoid the notion of simultaneous statistical inferences on the part of their know-
ing subject. Hypothesis tests fall into the same difficulty, inasmuch as they differ from 
significance tests only in that, instead of having the significance level vary according to 
the data, they interpret the significance level as a potential error rate, which is made to 
vary as specified by their knowing subject. In both kinds of tests the notion of the prob-
ability of a mistaken inference is inspired by the idée fixe, and a probability is of course 
just one number, not two. Inasmuch as a likelihood is not a probability, likelihood infer-
ence might seem to escape the idée fixe. However, its usage of the term ‘likely’ betrays 
psychology that derives from the idée fixe, even though such usage does not explicitly 
involve a knowing subject.
10.11   Absolute quality of fit as opposed to relative quality 
    of fit
In this section we consider how likelihood inference approaches the idea that such and 
such values of the parameter of interest will by investigation be found to be those that 
are consistent with the data. Kalbfleisch (1979) develops the idea by evaluating the like-
lihood of different models, relative to the likelihood of the model most likely in view of 
the given data. Thus, by solving for values of the model index θ from:
L(θ/the most likely value of θ given the data) ≥ α for various specified α,
Kalbfleish typically obtains an array of intervals of the form:
θ1(α) ≤ θ ≤ θ2(α) for various specified α (0 < α < 1).
He calls such an interval ‘a 100α % likelihood interval for θ’. We will now apply this ap-
proach to three different examples, and then discuss the results. It turns out that the 
distinction between absolute quality of fit and relative quality of fit (as previously ex-
plained in Example 10.5.1) has awkward implications for likelihood inference.
Example 10.11.1
The likelihood function for the data FFFFFS of Example 10.9.1, both for the negative 
binomial class of models and the binomial class of models, is given by:
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(1-θ)5θ1, where θ = Pr(S). This likelihood is maximised by θ = 1÷(5+1) = 1. 6.
So the right-most column of Table 10.9.1 gives the ratio of the likelihood for different 
values of θ, relative to the likelihood for the most likely value of θ. For instance,
L(θ/θ = 0.1 6) = 0.75 for θ = 0.30.
This tells us that, for the data in hand, the lower bound of the 75% likelihood interval for 
θ is given by θ1(0.75) = 0.30. The upper bound of the same interval is given by the other 
root of the equation:
(1 − θ)5θ1 ÷ (0.8 3)5(0.1 6)1 = 0.75, which turns out to be θ2(0.75) = 0.07.
Thus, for the given data, 0.07 ≤ θ ≤ 0.30 is the 75% likelihood interval for θ, meaning that 
the likelihood of any value in the interval is, relatively speaking, at least 75% as likely as 
the most likely value of θ. But what does that mean in absolute terms? On the one hand, 
if Marie is at least 75% as swift as Sarie and Sarie is slow, Marie is slow. On the other 
hand, if Sarie is an Olympic champion, Marie might not be slow.
Example 10.11.2
Let an N(θ, 1²) random variable, X, where θ ∈ {… , -6, -3, 0, +3, +6, …}, be brought to mind 
as a class of models that model how a real-world datum, x, might have come about. Let 
the datum be x = 1.4. We wish to measure the quality of fit of the models indexed by 
various values of θ. The appropriate elimination pivot is then X-θ, whose distribution is 
N(0, 1²), and whose values in standard error units are:
… , +4.4, +1.4, -1.6, -4.6, … , for θ = … , -3, 0, +3, +6, …, respectively.
The situations of these test values within the N(0, 1²) test distribution are given by:
(1.000, ε, 0.000) for θ = -3,
(0.919, ε, 0.081) for θ = 0,
(0.055, ε, 0.945) for θ = +3,
(0.000, ε, 1.000) for θ = +6, etc. (10.11.1)
Thus co-ordination tests using X, the minimal sufficient statistic for θ, as test statistic, 
show that none of the various models provide a satisfactory quality of fit. The reader 
should note in particular that the model indexed by θ = 0 might be described in every-
day language as ‘a somewhat unlikely model’, where the descriptive term ‘unlikely’ is 
not being used in the terminological sense used by likelihood inference. Now consider 
likelihood inference also proceeding from the minimal sufficient statistic. The most 
likely amongst the possible values of θ, is θ = 0, as that is the value closest to x = 1.4. So, 
consider the relative likelihood of any hypothesised θ by considering:
L(θ/0) for θ = … , -3, 0, +3, +6, …, respectively.
L(θ) is given in kernel form by exp[-0.5(1.4-θ)²]. It is often convenient to consider the 
natural logarithm of the likelihood ratio, given in this case by -0.5[(1.4-θ)²-(1.4-0)²], 
which equals -8.7 when θ = -3. Thus L(-3/0) = exp(-8.7), which equals 0.0002. By pro-
ceeding in this way we obtain, below, an array of odds-ratio tests of the form: hypothe-
.
..
.
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sised θ versus most likely θ. Note that one of these tests is necessarily vacuous because it 
is not possible for an odds-ratio test to test a hypothesised model against itself:
L(θ/0) = 0.0002 for θ = -3,
L(θ/0) = 1 for θ = 0 (the necessarily vacuous test),
L(θ/0) = 0.7408 for θ = +3,
L(θ/0) = 0.0001 for θ = +6, etc. (10.11.2)
At (10.11.2), likelihood inference judges the model indexed by θ = +3 as being 74% as 
likely as the most likely model. But how likely is the most likely model? At (10.11.1) a 
co-ordination test in fact has shown that the most likely model is one that every-day 
language described as a somewhat unlikely model. But an advocate of likelihood in-
ference is not supposed to be capable of knowing that. In such cases the advocates of 
likelihood inference and Bayesian inference sometimes complain that critics imply they 
are stupid. ‘We are not so stupid,’ they are inclined to complain, ‘as to overlook discrep-
ancies of magnitude 1.4 and 1.6 standard error units.’ However, such complaint is beside 
the point; no statistician worth his while overlooks discrepancies of such magnitude. 
The point here is simply that stupidity is in this case being avoided at the cost of inco-
herence, as advocacy of the sweeping claims made at (10.2.10), (10.2.11), (10.2.12) and 
(10.2.13), cannot coherently serve reasoning that simultaneously relies on reasons that 
by those sweeping claims are held to be deluded.
Example 10.11.3
Consider a data set on the presence or absence of certain bacteria in a number, n, of test 
tubes, each tube containing a given volume of river water, where prior experience shows 
that the numbers of bacteria in different tubes may be represented as a random sample 
from a Poisson population with mean θ (0 < θ < ∞). The probability of a ‘negative’ (i.e. a 
tube containing no bacteria) is the probability of a zero Poisson count. So, the likelihood 
of just x positives with just n tubes is obtained from the expression at (10.2.15) as:
L(θ) = 1-e-q 
x
  e-q 
n-x
, because Pr(a zero count) = e-q.
Now suppose that there happened to be no negatives (i.e. suppose x = n). Then:
L(θ) = 1-e-q 
n
, which      1 as θ      ∞. (10.11.3)
So, loosely speaking, we might say that the most likely value of θ is ∞, although, strictly 
speaking, this value does not exist, as it is not a value in the parameter space. Neverthe-
less, the corresponding likelihood is well defined, where (10.11.3) gives its value as unity. 
So, the likelihood ratios of interest are given by:
 
L(θ/‘∞’) = 1-e-q 
n
÷(1), (10.11.4)
which, as in previous examples, is interpreted as the likelihood of the θ value under test, 
relative to the likelihood of the most likely θ value (see Kalbfleisch, p. 27). We note in 
passing that our expression, the most likely value, refers to the value that is conventionally 
called the maximum likelihood estimate, but our expression – though unconventional – 
better serves the epistemological interpretations that likelihood inference places upon the 
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likelihood of such and such. Returning to the expression developed at (10.11.4) we note 
that for any specified percentage, say 75%, likelihood inference would have us interpret a 
value of θ such that:
 1-e-q 
n
 = 75%,
as a value of θ that is 75% as likely as the most likely value of θ. Thus for instance, recall-
ing that 75% is simply a way of denoting 75÷100, we find that if:
if n = 1, then 1-e-q 
n
 = 75% for θ = 1.4,
if n = 10, then 1-e-q 
n
 = 75% for θ = 3.6, and
if n = 100, then 1-e-q 
n
 = 75% for θ = 5.9.
We thus obtain the following three 75% likelihood intervals for θ:
If n = 1, the 75% likelihood interval is 1.4 ≤ θ < ∞.
If n = 10, the 75% likelihood interval is 3.6 ≤ θ < ∞.
If n = 100, the 75% likelihood interval is 5.9 ≤ θ < ∞. (10.11.5)
Kalbfleisch (p. 23) describes any parameter value within a 10% likelihood interval as fairly 
plausible, and any parameter value within a 50% likelihood interval as quite plausible. 
So he would be compelled to describe each of the three values, 1.4, 3.6 and 5.9 found at 
(10.11.5), as quite plausible, and in fact as equally plausible, whereas that cannot possibly 
be correct. Each of the three values is 75% as likely as a most likely value, but those three 
most likely values arise from n = 1, n = 10 and n =100 observations, respectively, and so 
those three most likely values cannot possibly be three equally likely values. The difficulty 
is insurmountable because the expressions ‘10% as likely’, ‘50% as likely’ and ‘75% as likely’ 
have relative meaning only, whereas the expressions ‘fairly plausible’ and ‘quite plausible’ 
must convey absolute meaning, or else be found vacuous. Telling us that a horse named Lucky 
is almost as swift as a horse named Patch, does not tell us whether or not Lucky is swift.
Discussion of Examples 10.11.1, 10.11.2 and 10.11.3
Consider the concept ‘energy’. The latent energy stored in a bag of coal is converted into 
heat energy by burning the coal, and then converted into kinetic energy when used to pro-
pel a locomotive. Our bodies can see the coal, can feel the heat, can ride in the locomotive, 
but cannot experience energy as such. This shows that whilst the world of science is the 
world as experienced through the human body, science has also to resort to concepts that 
do not directly describe bodily experience. In other words, scientific language employs 
two different kinds of terms: on the one hand are terms such as ‘yellow’, ‘loud’ and ‘bit-
ter’ used to describe an experienced colour, sound and taste, respectively; they are terms 
whose meanings are directly experiential. On the other hand are terms such as ‘energy’, 
‘long-run frequency’ and ‘statistical independence’, whose meanings are not limited to 
sight, or hearing, or taste, or to any other particular form of bodily perception; they are 
terms whose meanings are indirectly experiential. Any minimally sufficient scientific lan-
guage requires both kinds of terms, where that leads inexorably to the problem of demon-
strating the necessity of a proposed term, especially one whose meaning is to be indirectly 
experiential. In modern physics for instance, the term ‘ether’ has fallen away as being no 
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longer needed, whereas the term ‘energy’ remains indispensable. Along these lines, what 
can we then say of statistical usages of the term ‘likelihood’? That the term is needed as 
an indirectly experiential one is beyond reasonable contest. We have but to consider the 
alternative versions of the Neyman-Pearson lemma in order to realise that if the term 
were to be discarded, the lemma would simply resurface in other, equivalent language, as 
the necessity of the concept in the context of the predictions, predications and forecasts 
with which the lemma deals, is demonstrable by simulation. Opposed to that, ‘likelihood 
inference’, as expounded by Edwards in the initial 32 pages of his book, tries to persuade 
us that ‘likelihood’ can be employed as having evidential meaning. But evidential meaning 
in science ultimately has to be put to the human body, which compels Edwards to re-
treat to an explanation in terms of frequencies, which explanation, quoted at (10.5.1) and 
clarified by way of Example (10.5.1), then limits ‘likelihood inference’ to relative evidential 
meanings, to comparison of the quality of fit of this model relative to that model, and of 
that model relative to the next model. It cannot deal with questions like: ‘Do any of these 
models fit the data well? Or does each and every one of these models fit the data poorly?’ 
This makes it incapable of commencement testing, and therefore inherently susceptible 
to circular reasoning.
10.12   Can odds-ratio testing usefully supplement other 
    methods of data analysis?
We can now dispense with the Likelihood Axiom because we have developed numer-
ous examples that refute the sweeping nature of its claims. However, the explanation at 
(10.5.1) implies that in those cases where the likelihood ratio is not statistically vacuous, 
an odds-ratio test produces scientifically meaningful evidence. Instead of the Likelihood 
Axiom we must therefore consider a far more modest possibility, namely that an odds-
ratio test might informatively add to what a data analyst can learn by other methods. 
So, to begin with, we note that an odds-ratio test can exist if and only if a corresponding 
likelihood-ratio ordering exists. An odds-ratio test therefore exists if and only if a corre-
sponding likelihood-ratio co-ordination test exists. Consider any pair of models, M1 and 
M2, capable of being tested by each of the members of such a pair of tests. Let the outcome 
of the co-ordination test be denoted by:
(U1, ε1, V1) for M1, and (U2, ε2, V2) for and M2. (10.12.1)
The outcome of the corresponding odds-ratio test is then given by ε2÷ε1, which gives rise 
to Theorem 10.12.1.
Theorem 10.12.1:
For every given odds-ratio test, a corresponding likelihood-ratio co-ordination test exists; and whatever can 
be learned from the odds-ratio test, can also be learned from the co-ordination test, but not vice versa.
There is worse to come. 
Let O1, O2, O3, …, Ok, denote the likelihood-ratio ordering in question. Let the mental 
correlate of the test datum, X = x, be situated in ordinal class Oj. Let M1 and M2 be 
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indexed by θ = θ1 and θ = θ2, respectively. We may, without loss of generality, suppose 
that pointing is to the right. Then consider the following:
Ordinal class: Oj Oj+1 Oj+2 Oj+3 … Ok
Pr(X = x | θ = θ1): CLj(θ1) CLj+1(θ1) CLj+2(θ1) CLj+3(θ1) ... CLk(θ1)
Pr(X = x | θ = θ2): CLj(θ2) CLj+1(θ2) CLj+2(θ2) CLj+3(θ2) ... CLk(θ2)
The ordering is a likelihood ratio ordering and, as pointing is to the right, we have:
Lj(θ2/θ1) ≤ Lj+1(θ2/θ1) ≤ Lj+2(θ2/θ1) ≤ Lj+3(θ2/θ1) ≤ … ≤ Lk(θ2/θ1). (10.12.2)
Let Oj and Oj+1 be rounded into a single class, thus placing the mental correlate of the 
test datum in Oj∪Oj+1, where the likelihood ratio for a datum in Oj∪Oj+1 is given by:
[CLj(θ2)+CLj+1(θ2)]÷[CLj(θ1)+CLj+1(θ1)]
= [Lj(θ2)+Lj+1(θ2)]÷[Lj(θ1)+Lj+1(θ1)]
= [Lj(θ2/θ1)Lj(θ1)+Lj+1(θ2/θ1)Lj+1(θ1)]÷[Lj(θ1)+Lj+1(θ1)]. (10.12.3)
The inequalities at (10.12.2) show that this likelihood ratio is bounded from below by: 
[Lj(θ2/θ1)Lj(θ1)+Lj(θ2/θ1)Lj+1(θ1)]÷[Lj(θ1)+Lj+1(θ1)]
= Lj(θ2/θ1).
This shows that the rounding has produced a more discriminatory odds-ratio test. The 
inequalities at (10.12.2) also show that the likelihood ratio for the rounded datum, i.e. 
the ratio at (10.12.3), is bounded from above by:
[Lj+1(θ2/θ1)Lj(θ1)+Lj+1(θ2/θ1)Lj+1(θ1)]÷[Lj(θ1)+Lj+1(θ1)]
= Lj+1(θ2/θ1).
So the reasoning repeats. Thus increasingly discriminatory odds-ratio tests arise when:
Oj is replaced by Oj∪Oj+1,
Oj∪Oj+1 is replaced by Oj∪Oj+1∪Oj+2, 
Oj∪Oj+1∪Oj+2 is replaced by Oj∪Oj+1∪Oj+2∪Oj+3,
… ,
and so on, until the original order class, Oj, is ultimately replaced by:
Oj∪Oj+1∪Oj+2∪Oj+3∪ … ∪Ok.
The odds ratio produced by this ultimate test is a ratio of significance levels, given by:
Pr(X ∈ Oj∪Oj+1∪Oj+2∪ … ∪Ok| θ = θ2)÷Pr(X ∈ Oj∪Oj+1∪Oj+2∪ … ∪Ok| θ = θ1)
= (ε2+V2)÷(ε1+V1) in the notation used at (10.12.1).
This brings us to Theorem 10.12.2.
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Theorem 10.12.2:
For every given odds-ratio test, a corresponding likelihood-ratio significance test exists; and a more dis-
criminative odds-ratio test is obtained when the given odds ratio is replaced by the corresponding ratio 
of significance levels.
Note that Theorems 10.12.1 and 10.12.2 concern tests directed at the problem of measur-
ing the quality of fit of alternative statistical models in respect of just one solitary real-
world data set. They do not for instance concern the comparison of such tests to hypoth-
esis tests, as the latter kind of test concerns the very different kind of problem of bringing 
populations made to specification into the real world.
10.13   Which variable is the concomitant?
In an analysis of covariance the concomitant variable is usually of no interest in itself, 
having been drawn into the analysis as a predictor variable only; our interest is in the pre-
dicted variable. The likelihood ratio fulfils a similar role in the Neyman-Pearson lemma, 
as we are then not interested in the values of the ratio itself; our interest is in the predicted 
consequences of the ordering it produces. Similarly, in the method of maximum likeli-
hood, interest is in the predicted properties of the resulting estimator, and not in the 
values of the likelihood itself. The point here is that the uncontroversial role of the likeli-
hood function in statistical theory is reasonably described as that of a concomitant vari-
able that is of no interest in itself. By contrast, likelihood inference controversially tries to 
elevate likelihood to a position of primary interest. In Example 10.7.3 the likelihood ratio 
turns out to be a defective concomitant, and in the present chapter we have met a variety 
of such examples. Those examples do not imply that we should never use the likelihood 
as a concomitant variable; they imply only that we cannot always rely on the likelihood as 
a concomitant variable. By way of comparison, we might find an example where last year’s 
wheat yields turn out to be uninformative concomitants for covariance adjustment of this 
year’s turnip yields; but that would not imply that last year’s wheat yields are always poor 
concomitants. Turning then to likelihood inference, we might well ask: ‘Does that not 
mistake the concomitant variation for the variation of primary interest? In other words, is 
that not trying to reverse the roles of the predicted variation and the concomitant varia-
tion?’ There is only one way in which likelihood inference can escape the criticism implied 
by these questions, and that is for it to counter our examples where such inference falls 
short when compared to co-ordination testing, with examples where the opposite would 
be the case. But there appears to be no such examples.
10.14   A definition of statistical inference
In the usage of present-day statistics, the term ‘statistical inference’ expresses a vague no-
tion. Despite common usage to the contrary, the notion of repetitive decision-making under 
statistical risk, when not mistaken for data analysis, may, however, be ruled out, in which 
case statistical inference refers to a variety of received theories about how conclusions are to 
be drawn from given data, for which theories the reader will find Definition 10.14.1 useful.
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Definition 10.14.1:
The term statistical inference refers to any epistemology that posits a constituent in the role of a knowing 
subject, held to be necessary for drawing from given data, statistical conclusions in the form of ‘infer-
ences’ that the knowing subject ‘infers’.
This definition has in effect already been used in Chapters 4 and 6. In Section 10.12 we 
found that in current usage the term ‘likelihood inference’ names a form of test that 
should more appropriately be named an odds-ratio test. Definition 10.14.1 does not 
apply to either co-ordination tests, or to odds-ratio tests, as such tests do not involve 
the notion of a knowing subject who infers the inferences and so might or might not 
infer mistakenly. The definition does not define the term ‘inference’, and thereby accom-
modates hypothesis tests, where an inference is a decision by the knowing subject, and 
significance tests, where an inference is a potential decision by the knowing subject. 
Chapter 12 will show that the definition also accommodates Bayesian inference, where 
an inference is a metaphysical belief arrived at by the knowing subject.
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Chapter 11
BAYES’S THEOREM
a forMula in frequency Physics
11.1 Introduction
In this chapter we develop a theorem of Bayes (1763). It has become associated with a 
long-standing controversy that has nothing at all to do with the theorem as such. So, the 
purpose of this chapter is to make that entirely clear, i.e. to make it clear that Bayes’s theo-
rem is a perfectly respectable part of frequency physics. The development will rely largely 
on examples.
11.2 An explanatory example
Consider three cards: one red on both sides, one red on one side and white on the other 
side, one white on both sides. One card is drawn at random and laid down on one side. 
The visible side is red. With what frequency in such cases is the other side white? The 
answer is not one half; it is one third, as we will now show. 
Label the sides as follows:
Card 1: (Red 1, Red 2). Card 2: (Red 3, White 3). Card 3: (White 2, White 1).
Then the appropriate sample space comprises six equally frequent cases, as follows:
Top side: Red 1 Red 2 Red 3 White 3 White 2 White 1
Bottom side: Red 2 Red 1 White 3 Red 3 White 1 White 2 (11.2.1)
Three cases have ‘top red’, of which one case has ‘bottom white’. The problem can also 
be solved using Bayes’s theorem, which we now derive. Take A = ‘red top’, B = ‘white bot-
tom’, and consider the elementary form:
Pr(A & B) = Pr(A)Pr(B|A), where B|A denotes B given A. (11.2.2)
We want to evaluate Pr(B|A), and we can do that by solving from the equation at (11.2.2) 
as follows, where the numerical information is obtained by counting ‘favourable cases 
out of six’ at (11.2.1):
(1÷6) = (3÷6)Pr(B|A), i.e., Pr(B|A) = 1÷3, as before.
Interchanging the roles of A and B at (11.2.2), we have:
Pr(A & B) = Pr(B)Pr(A|B), (11.2.3)
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and by inserting the right-hand side of the equation at (11.2.2) instead of P(A & B) in the 
equation at (11.2.3), we obtain the simplest form of Bayes’s theorem, namely:
Pr(B|A) = Pr(B)Pr(A|B)÷Pr(A). (11.2.4)
Denote ‘white bottom’ as B1 and ‘red bottom’ as B2. Then the equation at (11.2.4) refers 
to B1, and the reasoning leading to that equation repeats with B2 instead of B1. The equa-
tion at (11.2.4) can thus be made more explicit as:
Pr(Bj|A) = Pr(Bj)Pr(A|Bj)÷Pr(A) for j = 1, 2. (11.2.5)
Here Pr(A) can be expressed in terms of the other quantities involved at (11.2.5), as:
Pr(A) = Pr(A & B1)+Pr(A & B2)
          = Pr(B1)Pr(A|B1) +  Pr(B2)Pr(A|B2).
So, the result at (11.2.5) shows that for discrete sample spaces the theorem takes the form:
Pr(Bj|A) = Pr(Bj)Pr(A|Bj)÷[Pr(B1)Pr(A|B1)+Pr(B2)Pr(A|B2)] for j = 1, 2. (11.2.6)
Interest in Bayes’s theorem arises largely because of applications where an A-like event is 
preceded by an unknown B-like event, such that for each one of the different B-like events 
the theorem enables us to find the probability that that particular one was the predeces-
sor. Its attraction in the pursuit the statistical inference will-o’-the-wisp is therefore obvi-
ous. However, the premises of the theorem must be provided, and there lies the rub. Thus 
for instance, the following example from Reichenbach (1949) shows the attraction of the 
theorem for statistical inference, the difficulty of supplying its premises, and that it is 
sometimes difficult to make appropriate sense out of the answer it provides.
Example 11.2.1
‘Mr Smith’s gardener is not dependable; the probability that he will forget to water the 
rosebush during Smith’s absence is 2/3. The rosebush is in a questionable condition, 
anyhow; if watered the probability of its withering is 1/2; if it is not watered, the prob-
ability of its withering is 3/4. Upon returning, Smith finds that the rosebush has with-
ered. What is the probability that the gardener did not water the rosebush?’
Let B1 represent the event that the rosebush is watered, B2 the event that it is not watered, 
and A the event that it withers. We want to evaluate Pr(B2|A), which the theorem says is:
            Pr(B2)Pr(A|B2)                 =           (2/3)(3/4)            = 3/4. 
Pr(B1)Pr(A|B1)+Pr(B2)Pr(A|B2)     (1/3)(1/2)+(2/3)(3/4)
This example has a certain charm typical of many textbook examples that are supposed to help 
us come to grips with Bayes’s theorem. And, like many of its kind, one needs to be alert to its 
premises. How are the given probabilities obtained? We must also be alert as to the possible 
lack of sense made by the answer obtained. What population of cases does it belong to? In the 
present instance, a stereotypic array would seem to be the only real-world possibility.
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11.3 Some general forms
In the previous section, a datum, A, is used to form an opinion on which B-like unknown 
was involved. So, for notation more in line with that of previous chapters, let us envisage 
A as a randomly sampled value, X = x, and B as a parameter, q ∈ {q1, q2, q3, …}, which in 
the case of Bayes’s theorem is of course also a random variable. Then a general form cor-
responding to the special case obtained at (11.2.6) is given by Theorem 11.3.1.
Theorem 11.3.1: Bayes’s theorem in case of a discrete parameter space
If q1, q2, q3, …, qk, denotes a mutually exclusive and exhaustive partition of a sample space, such that 
Pr(q = qj) ≠ 0 for j = 1, 2, 3, …, k, and if X denotes a random variable, such that Pr(X = x) ≠ 0, then
Pr(q = qj|X = x) = 
Pr(q = qj)Pr(X = x|q = qJ)        for j = 1, 2, 3, …, k. 
                              k 
                              ∑ Pr(q = qi)Pr(X = x|q = qi) 
                              i=1
The denominator on the right-hand side of the equation that expresses the conclusion 
in the theorem is just a normalising constant, say C. So, for practical purposes the recipe 
given by the theorem can be expressed as:
Pr(q = qj|X = x) = C
-1Pr(q = qj)Pr(X = x|q = qj) for j = 1, 2, 3, ..., k,
or simply in mnemonic form as:
h(q|x) = C-1f(q)g(x|q), (11.3.1)
where h(•), f(•), and g(•) denote the appropriate density functions, and where by sum-
ming or integrating over the parameter space, C is obtained as:
∑[f(q)g(x|q)] if q is discrete, and ∫[f(q)g(x|q)]dq if q is continuous. (11.3.2)
We refer to f(q) as the prior distribution of q, and to h(q|x) as the posterior distribution of 
q. Since any constant arising from g(x|q) is absorbed by C-1, g(x|q) is interpretable as the 
likelihood of q, given the data.
Example 11.3.1
Player A rolls a billiard ball at random with respect to the length of a billiard table taken 
to be one unit in length, and removes the ball. Player B must try to discover how A’s ball 
bisected the table, q:(1-q), using a geometric sampling model for the number of attempts 
required when repeatedly also rolling the ball at random, till the ball first comes to rest 
beyond q (0 < q < 1). Let the number of unsuccessful attempts be denoted by X = x. By us-
ing the forms at (11.3.1) and (11.3.2), the distribution of q given x is found to be:
                                                       1 
h(q|x) = C-1(1)[qx(1-q)], and C = 
 
∫qx(1-q)dq which equals         1            . 
                                                     
  
                                          (x+1)(x+2)
 
                                                       0
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So, the distribution is given by: 
h(q|x) = (x+1)(x+2) qx (1-q), whose modus is at q = x÷(x+1).
For x < 1 the distribution is positively skewed, for x = 1 it is symmetric, and for x > 1 it is 
negatively skewed. This was Thomas Bayes’s favourite example, except that he took the 
sampling to be binomial rather than negative binomial. The reader should note that if the 
given data (x failures and one success) had been obtained by binomial sampling, the same 
posterior would have been obtained – a fact that has prompted much learned confusion.
Example 11.3.2
Mood, Graybill, and Boes (1974, p. 347) represent x1, x2, x3, ..., xn, as the realisation of a 
random sample from an N(m, 1²) population, where m is an N(x0, 1²) random variable in 
the first place. Bayes’s theorem shows that the posterior distribution of m is that of an
N[(x0+x1+x2+x3+...+xn)÷(n+1), (1÷√n+1)
2] random variable.
Thus the contribution of the prior is equivalent to one additional observation.
For a more general result, consider an observation, x, which may be represented as:
N(m, s2) with s2 known,
and where m may be represented as:
N(n, t2) with n and t2 both known.
Then the posterior distribution of m (Kempthorne and Folks, 1971, p. 300) turns out to be:
                                    
x        n
 
                                        +                                   s2     t2 
N(l, f2) where l =                   , and f2 =         1            . (11.3.3) 
                                    1        1                      1        1 
                                        +                                 + 
                                  
s2     t2                     s2      t2
Remark 1: Apart from the foregoing, if x and n are uncorrelated estimates of the same 
quantity m, the minimum variance linearly combined estimate and its variance are given 
by the two equations at (11.3.3), respectively. So, the prior contributes information that 
in this case can formally be expressed as if obtained by sampling.                    (11.3.4)
Remark 2: If t2 takes on some very large value corresponding to an uninformative prior 
(a so-called diffuse prior), the forms at (11.3.3) allow us to pass from:
X being N(m, s2) to m being N(x, s2). (11.3.5)
We will return to these remarks in Chapters 12 and 13.
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11.4 Bayes’s Theorem in decision-making under risk
For all its mathematical simplicity Bayes’s theorem has little to contribute to real-world 
statistical data analysis. The reason for that is simply that the notion of a prior distribu-
tion seldom corresponds to reality. (However, the extent of the theorem’s contribution 
to ivory-tower statistics is an entirely different matter – as we will see later.) The follow-
ing examples indicate that the theorem, as a formula in frequency physics, can be useful 
in special circumstances.
Example 11.4.1
Suppose that large consignments of components are regularly received for manufactory. 
Let 1-q denote the proportion of defective items in such a consignment. Let n-X denote 
the number of defective items in a pseudo-random sample of size n. If X is represented 
as a Bn(n, q) random variable, and if the historical record of consignments indicates 
that q can be represented as a random variable with the Beta1(a, b) distribution
g(q) = [Γ(a+b)÷Γ(a)Γ(b)]qa-1(1-q)b-1 
for a and b determined from the historical record, it follows from the recipes at (11.3.1) and 
(11.3.2) that the posterior distribution of q is also a Beta1 distribution given for X = x by: 
h(q|x) = [Γ(n+a+b)÷Γ(x+a)Γ(n-x + b)]qx+a-1(1-q)n-x+b-1. (11.4.1)
From this it can be shown to follow that:
  1-q     n-x+b  = Snedecor’s F on 2(x+a) and 2(n-x+b) df. (11.4.2) 
    q        x+a
By inserting, in turn, the upper and lower 5% critical values of F into the form at (11.4.2) 
and solving for q , lower and upper one-sided 95% confidence limits for q are obtained. 
An inspector of consignments, who wants to accept only consignments with 1 − q < 0.10 
apart from a 1-in-20 chance of erroneous acceptances, could try to accomplish that by 
rejecting any particular consignment if the lower limit for q turns out to be < 0.90 for 
that consignment, because
1-the lower limit for q = the upper limit for 1-q.
Thus the inspector must reject those consignments for which the calculated confidence 
limit for 1-q, given by:
1 -      (n-x+b)           for the appropriate critical value of F, exceeds 1-q = 0.10. 
     (n-x+b)+(x+a)F
For instance, if (x, n) = (5, 100) and (a, b) = (10, 105),
the 5% critical value of F on 2(100-5+105) = 400 and 2(5+10) = 30 df. is 1.65,
and so the requisite upper bound is given by:
1 -            (100-5-105)              = 1-0.89, i.e. 0.11, which is > 0.10. 
     (100-5+105)+(5+10)(1.65)
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Such a consignment would therefore be rejected. Alternatively, when inserting 1-q = 0.10 
as the hypothesised value at (11.4.2), the observed F = 1.48 on 400 and 30 df., which falls 
short of F = 1.65, thus indicating that 1-q larger than 0.10 is required for significance at the 
5 % level. So we find again that such a consignment would be rejected. It might seem that 
for fixed n =100, the inspector’s decision rule should be:
Accept consignments with X = 0, 1, 2, or 3. Reject those with X = 4, 5, 6, … .
The presentation of a scientific theory should, however, always exhibit its full potential. 
So consider a decision-maker, who computes the following significance levels:
X = 3, observed F =      0.10     x   202   = 1.7265 on 404 and 26 df. SL = 0.047, and 
                                    1-0.10          13
X = 4, observed F =     0.10     x   201   = 1.5952 on 402 and 28 df. SL = 0.067, and 
                                    1-0.10          14
who realises that an auxiliary device that produces the numbers Y = 1, 2, 3, … 20 with equal 
frequency would enable specs to be met more precisely by means of the following decision 
rule:
If X = 0, 1, 2, 3, accept the consignment.
If X = 4, draw Y.
If Y = 1, 2, 3, accept the consignment.
If Y = 4, 5, 6, …, 20, reject the consignment.
If X = 5, 6, 7, …, 100, reject the consignment. (11.4.3)
It would be absurdly silly for an inspector who wishes to please his masters by realising 
a 5% error rate as they specified, to shy away from using such a decision rule. So let us 
proceed to the decision-maker’s workplace, where we witness repetitive sampling being 
used to bring a population (a host of individuals) into the real world, as follows:
Consignment 1: (n, X) = (100, 5). The consignment is rejected.
Consignment 2: (n, X) = (100, 4), Y = 3. The consignment is accepted.
Consignment 3: (n, X) = (100, 4), Y = 7. The consignment is rejected.
Consignment 4: (n, X) = (100, 2). The consignment is accepted.
… (11.4.4)
In respect of this host, the inspector forecasts (correctly):
‘Mark my words, less than one in twenty accepted consignments will turn out to 
be defective.’ (11.4.5)
Example 11.4 2
Let us recall that the decision-maker of Example 3.2.2 wanted assurance that the aver-
age content of the active ingredient in certain roots containing insecticide would be at 
least eight parts per hundred apart from a 1-in-100 chance of error. Roots were available 
in batches and the decision-maker had to accept or reject, per batch, on the basis of the 
mean amount of active ingredient in nine bundles of roots drawn from that batch. The 
decision-maker used a historical record showing that the means can be satisfactorily 
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represented as realisations of independent normal random variables whose expectations 
represented the amounts of insecticide for corresponding batches, and whose variances 
were from that record known to be given (in parts per 100 squared) by:
s2 = (3.30÷√9)2. (11.4.6)
It now appears that an extension of the same historical record might also show that the 
distribution of the batch means is satisfactorily represented as:
an N(n, t2) population with n and t2 both known.
Then the forms at (11.3.3) can be brought to bear by way of achieving the same operat-
ing characteristics with fewer than nine bundles per batch, as follows:
Suppose that the values n = 9.120 and t2 = 3.63 are obtained from the historical record. 
Then the forms at (11.3.3) and the information at (11.4.6) show that the decision-maker 
can meet specs drawing only n roots per bindle, for n such that
   n    +   1    =    9    , that is to say, for n = 6 bundles, 
3.302    3.63     3.302
and where the decision rule is now that any given batch of insecticide roots is classified 
as acceptable if and only if the weighted linear combination of the mean of six bundles 
drawn from that batch, n, and the mean of the population of batches, X, exceeds 
8+Z×(the standard error of the weighted combination), where Z will be exceeded by 
N(0, 1²) random variables only one in a hundred times, i.e. Z = 2.330. (11.4.7)
The weights for X and v are given respectively by:
         1        = 0.5510 and     1    = 0.2755, totalling 0.5510+0.2755 = 0.8265. 
(3.30÷√6)3                         3.63
So the weighted combination of the two sources of information is given by:
(0.5510 X+0.2755 n)÷0.8265 
= 0.667 X+3.040
when n = 9.120 is inserted, (11.4.8)
and its standard error is given at (11.3.3) as the square root of the reciprocal of the total 
weight, which turns out to be 1.100. Therefore the decision rule at (11.4.7) is to accept a 
given batch when and only when:
0.667 X+3.04 > 8+2.330(1.100), i.e when and only when X > 11.28.
Let us then proceed to the decision-maker’s workplace, where we find that by repetitive 
pseudo-sampling the decision-maker is bringing a population (a host of individuals) into 
the real world, as follows:
{X = 12.22, accept}, {X = 9.32, reject}, {X = 14.12, accept}, … (11.4.9)
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In respect of this host, the decision-maker forecasts (correctly):
‘Mark my words, less than one in a hundred accepted batches will turn out to be 
defective.’ (11.4.10)
In principle the forecast can be improved by a randomised decision rule, as X has been 
measured on a discrete grid of class marks spaced 0.01 units apart.
11.5 Bayes’s theorem in data analysis
We now give some examples of the use of Bayes’s theorem in data analysis. We remark 
in advance that the examples will seem to be contrived. There is a reason for that, which 
is to be discussed in the next section.
Example 11.5.1
With reference to Example 11.4.1, Ms Spare Parts is delighted to learn that, owing to the 
data representing her consignment, (n, x) = (100, 2), the consignment was accepted, but 
she wonders whether she might have been rather lucky. So let her ask us to investigate 
which values of the mean of her particular batch, θ, are consonant with the data. We are 
of course aware that as a matter of public knowledge the batch mean can be represented 
as having been sampled at random from a Beta1(a, b) population with (a, b) = (10, 105). 
This brings into the human mind the class of models given at (11.4.1). In fact, the class 
of present interest is given more specifically by: 
h(θ|x = 2) = [Γ(n+a+b)÷Γ(2+a)Γ(n-2+b)]θ2+a-1(1-θ)n-2+b-1. (11.5.1)
Even more specifically, inserting n = 100 and (a, b) = (10, 105) at (11.4.2), the posterior 
distribution of θ for the particular batch of interest is represented by:
   1-q     203   = Snedecor’s F on 24 and 406 df. (11.5.2) 
    q        12
Inserting appropriate F values into the equation at (11.5.2) and solving for the index θ, 
the position of the mental correlate of the given datum, x = 2, within the correspondingly 
indexed members of the class of models as hypothesised at (11.5.1) is traced as follows:
The correlate is situated respectively at:
(0.08, ε, •) and (•, ε, 0.08) within the members indexed by θ = 0.038 and 0.094,
(0.04, ε, •) and (•, ε, 0.04) within the members indexed by θ = 0.034 and 0.104, and
(0.02, ε, •) and (•, ε, 0.02) within the members indexed by θ = 0.030 and 0.113.
The facts conveyed by this trace can, if needs be by simulation, be forced upon the hu-
man body, where we could then point and say:
‘See for yourself that any member indexed by a value in excess of θ = 0.10 fits the 
given data poorly.’ (11.5.3)
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We note in passing that this does not address Ms Spare Parts’s problem. In fact, science in 
general, statistical or otherwise, can recognise an instance of misleading data, only by fur-
ther investigation, either via comparable data that might directly expose the misleading 
data as such, or via further data that might indirectly expose the misleading data as not 
making sense. (Note that this also applies to an outlier.) In short, scientific investiga-
tion can never accomplish more that to establish whether or not a particular model of 
interest is consonant or dissonant with the accumulated data (or of course with theory 
arising from the accumulated data).
Comparison of Examples 11.4.1 and 11.5.1
In Example 11.4.1 repetitive sampling takes place in the real world; in Example 11.5.1 
repetitive sampling takes place in the human mind only. In Example 11.4.1 the decision-
maker brings a population (a host comprising many individuals) into the real world; 
in Example 11.5.1 the investigator addresses just a single, solitary real-world individual 
called the ‘given data set’. In Example 11.4.1 the decision-maker is not so silly as to shy 
away from using an auxiliary random device when that helps to meet specs; in Example 
11.5.1 the investigator is not so silly as to try to augment the given data with any vacuous 
‘data’ obtained post hoc by using a random device. In Example 11.4.1 the decision-maker 
forecasts by saying: ‘Mark my words …’; in Example 11.5.1 the investigator points at the 
relevant facts by saying: ‘See for yourself …’. In Example 11.4.1 the decision-maker tries to 
realise a specified error rate; in Example 11.5.1 the concept of an error rate does not ap-
ply – in fact cannot even be sensibly defined – as there is no sensible room for such a rate 
when we are pointing at facts. We challenge the reader to note very carefully that each 
of these five comparisons employs a diagnostic of the distinction between, on the one 
hand, the pursuit of statistical knowledge (data analysis) and, on the other hand, the use 
of statistical knowledge (decision-making under risk), as defined by Definitions 1.2.1 and 
1.2.2. Moreover (and this is not to be overlooked), the diagnostics also warn us when the 
statistical literature fails to draw that distinction, as much of the literature indeed fails to 
do, with confusing consequences.
Example 11.5.2
Consider the second consignment referred to at (11.4.9) and let us suppose that it came 
from a particular one amongst various producers of insecticide roots. Call that producer 
Mr Bane, and let us suppose that he is rather upset about his batch having been rejected, 
and so decides to investigate the matter by drawing anew six bundles from that particu-
lar batch. The new mean that then arises, say x = 12.11, is a single, solitary real-world 
item, which brings into the human mind a class of models, as follows:
The given mean, x, can be represented as a solitary realisation of an N[µ, (3.30÷√6)²] 
random variable, where µ can in turn be represented as an earlier solitary realisa-
tion of an N(n, t²) random variable, it being known by virtue of an analysis of the 
earlier (and very extensive) data set that n = 9.120 and t² = 3.63.
Referring to the result at (11.4.8), there is thus brought to mind the following elimina-
tion pivot for the value of µ in Mr Bane’s particular case:
Z = µ-(0.667x+3.040) = µ-11.12, is an N(0, 1²) random variable. (11.5.4)
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For instance, if Z = 1.96, i.e. if the hypothesised µ = 1.96+11.12 = 13.08, then the mental 
correlate of the given datum, 0.667x+3.040 = 11.12, is being placed at (0.025, ε, 0.975) in the 
hypothesised member of the class of models. Thus, inserting appropriate Z values at (11.5.4) 
and then solving for µ, the situation of the mental correlate of the given datum within cor-
respondingly indexed members of the class of models, is traced respectively at:
(0.03, ε, •) and (•, ε, 0.03) within the members indexed by µ = 9.2 and 13.0,
(0.06, ε, •) and (•, ε, 0.06) within the members indexed by µ = 9.6 and 12.7,
(0.09, ε, •) and (•, ε, 0.09) within the members indexed by µ = 9.8 and 12.5,
and on these facts µ = 8 parts per 100 is hardly tenable.
The facts conveyed by this trace can, if needs be by simulation, be forced upon the hu-
man body, where we could then point and say:
‘See for yourself that any member indexed by a value less than µ = 8 fits the given 
data very poorly.’
What Mr Bane could do with this information is moot, but that need not concern us here.
Comparison of Examples 11.4.2 and 11.5.2
All that was previously stated in the comparisons between Examples 11.4.1 and 11.5.1 
also applies to Examples 11.4.2 and 11.5.2, respectively.
11.6 Of how much practical use is Bayes’s theorem?
In the case of data analysis the answer to this question is ‘very little’. The reason for this 
is indicated by the contrived nature of Examples 11.5.1 and 11.5.2. They are contrived, 
as we must explain how the historical record that is requisite for the prior might have 
come about. It then appears at once that such a record is unlikely to arise otherwise 
than as an array of recorded activity aimed at some or other form of ongoing quality 
control. And from that it appears that an investigative activity aimed at trying to form 
an opinion about how just one particular term of such an array might have come about, 
is rather difficult to motivate. So in fact the practical uses of Bayes’s theorem (apart from 
purely theoretical development) seem to be found mainly in forms of industrial process 
control. That of course does not concern us; our concern is data analysis, not statisti-
cal technology. We note, however, that refined methods for the accumulation and on-
going feed-back of prior information for such technology have been developed under 
the name empirical Bayes procedures. For a definitive account of those procedures, the 
interested reader is referred to Maritz (1989).
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Chapter 12
INVESTIGATION MISTAKEN FOR THE  
METAPHYSICS OF BELIEF
the bayesian vicious circle
12.1 Introduction
The term ‘Bayesian inference’, as conventionally understood, does not refer to the use of 
Bayes’s rule in frequency physics; it refers to a metaphysical view of how an investigator 
must respond to statistical data. We must begin by explaining the term ‘metaphysical’ 
as it is used here, which will show how Bayesian inference has divided the statistical 
profession into two irreconcilably different schools of thought. In itself that would not 
necessarily persuade the reader to reject Bayesian inference. Otherwise why would there 
be the two different schools of thought? However, we also show that Bayesian inferences 
cannot be simulated, rest on a ramshackle foundation, are incoherent despite claims to 
the contrary, and cannot avoid circular reasoning. We note in advance that the litera-
ture on Bayesian inference, like the rest of present-day statistical literature, often fails 
to draw a distinction between informative data analysis (the pursuit of knowledge) and 
decision-making under risk (the use of knowledge). In this book, Bayesian inference 
concerns the problem of data analysis, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
12.2 Personal probabilities
Consider the proposition ‘South Africa’s next state president will be a Zulu.’ Suppose 
that if you answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ and your answer turns out to be correct, you receive R100 
in prize money. If your answer is ‘no’, an interpretation of that would be that your per-
sonal probability of the next president being a Zulu is < 0.50. Let a further offer then be 
R20 if ‘no’ proves to be correct and R80 if ‘yes’ proves to be correct. Then if, in respect 
of the second offer, your answer is ‘yes’, the interpretation of that would be that your 
personal probability of the next president being a Zulu is > 0.20. Continuing in this way 
your personal probabilities of yes and no are measured as say 0.35 and 0.65, respectively. 
Such probabilities are metaphysical; that is to say, they are incapable of being forced 
onto the human body. There is a simple proof of this, as follows: let a cocktail consist in 
equal proportions of vermouth, lemon juice and gin. Then inasmuch as mathematical 
probability is simply the mathematics of proportional constituency we may describe the 
composition of the cocktail as:
Pr(vermouth) = 1/3.     Pr(lemon juice) = 1/3.     Pr(gin) = 1/3. (12.2.1)
And inasmuch as vermouth and gin are alcoholic drinks, which lemon juice is not,
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Pr(alcoholic) = ²/3 .     Pr(non-alcoholic) = 1/3 . (12.2.2)
Similarly,
Pr(gin|alcoholic) = ½. (12.2.3)
The forms at (12.2.1, 12.2.2 and 12.2.3) express physical facts, that is to say, express facts 
that can be forced upon the human body. Now opposed to that, consider a plant whose 
flowers might turn out to be scarlet, magenta or white, and consider also a person who 
has no inkling which colour they might turn out to be. Such a person’s personal pro-
babilities would then necessarily seem to be:
Pr(scarlet) = 1/3 .     Pr(magenta) = 1/3 .     Pr(white) = 1/3 . (12.2.4)
Otherwise that person’s probabilities would seem to be idiosyncratic, that is to say, to be 
incapable of explanation. However, inasmuch as scarlet and magenta are shades of red, 
the choice at (12.2.4) implies:
Pr(red) = ²/3 .     Pr(white) = 1/3 . (12.2.5)
Whereas whatever considerations lead to the personal probabilities at (12.2.4), it would 
seem that by the self-same considerations, the personal probabilities at (12.2.5) instead 
should be:
Pr(red) = ½.     Pr(white) = ½. (12.2.6)
The point here is that when the mathematics of proportional constituency expresses a 
physical constituency, contradictions like that at (12.2.5) and (12.2.6) cannot arise. No 
matter as to whether such physical constituency is that of mixed drinks, or urns with 
scarlet, magenta and white chips, or long-run frequencies, or different kinds amongst 
Imelda Marcos’s shoes. Hence a ‘personal probability’ is a metaphysical notion. The fore-
going proof can be expressed in different ways. For instance, a non-Zulu president might 
nevertheless be a Nguni, such as a Swazi or a Xhosa, or might be a non-Nguni, such as 
an Afrikaner, or a Basuto, or a Shangaan, or a Venda, or … . Again, consider a random 
variable whose distribution is uniform, as given by the density
f(θ) = 1 for 0 < θ < 1, and zero otherwise. (12.2.7)
Let θ = η(1-η)÷4. Then the distribution of η is triangular, as given by the density
g(η) = (1-2η)÷4 for 0 < η < ½ , and zero otherwise. (12.2.8)
So if the density at (12.2.7) is supposed to characterise ignorance about the value of θ, the 
corresponding ignorance about the value of η would have to be characterised, not by the 
density at (12.2.8), which would then be expressing knowledge about the value of η, but by
g(η) = 2 for 0 < η < ½, and zero otherwise.
To have thus mistaken physics for metaphysics has inescapable consequences because 
metaphorically speaking it hangs an albatross from the neck of a Bayesian inference. It 
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has for instance been proposed that for sampling from an N(µ, 1²) population, prior ig-
norance about the value of µ is to be expressed by the improper prior according to which 
the density of µ is ‘zero from -∞ to +∞’. As such a prior is in effect ‘infinitely diffuse’, as 
explained at (11.3.5), it then follows that
x from an N(µ, 1²) population, amounts to µ from an N(x, 1²) population. (12.2.9)
But the notion of a constant having a density of ‘zero from -∞ to +∞’ is physically mean-
ingless. So, despite all its mathematical elegance, a physically meaningless prior will result 
in (and this is the albatross) a posterior that is also physically meaningless; a posterior that 
is incapable of being simulated; a posterior whose meaning cannot be forced upon the hu-
man body. It will be found that the albatross is inescapable. So let us underscore this, by 
introducing the notation bPr(•) for personal probability (i.e. for ‘belief Pr(•)’) as opposed 
to Pr(•) for long-run frequency. At (12.2.9) for instance,
Pr(x > 1.645) = 0.05, and bPr(µ > 1.645) = 0.05,
with widely different meaning, despite formal similarity.
12.3 A metaphysical view
In Bayesian inference the index of a class of models is treated as if it were a random variable, 
when it is, by universal agreement, a fixed constant. This might seem self-contradictory, yet 
technically its justification is extremely simple, as follows:
‘Yes we know full well that θ is indeed a constant; however, the probabilities we 
attach to its different possible values express our beliefs in terms of our personal 
probabilities that those would be the correct values.’ (12.3.1)
A Bayesian can thus introduce prior personal probabilities and, given suitable data, can 
convert prior personal probabilities to posterior personal probabilities by means of The-
orem 12.3.1, which is often attributed to Thomas Bayes on dubious grounds.
Theorem 12.3.1: (possibly due to Bayes, and possibly not)
Let θ1, θ2, θ3, …, θk, denote the values of the index, θ, of a class of models.
Let bPr(θ = θ j) ≠ 0 for j = 1, 2, 3, …, k.
Let X denote a random variable such that Pr(X = x) ≠ 0.
Then
b Pr(q = qj|X = x) =  
b Pr(q = qj) Pr(X = x|q = qj)  for j = 1, 2, 3, …, k. 
                                 k 
                                ∑b Pr(q = qi) Pr(X = x|q = qi) 
                                i=1
The reader might find it revealing to consider Example 11.2.1 in the present context, and 
to interpret the probabilities of the gardener forgetting (or not) to water the rosebush, and 
of the rosebush withering (or not), as the personal probabilities of Mr Smith. The point 
to note is that such an interpretation is psychologically persuasive, especially when the 
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means of replacing those personal probabilities with apodictic probabilities is daunting, 
or impractical, or not readily available, or worse. And that precisely is the attraction that 
Theorem 12.3.1 has for those decision-makers who must rely largely on archival resources 
for requisite empirical information. Consider for instance how an agricultural economist 
must decide on the alternatives of stock farming with goats, or springbuck, or ostriches in 
the Three Sisters area of the Great Karoo. Much archival information is available, but not 
all that is needed. What would a realistic stocking rate, q, for springbuck be? The available 
empirical data might be insufficient, and any prospect of further empirical determination 
not an option. So, resorting instead to the extraction of expert belief is attractive. The ar-
gument in favour of this is that such belief, albeit based on vague knowledge, should in the 
absence of facts be used – the word ‘used’ is crucial, as it signals the use of knowledge, as 
opposed to the pursuit of knowledge. So, whilst we may tolerate these ideas in respect of a 
decision-maker’s needs, we must firmly resist the notion that belief in the sense that here 
concerns us, can be interpreted as a kind of knowledge rather than of conjecture. We must 
also resist the notion that such a conjecture could sensibly refer to a distribution other than 
one with physical meaning. To that end let us revisit Mr Smith’s gardener, and let us suppose 
that Mr Smith has recorded that on 12 of 35 occasions the gardener forgot to water the rose 
bush. And let us, for the sake of argument, also suppose that Mr Smith obstinately tries to 
grow a rose bush in an unsuitable place, despite a record showing that previously four of 
nine rose bushes perished there, despite having been watered, and six of seven rose bush-
es perished there, perhaps owing to not having been watered. Then, by using estimated 
probabilities (frequencies) in place of the purported probabilities used in the calculation at 
(11.2.7), we can estimate the probability (the long-run frequency) with which the gardener 
would have forgotten to water the rosebush in those cases in which it withered, as follows: 
             Pr(B2)Pr(A|B2)                 =             (12/35)(6/7)              = 1/2. (12.3.2) 
Pr(B1)Pr(A|B1) + Pr(B2)Pr(A|B2)      (23/35)(4/9) + (12/35)(6/7)
Let us now ask our Bayesian friends:
‘With reference to your Theorem 12.3.1, can we point at our calculation at (12.3.2) 
as an exemplification of the kind of interpretation you would have us make of 
your use of that theorem?’
It will be found that the answer is ‘No, not at all!’ On this Bayesians are adamant. So it 
would seem that though we are dealing with a familiar logic, we were not supposed to 
interpret it as at (12.3.2). Let us then ask Miss Evelyn Rosenthall (1965) to refresh our un-
derstanding of the incompleteness of any logic. She considers (p. 205) the system of logic 
displayed in Table 12.3.1, and explains: ‘Mathematicians would love to be able to prove 
that the sets of axioms they use are consistent and that no contradictions can ever arise 
… However, in 1931 … Kurt Goedel proved that this ambition can never be realized: it is 
impossible to prove that a set of axioms for a system is consistent without going outside 
the system into a more complex one whose consistency is equally doubtful.’ By ‘system’ she 
means system of logic. However, by going outside logic itself into science, it can be shown 
that the foregoing system is consistent. Miss Rosenthall does this by pointing at the model 
reproduced in Figure 12.3.1(a), where rasks are lines and syrls are points. The model is 
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Table 12.3.1: A logic to which different scientific meanings can be adjoined
Undefined terms: rask, syrl
Axioms: (1) Each syrl has exactly one rask in common with every other syrl.
  (2) Each rask is on exactly two syrls.
  (3) There are exactly four syrls.
Among the theorems that can be deduced are:
Theorem 1: There are exactly six rasks.
Theorem 2: Each syrl contains exactly three rasks.
Theorem 3: For each rask, there is exactly one other rask not on the same syrl.
a triangular pyramid. We note that here, as in all science, any proof must ultimately ap-
peal to the human body as the overriding arbiter of truth. Miss Rosenthall underscores 
this by way of a second, quite different, physical interpretation she obtains by pointing at 
the model reproduced in Figure 12.3.1(b), where rasks are points and syrls are lines. From 
our point of view the crux of the matter is that no matter how persuasive a mathematical 
argument might be, ultimately scientific meaning and truth rely on pointing. And so, no 
matter how persuasive the metaphysics of a Bayesian use of Bayes’s theorem might be, 
ultimately the test of whether or not it has value for investigative science must necessar-
ily be sought in its answer to the question ‘What are you pointing at?’ Miss Rosenthall 
has taught us that a formal system can be made to point at different physical (bodily) 
experiences, and we have clearly understood that our Bayesian friends are adamant that 
their use of mathematical probability does not point at experiences of the kind we intro-
duced at (12.3.2). So let us accept that the axioms of Kolmogoroff (1933) lead to a purely 
formal logic called ‘mathematical probability’, which logic makes no reference to the 
physical world, but can, as we have seen by way of different applications to the physics of 
proportional constituency, be made to point at physical experiences other than frequen-
cies, experiences such as the proportional constituency of mixed drinks. So let us ask our 
Figure 12.3.1(a): In this figure, syrls are 
 points and rasks are lines
Figure 12.3.1(b): In this figures, rasks are 
 points and syrls are lines
rask
syrl
syrl
rask
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Bayesians friends: ‘As you are not pointing at frequencies, what are you pointing at?’ Alas! 
After more than two centuries of debate and development, Bayesian inference fails to 
produce an answer that is understandable to the majority of statisticians. In fact (and this 
is the albatross) the metaphysical nature of Bayesian inferences cannot be shaken off: try 
to replace the belief probabilities by resulting expected values, then those are belief ex-
pectations; try to replace those expectations with resulting losses or gains, then those are 
belief losses or belief gains. And so on. No matter what, the albatross keeps on surfacing 
whenever we ask: ‘How is that to be put to the human body?’
Let us note in passing that also, no matter how persuasive the metaphysics of a Bayesian 
use of ‘Bayes’s theorem’ might be, ultimately the test of whether or not it has value for 
scientific technology, that is to say for the use of scientific knowledge, must necessarily 
be sought in its answer to the question ‘What are you forecasting?
12.4 On the notion of ‘vague knowledge’
It is well worth noting that the notion of ‘vague knowledge’ is an offshoot of the idée fixe, 
as the latter has conditioned some of us to accept statements such as ‘… and there is all of 
a 95% probability that this conclusion is correct’, where that is but a short step removed 
from statements of the kind ‘… my personal odds are 19:1 in favour of that’. Thus the idée 
fixe has lead to a general failure to recognise that metaphysical odds cannot be explained 
in terms of belief; such an ‘explanation’ is a cop-out, because a scientific explanation, even 
when rejected, must at the very least try to explain physical (bodily) experience. In any 
case, it is meaningless to imply that one can ‘know something 95%’; one might know 
something, or one might not know something, but the idea of one’s having a degree of 
knowledge, is utter nonsense. That does not imply that knowledge cannot be fragmentary 
in the sense of not knowing all of certain requisite facts. After all, an investigator is some-
one who is short of facts, that is to say, who is in a state of partial ignorance.
12.5 A ramshackle foundation
The odds on q = qj as opposed to q = qk is given according to Theorem 12.3.1 by:
b Pr(q = qj) x 
Pr(X = x | q = qj) = 
b Pr(q = qj | X = x)  . (12.5.1) 
b Pr(q = qk)    Pr(X = x | q = qk)    b Pr(q = qk | X = x)
This well-known form states:
The prior odds × The likelihood ratio = The posterior odds.
It appears at once that Bayesian inference is subject to the shortcomings of odds-ratio 
testing as exemplified by the statistically vacuous likelihood ratios of Section 10.7. Let us 
consider two further examples of such vacuous likelihood ratios.
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Example 12.5.1
Let [x, Pr(X = x | θ = 1)] and [x, Pr(X = x | θ = 2)] be given by the singletons
(-3, 0.01), (-2, 0.01), (-1, 0.01), (0, 0.02), (+1, 0.15), (+2, 0.35), (+3, 0.45),
and
(-3, 0.45), (-2, 0.35), (-1, 0.15), (0, 0.02), (+1, 0.01), (+2, 0.01), (+3, 0.01),
respectively. Let the given data be X = 0. Then co-ordination testing finds the mental cor-
relate of the given datum situated at
(0.03, 0.02, 0.95) and at (0.95, 0.02, 0.03)
within the singletons indexed by θ = 1 and θ = 2, respectively, whereas Bayesian inference, 
using the form at (12.5.1) finds
b Pr(q = q1)  x 
0.02 
= 
b Pr(q = q1)    .That is to say, finds: ‘The data are vacuous.’ 
b Pr(q = q2)     0.02    b Pr(q = q2)
Co-ordination testing therefore learns that either model fits the given data poorly, where-
as Bayesian inference is incapable of learning anything at all from those same data.
Example 12.5.2
Basu (1975, p. 2) considers an urn that contains N tickets numbered consecutively as θ+1, 
θ+2, θ+3, …, θ+N, where N is a known integer, θ is an unknown integer, and a random sample 
of n tickets is drawn without replacement. Then the minimal sufficient statistic for θ is the 
order-statistical pair [X
(1), X(n)] which will presently be found to convey both determinate as 
well as statistical information about the possible value of θ. Let the given data be 
N = 10, n = 4, and [x
(1), x(4)] = (13, 17).
What can these data tell us about θ? First we consider how co-ordination tests address 
this question, next how Basu would have likelihood inference address the question, and 
then how Bayesian inference would have us address the question.
Co-ordination testing: As x
(1) cannot be less than θ+1, and x(n) cannot be more than 
θ+10, we have (this conveys determinate information) that
13 ≥ θ+1 and 17 ≤ θ+10, i.e. 12 ≥ θ and 7 ≤ θ.
So, owing to the given circumstantial details, there comes into the human mind a class 
comprising just six possible models, indexed respectively by
θ = 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, (12.5.2)
and comprising frequencies (this conveys statistical information) as in Table 12.5.1.
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Table 12.5.1: A class of models for an order-statistical datum [x
(1), x(4)] = (13, 17), in a random 
sample of n = 4 tickets drawn without replacement from N = 10 tickets numbered 
θ+j for j = 1, 2, 3, …, 10, where 7 ≤ θ ≤ 12. The frequencies of possible outcomes are 
displayed here as numbers of favourable cases out of 210 possible cases.
X
(4) θ+4 θ+5 θ+6 θ+7 θ+8 θ+9 θ+10 Total
X
(1)
θ+1 1/210 3/210 6/210 10/210 15/210 21/210 28/210 84/210
θ+2 1/210 3/210 6/210 10/210 15/210 21/210  56/210
θ+3 1/210 3/210 6/210 10/210 15/210 35/210
θ+4 1/210 3/210 6/210 10/210 20/210
θ+5 1/210 3/210  6/210 10/210
θ+6 1/210 3/210 4/210
θ+7 1/210 1/210
Total 1/210 4/210 10/210 20/210 35/210 56/210 84/210 1
The table shows, for instance, that for a co-ordination test of θ = 9 as a hypothesised 
model, and using X
(4) as the test statistic, the situation of the mental correlate of the test 
datum, i.e. of x
(4) = 17, is to be found
at [(1+4+10+20)/210, 35/210, (56+84)/210] in the test distribution.
Using such calculations, we develop the pair of traces displayed in Table 12.5.2.
Table 12.5.2: A pair of traces giving the co-ordinates of the mental correlates of a test datum pair 
[x
(1), x(4)] = (13, 17) in test distributions indexed by θ (7 ≤ θ ≤ 12)
 Trace for the suite of X
(1) tests Trace for the suite of X(4) tests
 [θ = 7,   (0.976, 0.019, 0.005)] [θ = 7,   (0.600, 0.400, ∅)]
 [θ = 8,   (0.929, 0.048, 0.024)] [θ = 8,   (0.333, 0.267, 0.400)]
 [θ = 9,   (0.833, 0.095, 0.071)] [θ = 9,   (0.167, 0.167, 0.667)]
 [θ = 10, (0.667, 0.167, 0.167)] [θ = 10, (0.071, 0.095, 0.833)]
 [θ = 11, (0.400, 0.267, 0.333)] [θ = 11, (0.024, 0.048, 0.929)]
 [θ = 12,       (∅, 0.400, 0.600)] [θ = 12, (0.005, 0.019, 0.976)]
The table shows that the X
(1) test is a unilateral right-sensitive test for small θ, and the X(4) 
test is a unilateral left-sensitive test for large θ. The X
(1) test shows that the singleton for 
θ = 8 fits the data poorly, and that the singleton for θ = 7 fits the data very poorly. The X
(4) 
test shows that the singleton for θ = 11 fits the data poorly, and that the singleton for θ = 
12 fits the data very poorly. These findings are not qualified as being in any sense probable 
or likely, as they are simply facts. They can by simulation be forced upon the human body, 
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and as such they are beyond all reasonable contest. Furthermore, they cannot appropri-
ately to be described as inferences, because they do not partake of a knowing subject, as 
no knowing subject has inferred them.
Likelihood inference: Basu (1975, p. 1), in part one of his essay (the part that concerns 
us) tries to formulate ‘the notion of “statistical information generated by a data (set)” in 
terms of some intuitively appealing principles of data analysis’. He remarks that he ‘comes 
out very strongly in favour of the unrestricted likelihood principle’ (he means, as we saw 
in Section 10.8, ‘the strong likelihood axiom’) and his principle example (one could almost 
say his only example) is the present one, in respect of which he remarks that ‘we know 
without any shadow of a doubt’ that the true value of θ belongs to the set
{x
(1)-1, x(1)-2, x(1)-3, …, x(1)-N+[x(n)-x(1)]}, i.e. (12.5.3)
{13-1, 13-2, 13-3, …, 13-10+[17-13]} when N = 10 and n = 4, i.e.
{12, 11, 10, …, 7} as we have already seen at (12.5.2).
So he asserts the likelihood axiom by denoting the set at (12.5.3) as A, and saying that in 
the present case:
‘the likelihood function … is “flat” over the set A and is zero outside (a situation that 
is typical of all survey sampling set-ups) and this means that the sample … “sup-
ports” each of the points in the set A with equal intensity.’ (12.5.4)
Basu re-asserts the axiom, by denoting x
(n)
-x
(1) at (12.5.3) as m, and saying:
‘Once … the sample is recorded, the magnitude of the information obtained de-
pends on the integer m (which varies from sample to sample) rather than on the 
constant n.’ (12.5.5)
The parenthetic remark at (12.5.4) is significant, however, for the moment that need not 
concern us. What must concern us here, is that the assertions at (12.5.4) and (12.5.5) are 
demonstrably fallacious. Let us begin with the curious notion that, once the data are 
before us, the information obtained does not depend on the sample size. Let N = 10 and 
[x
(1), x(n)] = (13, 17) just as before, but now with n = 3. Then as before ‘we know without 
any shadow of a doubt’ that the true value of θ belongs to the set
{x
(1)-1, x(1)-2, x(1)-3, …, x(1)-N+[x(n)-x(1)]}, i.e.
{13-1, 13-2, 13-3, …, 13-10+[17-13]} when N = 10 and n = 3, i.e.
{12, 11, 10, …, 7} precisely as before.
And the likelihood is ‘flat’ over this self-same set, precisely as before. So for Basu to 
uphold his axiom, he must conclude precisely as before at (12.5.4) and (12.5.5). But we 
must disagree, because a distinctly different class of models, as displayed in Table 12.5.3, 
has now been brought into the human mind. 
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Table 12.5.3: A class of models for an order-statistical datum [x
(1), x(3)] = (13, 17), in a random 
sample of n = 3 tickets drawn without replacement from N = 10 tickets numbered 
θ+j for j= 1, 2, 3, …, 10, where 7 ≤ θ ≤ 12. The frequencies of possible outcomes are 
displayed here as numbers of favourable cases out of 120 possible cases
X
(3) θ+3 θ+4 θ+5 θ+6 θ+7 θ+8 θ+9 θ+10 Total
X
(1)
θ+1 1/120 2/120 3/120 4/120 5/120 6/120 7/120 8/120 36/120
θ+2 1/120 2/120 3/120 4/120 5/120 6/120 7/120 28/120
θ+3 1/120 2/120 3/120 4/120 5/120 6/120 21/120
θ+4 1/120 2/120 3/120 4/120 5/120 15/120
θ+5 1/120 2/120 3/120 4/120 10/120
θ+6 1/120 2/120 3/120 6/120
θ+7 1/120 2/120 3/120
θ+8 1/120 1/120
Total 1/120 3/120 6/120 10/120 15/120 21/120 28/120 36/120 1
The pairs of co-ordination tests based on the respective elements of the minimal suffi-
cient statistic for θ, that is to say, based on the respective elements of the pair [X
(1), X(3)], 
as displayed in Table 12.5.4, differ from those previously obtained with n = 4. 
Table 12.5.4: A pair of traces giving the co-ordinates of the mental correlates of a test datum pair 
[x
(1), x(3)] = (13, 17) in test distributions indexed by θ (7 ≤ θ ≤ 12)
 Trace for the suite of X
(1) tests Trace for the suite of X(3) tests
 [θ = 7,   (0.917, 0.050, 0.033)] [θ = 7,   (0.700, 0.300, ∅)]
 [θ = 8,   (0.833, 0.083, 0.083)] [θ = 8,   (0.467, 0.233, 0.300)]
 [θ = 9,   (0.708, 0.125, 0.167)] [θ = 9,   (0.292, 0.175, 0.533)]
 [θ = 10, (0.533, 0.175, 0.292)] [θ = 10, (0.167, 0.125, 0.708)]
 [θ = 11, (0.300, 0.233, 0.467)] [θ = 11, (0.083, 0.083, 0.833)]
 [θ = 12,       (∅, 0.300, 0.700)] [θ = 12, (0.033, 0.050, 0.917)]
We note for instance that if the norm for ‘a poor fit’ is set at
(the statistical rounding)+(the pointing co-ordinate) < 0.100,
then
θ = 7, 8, 11, 12 are eliminated in Table 12.5.2, whereas only
θ = 7, 12 are eliminated in Table 12.5.4.
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To summarise:
At (12.5.4) we are being told (correctly) that the likelihood axiom would have us conclude 
(wrongly) that on the given data, the values θ = 7, 8, 11, …, 12, are equally well supported 
– wrongly so, as shown in Table 12.5.2.
At (12.5.5) we are told (correctly) that the likelihood axiom would have us conclude 
(wrongly) that, on the given data, correct conclusions would not depend on the sample 
size – wrongly so, as shown in tables 12.5.2 and 12.5.4.
Bayesian inference: It follows from the form at (12.5.1) that Bayesian inference cannot 
rectify wrongs that arise from the likelihood axiom.
12.6 A doubly incoherent discourse
Scientists tend to create jargon by adopting everyday words – sometimes with mislead-
ing consequences. In this section we consider the usage of the word ‘coherent’ in the 
literature of Bayesian inference, and we give reasons for being very critical of that usage. 
In fact, the following example shows that usage to be downright misleading. 
Example 12.6.1
The data shown in Table 12.6.1 are taken from Snedecor and Cochran (1989, p. 205).
Table 12.6.1: Frequency distribution of run lengths in 207 runs of diseased plants
Length of run 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
Observed frequency 164 33 9 1 0 0 0 207
Expected frequency 164.17 33.97 7.03 1.45 0.30 0.06 0.01 206.99
(Obs.-Exp.)²÷Exp. 0.00 0.03 0.55 0.14 0.30 0.06 0.01 1.09
(When pooling data for run-lengths > 2, chi-square has 4-1-1 degrees of freedom.)
They model the data as originating from a series of independent Bernoulli trials, and 
refer to an array of consecutive successes preceded and followed by a failure as a run of 
successes. They refer to the number of successes that comprise the run as its length. 
Each run is bracketed by the form FS … F. Thus, FFSFSSSFSSF involves three runs of 
lengths 0, 2 and 1, respectively. The probability of success, q, is taken to be constant from 
trial to trial. The probability of a run of length z is thus
q x q x q x ... x q x (1-q) = qz(1-q) ... .
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So, if a data set consists of x0, x1, x2, …, runs of lengths 0, 1, 2, …, respectively, in a particu-
lar order of occurrence, the probability of the data set is given by
[q0(1-q)]x0[q1(1-q)]x1[q2(1-q)]x2... = qx-n(1-q)n, (12.6.1)
where x denotes total number of successes, and n the number of runs (x ≥ n). The maxi-
mum likelihood estimate of q, i.e. the value of  that maximises the probability at (12.6.1), 
is given by 
q = 
x-n, which equals 261-207 for Snedecor and Cochran’s data. (12.6.2) 
        x                              261
As q is a minimal sufficient statistic for q, the class characteristic is obtained when we 
condition on the value of that statistic. Hence, in the notation of Table 12.6.1, the re-
sidual quantities
(Obs.-Exp.)÷√Exp., calculated by inserting q = 261-207 , (12.6.3) 
                                                                                   261
represent the class characteristic. We now consider at first how co-ordination testing pro-
poses to develop models to represent the data, and then how Bayesian inference proposes 
to develop such models.
Co-ordination testing
Under Snedecor’s and Cochran’s hypothesised class of models, the sum of the squares 
of the residuals defined at (12.6.3) provides an appropriate statistic to test the quality of 
fit of the class characteristic. Under that hypothesised model, it is distributed approxi-
mately as a chi-square random variable on 2 df. The test datum equals 1.09 as calculated 
in Table 12.6.1, and its mental correlate is situated at
(0.42, ε, 0.58*) in the test distribution. (12.6.4)
The class characteristic, as tested, fits the given data well. Next we need elimination tests 
to weed out untenable values of θ. Solving for x from the equation at (12.6.2), we find
x =    n   , which shows that x is a one to one transformation of q. 
       1-q
So x is an alternative form of the minimal sufficient statistic for q. The co-ordinates of 
the mental correlate of x for different q thus provide a uniformly most separating suite 
of co-ordination tests for the comparison of any pairs of alternative values of q. The dis-
tribution of x for any q is a member of the negative binomial class
Pr(X = x | q) =  
x-1
  qx(1-q)n for x = 0, 1, 2, … (0 < q < 1). (12.6.5) 
                          n-1
So, the expected value and the variance of the mean number of successes per trial are 
E x  =   q    and Var x  = 1      q     , respectively. 
   n      1-q                n     n  (1-q)
2
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
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Using the maximum likelihood estimate of q to estimate the standard error of the mean 
number of successes per trial, we obtain by N(0, 1²) approximation
 
  x  -   q    ÷   √1      q       as an elimination pivot for    q   .   n     1-q            n  (1-q)2                                                  1-q
Using Theorem 2.5.1, we then obtain pairs of elimination bounds for q. For instance
q = 0.17 and 0.24 at (0.10, ε, 0.90) and (0.90, ε, 0.10), respectively,
q = 0.16 and 0.25 at (0.05, ε, 0.95) and (0.95, ε, 0.05), respectively,
q = 0.15 and 0.26 at (0.01, ε, 0.99) and (0.99, ε, 0.01), respectively,
where each pair straddles the maximum likelihood estimate, q = 0.21. (12.6.6)
At (12.6.4) and (12.6.6) we point at physical facts of fit – facts that, if needs be, can by 
simulation be forced upon the human body. The facts pointed out at (12.6.6) stand en-
tirely apart from those pointed out at (12.6.4). When we point at a spoor in the veld say-
ing ‘The shape of this looks like the spoor of a nyala rather than a kudu, but if it were the 
spoor of a nyala, it would be that of an unusually large one’, the phrase ‘if it were’ shows 
that the datum of size stands apart from the datum of shape, and that our predication 
of the datum of size does not assume we have correctly predicated the datum of shape. 
Similarly, the facts pointed out at (12.6.6) do not assume anything at all about the facts 
pointed out at (12.6.4). That is so because the class of models was analysed into the two 
entirely separate entities called the ‘class characteristic’ and the ‘array of members’, and 
the data were analysed into correspondingly separate entities, thus enabling two entirely 
separate investigations culminating in evidence separately cited at (12.6.4) and (12.6.6), 
respectively. Moreover, statistical co-ordinates are not in any sense intended to convey 
the notion of ‘probable truth’. On the contrary, if we must perforce attach a probability 
of truth to the fact of fit that is conveyed at for instance (12.6.4), we would declare:
‘The “probability” that that fact of fit is true = 1, because it is after all a fact’.
But we would do so under protest, as there is nothing whatsoever to gain by dragging an 
irrelevant concept into our development. We must rather heed William of Occam when 
he says: ‘It is vain to try to do with more, what can be done with fewer.’
Bayesian inference
One has to begin with a commencement test, and for the present purposes the chi-square 
test introduced in Table 12.6.1 will do as well as any other. We have previously seen that 
such a test presents an insurmountable problem for ‘frequentist inference’ as any accept-
able commencement is inexorably open to the possibility of a Type II error of unknown 
kind, and hence of unknown ‘rate’. It might seem that Bayesians can escape the pro blem, as 
their probabilities are derived from introspection. So it might seem that just as at (12.3.1) 
here, too, they could say:
‘Yes of course we know full well that the class characteristic, whatever it might be, 
was not sampled from a population of alternative class characteristics. However, 
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
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the probabilities we attach to different possibilities express our beliefs in terms of 
our personal probabilities that those might amount to the actual state of affairs.’
So, consider how the investigator, after introspection, might express belief as follows:
Class characteristic         A = Negative binomial        A = Not negative binomial
Personal probability        bPr(A) = 0.85                       bPr(A) = 0.15 (12.6.7)
Turning now to inferences about q, suppose the investigator’s prior is given by the 
Beta1(50, 300) distribution on 0 < q < 1, where the likelihood of q given the data is of course 
given at (12.6.5). Then
the prior is proportional to q50-1(1-q)300-1,
the likelihood is proportional to q54(1-q)207, and
the posterior is proportional to q54+50-1(1-q)207+300-1, (12.6.8)
where the posterior is a Beta1(54+50, 207+300) distribution on 0 < q < 1. A personal pro-
bability ‘elimination pivot’ for q is thus given by
 1-q     54+50   = Snedecor’s F on 2(54+50) and 2(207+300) df. (12.6.9) 
  q    207+300
For instance, the upper 10% point of F here equals 1.143, and by inserting this value at 
(12.6.9) and solving for q, we find q = 0.152 as the lower bound of a 90% one-sided credi-
bility interval for q. Continuing like this, we obtain the following:
(90% one-sided lower bound, 90% one-sided upper bound)
= (q = 0.152, q = 0.191).
(95% one-sided lower bound, 95% one-sided upper bound)
= (q = 0.147, q = 0.198).
(99% one-sided lower bound, 99% one-sided upper bound)
= (q = 0.139, q = 0.210).
Maximising the quantity at (12.6.8) we obtain a point estimate, q = 0.170, which is 
straddled by each pair of bounds. (12.6.10)
Bayesian inference is clearly an attempt at implementing the notion of ‘probability infer-
ence’, and so cannot avoid the notion of ‘simultaneous statistical inference’. For instance, if 
any pair of bounds obtained at (12.6.10) is considered simultaneously, it becomes a pair of 
two-sided credibility bounds with altered coverage probability. So the credibility bounds 
at (12.6.10) can also be interpreted as follows:
The ‘unbiased’ 80% two-sided bounds for q are given by (q = 0.152, q = 0.191).
The ‘unbiased’ 90% two-sided bounds for q are given by (q = 0.147, q = 0.198).
The ‘unbiased’ 98% two-sided bounds for q are given by (q = 0.139, q = 0.210).
Maximising the quantity at (12.6.8) we obtain a point estimate, q = 0.170, which is 
straddled by each pair of bounds. (12.6.11)
ˆˆ
ˆˆ
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The developments at (12.6.6), (12.6.10) and (12.6.11) lead to revealing questions. To be-
gin with, let us ask of each of these developments in turn:
Are these results correct? (12.6.12)
At (12.6.6) we can answer ‘Yes of course. We can, if needs be, simulate them for you’. At 
(12.6.10) and at (12.6.11) such an answer is not possible, because those results are physi-
cally meaningless; they cannot be put to the human body; they are presumably to be put 
to the human psyche. But how is that done? Consider the bound q = 0.152, as it appears 
at (12.6.10) and (12.6.11); is it a case of ‘one-sided knowing’ versus ‘two-sided knowing’? 
It cannot be a case of different interest, because that belongs to the use of knowledge, 
not to the pursuit of knowledge; interest might be in an assurance against too small a 
value only, but one cannot call that one-sided knowing, as the idea that an investigator 
gains advantage by turning a blind eye to certain possibilities is arrant nonsense. Again, 
the question at (12.6.12) presupposes ‘a correct prior’. But how can that be? And again, 
consider the question: ‘Is the (0.050, ε, 0.95) bound at (12.6.6) comparable to the 95% 
one-sided lower bound given at (12.6.10), or to the 90% two-sided lower bound given 
at (12.6.11)?’ It cannot be answered; physics cannot be compared to metaphysics. The 
issue here is simply this: in the discourse of physics, the question at (12.6.12) is a mean-
ingful question. In the discourse of metaphysics it is evidently meaningless.
There is more to come.
The word ‘coherent’ has two quite different meanings; it might mean ‘sticking together’ 
or ‘making sense’. Bayesians hold that their inferences are ‘coherent’. If that refers to us-
ing Bayes’s rule in order to ‘stick together’ belief probabilities and likelihoods, then that 
is so in a trivial sense. If, however, one is supposed to understand that the posterior out-
comes of the process of ‘sticking together’ makes sense, that is fallacious, because if that 
were to be the case, the question at (12.6.12) would be easily answerable. In case of the 
results at (12.6.6) it is indeed easily answerable. But as we have seen above, in the case 
of the results at (12.6.10) and (12.6.11) the question leads to an epistemological mare’s 
nest. So let us note carefully that the term ‘coherent’ in the epistemologically important 
sense means ‘to communicate’, ‘to make sense’, ‘to convey meaning’ as in
‘Despite his traumatic experience little Oliver was able to give a perfectly coher-
ent account of what had happened’,
as opposed to
‘The poor child was quite incoherent; nobody could make out what had happened.’
We assert, using the term ‘coherent’ in this important sense, that Bayesian inference is in-
coherent. In fact, it is incoherent in two distinctly different ways, which we might identify 
as endogenous incoherence and exogenous incoherence, respectively.
The endogenous incoherence of Bayesian inference: Consider the ‘unbiased’ 80% two-
sided bounds for q given by (q = 0.152, q = 0.191) at (12.6.11). The unconditional personal 
probability that these bounds bracket ‘the true value of q’, with reference to the personal 
probabilities expressed at (12.6.7), is given by
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bPr(A)bPr(0.152 ≤ q ≤ 0.191|A)+bPr(A)bPr(0.152 ≤ q ≤ 0.191|A)
= (0.85)(0.80)+(0.15)bPr(0.152 ≤ q ≤ 0.191|A), (12.6.13)
where the second factor of the second term depends on an unknown possibility, A. The 
point here is simply this: Bayesian inference cannot be coherently adjoined to its own 
commencement. The incoherence is endogenous, as it arises within the frame of statisti-
cal reference. We note that co-ordination tests do not fall victim to any such difficulty, 
because commencement tests of co-ordination and elimination tests of co-ordination do 
not have to be ‘stuck together’ in order for them to ‘make sense’. After all, this is true of 
any investigative reasoning of science. When for instance we point at a fossil saying ‘This 
seems to be the fossilised skull of a three-toed horse, and if so it would be of more ancient 
origin than has so far been thought possible’, we say ‘if so’ indicating that the two observa-
tions are not to be ‘stuck together’; should the datum of species fall away, the datum of 
radiometric dating could still be standing.
The exogenous incoherence of Bayesian inference
Any reasoning that must resort to an input by Bayesian inference will necessarily be in-
coherent to science, because the arcane nature of the ‘personal probabilities’ that are re-
quired for such inference, are then made into a characteristic of that reasoning. No matter 
how remotely the reasoning might progress beyond that input, the questions
‘What does the reasoning contribute to the discourse of physical experience?’
or (equivalently)
‘How can an understanding of that contribution be forced upon the human body?’
or (equivalently, and quite simply)
‘How is it capable of simulation?’
cannot be escaped. Therefore, such reasoning leads back inexorably to the metaphori-
cal albatross of being unable to reply to the question: ‘What on earth does that mean?’ 
Some Bayesians have tried to suppress the influence of ‘personal belief ’ by resorting to 
diffuse priors. But, as we saw at (12.2.9) the albatross remains. In short, some 200 years 
of debate and development has failed to remove the exogenous incoherence of Bayesian 
inference, i.e. failed to make such inference understandable to the discourse of sub-
stantive science. This must be firmly grasped, because there is a great deal of literature 
in which all kinds of clever mathematical development might make us forget that if 
it started from Bayesian inference, it retains the incoherence of that source. So, to be 
brutally frank, what derives from the arcane is arcane, and what derives from the arcane 
that derives from the arcane is arcane, and so forth.
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12.7 A vicious circle
In this section we develop proof that the use of Bayesian inference for informative data 
analysis, that is to say, for the discourse of the pursuit of knowledge, inescapably leads 
to circular reasoning. We do so by means of examples.
Example 12.7.1
Recall the development at (12.6.13) where we found that for a purportedly ‘unbiased’ 80% 
two-sided credibility interval for q to be given by
(q = 0.152, q = 0.191),
the unconditional personal coverage probability should in fact be calculated as
bPr(A)bPr(0.152 ≤ q ≤ 0.191|A)+bPr(A)bPr(0.152 ≤ q ≤ 0.191|A)
= (0.85)(0.80)+(0.15)bPr(0.152 ≤ q ≤ 0.191|A), which is not calculable.
Clearly, the only way in which 0.152 ≤ q ≤ 0.191 can be defended as ‘an “unbiased” 80% 
two-sided credibility interval for q’, is by setting
bPr(A) = 0,
so that
bPr(A) =1,
so that the coverage probability can be calculated as
(1)bPr(0.152 ≤ q ≤ 0.191|A) + (0)bPr(0.152 ≤  ≤ 0.191|A),
so that the answer would be
(1)(0.80) + 0(•) = 0.80 as required,
and that is circular reasoning.
Example 12.7.2
Bliss (1967) reproduces from Campbell (1926) the survival times, in log minutes -2.3, of 
140 individual fourth-instar silkworm larvae following a dose of 0.10 mg arsenic per gram 
of body mass. The variance of the survival times, 0.0022884, can for all practical purposes 
be treated as the population variance. Bliss reports (p. 105) that the data are ‘… clearly 
lognormal without major deviations … in line with a wide range of tests of reaction time 
to insecticides’. But, in order to simulate a number of investigations, we pretend in the fol-
lowing that the value of the population variance is all that we can learn from Campbell’s 
historical record. From Bliss’s Table A1 reading downward in columns of three and using 
the first 18 positive numbers less than 141 (thus counting from 001 to 140) we draw 18 
survival times, as follows in pseudo-random order:
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0.174     0.108     0.127     0.038     0.098     0.167    }0.127     0.133     0.091     0.123     0.082     0.100       Data Set 1
0.115     0.139     0.263     0.156     0.067     0.158    
Adding consecutive pairs of survival times, we reduce the data as follows:
0.282     0.165     0.265     }0.260     0.214     0.182        Data Set 2
0.254     0.419     0.225     
Adding consecutive triplets in Data Set 1, we reduce the data as follows:
0.409     0.303    }0.351     0.305       Data Set 3
0.517     0.381  
Co-ordination tests applied to Data Sets 1, 2 and 3, in turn
Using Shapiro-Wilk’s W to test, in turn, Data Sets 1, 2 and 3 for non-normality, we obtain 
respectively:
W = 0.939 with mental correlate at (*0.34, ε, 0.66) in the test distribution.
W = 0.874 with mental correlate at (*0.18, ε, 0.82) in the test distribution.
W = 0.898 with mental correlate at (*0.38, ε, 0.62) in the test distribution. (12.7.1)
Next we note that for the class of normal models a minimal sufficient statistic for the 
population mean may be taken to be the sample mean, whose distribution is that of a 
normal random variable. For Data Set J that distribution is
N[Jµ, Jσ²÷(18÷J)] where σ² = 0.0022884, J = 1, 2, 3, respectively. (12.7.2)
Co-ordinate bounds for Jµ at (0.05, ε, 0.95) and (0.95, ε, 0.05), are thus for J = 1, 2, 3,
µ = 2.266±1.645 √0.0022884   , i.e. 0.126±0.00185 in -2.3 code,          18                            18
2µ = 2.266±1.645 √2(0.0022884)   , i.e. 2(0.126±0.00185 in -2.3 code), and             9                                9
3µ = 2.266±1.645 √3(0.0022884)   , i.e. 3(0.126±0.00185 in -2.3 code),             6                                6
respectively. We remark on three points: 
(1) The three pairs of co-ordinate bounds are one to one transforms of each other because 
the minimal sufficient statistics and the data it addresses are one to one transforms of 
each other. In short, we have derived the same bounds in superficially different ways.
Investigation mistaken for the metaphysics of belief
389
(2) The three tests at (12.7.1) differ from each other, because the data differ and the class 
characteristics differ correspondingly by way of different sample sizes.
(3) In all three cases the normal class characteristic, as tested, fits the data very well. How-
ever, the co-ordinate bounds are not based on an assumption of normality. This is so be-
cause co-ordinate tests measure quality of fit only. The reader must recall that if we should 
point at a spoor in the veld saying, ‘This does not resemble the spoor of an aardvark; but 
if it were the spoor of an aardvark, it would seem to be that of a juvenile’, then we have not 
assumed that the spoor is that of an aardvark. And if we point at a spoor in the veld saying, 
‘This resembles the spoor of an aardvark; and if it were the spoor of an aardvark, it would 
seem to be that of a juvenile’ then, too, we have not assumed that the spoor is that of an 
aardvark.
Bayesian inference applied to Data Sets 1, 2 and 3, in turn
The minimal sufficient statistic for µ is identical in the three cases, and is given by
X = 0.1259, whose distribution is N [m, (s÷√18)2] with s2 = 0.0022884.
Let the prior distribution of m be N(n, t2) with n = 0.3, and t2 = 0.0025000. Then the pos-
terior distribution of m, according to the forms at (11.3.3) is N(l, f2), where
f2 is given by             1             = 0.00012, so that f = 0.0110, and 
                               1       +    1 
                         s
2÷18          t2 
                        0.1259  +  0.3 
                        s2÷18        t2 
l is given by                           = 0.1222. 
                              1      +  1 
                          s
2÷18      t2 
So the ‘unbiased’ 90% two-sided ‘credibility interval’ for m is given by
0.1222-1.645(0.0110) ≤ m ≤ 0.1222+1.645(0.0110).
Hence the ‘unbiased’ 90% two-sided ‘credibility interval’ for m is given by
0.104 ≤ m ≤ 0.140 for Data Set 1,
0.104 ≤ m ≤ 0.140 for Data Set 2, and
0.104 ≤ m ≤ 0.140 for Data Set 3, (12.6.3)
each of these being conditional on the population being normal, and we cannot close 
our minds to the possibility that the population might be non-normal. So let us consider 
how by introspection an investigator expresses belief, perhaps as follows:
Class Characteristic                             A = Normal          A = Non-normal
Personal Probability on Data Set 1     bPr(A) = 0.85      bPr(A) = 0.15
Personal Probability on Data Set 2     bPr(A) = 0.75      bPr(A) = 0.25
Personal Probability on Data Set 3     bPr(A) = 0.65      bPr(A) = 0.35 (12.6.4)
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Here bPr(A) for Data Set 1 > bPr(A) for Data Set 2 > bPr(A) for Data Set 3, might arguably 
be seen as the natural response to the tests at (12.7.1), as three equal values for bPr(A) in 
the three cases would seem laughable. Be that as it may, we note that the unconditional 
coverage probability is in each of the three cases given by
bPr(A)bP(0.104 ≤ m ≤ 0.140 | A)+bPr(A)bP(0.104 ≤ m ≤ 0.140 | A),
which is unknown. So, the only way in which 0.104 ≤ m ≤ 0.140 can be defended as ‘an 
“unbiased” 90% two-sided credibility interval for m’, is by setting
bPr(A) = 0,
so that
bPr(A) =1,
so that the coverage probability can be calculated as
(1)bPr(0.104 ≤ m ≤ 0.140 | A)+(0)bPr(0.104 ≤ m ≤ 0.140 | A),
so that the answer would be
(1)(0.90)+0(•) = 0.90 as required,
and that is circular reasoning.
Concluding remark
The idée fixe invariably leads to a vicious circle because its commencement requires us 
to know for sure something that cannot possibly be known for sure. So, Bayesian infer-
ence is inexorably caught on the horns of an inescapable dilemma. If it tries (this is the 
first horn of the dilemma) to provide for a commencement test, it turns out to be impos-
sible to achieve a coherent transition from that commencement to the elimination tests 
at which Bayesian inference is directed. So it is forced (this is the second horn of the 
dilemma) to proceed from a purportedly reasonable assumption about the class char-
acteristic, whereby its reasoning then becomes circular. It is well worth noting that the 
proof we developed in the present section is in principle the same as the proof we devel-
oped in Section 4.8 in respect of the bête noire of Bayesian inference, namely frequentist 
inference. More than any others amongst the various silly theories of statistical infer-
ence, these two theories have cluttered the statistical literature with endless arguments 
and counter-arguments in which both of the two theories are so busy scoring points off 
each other that they are blind to the fatal circularity they have in common.
12.8 On a method of commencement testing
Certain remarks made by Daniel and Wood (1971, p. 29) might prompt the following 
approach to commencement testing of the quality of fit of a given class characteristic. 
Consider for instance whether or not a data set comprising say n = 16 measurements can 
satisfactorily be represented as a random sample from an N(0, 1²) population. For such 
samples, the standardised residuals may be taken to be the corresponding samples from 
the normal class characteristic. So, simulate say 100 independent samples of such residu-
als, and plot for each simulated sample, the quantiles of its empirical cumulative distri-
bution (e.c.d.) against the quantiles of the N(0, 1²) distribution for the percentage points 
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(j-0.5)÷n, where j = 1, 2, 3, …, n. The plotted points will tend to scatter round a straight 
line (examples are given by Daniel and Wood on pp. 34-43). Similarly, plot the data e.c.d. 
for comparison to the hundred simulated e.c.d.-s Does the data e.c.d. blend snugly into 
that crowd? Perhaps not, the data e.c.d perhaps being in a particular way atypical, such as 
involving an oversized residual, or being curved rather than straight, or seeming to arise 
from a discontinuity. In such a case, sort the simulated samples into three groups with 
Group U, on the left, comprising those simulated e.c.d.-s that are more atypical in the par-
ticular way that the data e.c.d. is atypical; Group V, on the right, comprising those simu-
lated e.c.d.-s that are less atypical in that way; and Group ε, in the middle, comprising the 
remaining e.c.d.-s. Count the e.c.d.-s in each group. Typical relative counts might be
(U, ε, V) = (0.07, 0.02, 0.91), or (0.11, 0.06, 0.83), or (0.74, 0.12, 0.14), or … ,
where a low relative count on the left points at a poor quality of fit. This procedure can be 
facilitated by computing for each e.c.d. the value of a measure of the particular atypicality 
of the data e.c.d. The measure might be the Shapiro-Wilk measure, or Pearson’s measure 
of skewness, or Pearson’s measure of kurtosis, or whatever measure might be retrospec-
tively devised to describe the atypicality of the data e.c.d. It will in fact be found that 
certain computer facilities in effect do just that, thereby producing printouts that give the 
results for a variety of such measures, usually along with a plot of the data e.c.d. What do 
advocates of Bayesian inference want a data analyst to do with such a printout? Is such a 
printout a snare and a delusion? Is it best ignored? Is it best, with eyes averted to be on the 
safe side, quickly torn off and thrown away? An answer in the affirmative would be absurd. 
And an answer in the negative must prompt us to ask how Bayesian inference then avoids 
incoherence or (even worse) circularity.
12.9 There cannot be ‘a parametric commencement’
Tukey’s test for non-additivity can be interpreted as a test for the value of a parameter that 
represents a multiplicative effect. It might therefore seem that commencement testing 
can be avoided by introducing a suitable parameter (or parameters) and then proceeding 
to elimination testing. However, that is not the case. Examples given by Tukey (1949a) 
make it clear that he tests for a multiplicative term, rather than a parameter. So the test 
detects non-additivity of different kinds, such as non-additivity removable by arcsine 
transformation, or by power transformations of various kind, or yes also by logarithmic 
transformation, or by the removal of outliers. Again, if γ denotes the parameter for which 
Tukey ostensibly tests, the test is a commencement test because we are not interested in 
what variety of γ-values are tenable on the given data; we are interested in whether just 
one particular γ-value (usually zero) is tenable, where that value is often suggested by 
circumstantial evidence above and beyond the data to be statistically analysed. Again, it 
is arguably the case that non-normality of a data set of say ten observations can often be 
dealt with by means of a transformation such as
X      (α+X)β, where α and β are parameters additional to the usual µ and σ².
That simply means that instead of having 10-2 degrees of freedom amongst the residuals 
to test for non-normality, we have 10-4 degrees of freedom amongst the residuals, and we 
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still have to test for non-normality. If we introduce a further six parameters, there will be no 
residual slack, and we will be unable to test for anything. Similar remarks apply to the gen-
eralisation of Tukey’s test developed by Milliken and Graybill (1970, 1971). The crux of the 
matter is that there must be slack if we are to test the adequacy of the class characteristic. 
12.10   An unrealistic outlook
There is a community of ivory-tower individuals who have confidently declared that ‘the 
21st century will be the Bayesian century’ and who therefore seem to believe it possible 
for current practices of investigative statistics to be advantageously replaced by Bayesian 
inference. It would seem they have either failed to notice that their ideas find no place at 
all in the handbooks by Snedecor and Cochran (1989), Mead and Curnow (1983), Steel 
and Torrie (1980), Bliss (1967), and so forth, or else they must believe these handbooks 
to be badly out of date. So, let us consider what a successful palace revolution under their 
leadership would inflict upon our customers in the substantive sciences. Consider how 
the examiners of a PhD candidate in for argument’s sake agronomy would then have to be 
persuaded to approve his/her thesis. It would, if properly organised, comprise two parts 
that the candidate would then have to defend as follows:
Defence of Part 1: In this part of my thesis I had to use certain commencement tests to 
defend the class characteristics that define various models that I need to represent my 
data. I realise that these tests rely on an outdated form of reasoning, but my statistical 
advisors tell me that inasmuch as Bayesian improvements on such reasoning have yet to 
be developed, the outdated tests are currently the best that can be done. So …
Defence of Part 2: Thanks to my statistical advisors, I have, for this part of my thesis, 
been able to use the modern methods of Bayesian inference that have recently been in-
troduced to replace most of the old-fashioned Snedecor-style statistical methods. I real-
ise that it is awkward, and in fact incoherent, to have modern methods rest on findings 
that in Part 1 were arrived at by reasoning that, by the modern methods, are held to be 
outdated if not downright fallacious, but on that point I must plead for your indulgence. 
After all, if I cannot assume that the findings obtained by the Snedecor-style methods I 
am forced to rely on in Part 1 are correct, I would be quite unable to proceed. So … 
It might be countered that such incoherence already exists, as we have seen in Chapter 4. We 
must, however, note that the current incoherence arises within the framework of frequency 
physics, owing to which it is demonstrable that statisticians and substantive investigators 
together somehow manage to avoid its worst consequences. As opposed to that, the palace 
revolutionaries would have that incoherence greatly aggravated, as one would then have 
a ‘Part 1’ in frequency physics followed by a ‘Part 2’ in belief metaphysics. In any case, the 
theory of co-ordination tests shows how to eliminate the current incoherence. 
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12.11   ‘Bayesian inference’ and the problem of ancillary 
    partitions
It is widely (and wrongly) believed that the problem of finding the correct ancillary parti-
tion does not arise in Bayesian inference. Such belief is wrong, as the ancillary-partition 
conundrum in respect of a solitary data set to be analysed can be resolved by, and only by, 
an epistemology whose findings are expressed in terms of populations of samples that are 
capable of showing, by simulation, how those data may, or may not, have come about. Fre-
quentist inference cannot resolve the conundrum because, although it understands that a 
physical resolution is required, it fails to grasp that the resolution must necessarily address 
just one particular real-world data set; instead it opportunistically tries to adjoin its rules 
for physical discourse to whatever the correct resolution might be. Bayesian inference also 
cannot resolve the conundrum because, although it understands that a particular data 
set is to be addressed, it fails to grasp that the resolution needs to do so in physical terms; 
instead it opportunistically tries to adjoin its rules for metaphysical discourse to whatever 
the correct resolution might be. In fact, no theory of statistical inference could resolve 
the conundrum because the conundrum does not arise in elimination testing; it precedes 
elimination testing. Consider for instance the examples in Sections 9.4 and 9.5, where the 
conundrum for frequentist inference takes the form: ‘Which one of these different arrays 
of statistical models indexed by θ is the correct array?’, and the conundrum for Bayesian 
inference takes the form: ‘Which one of these different arrays of likelihoods indexed by 
θ is the correct array?’ The conundrum in fact also precedes commencement testing, be-
cause its general form is: ‘Which one of these different classes of statistical models is the 
correct class?’ and, as pointed out in Section 9.5, its resolution can be achieved by, and 
only by, involving substantive science.
12.12   Subjective versus objective – a silly dispute
An infernal nuisance in the statistical literature arises from frequentist claims that it em-
ploys probability in the ‘objective’ sense of long-run frequency only, as opposed to the 
‘subjective’ probabilities employed by the Bayesians. A counter-argument by the Baye-
sians claims that frequentist inference and Bayesian inference both rely on assumptions 
that cannot ‘objectively’ be proven to be true, and so both these forms of inference involve 
‘subjective’ constituents anyway. Because of this, the statistical literature pervasively draws 
a distinction between objective and subjective matters. But that is not the important dis-
tinction to be drawn between, for instance, the trace of a mental correlate and a Baye-
sian posterior of belief probabilities. The important distinction is that the trace expresses 
physical meanings; no one can say of the trace ‘I cannot grasp its meanings’, because one 
can be invited into the statistical laboratory where those meanings can by simulation be 
forced onto the human body. Opposed to that, the Bayesian posterior tries to convey met-
aphysical meanings; that is to say, it tries to convey meanings that cannot be forced onto 
the human body. So, Bayesians have little use for the statistical laboratory; some even hold 
that the randomisation of an experimental design is unnecessary. The issue is this: often, 
even usually, usage of the terms ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ distracts the attention from the 
distinction between physics and metaphysics in cases where the latter distinction is the 
important one. We can therefore understand why Oscar Kempthorne often called for the 
terms ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ to be banned from the statistical literature.
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Chapter 13
THE MULTIPLE COMPARISON MUDDLE
a Profession in denial
13.1 Introduction
In previous developments we underscored the analytic nature of scientific investigation. 
Consider for instance what to expect in a book on geology. A naïve understanding might 
expect chapters describing the Cango Caves, Baviaans Kloof, Table Mountain, and so on. 
Instead one finds chapters on wind erosion, sedimentation, metamorphic processes, and 
so on – chapters on the analytic models of geology, where the Cango Caves, Baviaans 
Kloof and Table Mountain serve merely as examples. Much, if not most, of the literature 
on statistical inference fails to grasp this. Instead of developing the analytic questions 
that substantive science might ask, and developing statistics that are minimally sufficient 
for separately addressing each question in turn, our literature on inference falls victim to 
irrelevant notions about the possible errors of a knowing subject. This inexorably leads 
to statistical views in which the activities of investigators in substantive science are envis-
aged as ‘data snooping’ (Scheffé 1959, p. 80). According to such views statisticians must 
reconcile themselves with the fact that substantive investigators simply cannot be pre-
vented from recklessly ‘looking at the data’ (Cox and Hinkley 1974, p. 241) and so (horror 
of horrors) arriving at effects ‘suggested by the data’, that is to say, arriving at ‘unplanned 
comparisons’ (Steel and Torrie 1980, p. 174). This, such views would have us hold, can-
not be dealt with in the same way that we would deal with a limited number of ‘planned 
comparisons’ formulated in advance (Snedecor and Cochran 1989, p. 226). So, willy-nilly, 
our profession has set itself the task of ‘protecting’ science from the outcomes of such 
‘unplanned’ investigations, by providing recipes for such investigations to be subject to 
‘controlled error rates’. The outcome is predictably incoherent because comparisons that 
are unplanned are also unforeseeable. So we are supposed to provide for forecasting error 
rates of unforeseeable conclusions on the part of the knowing subject. But as the extent of 
the unforeseeable is infinite, it turns out to be impossible to ensure that such attempts at 
foreseeing the unforeseeable make scientific sense. In fact, we will find that all multiple 
comparison procedures have logical implications that do not make sense. The procedures 
are of two different types named simultaneous-confidence-region procedures and multiple 
range procedures, respectively. Their beginnings are essentially to be found in Student’s 
two-tailed t test as we have previously explained in Section 1.27. We will recall that expla-
nation after briefly introducing the following definitions and notations that will also be 
required for examples to be used in subsequent sections:
m treatments A, B, C, … , are replicated n times in a completely randomised design.
The treatment means are denoted by, xA, xB, xC, …, for A, B, C, …, respectively.
XA, XB, XC, …, denote independent homoscedastic normal random variables.
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xA, xB, xC, …, also denote realised values of XA, XB, XC, …, respectively.
mA, mB, mC, … = E(XA, XB, XC, … ), denote corresponding population means.
σ² and s² denote the error variance and the pooled error estimate, respectively.
s² is a realisation of S2 whose distribution is σ²[c2 on m(n-1) df]÷m(n-1). (13.1.1)
If interest is expressed in mA-mB the investigator might consider Student’s t, given by
    x
A
-x
B    = t(A versus B) say. (13.1.2) 
s x √2÷n
If this turns out to be unusually large in the positive direction, the investigator might 
well consider that to be evidence that mA-mB > 0. Cox and Hinkley (1974) would then have 
us envisage other cases in which such a value is unusually large in the negative direction, 
and therefore considered to be evidence that mA-mB < 0. The possibility persuades Cox 
and Hinkley to make ‘a correction for selection’ (p. 106) which amounts to 
replacing (XA-XB, S
2
) with (| XA-XB |, S
2
). (13.1.3)
There is more to come. If interest is also expressed in mC-mD the investigator would con-
sider Student’s t as given by t(C versus D) in the notation defined at (13.1.2), where ‘cor-
rection for selection’ would then amount to
replacing (XC-XD, S
2
) with (| XC-XD |, S
2
). (13.1.4)
A further correction for selection is then required to account for
(| XA-XB |, S
2
) and (| XC-XD |, S
2) simultaneously. (13.1.5)
Cox and Hinkley sometimes refer to such reasoning as making ‘allowance for selection’ 
(p. 123) or by saying in effect that the ‘knowing subject’s error rate’ must be ‘adjusted for 
selection’ (p. 124). The reasoning is very persuasive, as follows: 
If the error rate of findings like mA-mB > 0 would be α,
then the error rate of findings like mA-mB < 0 would also be α.
So, the error rate of findings like mA-mB > 0 or mA-mB < 0 would be 2α,
and the error rate of findings like mC-mD > 0 or mC-mD < 0 would also be 2α.
So, the error rate of findings like
mA-mB > 0 or mA-mB < 0, and mC-mD > 0 or mC-mD < 0,
would be 2α+2α-(2α)(2α) = 1-(1-2α)2.
But look at what this amounts to! At (13.1.3) we replace the minimally sufficient statistic 
for mA-mB with a statistic that is insufficient for mA-mB. At (13.1.4) we replace the mini-
mally sufficient statistic for mC-mD with one that is insufficient for mC-mD. At (13.1.5) we 
then confound the statistic that is insufficient for mA-mB with a statistic that is vacuous 
for mA-mB and, by the same token, confound the statistic that is insufficient for mC-mD 
with a statistic that is vacuous for mC-mD. Here Definition 13.1.2 is appropriate.
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Definition 13.1.2:
A statistic is vacuous for a parameter if and only if the distribution of that statistic is independent of that 
parameter.
For instance, the crux of the randomised test paradox discussed in Section 4.22 is that 
the auxiliary random number is vacuous for the parameter of interest. The reader should 
note, however, that the power of an array of hypothesis tests is maximised for a specified 
Type I error rate by adjoining the auxiliary random number, whereas a comparable gain 
is not at all achieved in the case of simultaneous statistical inference. On the contrary, 
whenever the ideas of such simultaneity are introduced, operating characteristics in the 
case of an array of hypothesis tests, or separating characteristics in the case of a suite 
of co-ordination tests, are adversely affected. The adversity can be horrendous. Refer-
ring to the denominator of t as defined at (13.1.2) as a standard error unit, we find for 
instance from the prepared tables of Harter (1960) for Duncan’s new multiple range test 
that for a specified Type I error rate α = 0.01, the required difference for significance be-
tween any two of ten treatment means arising as at (13.1.1) is three standard error units 
– and this might be considered too small, as Duncan’s procedure has been criticised by 
amongst others Scheffé (1959, p.78) as incomprehensible.
13.2 Student’s knowing subject
Suppose that any one of five alternative protein sources can be used to make up a feeding 
ration for dairy cows, and that in order to compare the five sources for their efficacy, we 
obtain the data in Table 13.2.1. A multiple range procedure originating in Student (1927) 
Table 13.2.1: Imaginary data purportedly from a completely randomised design
Treatment (protein source) A B C D E
Number of cows (replications) 5 5 5 5 5
Milk production per cow 21.1 21.5 22.0 20.2 27.1
Cost per cow in terms of milk 11.5 12.0 16.0 18.0 26.0
Treatment mean (profit) 9.6 9.5 6.0 2.2 1.1
Estimated standard error of a treatment mean: 1.2 on 20 degrees of freedom
would then have us proceed as follows. We must choose the Type I error rate without 
any reference to the data. Let us choose 5%. We then require certain ‘raising factors’ that 
are obtainable from tables prepared by May (1952). In our case (five treatments, 20 df 
for error, and a 5% risk) the factors are 2.9, 3.6, 4.0 and 4.2, respectively. We must raise 
the value of the estimated standard error of a treatment mean by each of these factors 
in turn. (The factors already incorporate the square root of two, thus effectively rais-
ing the standard error of the difference between two treatment means.) Corresponding 
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values of multiple range statistics appropriate to our case are thus realised, as follows 
(in standard error units):
R2 = 1.2×2.9     R3 = 1.2×3.6     R4 = 1.2×4.0     R5 = 1.2×4.2
     = 3.5 units.      = 4.3 units.      = 4.8 units.      = 5.0 units.
The following display of ordered treatment means is then obtained by underlining every 
array of j consecutive means that vary by less than Rj, for j = 5, 4, 3 and 2, in that order, 
subject to the condition that, once an array of means is underlined, no sub-array found 
in that array is to be underlined (Miller 1981, p. 82):
     A            B          C          D          E
    9.6           9.5         6.0         2.2         1.1
Here for instance, ABC is underlined because 9.6 − 6.0 < R3, and DE is underlined be-
cause 2.2 − 1.1 < R2. The multiple range rules for inferential discourse then want us to 
reason that any differences between pairs of means that have been underlined are at-
tributable to error, whereas (we are supposed to reason) any differences between pairs 
of means that have not been underlined are attributable, subject to negligible risk (5% 
in our case), to corresponding treatment differences. So in the present case we are inter 
alia supposed to reason that the apparent superiority of A over C might well be attribut-
able to error, and so cannot be attributed to the superiority of A. But suppose the cost 
of B now increases from the previous equivalent of 12.0 units of milk per cow, to a new 
equivalent of 20.3 units of milk per cow. Then the previous display must be replaced by 
a new display, as follows:
     A            C          D          B          E
    9.6           6.0         2.2         1.2        1.1
The multiple range rules for inferential discourse would now have us reason that the dif-
ference between the measured mean performances of A and C is no longer attributable 
to error – because of the increased cost of B!
It would be futile to try to wriggle out of such implications by arguing that we were not 
supposed to alter the data. We have in fact not altered the data; the full data set simply 
tells us that a given protein source might be of a different cost, depending on the suppli-
er. It is an inescapable principle of science that its reasoning must be able to survive any 
test of logical implication. So, if the protein sources labelled A, B and C, were soy bean 
meal, fish meal and lupine meal, respectively, the ‘inferences’ we are supposed to make 
then commit us, by their logical implication, to botanical reasoning according to which 
the efficacies of the two plant protein sources have come to differ as a result of declining 
numbers of pelagic fish in South African waters, owing to over-fishing by commercial 
trawlers, resulting in an increase in the price of fish meal. This is a perfect example of 
how the knowing subject of statistical inference looses track of substantive science.
It would also be futile to try to wriggle out of the foregoing by arguing that the multiple-
range mathematics is correct. Of course it is correct! After all, the procedure used in the 
foregoing traces back to Student (1927), and its mathematics have been checked and re-
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checked by countless other individuals. We must understand that the procedure is mis-
taken, which is not the same as being wrong. This distinction must be firmly grasped. 
For instance, if Koos brings a ladder to a party because the invitation said that drinks 
will be on the house, he has mistaken a figurative meaning for a literal meaning. Nev-
ertheless, his reasoning is not wrong. On the contrary, according to his understanding, 
his reasoning is perfectly sound. The issue can hardly be overemphasised, as the whole 
sorry confusion of efforts to provide for statistical inference springs from a mathemati-
cal impatience with the reasoning of our customers in the substantive sciences, so that, 
instead, our reasoning can ‘get on with the mathematics’, which mathematics, despite 
being correct, then time and again turns out to proceed from a mistaken perception of 
the investigative method of substantive science.
It will be found that all multiple-range procedures suffer from the defect exemplified by 
the foregoing example, because all those procedures advocate rules for discourse where 
the significance, or insignificance, of the difference between any two means, is depend-
ent on whether or not those two means straddle other means. Hence, we may dispense 
with any further procedures of that type, and in the rest of this chapter consider proce-
dures of the simultaneous-confidence-interval type.
13.3 Example of a simultaneous-confidence-interval procedure
Let the set-up at (13.1.1) be for a yield trial with oat cultivars A, B and C, the data being
(xA, xB, xC, s²) = (19, 14, 10, 4.41) from say n = 9 replications. (13.3.1)
For reasons that will soon appear, we suppose that the investigator tries to address an 
extremely odd problem, as follows: the investigator envisages a point on the wall of the 
agronomy building by postulating that for some choice of origin and graphical scale its 
Cartesian co-ordinates are given in terms of the oat yield parameters as
[(mA-mB), (mA+mB-2mC)÷√3] = [E(p), E(q)] say, (13.3.2)
an estimator of this point being given by
[(XA-XB), (XA+XB-2XC)÷√3] = (p, q).
The (p, q) notation is intended to underscore the formal resemblance of the development 
that follows to a previous development of the travelling-gene problem in Section 6.7. The 
estimated standard error of either one of the members of (p, q) is given by
√2(s2÷n) = 0.990 on (3-1)(9-1) = 24 degrees of freedom.
Since (1-2α)² = 0.99 when 2α = 0.005, and since the 0.005 critical values for Student’s 
|t| on 24 degrees of freedom are given by -3.09 and +3.09, it follows that a 99% square 
confidence region for E(p) and E(q) simultaneously, takes on the form of the Cartesian 
product of the two 99.5% confidence intervals for E(p) and E(q) separately, as follows:
[p-3.09(0.990) < E(p) < p+3.09(0.990)]×[q-3.09(0.990) < E(q) < q+3.09(0.990)].
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Figure 13.3.1: Four different 99% confidence regions for all possible parameter values of the form 
(lAmA+lBmB+lCmC) ÷ √l2+l2+l2   x √2  , simultaneously, where mA, mC, and mB are po- 
                                      
A       B       C
 pulation means representing the yield totals of oat varieties A, B and C, respectively, 
and lA, lB, and lC are any real numbers that sum to zero 
For the data given at (13.3.1)
p = 19-14, i.e. 5, and q = [19+14-2(10)]÷√3], i.e. 7.5,
and since 3.09(0.990) = 3.1, the 99% confidence square for [E(p), E(q)] is given by
[5-3.1 < E(p) < 5+3.1]×[7.5-3.1 < E(q) < 7.5+3.1], as in Figure 13.3.1(a). (13.3.3)
(mC-mB)
(mA-mB)
(mA-mC)(mA+mB-2mC)÷√3
-4
5+3.155-3.1-4+4.25
9-4.25
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9
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In the travelling-gene problem, the parameters E(p) and E(q) jointly conveyed a scientific 
meaning. In the present case, however, there is no such joint meaning – proof of this be-
ing as follows:
In order to draw a version of Figure 13.3.1(a) onto the wall of the agronomy build-
ing we would, as already mentioned, require some choice of origin and of graphi-
cal scale. Must we for instance choose a graphical scale of 10 cm per kg of oats, or 
20 cm per kg of oats, or 30 cm per kg of oats? And must the origin then be in the 
centre of the wall, or must it be lower down, at a suitable viewing height? These 
questions show that the agronomical point on the wall is completely ill defined, 
because whether or not the confidence square covers any given point on the wall 
will depend on our choice of the origin and scale. Q.e.d.
The issue is simply this: the confidence square is a well-defined behavioural concept, 
but the two parameters defined at (13.3.2) do not jointly, that is to say, as a pair, convey 
any corresponding agronomical concept. In other words, there does not exist an agro-
nomical concept whose meaning is conveyed by, and only by, E(p) and E(q) jointly. So 
whatever was introduced to serve the idea of simultaneity in the present example was 
introduced to serve the idea of the knowing subject of statistics and not to serve any 
agronomical idea of simultaneity. The simultaneity envisaged for the knowing subject is 
therefore not anchored in agronomical science and must inexorably lead to the kind of 
silly gibberish we met in the previous section. Thus for instance if seed costs for variety 
A exceeds those for variety B by the equivalent of two additional units of yield, the 99 % 
confidence square at (13.3.3) would have us infer that:
A is too costly compared to B, and the chance of this inference being wrong is a 
trifling 1%.
But, suppose we subsequently discover that the seed used as being for variety C, was in 
fact adulterated by seed of unknown origin, where we nevertheless observed that the 
oats labelled C was of the usual type, so that the error estimate remained appropriate. 
In that case the mean labelled C would be utterly worthless for the purposes of the trial 
and any analysis that retained that mean could not be defended as involving the correct 
error rate for the relevant agronomical conclusions. Thus forced to recalculate the 99% 
confidence region for E(p), we would obtain
[5-2.80(0.990) < E(p) < 5+2.80(0.990)], that is to say, [5-2.8 < E(p) < 5+2.8],
and so be forced to infer that
because the seed for C was adulterated, A is no longer too costly compared to B, and 
the chance of this inference being wrong is a trifling 1%.
Here the simultaneous-confidence-region procedure forces us to draw conclusions whose 
logical implications do not make substantive sense. It will be found that all simultane-
ous-confidence-region procedures suffer from this defect. Note also that despite differ-
ences in particular detail this is the same defect found in the previous section in respect 
of multiple-range procedures. In both kinds of procedure we are to draw conclusions that 
depend on irrelevant facts, and in both kinds of procedure that irrelevancy is dragged in 
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by rules for discourse whereby the statistic that is minimally sufficient for the parameter 
of interest is to be confounded with statistics that are vacuous for that parameter. Thus 
both of the two general types of multiple comparison procedure are defective in that 
logical implications of the conclusions they would have us draw amount to substantive 
gibberish. Also, in both kinds of procedure the defect is owing to beguiling probability 
calculus that has lost track of the investigative problem.
13.4 Vectors of experience
One of the sources of confusion leading to multiple comparison procedures is a failure 
to grasp that a vector of experiences (or conceptual experiences) is not a further experi-
ence (or further conceptual experience). Thus the point on the wall of the agronomy 
building is not an isolated example; on the contrary, it illustrates a general principle. 
Consider for instance the co-ordinates of the earth’s magnetic pole. This might take the 
form of a pair of Cartesian co-ordinates, that is to say, a pair of conceptual experiences, 
in which case they might be thought to simultaneously comprise a singular experience, 
called for instance ‘the position of the pole’. However, in order to grasp that such is not 
the case, we simply have to transform to polar co-ordinates, where the experiential pair, 
angle and distance, are clearly two distinct concepts. An analyst must always be exceed-
ingly leery of dealing with an experiential vector, rather than with its separate compo-
nents. (We note in passing that ‘discriminant analysis’ is a contradiction in terms arising 
from widespread misuse of the term ‘analysis’ in current statistical literature. ‘Bayesian 
data analysis’ is another such contradiction in terms.)
13.5 Two properties shared by all simultaneous-confidence- 
 region procedures
The confidence square of the previous section provides confidence limits not only for
mA-mB and (mA+mB-2mC)÷√3,
but in fact for all such contrasts, that is to say, for all possibilities of the form
lAmA+lBmB+lCmC, where lA+lB+lC = 0. (13.5.1)
In order to exemplify this, we note that the transformation
(cos θ)p + (sin θ)q, and
(cos θ)q − (sin θ)p,
rotates the original co-ordinates in Figure 13.3.1(a) clockwise by θ = 60° to co-ordinates 
given by
 + 1 [(mA-mB)]+  +
√3
  [(mA+mB-2mC)÷√3 ] = mA-mC, and (13.5.2) 
    2                          2
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 + 1 [(mA+mB-2mC)÷√3]+ + 
√3   [(mA-mB)] = (2mB-mA-mC)÷√3 
    2                                      2
and rotates the original co-ordinates in Figure 13.3.1(a) anti-clockwise by θ = -60° to
 
 + 1 [(mA-mB)]+ - 
√3 
 [(mB+mA-2mC)÷√3] = mC-mB, and (13.5.3) 
    2                        2
 + 1 [(mA+mB-2mC)÷√3]+ -
√3   [(mA-mB)] = (2mA-mB-mC)÷√3. 
    2                                    2
The co-ordinates arising at (13.5.2) and (13.5.3) are of special interests. Perpendicular 
projections of the confidence square onto these co-ordinates show that our simultaneous 
confidence square not only provides confidence limits for the two contrasts we originally 
introduced as
mA-mB and (mA+mB-2mC)÷√3,
but by implication also provides confidence limits for any further contrasts. In the case of
mA-mC and mC-mB
the limits are calculated as follows: in Figure 13.3.1(a) the perpendicular giving the lower 
limit for mA-mC coincides with the upper left corner of the square, at which corner we 
have from the result at (13.3.3) that
mA-mB = 5-3.1 and (mA+mB-2mC)÷√3 = 7.5-3.1.
Solving for mA-mC from these equations, the lower limit for mA-mC is found to be
9-4.25 < mA-mC, where xA-xC = 9.
In this way the following confidence limits are found to be implied by our square:
9-4.25 < mA-mC < 9+4.25 and -4-4.25 < mC - mB < -4+4.25. (13.5.4)
This illustrates the following two properties of all simultaneous confidence regions.
Firstly, the width of the limits at (13.3.3) equals 2×3.1, whereas the width of the limits at 
(13.5.4) equals 2×4.5. Thus a simultaneous confidence region does not necessarily place 
different contrasts on an equal footing.
Secondly, any particular choice of values lA, lB, lC at (13.5.1), corresponds to a co-ordinate 
axis in Figure 13.3.1(a), where the perpendicular projection of our square region onto 
that axis provides a confidence interval for the value of
lA mA + lB mB + lC mC
Thus infinitely many contrasts are being taken into account, of which the vast majority 
are substantively meaningless. For example, consider pi (π = 3.14 ... ) and the Napierian 
constant (e = 2.71 ... ), in order to form the contrast
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[πmA+emB-(π+e)mC]÷√π2+e2+πe,
for which our square would provide the confidence limits. This is surely a substantively 
meaningless contrast! Whatever could pi and the Napierian constant have to do with oat 
yields? It will be found that simultaneous-confidence-region procedures cannot avoid 
providing for such contrasts, because such procedures simply cannot logically be limited 
to account for certain contrasts only.
13.6 The extent of the confounding
In fairness to simultaneous-confidence-region procedures, the second property uncovered 
in the previous section should not be allowed to exaggerate the extent of the confounding 
of any significant data pattern with other data patterns, either contrary or vacuous. This 
consideration arises because, though the kind of region of present interest provides limits 
for any one of the infinitely many contrasts of the form defined at (13.5.1), it requires only 
as many perpendicular contrasts as there are dimensions to the Cartesian space involved, 
to define any region of interest. We speak of
contrasts C1(m) = kA mA+kB mB+kC mC and C2(m) = lA mA+lB mB+lC mC
as perpendicular (or orthogonal) if kA lA+kB lB+kC lC = 0.
Thus, if for some or other reason one of the following two contrasts would be of interest, the 
other one would be represented by a perpendicular in two-dimensional Cartesian space:
C1(m) = 1mA+2mB-3mC and C2(m) = 5mA-4mB-1mC.
So, if ‘C1 small’ is a pattern of interest, simultaneous statistical inference might want 
to make allowance for selection by confounding that pattern with patterns of the type 
‘C1 large’, ‘C2 small’ and ‘C2 large’. Any significant pattern is thereby confounded with 
one contrary pattern and two vacuous patterns. Again, consider the following region 
wherein the factors are a pair of one-sided lower-bounding regions 
[4-3.1 < E(p) < ∞]×[7.5-3.1 < E(q) < ∞].
Here any significant pattern is being confounded with zero contrary patterns and one 
vacuous pattern. And again, consider
[4-3.1 < E(p) < 4-3.1]×[7.5-3.1 < E(q) < ∞].
Here ‘E(p) extreme’ is confounded with one contrary pattern and one vacuous pattern, 
and ‘E(q) small’ is confounded with zero contrary patterns and two vacuous patterns.
13.7 Scheffé’s knowing subject
The normalised form of any contrast as defined at (13.5.1) is given by
(lAmA+lBmB+lCmC) ÷ √l2+l2+l2   , 
                                      
A       B       C
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whose estimated standard error is given,
not by √2(s2÷n), but by √s2÷n. (13.7.1)
For the present purposes, however, we express any contrasts of interest in ‘normalised × 
√2 code’, so the form on the left at (13.7.1) is always the correct one. Using this code let 
us then consider a (1-a) simultaneous confidence region of a kind introduced by Scheffé 
(1953), which in our oat-yield case is a circular region as depicted in Figure 13.3.1(b). 
The circle is centred for any contrast at the estimated value of that contrast, and has a 
radius given by
√2(s2÷n)×√(3-1)F(3-1), 3(n-1) (a) , (13.7.2)
where the F(•)-like quantity is exceeded with probability a by Snedecor’s F on 3-1 and 3(n-1) 
df (n = 9 in the present case). We previously noted the resemblance of the square region 
depicted in Figure 13.3.1(a) to the rectangular region developed for the travelling-gene 
problem of Example 6.7.1. But, though both regions convey statistically well-defined 
meanings, the travelling-gene region estimates a vector, [E(p), E(q)], which as such also 
conveys a substantively well-defined meaning, whereas the oat-yield region estimates a 
corresponding vector, but one that as such is substantively meaningless. Very much the 
same holds for the resemblance of the circular region depicted in Figure 13.3.1(b) to the 
circular region developed for the problem of the earth’s magnetic pole in Example 6.7.2. 
Each circle can in its own right be statistically explicated in terms of repetitive attempts 
at covering a mathematically well-defined point with a specified long-run probability of 
success. However, the point called ‘the position of the earth’s magnetic pole’ has a well-de-
fined substantive meaning, whereas the point in the oat-yield example has no meaningful 
status in agronomical science, none at all. Certainly, agronomical science is unacquainted 
with any point on the wall of the agronomy building. In order to grasp the confounding 
implicit in the development of the circular oat-yields confidence region, let
C1(m) = kA mA+kB mB+kC mC and C2(m) = lA mA+lB mB+lC mC 
be any pair of normalised perpendicular contrasts. They are estimated in × √2 code by
C1(x) = (kAxA+kBxB+kCxC) √2 and C2(x) = (lAxA+lBxB+lCxC) √2,
respectively, in which terms the circle depicted in Figure 13.3.1(b) is given by
[C1(x)]
2+[C2(x)]
2 =  √2(s2÷n) x √(3-1)F(3-1), 3n-1) (a)  
2
. (13.7.3)
If, for instance, interest is in mA- mB, we could estimate the two perpendiculars as 
C1(x) = (xA-xB) and C2(x) = (xA+xB-2xC)÷√3.
The equation at (13.7.3) would then take the form
(xA-xB)
2+[(xA+xB-2xC)2 ÷3] =  √2(s2÷n) x √(3-1)F(3-1)2(n-1)(a)  
2
.
This shows that data patterns of the type
‘xA-xB small’ and ‘xA-xB large’,
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are being confounded with each other, and with data patterns of the type
‘xA+xB-2xC small’ and ‘xA+xB-2xC large’.
Thus for any significant pattern of the type ‘xA-xB extreme’ the confounding is of the type 
‘one contrary pattern and two vacuous patterns’. In case of four treatments, the circle in 
Figure 13.3.1(b) is replaced by a sphere given by
[C1(x)]
2+[C2(x)]
2+[C3(x)]
2 = √2(s2÷n) x √(4-1)F
(4-1)4(n-1)(a)  
2
, (13.7.4)
where the perpendiculars might for instance be
C1(x) = xA-xB,
C2(x) = xA+xB-2xC, and
C3(x) = xA+xB+xC-3xD.
Thus for any significant pattern of the type ‘xA-xB extreme’, the confounding is of the type 
‘one contrary pattern and four vacuous patterns’. For 5, 6, 7, … treatments the foregoing 
algebra extends, even though the corresponding geometry (the circle or the sphere) falls 
away. Thus for m treatments, the confounding of any significant data pattern, for instance 
‘xA-xB extreme’, is of the type ‘one contrary pattern and 2(m-2) vacuous patterns’. For even 
quite small numbers of treatments the extent to which the instruments of investigation 
are blunted by this confounding is horrendous. Referring to the standard error of a dif-
ference between two treatment means as a standard error unit, the expressions given at 
(13.7.3) and at (13.7.4) show that for significance at the α level, an observed difference 
between two treatment means must exceed
√(m-1)F
(m-1), m(n-1) (a) such standard error units.
Thus for significance at the α = 0.05 level, and with many degrees of freedom for error, 
an observed difference between two treatment means must exceed
3.1 rather than 1.96 standard error units in case of five treatments,
4.1 rather than 1.96 standard error units in case of ten treatments, and
4.9 rather than 1.96 standard error units in case of fifteen treatments. (13.7.5)
For finite numbers of degrees of freedom for error the situation is worse.
13.8 Tukey’s knowing subject
At (13.5.4) we saw that a simultaneous-confidence-region procedure need not place its 
inferences on an equal footing; for any given specification of the confidence coefficient, 
confidence bounds for certain inferences might be chosen to be narrower than those for 
other inferences. Epistemologically the idea is extremely odd; we are expected to take 
seriously an epistemology where, for given data, the investigator can get to ‘know’ some 
things more precisely by being willing to get to ‘know’ other things less precisely. This is 
a remote consequence of epistemology that at the very outset was based on the idea of 
using Student’s t statistic for one-sided, two-sided and more generally biased ‘knowing’. 
The awful damage wreaked by Scheffé’s knowing subject, as exemplified at (13.7.5), has 
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prompted procedures in which bounds for certain inferences of special interest are nar-
rower than for inferences of lesser interest. A very popular outcome of these ideas is a 
simultaneous-confidence-region procedure attributable to Tukey (1953) and described 
by Scheffé (1959). It considers all possible normalised comparisons, and it chooses to 
draw unbiased confidence bounds for all possible comparisons between two means at 
a time, as narrowly as possible, at the cost of broader bounds for all other comparisons. 
In the case of our oat yields, the resulting region takes the form of the hexagon depicted 
in Figure 13.3.1(c). For a (1 − α) simultaneous-confidence region, the bounds for any of 
the three possible pair-wise comparisons are given by
xI-xJ ± q3, 3(n-1)(α) × √s2÷n for (I, J) = (A, B), (A, C), (B, C), (13.8.1)
where the q(•)-like quantity is exceeded with probability α by the Studentised range 
statistic, and is obtainable for α = 0.05 and α = 0.01 from the tables of May (1952). For 
our case (m = 3 and n = 9) the requisite q(•)-like quantity for α = 0.01, equals 4.54. So the 
bounds for a 99% region turn out to be
xA-xB ± 3.2, xA-xC ± 3.2, and xC - xB ± 3.2, as depicted in Figure 13.3.1(c).
In the case of Scheffé’s procedure, these bounds are 
xA - xB ± 3.3, xA - xC ± 3.3, and xC - xB ± 3.3, as depicted in Figure 13.3.1(b).
Note that in Figure 13.3.1(b) the limits for mA-mC are to be found on the mA-mC axis, and not 
on the circumference of the circle. With Scheffé’s procedure the bounds for any normal-
ised contrast in × √2 code are obtained as the estimated value ± 3.3. With Tukey’s proce-
dure, however, the bounds for, for instance, the contrast
[(xA-xB-2xC)÷√6 ] x √2 (13.8.2)
will be wider than ± 3.2. This contrast is perpendicular to xA-xB. Figure 13.3.1(c) there-
fore shows that its lower and upper confidence limits coincide with the lower and upper 
corners of the hexagon, respectively, at which corners
xA-xB = 5 and xC-xB = -4-3.2, and
xA-xB = 5 and xC-xB = -4+3.2, respectively.
Solving from these two sets of equations for the values of the contrast defined at (13.8.2), 
we find its confidence bounds for Tukey’s procedure are given by
[(xA+xB-2xC)÷√3 ] ± 3.7.
For any number, m, of treatments the expression at (13.8.1) becomes
xI-xJ ± q(m-1), m(n-1) (α) × √s2 ÷ n for all (I, J) such that I ≠ J. (13.8.3)
Recalling that here the q-like quantity incorporates √2 to provide for the standard error 
of the difference between two treatment means and, again referring to that standard er-
ror as a standard error unit, we find from the expression at (13.8.3) and from May’s tables, 
that for significance at the α = 0.05 level, and with many degrees of freedom for error, an 
observed difference between two treatment means must exceed
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2.7 rather than 1.96 standard error units in case of five treatments,
3.2 rather than 1.96 standard error units in case of ten treatments, and
3.4 rather than 1.96 standard error units in case of fifteen treatments. (13.8.4)
For finite numbers of degrees of freedom for error the situation is worse. The facts at 
(13.8.4) are not quite as bad as those at (13.7.5), but remain bad, as we are dealing with 
normally distributed quantities that have known standard errors. We must ask: ‘What has 
happened to the ubiquitous statistical rule that any discrepancy in excess of 2.58 standard 
error units is highly significant’? Clearly, any investigator who would employ Tukey’s mul-
tiple comparison procedure stands to overlook glaringly obvious treatment effects. Small 
wonder then that Tukey had misgivings about publishing the procedure. Instead, by cir-
culating the work in unpublished form, he cleverly gets credit for correct mathematics, as 
well as for suspecting an extra-mathematically flaw. But his suspicion never converts to 
understanding; he never comes to understand that the elaborate probability calculations 
that purport to account for the possible Type I errors of what he calls ‘confirmatory data 
analysis’ rely, for their tenability, on assumed zero probabilities of any Type II errors of 
what he calls ‘exploratory data analysis’. He does not understand that all data analysis is 
exploratory, and that it is impossible to compute any ‘probabilities of error’ in respect of 
its findings; instead all that it is possible to compute, are measurements of the quality of 
fit of those findings.
13.9 Dunnet’s knowing subject
A simultaneous-confidence-region procedure introduced by Dunnet (1955) considers all the 
possible normalised comparisons simultaneously and draws unbiased confidence bounds 
for all pair-wise comparisons with a control, as narrowly as possible and at the cost of broad-
er confidence bounds for all the other comparisons. In the case of our oat-yield example the 
resulting region takes the form of a parallelogram, as depicted in Figure 13.3.1(d), treatment 
A being the control. For a (1-α) simultaneous-confidence region, Dunnet’s bounds for the 
two possible pair-wise comparisons with the control are then given by
xA - xI ± t’2-one, 3(n-1)(α) × for I = B, C, (13.9.1)
where the t’ (•)-like quantity is exceeded with probability α by Dunnet’s many-one-t ap-
propriate for the present case [two-one-t, on 3(9-1) df], and is obtainable from prepared 
tables (Dunnet 1955). For a 99% region in the present case these bounds turn out to be
xA - xB ± 3.07 × 0.990 and xA - xC ± 3.07 × 0.990, i.e.
xA - xB ± 3.0 and xA - xC ± 3.0, as depicted in Figure 13.3.1(d).
From Figure 13.3.1(d) we see that the lower and upper bounds simultaneously obtained 
for xC-xB are given by the solutions of
xA - xB = 5-3.0 and xA - xC = 9+3.0, and of xA-xB = 5+3.0 and xA - xC = 9-3.0, i.e. by
xC - xB - 6.0, and xC - xB + 6.0, respectively.
Again, just as in previous sections we find that even for its intended results, the idea of simul-
taneity grievously blunts our instruments of investigation. From Dunnet’s tables we find, for 
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instance, that for significance at the α = 0.05 level, and with many degrees of freedom for error, 
an observed difference between the mean for control and that for any other treatment must 
exceed 2.23 (rather than just 1.96) standard error units in the case of five treatments.
13.10   One question many answers?
Figure 13.3.1 displays, for the comparison of the mean yields recorded for oat varieties A 
and B, four distinctly different answers. Moreover, the developments around this display 
have made it clear that there could be many more such answers arising from questions such 
as: Do you want to know ‘one sidedly’ or ‘two sidedly’? If the latter, do you want to know 
‘biasedly’? For what error rates do you wish to settle? Are you of the ‘conservative’ school 
of thought that would unleash the Type II error rate in order to keep the Type I error rate 
under control, or are you of a less conservative school of thought? Must A be considered a 
control? And so on, and so forth. Further developments, for instance the Waller-Duncan 
Bayesian k ratio multiple comparison procedure, have also incorporated metaphysics of 
belief (Waller and Duncan 1969). We must ask: Is this endless variety of procedures being 
referred to by those of our statistical friends who exhort us to be proud of the fact that 
‘statistics is not so simple a science that it produces only one answer to a given question?’ 
And must we not also ask: Is it not the case that any unambiguous question in substantive 
science can have only one correct answer? Or is that a snare and a delusion? Surely, as a 
first step toward answering these questions, we must strip away any manifest redundancy. 
Otherwise what good is it to have a forceful theory of minimal sufficiency, if only to then 
ignore what it tells us? So, note that when all redundancy is stripped away, we find for the 
class of models given at (13.1.1) that the information required for judging the tenability 
of any value assigned to µA-µB in respect of a given data set, and all of that information, is 
conveyed by the minimal sufficient statistic for µA-µB, that is to say, by
{XA-XB, S
2}.
Here Student’s t is appropriate, owing to which 99% confidence limits for µA-µB on the 
oat-yield data given at (13.3.1) are obtained as
5-2.80(0.990) < µA-µB < 5+2.80(0.990), i.e. as 
5-2.77 < µA-µB < 5+2.77. (13.10.1)
Now recall that the 99% confidence limits given here can also be interpreted as a pair 
of (0.005, 0.995) and (0.995, 0.005) co-ordination limits, and note that the four pairs 
of corresponding confidence limits given in Figure 13.3.1 can be similarly interpreted. 
Then it appears at once from the width of the different pairs of limits that, because of 
the confounding of the minimal sufficient statistic with vacuous statistics by any of the 
multiple comparison procedures involved, any co-ordination tests derived from those 
procedures have inferior separating characteristics compared to the test derived from 
the confidence limits at (13.10.1) where any such confounding has been avoided. Now 
note further that confidence limits of the form given at (13.10.1), but based on 0.005 as 
the physical norm of extremity, are given by the 99.5% limits
5-3.09(0.990) < µA-µB < 5+3.09(0.990), i.e. by
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5-3.06 < µA-µB < 5+3.06. (13.10.2)
Comparison of the limits at (13.10.1) to those at (13.10.2) then shows that for the self-
same physical norm of extremity (here 0.005 vs. 0.995, or 0.995 vs. 0.005) the pair of unbi-
ased two-sided confidence limits are wider than the corresponding co-ordination limits 
based on that same norm. So, any co-ordination test we derive from two-sided confi-
dence limits has inferior separating characteristics compared to those derived from the 
corresponding pair of one-sided confidence limits.
The reader should carefully note that the two sources of inferior separating characte-
ristics uncovered in the foregoing arise from the same underlying source, that is to say, 
from the involvement of possible mistakes on the part of a knowing subject, as follows:
(1) We are supposed to envisage an array of different investigations (different repetitions) 
in which a knowing subject might mistakenly judge µA-µB to be larger than hypothesised 
in some of the repetitions and, by the same token, mistakenly judge µA-µB to be smaller 
than hypothesised in other repetitions.
(2) Having thus envisaged possible mistakes by the knowing subject in respect of the 
hypothesised values of µA-µB, we are then persuaded also to envisage possible mistakes 
by that knowing subject in respect of µA-µC and µC-µB.
Here the knowing subject has been represented as a ‘deciding subject’. Opposed to that, 
Bayesian procedures represent the knowing subject as a ‘believing subject’, owing to which 
the foregoing arguments fall away, as they rely on the physical theories we refer to as those 
of operating characteristics and separating characteristics, respectively. As Bayesian rea-
soning is of a metaphysical nature, its critical evaluation requires a different approach. The 
distinction between co-ordination tests and Bayesian tests is in important ways on a par 
with the distinction between astronomy and astrology – and it is not at all the intention 
here to give offence; it is the intention to record important facts. It is a fact that astronomy 
is a physical discourse, as its concept of ultimate evidence is that and only that which the 
human body can be forced to perceive. As opposed to that, it is a fact that astrology is a 
metaphysical discourse, as its concept of ultimate evidence is that and only that which hu-
man belief can be persuaded to perceive. In section 13.13 we return to this point.
13.11   Mean separation procedures
Tukey (1949b) considers how we might assist an investigator who wishes to compare the 
mean yields of a number of varieties. He states:
‘At a low and practical level, what do we want to do? We wish to separate the varie-
ties into distinguishable groups as often as we can without too frequently separat-
ing varieties which should stay together.’ (13.11.1)
This prompts the idea of using cluster analysis (Placket 1971; Jolliffe 1971). Scott and Knott 
(1974) develop a well-known method of cluster analysis for the purpose of making multiple 
comparisons. Gates and Bilbro (1978) illustrate its application to four different concrete 
examples. How must we react to this development? First and foremost, we must establish 
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how substantive science is being modelled by the development. So let us resort to our old 
standby: simulation. How then could we simulate the model? A Herculean but illuminat-
ing effort is as follows: cross two wheat varieties. Self the F1. Cultivate 100 F2 plants. Self the 
F2. Cultivate one F3 plant from each F2 parent. Self the F3. Cultivate one F4 plant from each 
F3 parent … Continue until the F10, at which point we have developed 100 different wheat 
varieties. Obtain 100 packets of seed from each of the 100 varieties. Draw a random 100 of 
the 10 000 packets. Discard the other 9 900 packets. Number the 100 random packets 1, 2, 
3, …, 100, and destroy all other means of identifying them. Replicate the 100 seed sources 
now identified only as numbers 1, 2. 3, …, 100, using a randomised design, and determine 
the 100×n yields (n = the number of replicates). The outcome of such a simulation would 
produce exactly the kind of data Tukey and the cluster analysts have in mind. There could 
for instance be six clusters, respectively of size 11, size 78, size 1, size 3, size 1 and size 6. 
Or there might be a single cluster of size 100, or 100 clusters of size 1 each. It then appears 
that two things are wrong with the idea at (13.11.1). Firstly, there is not a shred of substan-
tive evidence to have us believe that wheat varieties routinely belong to fewer clusters than 
there are varieties. On the contrary, such an assortment arises only under very special cir-
cumstances, such as in the presence of a few Mendelian factors with major effects, or in a 
grossly heterogeneous mixture of varieties. Secondly, cluster analysis is directed at certain 
characteristics that an entire ensemble of varieties might have, such as: ‘This ensemble 
seems to comprise altogether three clusters of sizes 57, 18 and 25, respectively’. But the 
question, ‘Do varieties A and B differ in yield?’ is not effectively addressed by cluster analy-
sis followed up by the question, ‘Do A and B belong to the same cluster, or do they belong 
to different clusters?’ That is so because in the set-up envisaged, any question about the 
comparative yields of varieties A and B is a question about the possible values of µA-µB, 
where such a question ought to be dealt with by means of, and only by means of,
(XA-XB, S
2), which is the minimal sufficient statistic for µA-µB,
not by (| XA-XB)|, S
2) which is insufficient for µA-µB,
and not involving XC, XD, XE, …, which are vacuous for µA-µB. (13.11.2)
Example 13.11.1
Shulkeum, as reported by Duncan (1955), performed a yield trial with seven varieties of 
barley in a randomised block design, and obtained the data reproduced in Table 13.11.1, 
where the 21 pair-wise differences amongst the seven means are also shown. We see at a 
glance that several of those differences exceed 10, i.e. exceed 2 × the standard error of the 
difference between those pairs of means. Much of the statistical literature would have us 
believe that these 21 tests involve redundancy because, so that literature tells us, amongst 
seven different means there are only 7-1 algebraically independent contrasts. The reason 
given is indeed a mathematical fact, but the conclusion drawn from it is false, because it 
tacitly assumes that beyond the numerical facts given in the table, the investigator is com-
pletely ignorant. The assumption is inadvertently promoted by calling the varieties ‘A, B, 
C, …’ whereas they are known to agronomy by names such as Brewer’s Delight, Socks, 
Early Pearl, and so forth. To the agronomist these names convey a great deal of informa-
tion – this one is exceedingly drought resistant, that one is prone to lodging, the next one 
has a particularly short growing season, and so forth. Owing to such substantive matter, 
each of the 21 tests performed in Table 13.11.1 is distinctly different from the other 20.
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Table 13.11.1: Yields of seven varieties of barley from a randomised block design
Treatment (variety of barley) A B C D E F G
Treatment mean 49.6 58.1 61.0 61.5 67.6 71.2 71.3
Minus the mean for treatment A • 8.5 11.4 11.9 18.0 21.6 21.7
Minus the mean for treatment B • 2.9 3.4 9.5 13.1 13.2
Minus the mean for treatment C • 0.5 6.6 10.2 10.3
Minus the mean for treatment D • 6.1 9.7 9.8
Minus the mean for treatment E • 3.6 3.7
Minus the mean for treatment F • 0.1
Estimated standard error of a treatment difference: 5.15 on 30 degrees of freedom
The essence of this is reasoning to be found in the work of the 14th century philosopher 
William of Occam. In epistemology Occam is a data analyst. Consider the proposition 
‘Tom is a bald man’. It analyses the data named Tom into
(a datum of baldness)+(a datum of manliness)+(a residual datum).
The residual is a co-ordinate datum, where that goes to show that we are continually an-
alysing (and adding to) the set of ‘all data’; we are continually partitioning the set of all 
data in different ways. Occam’s opening argument is then that of ‘the displaced finger’:
See me move my finger. Where, in ‘the analysis of Tom’, does this new datum now 
belong?
It is not part of the ‘datum of baldness’. And it is not part of the ‘datum of manliness’. 
So we are compelled to make the ‘displaced finger’ become part of the ‘co-ordinate da-
tum’ (the residual), where we then find (and this is the point of the argument) that we 
are able to analyse the set of ‘all data’ such that subsidiary sets of relevant data are co-
ordinated by residual data. Toward clarifying that relevancy, Occam then advances his 
famous rule for discourse, reproduced here as Axiom 13.11.1.
Axiom 13.11.1: William of Occam’s principle of paucity
It is vain to try to do with more what can be done with fewer.
We have of course met this rule before:
Never, ever introduce a constituent that is not needed.
Occam holds that different languages give rise to different conventional signs when just 
one natural sign (concept) might be involved. Thus for instance ‘horse’, ‘equus’, ‘perd’, 
… are different conventional signs that bring the selfsame natural sign into the human 
mind, that is to say, the natural sign cannot be in any language. So Occam says inter alia 
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that we must not try to do with more conventional signs ‘what can be done with fewer’ 
natural signs. But our interest in the principle of paucity must go beyond that, and here 
it will be helpful to note that the principle could also be called the principle of minimal 
sufficiency, which brings us back to the distinctions
minimal sufficient statistic, insufficient statistic and vacuous statistic.
When Occam says, ‘It is vain to try to do with more’ he rules out the vacuous statistic. When 
he says, ‘what can be done’ he calls for the sufficient statistic. And when he says ‘with fewer’ 
he calls for the latter to be minimally sufficient. That much is accomplished at (13.11.2). We 
must, however, refuse to agree to it that, inasmuch as Table 13.11.1 tells us that
‘B-A’ = 8.5     ‘C-A’ = 11.4     ‘C-B’ = 2.9, (13.11.3)
there is a ‘redundancy’ because purportedly
‘C-A’-‘C-B’ = ‘B-A’. (13.11.4)
We must refuse because at (13.11.3) and (13.11.4) the symbolism ‘C-A’, ‘C-B’ and ‘B-A’ is 
made to refer to the numerical data only, whereas a sound epistemology must insist that 
the symbolism ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ be made to convey any substantive information about the 
varieties involved. If interest in ‘C-A’ arises because amongst the seven, they are the only 
two varieties that produce high lysine seed, and interest in ‘C-B’ arises because amongst 
the seven, they are the only two varieties that have a growth season of less than 90 days, 
that does not at all imply that it would then be redundant for interest in ‘B-A’ to arise 
because amongst the seven, they are the only two varieties that do not lodge when grown 
under wet climatic conditions. The issue is not at all difficult. In fact, silly epistemology 
can almost always, if not always, be avoided in three easy steps, as follows:
Step 1: Analyse the substantive investigator’s questions. What are they? Do they 
make sense? Try to replace them with analytic subsidiary questions. Determine 
which, if any, of those questions can be expressed as a question about the pos-
sible values of a scalar parameter. (Be leery of questions about a vector parameter 
that fails to convey just one singular concept, i.e. one single concept that cannot 
be analysed into several self-contained subsidiary concepts.)
Step 2: For each question in turn find the minimal sufficient statistic for address-
ing the question, inter alia avoiding any vacuous statistics. This is relatively easy 
in the event of questions about the possible values of a parameter.
Step 3: Address each question in turn, in terms of, and only in terms of, the mini-
mal sufficient statistic for addressing that question. Try to avoid replacing the 
minimally sufficient statistic with an insufficient statistic.
This has been accomplished in Table 13.11.1 insofar as the table goes. We will now show 
that over and above the 21 contrasts in Table 13.11.1, numerous further contrasts might be 
considered, without substantive redundancy. Let us for that purpose pretend the barley data 
is South African, and let us imagine how a South African investigator might further analyse 
that data without redundancy, as follows: if varieties A and D are susceptible to damage 
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by an unseasonable cold snap as often experienced in the Golden Gate area, the suite of 
shortfall tests in Table 13.11.2 would indicate varieties G, F and E as suitable for that area.
Table 13.11.2: Shortfall tests for varieties not susceptible to unseasonable cold
Treatment (variety of barley) B C E F G
Treatment mean 58.1 61.0 67.6 71.2 71.3
Shortfall 13.2 10.3 3.7 0.1
Hypothesised left-most right co-ordinate 0.026 0.086 0.505 0.729
Estimated standard error of a treatment mean: 3.64 on 30 degrees of freedom
(Why not recommend just variety G? Because it is better not to put all our eggs in one 
basket.) If varieties A, E and G, produce inferior malt, the suite of shortfall tests in Table 
13.11.3 would indicate variety F only as suitable for supplying breweries.
Table 13.11.3: Shortfall tests for those varieties that yield satisfactory malt
Treatment (variety of barley) B C D F
Treatment mean 58.1 61.0 61.5 71.2
Shortfall 13.1 10.2 9.7
Hypothesised left-most right co-ordinate 0.021 0.070 0.084
Estimated standard error of a treatment mean: 3.64 on 30 degrees of freedom
And if only C, E and F, are drought tolerant, the suite of shortfall tests in Table 13.11.4 
would indicate F and E as suitable for the dry-land farming practised to the west of 
Thaba ’Nchu.
Table 13.11.4: Shortfall tests for varieties of barley able to tolerate drought. 
Treatment (variety of barley) C E F
Treatment mean 61.0 67.6 71.2
Shortfall 10.2 3.6
Hypothesised left-most right co-ordinate 0.050 0.364
Estimated standard error of a treatment mean: 3.64 on 30 degrees of freedom
The multiple comparison muddle
415
Note that for a suite of shortfall tests, the minimal sufficient statistic obviously consists 
of all the non-negative shortfall contrasts and the error estimate. This is obvious, because 
the many-one contrast for any specified one of a suite of tests cannot be formed without 
knowing the yield of the specified one, and so being able to draw the appropriate order-
statistical value from the yields of the many. Note also that Tables 13.11.J (J = 1, 2, 3, 4) 
have involved
[7(7+1)÷2]+(5-1)+(4-1)+(3-1) = 37 different contrasts, and there could be more.
That the purely numerical evidence conveyed by these 37 contrasts is not derived from 
37 algebraically independent variables is beside the point. The point is this: in each of 
the 37 cases, a question in substantive science leads to an item of 
a minimally sufficient statistic of the form,
{the relevant contrast for the given question, S2},
together with further information of substantively relevant scientific nature.
So, owing to the substantive part of any specified one amongst these 37 items, the full 
but minimally sufficient information required for that item, cannot be deduced from 
the full but minimally sufficient information required for the other 36 items. So Occam 
could not argue in any one of those 37 cases that we could ‘do with less’.
We note in passing that certain literature wrongly attributes to Occam a principle known 
as Occam’s razor, according to which, if there are more than one explanation for the self-
same observation, we must prefer the simpler explanation. The razor is not due to Oc-
cam, and in any case it is nonsense, because if each of two explanations satisfies Occam’s 
principle of paucity, the only way in which we can then discriminate between the two is by 
obtaining appropriately discriminative data.
13.12   On ‘scientific coherence’ as opposed to ‘numerical 
    coherence’
All multiple-comparison procedures are directed at producing conclusions of the type
‘mA-mB < 0’, ‘mA-mC > 0’, ‘mA-mD might be 0’ and so forth. (13.12.1)
Obviously, such a procedure would not be taken seriously if it failed to provide numeri-
cal coherence, meaning that if the procedure produces for given numerical data con-
clusions such as, for instance, those at (13.12.1), that procedure must not for the same 
numerical data produce other conclusions in conflict with those at (13.12.1), such as:
‘mA-mB = 0’, ‘mA-mC < 0’, ‘mA-mD < 0’ and so forth. (13.12.2)
However, a data set in the scientific sense, cannot be merely numerical, and owing to that 
we have been able to develop proof that multiple-comparison procedures cannot provide 
scientific coherence, meaning that any conclusions that a given procedure might arrive at 
with respect to a given data set, do not contradict other conclusions that the procedure 
might imply in respect of the same data set. In Section 13.2 we saw that if a judgement 
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of ‘significance’ or ‘non-significance’ in respect of the difference between two treatment 
means is by a given procedure made to depend on whether or not the two means straddle 
other means, that procedure can very simply be shown to be scientifically incoherent. We 
also remarked that all multiple-range procedures are incoherent on that basis. In Section 
13.3 we saw more generally that inasmuch as all multiple-comparison procedures would 
have the significance of any observed difference between two means depend on the mere 
presence or absence of other means, the procedures are scientifically incoherent. It is sim-
ply nonsense to have an investigator reporting:
‘Because ten other peach cultivars were present, the yields of cultivars A and B 
did not differ significantly, but because only three of the ten are yellow cultivars, 
the yield of A and B, viewed as yellow cultivars, differed significantly.’
So it must be firmly grasped that numerical coherence does not ensure scientific coherence. 
The crux of the matter is simply an instance of the principle of paucity:
Never, ever draw conclusions involving a vacuous statistic.
Mead and Curnow (1983 p. 41) note a common violation of this rule in summaries such as: 
‘A was shown to be superior to B but not superior to C; there was no difference 
between B and C.’
In the matter of A being, or not being, superior to B, the performance of C is vacuous. 
There cannot be any objection to adding that the performance of C was intermediate be-
tween that of A and of B without its being ‘statistically separable’ from either of them.
13.13   Lindley’s ‘knowing subject’
The literature on simultaneous statistical inference is arguably the largest sub-literature 
of statistics. Certainly it is so extensive that it would be foolish here to try to describe all 
the numerous recipes proposed for such inferences. Our coverage so far is, however, suf-
ficient for the purpose of coming to grips with the general idea, which is simply this: an 
investigator conducts an experiment involving several treatments and proceeds to draw 
conclusions from this, that and the other comparison between treatment means. The 
idée fixe would then have it that for any one conclusion there is a probability of its be-
ing erroneous, and the more conclusions drawn, the larger the probability that an error 
is involved. So we are told to be concerned about the probability of one or more errors 
amongst several simultaneous conclusions. Here the first of a number of flaws in the 
reasoning surfaces because if, on the one hand, the conclusions are entirely unrelated, 
scientific simultaneity does no apply, and if on the other hand, the conclusions con-
tribute to a coherent scientific opinion, statistical calculations do not provide for such 
coherence, as they provide only for statistical simultaneity. In order to grasp this, we 
have but to ask: Do the procedures of Student, Scheffé, Dunnet, etc. ensure that simul-
taneous conclusions drawn by such procedures, make simultaneous scientific sense? 
We can be compelled to answer that they obviously do not, because if several tests are 
performed according to the statistical rules for tests performed separately, all multiple-
comparison procedures hold that the probability of one or more erroneous conclusions 
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increases with the number of tests performed. However, science holds that the more a 
coherent scientific view is tested, the more such a probability of error, if at all meaning-
ful, must decrease. The next obvious flaw in the procedures is that they would in effect 
have us replace any observed treatment difference by shrinking it to a smaller difference. 
(The term ‘shrinking’, in this sense, is actually used in present-day statistical literature.) 
With for instance Tukey’s procedure, an observed treatment difference, when expressed 
in its actual standard error units, must, for significance at the 1% level, exceed
2.58 if the number of means is m = 2,
2.91 if the number of means is m = 3,
3.11 if the number of means is m = 4,
3.25 if the number of means is m = 5, …
A way of implementing this would be to fix the required excess at 2.58 or more, and then 
to shrink the observed differences as follows for m > 2:
If m = 3, shrink each observed difference by expressing it in × (2.58÷2.91) code.
If m = 4, shrink each observed difference by expressing it in × (2.58÷3.11) code.
If m = 5, shrink each observed difference by expressing it in × (2.58÷3.25) code. 
…
This consequence of simultaneous statistical inference would surely strike visitors from 
another planet as extremely odd, as it results in the findings of substantive investigators 
being treated on a par with fishermen’s tales about the size of the one that got away. It 
would seem to such visitors that when a substantive investigator earnestly tries to assure 
a statistician about the integrity of a measurement of the difference between say re-
sponses A and B, the statistician’s stock reaction is: ‘Come come my dear fellow, it could 
not have been that much. We’ll just have to shrink it down to a believable size.’ Shrink-
ing is not limited to frequentists; there are Bayesian forms of shrinking as well. For such 
data as we have here envisaged, Lindley (1971) explains this as follows (the italics are 
Lindley’s, the notation is ours, and he simplifies the variance notation by considering 
samples of size n = 1, so that we must interpret his variance notation as ‘variance ÷ n’):
‘Let xI and mI be respectively the sample and population means for the I
th sample. 
Then … xI is not a sensible estimate of mI: technically, it is inadmissible. A more 
satisfactory estimate is of the form
[   xI + x• ] ÷ [ 1 + 1  ],     s2   t2          s2   t2 (13.13.1)
where t2 is a number that need not (here) concern us … , and x• is the overall 
mean. The form of this estimate is a weighted average of the sample mean and the 
overall mean, and the effect of this weighting is to pull all the “estimates” xI to-
ward the central value x•: in particular, the extreme values of xI get the most shift. 
So already we have a partial answer to the multiple comparison conundrum.
But we can go further. Suppose we are interested in estimating the difference 
mI - mJ (I ≠ J). It is reasonably estimated by the corresponding difference of the 
above estimates, i.e. by
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t2
 
(xI - xJ) [s2 + t2 ] , 
which, although it does not involve the overall mean, is less than the “natural” 
estimate (xI - xJ), so that the differences have been diminished in magnitude in 
accordance with common sense.’
He notes that the foregoing ‘only deals with point estimation’, then uses it as a platform 
to develop, as a pivot for Bayesian ‘interval estimation’, the quantity 
(xI - xJ) [    t
2    ]1/2, to be treated as if an N(0, 12) variable. (13.13.2) s√2       s2 + t2   
He points out the ‘shrinking’ when he points out that the quantity at (13.13.2) is
                                                                                                   (xI - xJ) 
‘… less than the value we are used to considering, namely   
 s√2  
  so that a
larger observed difference is needed to obtain a given “significance”.’ (13.13.3)
He concludes from the foregoing that:
‘It seems to me that this recognition that one cannot do the obvious in the estimation 
problem is of great help in considering the multiple comparison situation.’ (13.13.4)
Clearly, Lindley is using the expressions ‘not a sensible estimate’, ‘is inadmissible’, and 
‘in accordance with common sense’ with provocative intent. In fact, he tacitly admits to 
that when he subsequently uses the expressions ‘the value we are used to considering’ at 
(13.13.3) and ‘one cannot do the obvious’ at (13.13.4). The reader might well be mystified 
by these provocations. However, they are simply derived (which is not to say explained) 
as follows:
Let XI = mI + εI, where εI denotes an error random variable with E(εI) = 0, so mI represents 
the true potential of treatment I. The error variance is the variance of εI, and (true to 
Bayesian form) the parameter mI is treated, not as a fixed constant, but as a random vari-
able. So we have two random variables with
Variance(mI) = t
2, Variance(εI) = s
2, and Covariance(mI, εI) = 0.
Lindley then wants us to estimate mI by means of the linear regression formula:
m•+b(XI-m•), (13.13.5)
where m• is the population mean of the mI (I = 1, 2, 3, …) and b is the coefficient of the 
regression of the mI on the XI. Then, reasoning as if n = 1, as Lindley does,
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b = Covariance(mI, XI)÷Variance(XI)
   = Covariance(mI, mI + εI)÷Variance(mI+εI)
   = (t2+0)÷[t2+2(0)+s2]. (13.13.6)
We note further that
E(XI) = E(mI + εI), which equals E(mI)+0 = m•.
So the overall mean of the treatment means, X•, is an estimate of m•. Inserting this esti-
mate and the form at (13.13.6) into the form at (13.13.5), we obtain
X•+[t2÷(t2+s
2)](XI-X•) = (t
2XI+s
2X•)÷(t2+s2).
Multiplying both the numerator and the denominator of the expression on the right by 
1÷(t2s2), we obtain the form given at (13.13.1).
Now how to explain this?
Let us begin with something that clearly is ‘in accordance with common sense’. It can be 
shown that optimally an AI centre for dairy cattle should each year mate a certain pro-
portion of the pool of cows involved with a certain number new sires for progeny testing. 
For each sire one obtains a number of contemporary comparisons of the form
xI-xJ, where xI denotes the mean production of that sire’s daughters in a given herd, 
and xJ denotes the mean production of their contemporaries in the same herd.
The variances of such comparisons will differ, being proportional to
(nI+nJ)÷nInJ, where nI denotes the number of daughters in the given herd, and 
nJ denotes the number of contemporaries in that herd. (13.13.7)
Each year a new cohort of young bulls is tested, the contemporary comparisons are used to 
identify a given number of them as the superior members of that cohort, and seed from the 
superior members is harvested and frozen for use during the coming year. Any seed from pre-
vious cohorts is discarded, and the bulls, superior or otherwise, are slaughtered. This practice 
enables maximum selection pressure, without undue inbreeding, as the gene pool is a closed 
one. The point here is that there is no interest in any one particular bull as such. No particu-
lar one of them would be identified as ‘The Great iThemba Bulelani who has occupied the 
Number 1 Bull Pen for the past nine years’. On the contrary, each cohort is viewed as a random 
sample from the potential sons of the best cows. Thus, the breeding values of the various bulls 
can be represented as a random sample, just as Lindley would have us formally represent the 
m values in his scheme as a random sample. A weighted mean performance for each bull is 
obtained by combining his contemporary comparisons in accordance with weights based on 
the form at (13.13.7). Thus any bull’s performance can be represented as m+ε, where m denotes 
his breeding value, and ε denotes the statistical error of his weighted mean performance. As 
in Lindley’s scheme, m and ε are uncorrelated, and as in Lindley’s scheme, m is a random vari-
able with constant variance. In the case of ε, however, the weighted mean performances of 
the different bulls vary in precision, as the numbers of daughters and contemporaries vary 
from bull to bull. And precisely for that reason regression estimators of the type derived in our 
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explanation of Lindley’s reasoning are, in case of the AI problem ‘in accordance with common 
sense’. The crux of the matter is now simply this:
If we cannot represent the m values as a random sample, both of the foregoing two 
developments collapse.
In the case of the AI centre, both the genetics and the physical acts of the breeding 
procedure ensure that such a representation, as a physical model, is in accordance with 
common sense. In the case of Lindley’s reasoning, however, it is beyond any reasonable 
contest that, as a physical model, the m values cannot be represented otherwise than as a 
set of unknown constants. So Lindley has to resort to a metaphysical model in which the 
m values are constants, but ‘a knowing subject’s beliefs’ about them are to be modelled 
by treating them as a random sample of values. The resulting development inexorably 
ends up finding the perennial albatross of Bayesian inference hanging from its neck 
when it has to deal with the ultimate question: How are ‘the knowing subject’s beliefs’ 
to be mapped onto corresponding physical facts, that is to say, onto facts that can be 
forced upon the human body?
We can now usefully return to the remarks on Bayesian procedures made toward the end 
of Section 13.10. There we began to consider how such procedures might be scientifically 
evaluated. There are just three possibilities or approaches (see below), of which the first, 
though entirely justified, is currently rebuffed by Bayesians and the second and third are 
the moieties of a proof by dilemma that Bayesian inference can be sensibly viewed only as 
a technology. 
Approach 1: It is entirely justified, but currently quite futile, to point out to Bayesians 
that their system of verities is not compatible with the evidential rules for discourse of the 
physical sciences. As noted in Section 13.10, the concept of the ‘operating characteristics 
of a decision-making procedure’ and the concept of the ‘separating characteristics of a 
data-analytical procedure’, which are exemplified by the ‘error rates of an array of hypoth-
esis tests’ and ‘the sensitivities of a suite of co-ordination tests’, respectively, are physically 
meaningful concepts because their meanings can, by simulation, be forced upon the hu-
man body. However, current Bayesian reasoning brushes such notions aside by claiming 
that it is not the experiences of human body, but the probabilistic beliefs then developed 
in the human psyche that are the ultimate arbiters of scientific truth. Hence, for the pur-
poses of such arbitration, they hold that the statistician’s task is to develop the ‘psycho-
logical (that is to say, metaphysical) “probabilities of truth” of those beliefs’.
Approach 2: A second method for the evaluation of Bayesian reasoning arises because a 
Bayesian procedure necessarily proceeds from an array that constitutes the members of 
a class of models, as required for the introduction of Bayes’s formula. Thus, in the con-
text of any investigative procedure, we must call for explication of those commencement 
tests that necessarily had to justify the introduction of the class characteristic involved. 
And, as the only discernable methods for such testing rely on frequency physics, any at-
tempt at adjoining such an explication to Bayesian metaphysics generates incoherence.
Approach 3: A third method proceeds from the second method by noting that the inco-
herence of attempting to adjoin the frequency physics of commencement testing to the 
metaphysics of Bayesian inference can be avoided by, and only by, introducing the class 
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characteristic as an assumption, rather than an inference. However, that can be justified 
as, and only as, requisite for decision-making under risk, because the statistician must 
then be able to say ‘I have to decide on this; so I have to assume where necessary, and I 
have to do so as best I can. If you can convince me that other assumptions would be bet-
ter, I will adopt them.’ The point here is that reasonable assumptions, when necessary, are 
perfectly acceptable in the context of the use of knowledge, but we must never, ever in the 
context of the pursuit of knowledge pretend that ‘to assume’ is ‘to know’.
The reasoning in Approaches 2 and 3 provide the respective horns of proof by dilemma 
that Bayesian inference cannot coherently contribute to investigative discourse, that is 
to say, to the discourse of the pursuit of knowledge. So, such inference is compelled to 
try to justify itself in the context of, and only of, the discourse of the use of knowledge. 
After all, this should hardly come as a surprise, as the stock argument for introducing 
a Bayesian prior is to plead that such metaphysics ‘conveys “knowledge”, albeit “vague”, 
additional to the sample information, and we must try to use that additional knowl-
edge’. Thus, returning to Definitions 1.2.1 and 1.2.2, we see that Bayesian inference can-
not survive otherwise than in the discourse of the use of knowledge. (We note in passing 
that Definition 1.35.3 need not concern us here, as it can involve Bayes’s theorem only 
as a formula in frequency physics.) Hence, having confined Bayesian inference to the 
discourse of the use of knowledge, the term ‘Bayesian inference’ must be discarded in 
favour of the alternative designation ‘Bayesian decision-making under risk’, and conse-
quently we can now develop a greatly strengthened form of Approach 1. This is so be-
cause it compels Bayesians to recognise that the use of knowledge is directed at physical 
rewards. If for instance the required reward is ‘bigger and better potatoes’ we cannot 
possibly take that to mean that our customers will be happy to believe that they are busy 
eating ‘bigger and better potatoes’ when in fact those potatoes are the same old potatoes 
as before. The only discernable way in which a Bayesian posterior could have a physical 
meaning, is for the Bayesian prior to have a physical meaning, and the only discernable 
way for the prior to have such a physical meaning, is for it to be capable of defence as 
a frequency distribution – either theoretical, or estimated, or conjectured. Or does the 
reader know about any other appropriate physical meaning?
It is not the purpose of the foregoing argument to assert that the knowledge arrived at 
by statistical reasoning cannot fall short of other sources of information. Let us suppose 
for instance that a zoologist has discovered a new species of rodents and, closely exam-
ining just ten of the animals, finds two are female and eight are male. The (0.05, 0.95) 
and (0.95, 0.05) co-ordinate bounds for binomial sampling would then indicate a popula-
tion proportion of females somewhere between 0.04 and 0.69. However, the zoologist’s 
knowledge of rodent biology would indicate population proportions much closer to 0.50. 
Therefore, what our argument does assert is only that rodent biology is incapable of mak-
ing any acquaintance with the results of Bayesian attempts at combining the two sources 
of information.
It is also not the purpose of the foregoing argument to assert that all personal probabilities 
are incapable of providing useful information, either in the pursuit of knowledge or in the 
use of knowledge. What our argument does assert is that when Bayesian inference tries 
to persuade us that its metaphysical inferences represent scientific knowledge, it relies 
on the ill-defined notion of statistical inference to inadvertently reverse the roles of the 
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concomitant variable (personal probability) and the target variable (physical reality). This 
type of confusion is not all that unusual; there exists a statistical literature that obstinately 
persists with the claim that the linear calibration problem is best solved by using standard 
regression formulae so to speak ‘the wrong way round’ (Randall 1985). There also exists a hor-
ticultural literature that pursues the ‘ideal architecture’ for this, that or the other species 
of fruit tree, without any discernable objective other than that ‘ideal architecture’ itself.
We note that the argument here developed from Approaches 1, 2 and 3, is just a version 
of a basic argument developed in Section 4.8. In Chapter 14 we will meet another version 
of the same basic argument. In fact, with the possible exception of likelihood inference, 
all the various received theories of statistical inference fall victim to it. Likelihood infer-
ence escapes it only by reinterpretation as odds-ratio testing, whereby it relinquishes 
any claim to be a theory of inference, as any theory of inference must necessarily have a 
knowing subject; otherwise, who infers?
13.14   Cox’s ‘knowing subject’
D.R. Cox has addressed the notion of multiple comparisons (more correctly referred to 
as ‘simultaneous statistical inference’) on very general grounds by way of what he refers 
to as ‘making allowance for selection’ (e.g. Cox 1977, p. 51). He reasons in the context of 
significance tests rather than of hypothesis tests. However, his reasoning fails to prop-
erly separate two quite different possibilities, of which the first is explained as follows: an 
investigator of a solitary real-world data set wishes to test a hypothesised model against 
a particular alternative, and finds that different tests of significance might be used for 
that purpose. So, using various different tests in turn, he obtains the significance levels 
pobs(1), pobs(2), pobs(3) … . The investigator selects the smallest of those observed levels, 
and wrongly interprets that as the appropriate significance level, that is to say, as the pro-
bability of mistakenly concluding that the evidence thus obtained is just decisive against 
the hypothesised model. Cox proposes (correctly so) that allowance must be made for that 
level having been selected from several levels, which allowance is made by interpreting 
the selected level as the smallest order-statistical value in the set
{pobs(1), pobs(2), pobs(3), …}, (13.14.1)
and then taking the distribution of the corresponding order statistic as the test distribu-
tion. In order to see that this reasoning is correct, we could resort to simulation, where 
it will be found that the smallest significance level might be pobs(7) in a first repetition, 
pobs(2) in a second repetition, pobs(9) in a third repetition, …, thus showing that as far as 
the choice of test statistic goes, Cox’s reasoning is correct. We subsequently show that 
he employs the statistic wrongly, but for the moment that need not concern us. Let us 
consider a concrete example.
Example 13.14.1
In sheep one would expect body mass and number of crimps per centimetre of the wool 
to be uncorrelated. This was confirmed by within-flock correlation coefficients obtained 
from 39 different flocks of sheep. The 39 null-hypothetical right statistical co-ordinates 
were uniformly distributed over the unit interval, except for one co-ordinate that seemed 
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remarkably small. Taking the statistical rounding to be zero, the jth smallest co-ordinate, 
V
(j)
, is transformed as follows to Snedecor’s F (Wilkinson 1933; Ling 1992):
{[1-V
(j)
]÷V
(j)
}÷{2(39+1-j)÷2j} = F on 2(39+1) and 2j df. for j = 1, 2, 3 …, 39.
This is improved by employing mid-co-ordinates (Stone 1969); these may be taken to be
either of the form U
(j)
 + 0.5 ε, or of the form 0.5 ε+V(j).
In the present case the ε values were ≈ 0. So
V
(1) = 0.0001, V(2) =0.0758, V(3) =0.0994, V(4) = 0.1029, …
could be considered mid-co-ordinates and transformed to corresponding F values whose 
hypothesised right co-ordinates thus turned out to be
0.004, 0.806, 0.758, 0.580 …, respectively. (13.14.2)
The first of these co-ordinates points at a possible outlier. So, as a test for zero correla-
tion of body mass and crimps per centimetre of the wool, it seems appropriate to test 
the co-ordinates of the median V (of V
(20) = 0.5621), whose co-ordinates under the hy-
pothesised model, (0.63, ε, 0.37), are not indicative of non-zero correlation. Cox (1977, 
p. 51) views such problems from a significance tester’s point of view; so he would have us 
imagine the behaviour of a knowing subject who examines k significance levels, selects 
the smallest level and (ignoring the other k − 1 levels) regards the selected level as just 
decisive against the hypothesised model. In order to then make allowance for selection, 
Cox would have us calculate the significance level as the Type I error rate of such behav-
iour. He makes qobs denote the smallest original level, noting that in cases such as ours 
the required error rate is given by 
pobs = 1-(1-qobs)k, which in our case = 1-(1-0.0001)39 = 0.004. (13.14.3)
It would require immensely precise calculations to display the numerical distinction be-
tween the result at (13.14.3) and the initial term of the array at (13.14.2). But that is not 
the point of this example. The point is this: the reasoning that has lead us to the array 
at (13.14.2) did not involve a knowing subject; it simply established what test statistic 
was being used, as in fact we could have established by a simulation as described. So, 
contrary to Cox’s reasoning, the behavioural device invoking his knowing subject is not 
needed for problems of the present kind. In order to judge his device we must consider 
problems in which its results could not otherwise be obtained. That brings us to the 
second of the two possibilities covered by Cox’s reasoning.
The second possibility can be explained as follows: an investigator of a solitary real-world 
data set, wishing to test whether or not the value of a certain parameter might be zero, 
finds that a recommended test statistic tends to be positive when the parameter is posi-
tive, and tends to be negative when the parameter is negative. Thus, finding that the value 
observed is (say) negative, the investigator computes the significance level as the prob-
ability under the hypothesised parameter value zero, that the test statistic would take a 
value as small, or smaller, than observed, and then interprets this level as one of which a 
small value points at a negative parameter value. Denote this significance level as pobs(-). 
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Cox argues that, had the observed value been a positive one, the investigator would then 
have computed the significance level as the probability under the hypothesised parameter 
value zero, that the value of the test statistic would be as large, or larger, than observed, 
and would have interpreted that level as one in which a small value points at a positive 
parameter value. Denote this significance level as pobs(+). Cox argues that in either case the 
investigator would in effect be performing two different tests corresponding to pobs(-) and 
pobs(+), respectively, and would be selecting the smaller of the two levels as the appropriate 
significance level. So he argues that allowance for that selection be made by interpreting 
the test statistic actually used as the smallest order-statistical value in the set
{pobs(-), pobs(+)}, (13.14.2)
and then taking the distribution of the corresponding order statistic as the test distribu-
tion. In order to show that ‘allowance for section’ from the set at (13.14.1) and ‘allowance 
for selection’ from the set at (13.14.2) are two very different kettles of fish, we might again 
resort to simulation, in which case a glaringly obvious distinction will appear, as follows: 
for the simulation previously required, repetitive drawing from a hypothesised model and 
from just one alternative will suffice. But for the simulation presently required, the hy-
pothesised model and more than just one alternative must be considered, because the 
hypothesised parameter value cannot, for just one solitary real-world data set, at one and 
the same time be both too large and too small. The next example shows how that leads to 
a fundamental disagreement between a co-ordination test and a significance test.
Example 13.14.2
Let the mean difference in observed yields of two bean cultivars be +19, whose estimated 
standard error is 8.6 on 10 degrees of freedom, and let Student’s t be appropriate as a test 
statistic for judging the quality of fit of the population model whose mean is zero. A co-
ordination test places the mental correlate of the observed value of t at (0.948, ε, 0.052) in 
Student’s test distribution. A reasonable person would surely find this a rather awkward 
fit, pointing instead at certain models where the population mean deviates from zero in 
favour of the cultivar with the higher observed yield. Opposed to that, Cox would have us 
imagine how his knowing subject might have observed a difference of -19, and thus have 
concluded in favour of the other cultivar. So we must calculate that such behaviour would 
lead to wrong conclusions in as much as 10.4% of cases, and we must use that to argue 
that the co-ordination test has misled us in this particular case. Moreover, we must argue 
that a co-ordination test in the imaginary case would have been equally misleading. A co-
ordination tester will reject this argument, arguing instead as follows:
The observed co-ordination (0.948, ε, 0.052) favours the first of the two cultivars. The 
possibility of another case with observed co-ordination (0.052, ε, 0.948), is utterly ir-
relevant, as that is not the data in hand, and the imaginary behaviour of a knowing 
subject is not part and parcel of how the data in hand came about. So, any valid ex-
planatory model for the data in hand, cannot partake of that imaginary behaviour.
Cox’s knowing subject reflects a failure to distinguish between Definitions 1.2.1 and 1.2.2, 
owing to which, as the foregoing example demonstrates, Cox confounds indicative data 
patterns with contrary data patterns, and this then leads him to further confounding with 
vacuous data patterns, as was demonstrated in Example 1.31.1.
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It might well be thought that there is no difference between Cox’s knowing subject and 
Fisher’s knowing subject, and that might well be so. However, in Chapter 6 we noted that 
Fisher introduces two-tailed tests without explanation. Moreover, Fisher wears different 
hats in different writings. In his book on inference he even alternates between different 
hats in the same book. That makes it difficult for us to know whether or not we interpret 
him correctly. So it seems appropriate to deal with Cox’s epistemology in its own right.
Note in conclusion that Examples 13.14.1 and 13.14.2 have once again underscored that 
a co-ordination test is not ‘a significance test with frills’.
13.15   A stupid question
It is demonstrable that the literature on multiple-comparison procedures perceives the 
prime question motivating those procedures as:
‘How does one compare means arising from a set of unstructured treatments fol-
lowing analysis of variance?’
The question is incredibly stupid. There is no point in mincing words; the stupidity is 
manifested by failure to understand that such comparison must follow on the question:
‘What was the motivation for choosing those particular treatments? What question(s) 
did the substantive investigator wish to address?’
When for instance Nelder (1971) says of multiple-comparison procedures that ‘their 
principle use appears to be to lend an air of respectability to otherwise uninteresting sets 
of data’, we must respond by asking: ‘How can a data set be “uninteresting”, otherwise 
than not being linked to any specific question that it was intended to address, or that it 
might subsequently have been perceived to bear upon?’ Possibly Nelder means just that 
when he explains: ‘By uninteresting I mean data to which no prior structure attaches 
and which do not themselves clearly show posterior structure.’ We note, however, that a 
data set does not ask questions; it is we who must ask questions. And, in cases where a 
data set has ‘prior structure’, as in the case of a factorial structure, it is we who prepared 
the way for certain questions to follow. And, when a data set shows ‘posterior structure’ 
it is we who perceive that structure and it is we who then ask: ‘Does it reflect such-and-
such?’ So, it would be counterproductive not to observe that the multiple comparison 
muddle has originated in failure to grasp that most of its various procedures begin with 
vague ideas of the kind expressed at (13.11.1) – ideas that have not been motivated by the 
purposes of the substantive investigator. Shulkeum’s data of Example 13.11.1 is a case in 
point. More than half a century has elapsed since Duncan (1955) placed Shulkeum’s nu-
merical data in the literature on multiple-comparison procedures, and since then those 
numerical data have been used in enumerable papers to exemplify numerical recipes for 
the implementation of this, that and the other such procedure, without asking why in 
the first place Shulkeum might have produced those data.
In the case of a multiple-range procedure: What substantive questions by Shulkeum 
would make it significant for a pair of means to straddle or not to straddle another 
mean?
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In the case of a simultaneous-confidence-interval procedure: What substantive 
questions by Shulkeum would make it necessary to consider comparisons jointly?
In the case of a cluster analysis: Could Shulkeum have thought the number of true 
means would be less than the number of observed means? If so, what could have 
prompted such an idea?
And in each of the foregoing: What question could Shulkeum conceivably have 
asked about a subset of the seven barley varieties, such that the answer to the ques-
tion would depend on the mere existence of recorded mean yields from the rest of 
those varieties?
With due respect to Nelder we must nevertheless point out that it is not the data sets 
that are ‘uninteresting’; it is the results of silly procedures that are uninteresting. It is 
impossible for a substantively sensible question and appropriate data to be found unin-
teresting by our profession.
13.16   The multiple-comparison ‘lore’ on factorials
The ill-defined purposes of simultaneous statistical inferences have resulted in pro-
found confusion about when, how and why such inferences are called for. An example of 
that confusion is an almost universally accepted ‘lore’ (there is no other way to describe 
it) according to which such inferences are not applicable to factorial experiments, de-
spite the analysis of such experiments being clearly directed at drawing related conclu-
sions. A typical 2 × 2 factorial experiment, for instance, usually results in a conclusion 
conveyed by just three related contrasts in one of two possible ways, as follows: 
Possibility 1: The interaction is significant, so the simple effects of one of the fac-
tors at the two different levels of the other factor are examined.
Possibility 2: The interaction is not significant, so the main effects of the two dif-
ferent factors are examined.
In both cases the results of the analysis are conveyed by exactly three different contrasts 
jointly. So it would seem obvious that simultaneous statistical inference would specify 
an overall error rate, α, and apply a subsidiary error rate, γ, to each of the three contrasts 
separately, where γ is the solution of
1-(1-γ)3 = α.
However, the literature on simultaneous statistical inference overwhelmingly holds that 
that is not appropriate, positing, as the arcane reason for that, that ‘the three contrasts 
are orthogonal’, thus generating a meme nested within the wider meme named ‘simul-
taneous statistical inference’, which in turn is a meme nested within the yet wider meme 
named ‘statistical inference’, which in turn is a meme nested within the yet wider meme 
named ‘probability inference’.
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13.17   ‘More conservative’ procedures and ‘less conservative’ 
    procedures
Facts such as those listed at (13.7.5) and (13.8.4) are referred to in multiple-comparison 
jargon, not by saying that the former procedure is ‘the more destructive’ of the two, and 
that the latter procedure is ‘the less destructive’ of the two, but by using ‘conservative’ as 
a euphemism for destructive. Nevertheless there has been a demand for less conserva-
tive procedures. The demand has resulted in a stream of increasingly obscure proce-
dures, so much so that Monte Carlo studies have been conducted to try to fathom what 
the methods actually do. Chew (1976) for instance describes four Monte Carlo studies 
(by Boardman and Moffit, 1971; Carmer and Swanson, 1973; Thomas, 1974; and Einot 
and Gabriel, 1975), but he seems to have been unable to make much use of them. It can-
not but be considered very odd that a community of mathematically talent individuals 
have devised many procedures, persuaded thousands of investigators in substantive sci-
ence to use those procedures and, having done that, have then resorted to simulation 
studies in the hope of finding out what they have wrought by way of the procedures.
13.18   A fundamental error
Let us return to a point made in Section 13.13, namely that if several tests are performed 
according to the statistical rules for tests performed separately, all multiple-comparison 
procedures hold that the probability of erroneous conclusion increases with the number 
of tests performed. But science holds that the more a coherent scientific view is tested, 
the more such probability of error, if at all meaningful, will decrease. For a simple exam-
ple, consider Theodosius Dobzhansky’s book, Genetics and the origin of species (1951). 
He tests his thesis on literally hundreds of independent empirical data sets, many of 
which are of a statistical nature. So, simultaneous statistical inference must hold that if 
α1, α2, α3, … denote the probabilities of error for those of his tests that are of a statistical 
nature, the probability that his book contains an error is given by
1-[(1-α1)(1-α2)(1-α3) … ], which must be very large, owing to the many tests.
And it is believed that his book does contain an error in that he cites Ford (1937, 1945) on 
the latter’s evidence for evolution of industrial melanism as protective colouring in moths, 
evidence which has subsequently been questioned (Hooper, 2002). Yet that has virtually no 
impact on whether or not we are prepared to accept Dobzhansky’s thesis. The lack of impact 
arises because of the overall coherence of Dobzhansky’s reasoning. Such reasoning is capable 
of surviving this, that or the other factual error not of crucial importance. The reader should 
note that one can find hundreds of such books. A remarkable example of such a book, and 
one dealing with the findings of many wide-ranging scientific investigations, but requiring no 
specialised knowledge for its understanding, is Randy Shilts’ book And the band played on.
The point here is this: simultaneous statistical inference rests on the fundamental error of 
thinking that the scientific investigator is completely dependent on the numerical data un-
der consideration, that is to say, is otherwise utterly ignorant, and so can be persuaded to 
adopt the findings of a set of numerical rules, without having the ability to judge the scien-
tific sense of those findings when viewed in the wider perspective of substantive science.
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13.19   A profession in denial
The introduction of multiple-comparison procedures has thrown – and continues to 
throw – the statistical profession into profound disarray. Different schools of thought are 
deeply divided as to what the methods are supposed to achieve, and even as to what, if 
anything, they do achieve. A review by O’Neill and Whetherill (1971) has a bibliography of 
254 references; yet, despite such a wealth of information, they declare that ‘in spite of the 
importance of the subject, and the amount written on it … there is still much confusion 
as to what the basic problems are, what the various procedures achieve, and what criteria 
and properties should be studied.’
Bryan-Jones and Finney (1983) commend the use of ‘Duncan’s new test’ for pair-wise 
comparisons ‘if an experiment concerns a totally unstructured set of treatments’. But 
they furiously attack the use of such methods if treatments have a ‘logical structure’. 
They evidently subscribe to the widely maintained lore that simultaneous statistical 
inference does not apply in cases where treatments are structured, as for instance in the 
case of a factorial treatment array. However, Hartley (1955) would evidently recognise 
(quite correctly) that the lore in question is without reasoned defence, as he demon-
strates very simply how simultaneous statistical inference can be applied in a factorial 
case. We can easily supply forceful examples of our own, as indicated in Section 13.16.
Steel and Torrie (1980) devote an entire chapter to a variety of the procedures and then 
systematically apply them in the rest of their book. The same is true of Ott (1992). In 
both books various procedures are presented as part and parcel of correct statistical 
practice. However, both books lack clarity of explanation as to how, in any given case, 
one chooses amongst the various procedures. Ott, for instance, tries to explain as fol-
lows, referring to the procedure we described in Section 13.2 as the SNK procedure (i.e. 
the Student-Newman-Keuls procedure):
‘Which procedure should you use? We generally prefer the SNK procedure for 
efficacy (effectiveness) comparisons. But our reasons for this choice have a great 
deal to do with our work setting and the regulations surrounding our decision.’
However, any of the procedures described by Ott can be used for efficacy comparisons. 
So all we learn from this ‘explanation’ is that a regulatory authority has prescribed the 
SNK procedure. The reader may well surmise that the prescription did not spring from 
any proper understanding. More likely than not, it reflects the more persuasive contri-
butions to a learned confusion by certain members of a committee. Ott tries to explain 
further, as follows:
‘ … the decision regarding which procedure to use, and when to use it, is up to 
the individual. For a given problem, determine whether your decisions regard-
ing differences should, in general, be more (or less) conservative. Then choose a 
procedure that exhibits the desired characteristic.’ (13.19.1)
But how ‘conservative’ ought we to be? All that we learn from this further ‘explanation’ 
is that it is ‘up to the individual’. In other words, we are dealing with a question to which 
there is no correct answer. A similar ‘explication’ is found in Miller (1981) in a book wide-
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ly considered the definitive account on simultaneous statistical inference. He opens the 
concluding section of his introductory chapter by stating with disarming frankness:
‘Time has now run out. There is nowhere left for the author to go but to discuss 
what constitutes a family.’ [He means ‘family of simultaneous tests’.] 
‘This is the hardest part of the entire book because it is where statistics takes 
leave of mathematics and must be guided by subjective judgement.’
This is followed by three to four pages of attempted explications that are as clear as mud, 
and then, finally abandoning the attempt, he concludes that (his italics):
‘There are no hard-and-fast rules for where the family lines should be drawn, and the 
statistician must rely on his own judgement for the problem at hand.’ (13.19.2)
What kind of ‘science’ is that, where for a given question, Tom has this answer, Dick has 
that answer, and Harry has another answer? The ‘recommendations’ at (13.19.1) and 
(13.19.2) are a cop-out; they ask us to answer the question they are supposed to answer.
Snedecor (1956) devotes a section of his book to the procedures, and then ignores them 
in the rest of the book. His message to substantive investigators is clearly: ‘You will come 
across the use of these recipes in the literature of your subject. Therefore you should 
know about them. We do not use them.’ This stance is maintained in subsequent edi-
tions of Snedecor’s famous book.
Mead (1990) points out that: ‘For many experimenters, and even for editors of journals, 
[multiple comparison procedures] have become automatic in the less desirable sense of 
being used as a substitute for thought’. He strongly advises against the use of any of the 
procedures, ‘unless, … you decide that the method is exactly appropriate’. He gives sev-
eral examples where such a method is not at all appropriate, but does not give as much 
as a single example for which they would be exactly appropriate, and concludes that 
‘multiple comparison methods be avoided’. His message to substantive investigators is 
clearly: ‘I am entirely unable to think of any example for which such a procedure could 
be commended. In fact I strongly suspect there aren’t any such examples. But to be on 
the safe side, I won’t go so far as to declare the procedures utterly useless.’
Nelder (1971) states: ‘In my view, multiple comparison methods have no place at all in 
the interpretation of data.’
How can a profession of highly intelligent individuals continually be so divided on a ques-
tion that arises in their subject, and that has been widely debated for the better part of a 
century? There can be only one answer: they share and they cling to a deeply entrenched 
source of confusion. We have clearly seen, by way of reasoning whose import can be forced 
upon the human body, the introduction of that source at (6.4.1) and (6.4.2). There we saw 
how R.A. Fisher, in developing his theory of significance tests, violated a fundamental 
principle of science:
Never, ever introduce a constituent that is not needed.
The knowing subject of statistical inference, who must infer the inferences, and therefore 
might, with probability such-and-such, ‘infer mistakenly’, is not needed. By introducing 
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that subject Fisher fell into the profoundly confusing notion that statistics requires its very 
own form of inference; that notion kept confusing him for ever after, and the rest of us, 
like so many lemmings, followed him into that confusion. In order to abolish the dreadful 
notion of simultaneous statistical inference, indeed, in order to abolish all the other silly 
theories of statistical inference, we must learn not to confound significant data patterns 
with contrary data patterns, and we must learn not to confound informative data patterns 
with vacuous data patterns. So, as a first step in that direction, we must learn to just say no 
to Student’s two-tailed t-test.
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Chapter 14
FIDUCIAL INFERENCE
MetaPhysical Probabilities sans MetaPhysical Priors
14.1 Introduction
R.A. Fisher held that ‘Bayesian inference’, in the sense we considered in Chapter 12, inval-
idly addresses a valid problem in statistical inference and therefore proposed to develop, 
under the name ‘fiducial inference’, the valid solution to that problem. His development is 
unclear to such an extent that many, even most, statisticians dismiss it as beyond compre-
hension. However, Fisher is arguably the giant among the founders of mathematical sta-
tistics. So we must try to come to grips with the idea of fiducial inference, and as scientists 
rather than gullible disciples, we must critically judge that idea as best we can.
14.2 The basic idea
Fisher (1973; first published in 1956) quotes Keynes (1921) with evident approval:
‘If logic investigates the general principles of valid thought, the study of arguments, 
to which it is rational to attach some weight, is as much part of it as the study of 
those which are demonstrative.’ (original italics) (14.3.1)
The italicised word points at probability inference, likelihood inference, or some such 
notion. That would no longer be the case should we replace the phrases ‘to which it is 
rational to attach some weight’ and ‘are demonstrative’, with the phrases ‘to which it is 
possible to attach relevant physical evidence’ and ‘are logically demonstrative’, respec-
tively. However, Fisher throughout his long career was clearly convinced that the valid 
form of probability inference somehow existed to be discovered; and he was convinced 
that he was on the brink of that discovery. He took every attempt at such inference seri-
ously, but favoured the idea that his ‘fiducial’ method would, in some or other clarified 
form, supply the breakthrough.
He explains (1973, p. 54) that ‘fiducial probability’, like ‘Bayesian probability’ in the sense 
of our Chapter 12, is intended to express a justifiable degree of metaphysical ‘belief ’ 
about the unknown value of a parametric constant of interest, the difference between 
the two kinds of probability being, he explains, that whereas
‘… the argument of Bayes requires a distribution a priori involving probability state-
ments of the same logical form as those finally obtained a posteriori, the applica-
tion of the fiducial argument can only be made in the absence of such information 
a priori.’
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Let a datum, x, be modelled as a realisation of an N(μ, 1²) random variable, X, where 
-∞ < μ < +∞. The fiducial argument would somehow have our ‘beliefs’ about the possible 
values of μ take the form of an N(x, 1²) distribution of those values. Thus, for instance, a 
0.95 fiducial interval for μ is somehow (by fiducial argument) obtained as follows, where 
Pr f (•) denotes fiducial probability:
Pr (X-μ≥ 1.96) = 0.05. So, by the fiducial argument,
Pr f (μ-x≥ 1.96) = 0.05, i.e. Pr f (x-1.96 < μ < x+1.96) = 1-0.05.
In this case, the fiducial interval, x-1.96 < μ < x+1.96, is indistinguishable from the corre-
sponding 0.95 confidence interval. Since this is often – though not invariably –the case, 
it is important to note from the outset that Fisher emphatically denies that a fiducial 
probability requires, for its justification, to be capable of any frequency interpretation. 
This fact comes to the fore for instance in the fiducial treatment of the Behrens-Fisher 
problem, where it then turns out that a 1-α fiducial interval for the difference in the 
means of two normal populations with unknown and possibly different variances, does 
not cover the true difference with frequency 1-α in repetitive sampling of those two pop-
ulations (Neyman, 1941). Unfortunately, the examples of such disagreement between 
frequency physics and fiducial metaphysics tend to be so involved that it will be best for 
us to avoid them. But that need not concern us, as long as we firmly grasp that fiducial 
probabilities, as such, are not interpretable as frequencies; they are to be interpreted 
as degrees of belief only. Any fiducial inference is directed at elimination testing, and 
Fisher requires us to proceed from a minimally sufficient statistic for the parameter of 
interest. Furthermore, in the event of an ancillary partitioning we are required to condi-
tion on the ancillary. This of course requires clarification, and will strengthen, rather 
than weaken, Fisher’s position if we agree to the clarification developed in Chapter 9.
14.3 A concrete example
Fisher (1973, pp. 54-63) proposes to exemplify the fiducial mode of reasoning by ap-
plying it to a random sample of exponential waiting times. So, in order to provide a 
concrete example, let us apply his reasoning to the waiting times for the first n = 20 
eruptions of Vesuvius after that of ad 1631, given in years and in order of occurrence in 
Table 1.15.3. Denoting the expected waiting time as θ-1 (0 < θ < ∞), the maximum likeli-
hood estimator of θ is given by Fisher as
T = n , where X is the sum of the waiting times. 
      X
Fisher notes that T is minimally sufficient for θ, no ancillary statistics are involved, and 
X is ‘continuous over all positive values, uniformly for all values of θ’ – these being re-
quirements (so he asserts) for the fiducial argument to be applicable. Since 2θX is a χ² 
variable on 2n degrees of freedom, it follows that
if P is the frequency with which χ2on 2n degrees of freedom exceeds χ2 (P), 
                                                                                                                
2n
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then the statement
q >  T    χ
2
(P)         2n    2n 
‘is verified with the frequency P, for all values of P chosen’ (to quote Fisher). (14.3.1)
He points out: ‘The reasoning developed so far has been entirely deductive.’ He then 
proposes to develop ‘the fiducial argument’ whereby (so he claims) the status of q in the 
form at (14.3.1) is altered from that of a constant to that of a random variable. Hence, 
for T = t he obtains
Pr f [q >   T  χ2  (P)] = P  (14.3.2) 
                2n 
   2n
 
For instance, as the sum of the waiting times for the first n = 20 eruptions of Vesuvius 
after that of ad 1631, is 313 years, and as χ2 on 40 degrees of freedom exceeds 55.76 with 
frequency P = 0.05, a 0.95 fiducial interval for q is given by
0 < q <      1     (55.76). 
             2(313)
Thus a 0.95 fiducial interval for the expected waiting time is given by 
∞ > θ-1 > 2(313), i.e. by 
               55.76
11.2 years < θ-1 < ∞. (14.3.3)
But look at what this leads to! The 20 individual waiting times given in Table 1.15.3 enabled 
us in Example 1.15.2 to perform a commencement test of the quality of fit of the exponen-
tial class characteristic. Using the Cramer-Von Mises test, we found that the test datum is 
CvM = 0.150 whose mental correlate co-ordinates at (0.87, 0.13*) in the test distribution. 
Now suppose, for argument’s sake, that despite knowing that the 1st eruption preceded 
the 20th eruption by 313 years, for some reason or another only every second one of the 20 
individual waiting times are available for the Cramer-Von Mises test. Then the test datum 
turns out to be CvM = 0.055 whose mental correlate co-ordinates at (0.77, 0.23*) in the 
test distribution. In both cases, however, we know that there were n = 20 waiting times 
totalling to 313 years. So in both cases we arrive at precisely the same fiducial intervals as 
exemplified at (14.3.3). Thus the fiducial argument is not coherently adjoined to its com-
mencement. This is obviously so for any fiducial argument. This must be firmly grasped: 
it is surely the intention that fiducial probabilities such as 0.99, 0.95 and 0.90 must in some 
or other sense express different levels of ‘absolute credibility’, but they cannot possibly be 
doing so inasmuch as they simply do not in any reasonable sense depend on the credibility 
of the commencement tests that lead to them. It is futile to try to wriggle out of this dif-
ficulty by pleading that all the other theories of statistical inference suffer from the same 
defect. We reply: Indeed they do! So what does that tell us about them?
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14.4 The shortcomings of fiducial inference
The shortcomings that have so far been noted, and some further shortcomings, may be 
summarised as follows:
(1) According to Fisher himself, and as made explicit by the Behrens-Fisher test, fiducial 
reasoning is metaphysical. That is to say, it cannot coherently be adjoined to the reason-
ing of the physical sciences.
(2) Fiducial reasoning is not only metaphysical, but is peculiarly so. For instance, Lindley 
(1958) has shown that it cannot in general be coherently adjoined to Bayesian metaphysics.
(3) Apart from the foregoing two kinds of exogenous incoherence, we have seen above 
that fiducial reasoning also precipitates endogenous incoherence, because the reason-
ing it would have us use for elimination tests cannot coherently be adjoined to the rea-
soning required for the corresponding commencement tests.
(4) Another source of endogenous incoherence is that fiducial reasoning (and this is ac-
cording to Fisher himself) is applicable to a continuous test statistic only. Thus a discourse 
that must also rely on inferences involving a discrete test statistic, cannot be coherent.
(5) The fiducial rules for discourse are unclear. Buehler and Feddersen (1963) for in-
stance, show that Fisher’s favourite example of a fiducial interval (i.e. one based on 
Student’s t for the population mean with normal sampling, as in Fisher 1973, p. 193) fails 
to satisfy a requirement that Fisher himself laid down as necessary.
(6) Another obscurity in the fiducial rules for discourse is noted by Kendall and Stuart 
(1961, p. 136) when they point out: ‘As to what should be done to construct an interval 
for a single parameter θ where a single sufficient statistic does not exist, writers on fi-
ducial theory are for the most part silent.’ By ‘a single’ they mean ‘a scalar’; consider, for 
instance, the continuous form of the example at (1.12.1).
(7) As will be found, the rules for calculating fiducial probabilities are, by Fisher’s own 
account, inexorably subject to the notion of simultaneous statistical inference.
All this is bad enough. Yet there is worse to come.
(8) Fisher (1951, p. 60), referring to the example of exponential waiting times, states
‘if … there had been 500 accurately measured time intervals, calculations based on 
the distribution of χ2 for 1 000 degrees of freedom would show that the probabil-
ity was 25% of the true value lying below .96957 of the estimate, and 25% of lying 
above 1.02988, times the same quantity. These values then bracket a central region 
… within which the true value will lie with a probability of just one half.’ (14.4.1)
Still referring to the example of 1 000 exponential waiting times, he states (on p. 61) that:
‘When, as in the example chosen, the data are simple and the meaning of the calcu-
lations completely clear, other relevant probability statements may be made with 
equal confidence and exactitude. For example, the probability is 5% each way of 
the true value lying outside the limiting ratios .92732 and 1.07439, and it is only 1% 
Fiducial inference
435
of it lying below .89819 and another 1% of lying above 1.10622, so that the odds are 
49 to 1 that it should lie within these last limits. The fiducial distribution in this way 
comprises a complete set of probability statements appropriate to any chosen level 
of probability, or to any chosen limits. In such cases the precision of the estimate 
has been completely specified.’ (14.4.2)
This is circular reasoning: consider Investigators 1 and 2, having the same grounds to ex-
pect, but not to know for sure, that the waiting times for the first 20 eruptions of Vesuvius 
after that of ad 1631, might satisfactorily be modelled as a random sample of exponen-
tial waiting times indexed by θ for some θ in 0 < θ < ∞, where Investigator 1 is given all 
20 waiting times, and Investigator 2 is given only that the 20th eruption after that of ad 
1631 took place 313 years later. Then a commencement test using the Cramer-Von Mises 
test tells Investigator 1 that the exponential class characteristic, as thus tested, fits the 
data satisfactorily, whereas Investigator 2 cannot perform any such commencement test. 
However, following Fisher, each investigator can calculate that the maximum likelihood 
estimate is 15.65 years, and each investigator would very much like to have the precision 
of the estimate ‘completely specified’ as Fisher promises at (14.4.2). So, consider how each 
investigator might follow his instructions for obtaining limits for θ-1 such that the odds are 
19 to 1 that it should lie within those limits. The recipe previously given at (14.3.2) is then 
more conveniently expressed as 
Pr f   θ-1 <     2n      , 
                  χ2   (P) 
                      
2n
where χ2 (P) for 2n = 2(20), equals 59.34 when P equals 0.025, and 24.43 when
              
2n
P equals 0.925.
So the requisite 0.95 fiducial interval is by each one of the two investigators found to be
10.55 years < θ-1 < 25.62 years.
This clearly implies that in respect of a fiducial argument, any commencement test is 
completely irrelevant, and the reader should carefully note why this is so: for a Cramer-
Von Mises test on the 20 waiting times CvM = 0.150 whose mental correlate co-ordinates 
at (0.87, 0.13*) in the test distribution, from which we are surely justified to conclude:
The class characteristic, as tested by the Cramer-Von Mises test, fits the given data well.
Here, the phrases, ‘as tested’ and (more importantly) ‘fits the given data’, are warning us 
that we have not obtained proof that the class characteristic is that of exponential sam-
pling. Moreover, this applies not only to the Cramer-Von Mises test; it would also apply 
to any commencement test.
So the fiducial argument must assume that the class characteristic is exponential,
so that the probability statement at (14.3.1) can be made,
so that the fiducial argument will produce the probability statement at (14.3.2),
so that probability statements such as the one at (14.3.3) can be made, and
that is circular reasoning.
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It might be thought that we can escape this circularity by interpreting fiducial tests as 
tests of fit. However, that is precluded by the explanation at (14.4.2). It is not possible to 
justify the pooling of tail areas when testing fit. In any case, it also is not possible to justify 
a metaphysical number as a measure of physical fit.
14.5 Probability inference
Definition 4.20.1 attracted our attention to a general notion of probability inference, 
which transcends that of statistical inference. We remarked on it that if the idea of such 
inference cannot be viable in the latter case, it cannot be viable in the more general 
case. So, inasmuch as the vicious circle uncovered in Sections 4.8, 12.7, 13.12 and 14.4 
obviously extends to any form of statistical inference, for the simple reason that statisti-
cal inference cannot apply to the outcome of any commencement test, and inasmuch 
as such tests are inescapably needed to provide the platform from which any form of 
statistical inference must try to proceed, we have provided proof beyond any reasonable 
contest that the notion of statistical inference is not viable – it is a mere will-o’-the-wisp. 
It follows that the more general notion of probability inference is not viable. As a matter 
of fact, the wider literature on probability inference indicates that it is indeed a will-o’-
the-wisp. Thus for instance, two attempts at a general theory of probability inference by 
intellectual giants such as John Maynard Keynes and Rudolf Carnap, respectively, evi-
dently turned out to be fruitless (Keynes 1921; Carnap 1950). Nowhere in the vast body 
of present-day scientific knowledge do we find that their theories made any contribu-
tion whatsoever to that knowledge.
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Chapter 15
EPILOGUE
challenging the statistical Profession
This book originated in an attempt to resolve the dreadful confusion surrounding simul-
taneous statistical inference. The reader might, or might not, agree with the outcome. 
Either way, however, one cannot simply laugh the matter off. Our obligation to our cus-
tomers in the substantive sciences, and to consulting statisticians at the interface, disal-
lows that. All of us, as professionals, are responsible for it. If the manner of the present de-
velopment seems overly aggressive, even arrogant, I would plead for some understanding, 
on three grounds. Firstly, after a long time of trying to engage fellow statisticians on this 
matter, it became clear that an immense prejudice would have to be overcome. Notions 
about probabilities of drawing this, that, or the other wrong conclusion, have become so 
deeply entrenched that asking present-day statisticians to dispense with these ideas is 
akin to trying to row a boat up the Victoria falls. Secondly, whilst it is true that science 
cannot advance by way of the method of authority, it is a fact of life that much of what 
passes for ‘science’, is simply inspired by the views of this, that, or another authoritative 
person, and so the need to attack such authority seemed unavoidable. Thirdly, and most 
importantly, it is demonstrable that our notions on statistical inference and the inevitable 
correlative notions on simultaneous statistical inference do dreadful damage to substan-
tive science; for proof, one need only to scan the journals of such science, where one finds 
that substantive investigators have been persuaded to consider various probabilities of 
dubious relevance, instead of considering what appropriate analyses of their data would 
show. So clearly, for all three reasons, an attempt at subtlety would have courted failure to 
communicate. In order to compel the whole of the statistical community to deal with this 
problem, it needs to be attacked with a broad sword. And we must draw in the rank and 
file, because debates on the ideas of statistical inference have for too long been a province 
of the ivory tower. It is time to drag these nonsensical ideas into the market place, that is 
to say, into where they can be tested at the interface between statistics and the substantive 
sciences. For that, a suitable point of departure would for instance be the problem for-
mulated at (4.20.4) in Example 4.20.1, in respect of which we can test each of the various 
received theories of statistical inference in turn, as to how that problem is to be solved, 
such that we can claim to have done so:
without answers that mistake the pursuit of knowledge for the use of knowledge,
without answers that confound data patterns with contrary data patterns,
without answers that confound relevant data patterns with irrelevant data patterns,
without answers that confound physics with metaphysics,
without answers that rely on circular reasoning,
without answers that partake of a retrospectively invented knowing subject.
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In this book four different schools of inference, namely, frequentist, Bayesian, 
likelihood and fiducial are introduced and then with appropriate examples 
and discussions, the gaps and holes in the traditional sense of inferences are 
exposed. The author goes back deep into the literature, exploring views and 
fallacies introduced by outstanding scientists and statisticians. The author 
proposes a coordination test of any model posted for a given (observed) data 
set. A coordination test is a calculable ordered number triplet, whose three 
members are statistical coordinates. Various appropriate examples are given in 
each chapter where the traditional analysis and inference are applied, and then 
the statistical coordinates are calculated for each example. After each example 
the shortfalls, gaps and holes in the traditional methods are discussed.
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This is a bold book. It asks statisticians to revise deeply entrenched ways 
of thinking about not only the practice of their craft, but also about the 
philosophical basis of their subject. It does so by an exhaustive analysis, using 
a host of examples to demonstrate specific points.
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